Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 24 (2018) by unknown

Asian Yearbook of International Law






 This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license,  
which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,  
provided no alterations are made and the original author(s) and source are credited.  
Further information and the complete license text can be found at  
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
The Development of International Law in Asia-Korea (DILA-KOREA), as the secretariat of DILA, is 
responsible for the management of DILA along with the Asian Yearbook of International Law and  
Asia Pacific Ocean Law Institutions Alliance. DILA-KOREA has generously provided financial support so 
that Volume 24 (2018) is available as open access.
Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.
ISBN 978-90-04-43777-7 (hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-43778-4 (e-book)
Copyright 2020 by the Authors. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke 
Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei 
Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect the publication against unauthorized use and to authorize 
dissemination by means of offprints, legitimate photocopies, microform editions, reprints, translations, and 
secondary information sources, such as abstracting and indexing services including databases. Requests for 
commercial re-use, use of parts of the publication, and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke 
Brill NV.
This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.
Asian Yearbook of  
International Law
Co-Editors-in-Chief



















Kanami Ishibashi ( Japan)
Buhm-Suk Baek (Korea)
Shaun Kang (Malaysia)
Jay L. Batongbacal (Philippines)
Elisabeth Liang and Jaclyn L. Neo (Singapore)
Kitti Jayangakula (Thailand)

















The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ayil
Foundation for the Development of International 
Law in Asia (DILA)
DILA was established in 1989, at a time when its prime movers believed that 
economic and political developments in Asia had reached the stage at which 
they would welcome and benefit substantially from a mechanism to promote 
and facilitate exchanges among their international law scholars that had failed 
to develop during the colonial era.
The Foundation was established to promote: (a) the study of and analysis of 
topics and issues in the field of international law, in particular from an Asian 
perspective; (b) the study of and dissemination of knowledge of international 
law in Asia; and (c) contacts and co-operation between persons and institu-
tions actively dealing with questions of international law relating to Asia.
The Foundation is concerned with reporting and analyzing developments 
in the field of international law relating to the region, and not primarily with 
efforts to distinguish particular attitudes, policies or practices as predominate-
ly or essentially “Asian”. If they are shown to exist, it would be an interesting 
by-product of the Foundation’s essential function, which is to bring about an 
exchange of views in the expectation that the process would reveal areas of 
common interest and concern among the states of Asia, and even more impor-
tantly, demonstrate that those areas of interest and concern are, in fact, shared 
by the international community as a whole.
The Asian Yearbook of International Law
Launched in 1991, the Asian Yearbook of International Law is a major 
internationally-refereed yearbook dedicated to international legal issues as 
seen primarily from an Asian perspective. It is published by Brill under the 
auspices of the Foundation for the Development of International Law (DILA).
When it was launched, the Yearbook was the first publication of its kind, 
edited by a team of leading international law scholars from across Asia. It pro-
vides a forum for the publication of articles in the field of international law, 
and other Asian international legal topics. The objects of the Yearbook are two-
fold: first to promote research, study and writing in the field of international 
law in Asia; and second, to provide an intellectual platform for the discussion 
and dissemination of Asian views and practices on contemporary internation-
al legal issues.
Each volume of the Yearbook contains articles and shorter notes, a section 
on state practice, an overview of the Asian states’ participation in multilateral 
treaties and succinct analysis of recent international legal developments in 
Asia, as well as book reviews. We believe this publication to be of importance 
and use to anyone working on international law and in Asian studies.
In keeping with DILA’s commitment to encouraging scholarship in inter-
national law as well as in disseminating such scholarship, its Governing Board 
decided to make the Yearbook open access and is available through Brill Open.
Acknowledgments
The Co-Editors-in-Chief would like to acknowledge and thank the staff of 
the Handong International Law School Law Review for their work reviewing 
and editing the citations in the Yearbook. The staff includes Senior Editors So 
Jin Kim (Editor-in-Chief), In Hyuk Hwang (Managing Editor), Yeonsoo Lim, 
and Dajeong Lucy Kim; and Junior Editors Eojin Yoo, Ji Min Ryu, Ji Hun Park, 
Josephine Grace Mann, Soyeon Moon, and Yaeeun Shin.
Contents
Editorial Note xii
Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee
Special Feature: Asian State Practice in International Law from 
the Perspective of Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL)
The Centenary of the League of Nations: Colonial India and the Making of 
International Law 3
Amritha V. Shenoy
Breaking Bad Customs: Involving the Idea of Opinio Juris Communis in 
Asian State Practice 24
Thamil Venthan Ananthavinayagan
Understanding Human Rights from an Eastern Perspective:  
A Discourse 41
Ravi Prakash Vyas and Rachit Murarka
Subcontinental Defiance to the Global Refugee Regime: Global Leadership 
or Regional Exceptionalism? 60
Jay Ramasubramanyam
Harmonizing UNCITRAL Model Law: A TWAIL Analysis of Cross Border 
Insolvency Law 80
Dwayne Leonardo Fernandes and Devahuti Pathak
Use of Force as Self Defence against Non-State Actors and TWAIL 
Considerations: A Critical Analysis of India’s State Practice 106
Srinivas Burra
The “ASEAN Way”: A Sore Thumb for ASEAN Solidarity in the Face of an 
Ailing Global Trade System? 127
Noel Chow Zher Ming
x Contents
Articles
A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the 
South China Sea Arbitration 151
National Institute for South China Sea Studies
Prosecuting Crimes against Humanity before International Crimes 
Tribunal in Bangladesh: A Nexus with an Armed Conflict 294
Yudan Tan
Legal Materials
Participation in Multilateral Treaties 325
Karin Arts
State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law
Sumaiya Khair (Bangladesh) 353
V.G. Hegde (India) 370
Kanami Ishibashi ( Japan) 380
Buhm-Suk Baek (Korea) 384
Shaun Kang (Malaysia) 393
Amritha V. Shenoy, Ravi Prakash Vyas and Rachit Murarka 
(Nepal) 398
Jay L. Batongbacal (Philippines) 411
Elisabeth Liang and Jaclyn L. Neo (Singapore) 417
Kitti Jayangakula (Thailand) 426








2018 DILA International Conference and 2018 DILA Academy & 
Workshop 461
Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee
Editorial Note
The 2018 edition (volume 24) of the Asian Yearbook of International Law has 
special feature articles on the practice of Asian states from the perspective of 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and is followed by two 
main articles; legal materials including a listing of the participation of Asian 
states in multilateral treaties and a description of the state practice of 
Asian states in the field of international law; along with a literature section 
featuring a book review and a bibliographic survey of materials dealing with 
international law in Asia; and finally a summary of the activities undertaken 
by the Foundation for the Development of International Law in Asia (DILA) in 
the year 2018.
I Articles
The special feature articles were drawn from papers that were presented at 
the 2019 DILA-Korea International Conference on Asian State Practice in 
International Law from the Perspective of TWAIL held in Seoul, Korea from 
November 7 to 9, 2019. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the is-
sues related to the global South and assess how the dynamics of international 
politics and transnational interactions have influenced and redefined interna-
tional law.
The first article provides a historical case study in “The Centenary of the 
League of Nations: Colonial India and the Making of International Law” by 
Amritha V. Shenoy of Kathmandu School of Law. Next, Thamil Venthan 
Ananthavinayagan of Griffith College follows with a look at the sources of 
international law, in particular customary international law in “Breaking Bad 
Customs: Involving the Idea of Opinio Juris Communis in Asian State Practice.” 
After, Ravi Prakash Vyas and Rachit Murarka, both of Kathmandu School of 
Law, provide a TWAIL perspective of human rights in “Understanding Human 
Rights from an Eastern Perspective: A Discourse.” Jay Ramasubramanyam 
from Carleton University then examines the refugee issue in “Subcontinental 
Defiance to the Global Refugee Regime: Global Leadership or Regional 
Exceptionalism?” Next, Dwayne Leonardo Fernandes and Devahuti Pathak ex-
amine “Harmonizing UNCITRAL Model Law: A TWAIL Analysis of Cross Border 
Insolvency Law.” This is followed by the “Use of Force as Self Defence against 
Non-State Actors and TWAIL considerations: A Critical Analysis of India’s State 
Practice” authored by Srinivas Burra of South Asian University. The last special 
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feature article is a look at the issue of international dispute resolution in “The 
‘ASEAN Way’: A Sore Thumb for ASEAN Solidarity in the Face of an Ailing 
Global Trade System?” by Noel Chow Zher Ming of Tradewin Asia.
The special feature section is followed by the first main article entitled, 
“A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the 
South China Sea Arbitration” by the National Institute for South China Sea 
Studies. Next, Yudan Tan examines “Prosecuting Crimes against Humanity 
before International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh: A Nexus with an Armed 
Conflict.”
Ii Legal Materials
The Yearbook from its inception was committed to providing scholars, practi-
tioners, and students with a report on Asian state practice as its contribution 
to provide an understanding of how Asian states act within the international 
system and how international law is applied in their domestic legal systems. 
The Yearbook does this in two ways. First, it records the participation of Asian 
states in multilateral treaties; and second, it reports on the state practice of 
Asian states. A number of diligent scholars have provided the Yearbook with 
reports on the 2018 state practice of their respective countries.
1 Participation in Multilateral Treaties
Karin Arts of the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam in The Hague, The Netherlands has compiled and edited the par-
ticipation of Asian states in multilateral treaties for the 2018 calendar year.
2 State Practice of Asian States in the Field of International Law
The state practice section is intended to offer readers of the Yearbook an out-
line and summary of the activities undertaken by Asian states that have a direct 
bearing on international law. The national correspondents, listed in the table 
of contents, have undertaken the responsibility to report on the state practice 
of their respective countries during the 2018 calendar year. Their submissions 
describe how these states are applying international law in their domestic legal 




For this edition of the Yearbook, Seokwoo Lee, of the Board of Editors, gives his 
review of History and International Law: An Intertwined Relationship published 
in 2019 by Edward Elgar Publishing.
2 Bibliographic Survey
Soyeon Moon of Handong International Law School in Pohang, Korea pre-
pared the bibliography for 2018 which provides information on books, articles, 
notes, and other materials dealing with international law in Asia.
Iv DILA Activities
The 2018 edition of the Yearbook concludes with a report on the activities 
undertaken by DILA in the year 2018, namely the annual DILA International 
Conference and DILA Academy and Workshop that was held on April 21 to 22, 
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The Centenary of the League of Nations:  
Colonial India and the Making of International Law
Amritha V. Shenoy*
1 Introduction
The wave called “turn to history” in international law narrates various his-
torical aspects of international law. This turn introduced a sub-discipline 
namely, the “History of International Law. However, narrating the history of 
international law is not a new phenomenon. History has been indispensable 
to the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). In the words of 
R.P. Anand, “the present cannot be properly assessed, nor future projected, 
without an understanding of the past”.1 The second generation of TWAIL schol-
ars connects history to the present.2 Comparing the writings of TWAIL scholars 
on historical aspects of international law to the present writers on the disci-
pline, one can see that Eurocentric histories are reiterated. The Eurocentric 
turn to history needs to be challenged by the narration of alternative histories. 
The alternative histories need to point out the principles of international law 
that existed in different civilisations so that modern international law can truly 
become a universal law.
There are rules that governed war, treaty-making, diplomacy, and trade 
in many civilisations of the world. However, the existence of an interna- 
tional organisation in pre-nineteenth century cannot be found in other 
civilisations of the world.3 International organisations were formed in the 
nineteenth century. The craving for co-existence and the catastrophes of 
the World Wars gave an impetus to the formation of international organisa-
tions in the twentieth century.4 Thus, the consciousness of a State to move 
*   Assistant Professor, Kathmandu School of Law, Bhaktapur, Nepal.
   I would like to express my gratitude to Sakshi Shree, Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Japanese 
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University for providing valuable suggestions.
1   R.P. Anand, New States and International Law 5 (2nd ed. 2008).
2   Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law 139 (2004).
3   Clive Archer, International Organizations 5 (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 
3rd ed. 2001).
4   Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares 17 (4th ed. 1964).
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beyond national interests, i.e., internationalism, led to the creation of interna-
tional organisations.5
The pioneer international organisations were for postal services, technol-
ogy, humanitarian aid and other matters.6 The League of Nations was the first 
international organisation that dealt with pervasive topics affecting human 
life. It had an inextricable link to the International Labour Organisation, 
international health organisations, and interntional economic and financial 
organisations.
Remembering the organisation on its centenary, the League of Nations, 
despite its demise, was a breakthrough idea not only for international relations 
but also for challenging various concepts of international law itself. It posed 
a challenge to the positivist idea that State was the only subject of interna-
tional law. It gradually widened the ambit of international law.7 The formation 
of an international organisation was clearly piercing through the sovereignty of 
the States. Many internal matters were discussed directly or indirectly in the 
League. Therefore, in theoretical terms, international law was moving from 
positivism to liberalism.
However, only European states became members of the international organ-
isations established before the League. For instance, the Central Commission 
for the Navigation of the Rhine was formed as a result of the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815. It was a creation of Europe with European members. Eurocentrism was 
challenged by the formation of alternative organisations. The Soviet Union 
and the colonised nations together formed the Comintern or Communist 
International in 1919, challenging imperialism.
Apart from Eurocentrism, patriarchy was challenged also by the formation 
of women’s organisations. There were three prominent international women’s 
organisations in the post-First World War era, viz., the International Alliance of 
Women, the International Council of Women, and the Women’s International 
League for Peace and Freedom. The Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom organised a meeting of women during the First World War when 
most of the other inter-governmental organisations were not functional.
5   Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations 
in the Making of the Contemporary World 9–10 (2002).
6   Commerce was the triggering point for the proliferation of international organisations. 
Health was another concern. The international organisations included the International 
Telegraphic Bureau (1868), the General Postal Union (1874), the International Bureau of 
Weights and Measures (1875), the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs 
(1890), the Metric Union, and International Health offices in Vienna, Paris, and Havana.
7   This challenge was manifest after the creation of the United Nations. However, the League of 
Nations was one of the first steps.
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Colonial India was a member of some of the international organisations. 
In 1874, a representative for India signed the Berne Convention, by virtue of 
which India became a member of the Universal Postal Union in 1876. In 1890, 
India8 was represented by a delegate at the Conference of the International 
Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. British India signed the Inter-
national Wireless Telegraph Convention in 1912. India had a separate vote at 
the International Radiotelegraph Conference in 1912. Colonial India was party 
to 150 multilateral treaties9 and 44 bilateral treaties.10 Certain international 
agreements were also signed separately by colonial India.11 With regard to the 
alternative organisations, M.N. Roy, an Indian, was a member of the execu-
tive committee of the Comintern. Colonial India acceded to the International 
Alliance of Women to promote universal suffrage.12
Colonial India was a founding member of the League of Nations. 2019 was 
the centennial year of the formation of the League of Nations. Its contribu-
tions as one of the first international organisations are remarkable in the 
history of international law. Nevertheless, in the narrations of the League’s 
history, a substantial part is neglected; it is the contribution of the colonies. 
Their contributions remain a part of alternative histories. The struggles of the 
people of colonial India, internal as well as external struggles, remain neglected. 
The period when colonial India was a member of the League reflects the 
way the Empire operated.13 Therefore, the present article is an attempt to nar-
rate an alternative history to highlight the contributions as well as struggles of 
colonial India in the international arena.
The article describes the political entity called colonial India by exam-
ining its position in international organisations despite being a colony. It 
discusses the ground for Indian membership in the League. Membership in 
an international organisation gives rise to financial responsibilities to con-
tribute to the sustenance of the organisation. Hence, the article elucidates 
financial contribution and disproportionate representation with regard to 
colonial India. It highlights the problems faced by the Indian delegation due 
to the dominance of Europe in the League. It points out the issues discussed 
in the League on India. The history narrated herein also looks at the positive 
8    India hereafter means colonial India.
9    See generally 124 L.N.T.S., 26 U.N.T.S.
10   See generally 32 L.N.T.S., 12 U.N.T.S.
11   Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Territorial Entities other than Independent States in the Law of Treaties, 
125 Recueil Des Cours 1, 72 (1968).
12   Iriye, supra note 5, at 29–30.
13   B.S. Chimni, India, in The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Asia and 
the Pacific 551 (Simon Chesterman, Hisashi Owada & Ben Saul eds., 1st ed. 2019).
6 Shenoy
aspects of colonial Indian membership in the League. The article views history 
not only against Eurocentrism but also the role the different forms of hier-
archy, i.e., of class, caste, and gender, played in the participation of India in 
international fora.
2 Colonial India – an Anomalous Political Entity and IOS
Colonial India was a complicated political entity. As mentioned in the Paris 
Peace Conferences, India was of a composite character.14 Colonial India had 
broadly two components, viz. the territories governed by the British admin-
istration and the 562 Princely States.15 The Governor-General dealt with the 
relationship between these two components. The Princely States had auton-
omy over internal matters whereas external affairs were controlled by the 
British. The Princely States did not have the power to enter into foreign rela-
tions with the external powers. The Princely States of India were like vassal 
states under the control of Britain.16
With regard to the territories governed by the British Administration, 
the British had control over internal as well as external affairs.17 The right to 
declare war lay with the British Crown. Diplomatic relations were maintained 
on behalf of colonial India by the India office in London. The Government of 
India was comprised of a Foreign Department. The department did not deal 
with matters of external relations with other States or international organ-
isations (such as the League of Nations). Thus, the Government of India was 
confined to territorial disputes and internal matters.18
Due to the power exercised by the British, India was not a self-governing 
territory, neither internally nor externally.19 However, India’s international 
personality was maintained as separate from that of Britain because the 
Interpretation Act of 1889 did not mention India as a colony. Primarily based 
14   R.P. Anand, The Formation of International Organizations and India: A Historical Study, 23 
Leiden Journal of International Law 5, 9 (2010).
15   India meant British India according to Section 18(5) of the Interpretation Act, 1889. 
Section 18(5) of the Interpretation Act of 1889 defines India as follows:
    “British India, together with any territories of any native prince or chief under the 
suzerainty of His Majesty”.
16   Anand, supra note 14, at 11.
17   Id.
18   D.N. Verma, India and the League of Nations 83 (1968).
19   Lissitzyn, supra note 11, at 66.
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on the Act, India was accommodated by the British as a member of interna-
tional organisations.20
There were two reasons for granting membership to India in international 
organisations, specifically the League of Nations. The primary reason was 
that the British had a vested interest to increase Britain’s “voting strength” in 
international fora.21 Therefore, Britain included other Dominions also as mem-
bers. Thus, the total vote on behalf of the British counted to six (Great Britain, 
India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa). Six votes were good 
enough to increase the strength of the British Empire.22
Prominent personalities like Govind Ballabh Pant, Bhagwan Das, and others 
criticised India’s membership in the League as beneficial to the British. The 
British denied this allegation by pointing out Article 5 of the Covenant which 
mentions the voting procedure of the League and demands unanimous votes, 
with few exceptions, in the Assembly and the Council.23 The British reply was 
not satisfactory in the appointment of committees and the matters of pro-
cedure. The British wielded much power by the voting strength it had in the 
Assembly. It also had an impact on the membership in the Council.24
Another reason for including colonial India in the League was that it was 
a major political entity which lent a helping hand to the British and its allies 
during the First World War. The admission of members to the League was the 
discretion of the States that met at the Paris Peace Conference. It is pertinent 
to note that while India was given membership in the League, India’s participa-
tion in the First World War itself was a result of British rule in India.25
20   R. Kemal, The Evolution of British Sovereignty in India, in 8 Harbans S. Bhatia, 
Political, Legal and Military History of India 119, 122 (1986).
21   Till 1919, India was represented by the officials appointed by the British. Anand, supra 
note 14, at 7–8.
22   V. Shiva Ram & Brij Mohan Sharma, India and the League of Nations 142 
(1932).
23   Article 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations states:
    Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the 
present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require 
the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.
    All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including 
the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by 
the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the 
League represented at the meeting.
    The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be sum-
moned by the President of the United States of America.
24   Verma, supra note 18, at 24–25.
25   Id. at 29.
8 Shenoy
Due to the composite character of India, one Prince from the Princely States 
was part of the Indian delegation to the League Assembly’s Annual Sessions. The 
Princely States supported the British during the First World War. Furthermore, 
their inclusion in the delegation meant that they would convey international 
obligations to the Chamber of Princes, and the Government of India did not 
have to persuade them separately. An Indian Prince was appointed as a cul-
tural diplomat in the League. Hence, the cooperation of the Princely States 
and the British was manifest with the signature of the Maharaja of Bikaner in 
the Treaty of Versailles. This step brought both political entities (British India 
and the Princely States) closer.26
Be that as it may, membership in the League did not grant any autonomy 
to the Indians. The representatives of colonial India to international fora 
were selected by the British.27 The question of authority in selecting Indian 
delegates to international organisations was a tough one. The issue revolved 
around the superiority of the Secretary of State or the Government of India. 
The appointments were to be made, as decided in 1920, in “prior consultation 
and agreement” between the Government of India and the Secretary of State.28 
The India Office despatched the appointment letter. The name of the authority 
was not mentioned so that an impression that superiority of the Secretary of 
State existed. The instructions were issued by the India Office on the informa-
tion given by the Government of India. When necessary, they were given by the 
Secretary of State in consultation with the Government of India.
After the conference, delegates submitted reports to the Secretary of State, 
and a copy was despatched to the Government of India. This decision was 
made in 1920. Thus, control was attempted to be imposed on India’s represen-
tation in international fora during the colonial era. The treaties signed by India 
were ratified by “an instrument of ratification signed by the King on the advice 
of the British Cabinet”.29 In matters of less gravity, the Secretary of State for 
India did the ratification.
Sometimes, the arguments formulated by the British were reformulated 
according to the opinion of Indians.30 The freedom of expression for India was 
not untrammelled. It was under British control. However, it is laudable that 
whatever autonomy the Indian delegates obtained, they utilised it for the ben-
efit of India and her interests. Emulating the Latin American countries that 
26   Id. at 310.
27   Anand, supra note 14, at 12.
28   Lanka Sundaram, The International Status of India, 9(4) Journal of the Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs 452, 462 (1930).
29   Verma, supra note 18, at 30.
30   Sundaram, supra note 28, at 459.
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took a joint stand in many instances, the British made joint decisions for the 
Empire as a whole.31 Nevertheless, the important political matters “affecting 
the Empire as a whole” were left to the British Government.32
With regard to the Princely States, the Prince could not express on behalf 
of his fraternity and he was sent as a part of British India.33 Whenever the 
Government of India accepted some international obligations, it had to 
appease the Indian Princely States to follow similar obligations. Since prob-
lems would arise with negotiations, the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and other conferences had provisions to exclude territories from its purview.34 
When the British realised that some obligations can never be expected to be 
followed by the Princely States, they excluded those territories.
Complications arose in the case of Princely States because they had seceded 
their external autonomy but did not give up internal autonomy. There were 
instances when the Princes signed the conventions and later, after the discus-
sions in the Chamber of Princes, they refused to fulfil international obligations. 
They claimed autonomy in internal administration. The Government of 
India issued a circular on January 21, 1926, asking the Princely States to fol-
low international obligations under the League of Nations as deem fit in their 
internal administration.35 The Princely States maintained the position that 
the Government of India should not interfere in their administration. The 
assertion of the Princely States led the Government of India to exclude them 
from the application of many important treaties like the Hague International 
Opium Convention, the Slavery Convention, and the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, etc.
Gradually, some autonomy was granted to India. J. C. Coyajee explains the sit-
uation as India being granted “quasi-independence in her external relations”.36 
One of the reasons for autonomy is because of the freedom struggle against 
the colonial rule in India. As far as international obligations were concerned, the 
matters concerning bilateral relations with a foreign power were dealt with by 
the British government. In the matters that affected India only, discretion was 
given to India. Treaties like the Locarno treaty had provisions that the issues 
affecting India and other Dominions were to be decided on their consent. The 
Imperial Conferences of 1923 and 1926 made it obligatory on the Empire to let 
the dominions and India decide whether to sign treaties or not.
31   Verma, supra note 18, at 115–16.
32   Sundaram, supra note 28, at 461.
33   Id. at 464.
34   Id. at 465.
35   Verma, supra note 18, at 251.
36   J.C. Coyajee, India and the League of Nations 23 (1932).
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The inclusion of Indian Princes projected India as one political unit,37 and 
the Indian nationalists utilised this to propose a federal structure of indepen-
dent India.38 Later, the Government of India Act of 1935 altered the relations 
between the Government of India and the Princely States. The Rulers of the 
Princely States had to sign an instrument of accession. They could specify in 
the instruments as to the matters on which the Government of India could 
enter into international treaties on behalf of the Princely States. They were 
also empowered to opt out of international labour conventions. The Princely 
States were termed as “international orphans” because they did not have obli-
gations under many international treaties due to such reservations.39
From the above account of the political structure of colonial India and 
its subsequent participation in international organisations, many schol-
ars termed the situation as anomalous in nature. D. H. Miller termed India’s 
membership in the League as “an anomaly among anomalies”.40 V. Shiva Ram 
and Brij Mohan Sharma opined that “India is a political curiosity inside the 
League”.41 India’s situation in the period between 1919 and 1947 is described as 
an “anomalous situation” again by T.T. Poulose.42 The Princely States were in 
a more complicated position. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not 
have a provision for the representation of different political entities. Despite 
such absence of provision, the Indian Princes represented the Princely States 
in the League. Therefore, such representation was termed as an anomaly by 
D.N. Verma.43 Thus, the political entity called colonial India had an anomalous 
position in international organisations.
3 Colonial India and Membership in the League of Nations
Two Imperial Conferences, or Colonial Conferences, were convened in 1887 
and 1897. India did not participate in both conferences. In 1902, the Third 
Colonial Conference was held wherein preferential tariff in the jurisdiction 
of the Empire was discussed. The representation of India was inevitable, and 
therefore, an invitation was sent to the Government of India. A representative 
37   Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 143.
38   Verma, supra note 18, at 246.
39   Int’l Labour Org., Record of Proceedings for its Twenty-Sixth Session, at 228 (1944).
40   As quoted in Verma, supra note 18, at 20. See Coyajee, supra note 36, at 26.
41   Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 139.
42   T.T. Poulose, India as an Anomalous International Person (1919–1947), 44 British Year-
book of International Law 201, 206 (1970).
43   Verma, supra note 18, at 244.
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of the India Office attended the conference. It was an “ad-hoc representation 
at the imperial conference”.44 In the Fourth Colonial Conference conducted in 
1907, the representative of the Secretary of State for India attended. The Fifth 
Colonial Conference was held in 1911. Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for 
India, participated in one of its meetings and discussed the issue of Indian 
immigrants to the Dominion. Issues related to India were discussed in the con-
ferences through the participation of the India Office.
India’s demand for participation in the Imperial Conferences was given 
impetus by the support provided by India to Britain in the First World War.45 
The support changed the attitude of the British public and the Dominions 
towards India. On 22 September 1915, Mian Muhammad Shafi put forth a 
resolution in the Legislative Council demanding an invitation to India for par-
ticipation in the Imperial Conferences in the future. The Governor-General 
of India, Lord Hardinge, assured consideration. The War Cabinet decided in 
January 1917 to include India in the forthcoming conference.46 In March 1917, 
the War Cabinet began its meetings. India was represented by James Meston, 
S.P. Sinha, and the Maharaja of Bikaner. A permanent participation of India 
in the conferences was decided. A resolution was passed for the Dominions 
and India conferring “a right to an adequate voice in foreign policy and for-
eign relations”.47 India was not mentioned in the original text, but S.P. Sinha 
insisted on an amendment to include India. India’s claim on enemies of the 
First World War amounted to 80,000,00 Rupees. This claim made the represen-
tation of India inevitable in the Paris Peace Conference. India was represented 
at the Paris Peace Conference by E.S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, 
the Maharaja of Bikaner, and S.P. Sinha, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for India.
India participated in the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. In 1919, India signed 
the Treaty of Versailles and other accompanying peace treaties. India’s mem-
bership in the League was dependent on the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Thereby, India became an original member of the League of Nations.48
44   Id. at 2.
45   Id. at 3.
46   The Imperial War Conference of 1917 “passed a resolution which defined the self-
governing Dominions ‘as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth’, and India 
‘as an important portion of the same’, and claimed for the Dominions and India an ade-
quate voice in the regulation of the foreign policy and foreign relations of the Empire”. See 
Sundaram, supra note 28, at 454.
47   Verma, supra note 18, at 6.
48   India was a participant in the Paris Conference wherein the Covenant of the League was 
drafted. It was listed as one of the original members. Original members were included 
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As a prelude to membership in the League, India struggled to be a par-
ticipant in the Imperial Conferences. The struggle for membership in the 
League continued due to the opposition from the French and others, whereas 
the USA supported and debated in its Senate on India’s membership in the 
UN. President Woodrow Wilson was the mastermind behind the creation 
of the League as highlighted in his Fourteen Points Agenda Speech. The US 
supported decolonisation for the creation of markets in the new states thus 
formed. In this context, the US supported “colonies enjoying full powers of 
self-government”.49 However, the US Senate did not approve the League 
Covenant. In the context of Indian membership in the League, British hypoc-
risy was debated in the US Senate. Senator Norris pointed out the atrocities 
committed by the British in the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre.50 Despite such 
inhuman acts, the British showed the participants of the Paris Conference 
that India was governed democratically. However, by virtue of Article 1 of the 
League Covenant, India became a member of the League.51
4 Eurocentrism in the League
Due to prominent European representation in the League, European interests 
were discussed vastly. It was known as a “European organisation”.52 Due to 
European dominance, D.N. Verma opines that “oriental conditions and inter-
ests were in this way accorded a condescending and somewhat contemptuous 
tolerance, and then forgotten, while attention was concentrated on Western 
problems”.53
Indians opposed Eurocentrism in the League. The League of Nations aimed 
at maintaining the status quo. The status quo was not acceptable to the 
according to Article I, paragraph I of the Covenant that states, “the original members of 
the League shall be those of Signatories which are named in the Annex to the Covenant”.
49   Verma, supra note 18, at 15.
50   The negotiations at Versailles were conducted as an epilogue to Jallianwala Bagh Massacre 
and the Satyagraha of Mahatma Gandhi. See Anghie, supra note 2, at 139.
51   Article 1 of the The Covenant of the League of Nations provides:
    “Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may 
become a member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, 
provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere attention to observe its inter-
national obligations”.
52   Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 93; Stephen Legg, An International Anomaly? 
Sovereignty, the League of Nations and India’s Princely Geographies, 43 Journal of 
Historical Geography 96, 98 (2014).
53   Verma, supra note 18, at 84.
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Indians who were struggling for freedom.54 For them, the League was a mani-
festation of imperialism. They wanted to get rid of the clutches of imperialism 
and colonialism.
The Council of the League of Nations was an arena of the great powers. It 
did not have representation from Africa, Australia, North America, and South 
America. Ram and Sharma55 staunchly criticise the composition of the League 
Council by stating that “Although the chief aim of the League is to inspire 
confidence in all the nations of the world and to treat them as equals, still 
in the composition of its organisations there is clearly inequality prevailing”. 
They opined that India and China deserved to be permanent members of the 
Council due to their large population.56 India’s seat in the Council was further 
bleak due to the British rule.
In the League Secretariat, there were very few employees from India (about 
half a dozen).57 A representation was sent to the League of Nations in 1926 
on the appointment of Indians in the League of Nations. One of the earliest 
appointments of Indians made to the League of Nations Secretariat was that 
of P.P. Pillai. The representation in the Secretariat was again disproportionate 
to the heavy financial contribution given by colonial India.58
The election of an Indian as the Judge of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) was also a difficult task. Candidates like Amir Ali and 
Sultan Ahmad contested for elections of the judicature in vain. Even though 
the Court intended to represent all the principal legal systems and civilisations 
of the world, it was not fulfilled due to European dominance.
The British accepted the optional clause59 of the Statute of the PCIJ in 
1929 after a long contemplation. The exceptions given by India to the optional 
54   Id. at 273.
55   Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 193.
56   Id. at 166; Ram and Sharma proposed “reshuffling” of the council. In their words, “Some 
of the seats on the Council should be assigned on a territorial basis. For example, Europe 
and Asia should each get three seats, America two, Africa two and Australia one. After 
that, some seats should be distributed on population basis, and India and China, being 
the countries with the largest populations in the world, should each get a permanent 
seat. Seats may be assigned on the basis of the principal forms of civilisation, such as 
Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic, Slev, Latin, Chinese, Japanese, Hindu and Mohammedan etc. 
There should be a number of non-permanent seats open to election as at present”. Id. 
at 208.
57   Id. at 167.
58   League of Nations Notes, 5(7) Bulletin of International News 17, 21 (1928).
59   The Indian delegation led by Mr Habibullah signed the optional clause on 19 September 
1929. He made the following statement (United States Department of State, Treaty 
Information: Permanent Court of International Justice – India, 2 The Department of 
State Bulletin 451, 452 (1940)).
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clause in effect nullified compliance with it.60 Due to such exceptions, India 
could not settle disputes (for instance, with the problem of Indian emigrants 
in South Africa) with the other imperial dominions and left them to the 
Privy Council.
The Eurocentric nature of the League was reflected in the Mandate System 
which kept all members of the League under the control of the great powers. 
The Mandate System was formulated to promote self-government among the 
colonies and to make them a part of the “international system as sovereign, 
independent nation-States”.61 It changed the language “civilised and unci-
vilised” to that of “backward and advanced”.62 This reflects the Eurocentric 
idea of waiting for the “backward” nations to become “advanced” with the help 
of the “civilised” nations.63
Indian public opinion was against the Mandate System because of the 
delay in granting self-determination by the establishment of the System 
in the League. The discontent amongst Indians was also due to the issue of 
Tanganyika. It was a mandate territory under the British. Indians residing in 
the area faced discrimination because of British policies. The mobilisation of 
Indian public opinion against it led the Government of India to take the issue 
before the Permanent Mandates Commission. India could not move the PCIJ 
    “On behalf of the Government of India and subject to ratification, I accept as com-
pulsory ipso facto and without special Convention, on condition of reciprocity, the 
jurisdiction of the Court in conformity with Article 36, para 2, of the Statute of the Court, 
for a period of 10 years and thereafter until such time as notice may be given to terminate 
the acceptance, over all disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration 
with regard to situation or facts subsequent to the said ratification, other than – disputes 
in regard to which the parties to dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse 
to some other methods of peaceful settlement; and disputes with the Government 
of any other Member of the League which is a Member of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such a manner as the parties have agreed 
or shall agree; and disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall exclu-
sively within the jurisdiction of India. And subject to the condition that the Government 
of India reserve the right to require that proceedings in the Court shall be suspended in 
respect of any dispute which has been submitted to and is under consideration by the 
Council of the League of Nations, provided that notice to suspend is given within 10 days 
of the notification of the initiation of the proceedings in the Court and provided also that 
such suspension shall be limited to a period of 12 months or such longer period as may be 
agreed to by the parties to the dispute or determined by decision of all the Members of 
the Council other than the parties to the dispute”.
60   Verma, supra note 18, at 95.
61   Anghie, supra note 2, at 116.
62   Anghie, supra note 2, at 189.
63   Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and 
Historical Difference (Reissue ed., 2008).
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because of the exceptions made in the optional clause.64 All these issues arose 
due to the Eurocentric nature of the League. It ended up as politics of the great 
powers. This affected the Indian delegates to the League directly.
5 Problems Faced by the Indian Delegation
The Indian delegation, as previously mentioned, was comprised of the British, 
Indian Princes, and Indians. The British, who were part of the Indian delega-
tion to the League, largely made decisions on behalf of India. At times, the 
British expressed Indian interests. For instance, William Meyer strongly sup-
ported the reduction of India’s expenses in the League of Nations. However, 
when the interests of Britain and India clashed, the British served the former.
The Indian delegates faced many problems. Due to the lack of instructions 
and delays in instructions from the India Office, the Indian delegates had to 
face difficulties in the conferences they represented.65 Moreover, the dele-
gates sent on behalf of India were less in number in comparison to any other 
member of the League. The Indian delegates maintained professional contact, 
unlike other members with more delegates who entered into unofficial diplo-
macy. The constant demand of the delegates added three substitute delegates 
to represent India in the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations.
India did not have a permanent representative in Geneva. Many nations 
had permanent representatives, but the Government of India was reluctant to 
incur expenditure. The absence of a permanent representative in Geneva led 
to a setback to Indian interests in many issues.66 The members of the Indian 
legislature demanded the appointment of an Indian head in the delegations 
sent on behalf of India. The British rejected it in the pretext that an Indian 
could not “appreciate the guiding principles of His majesty’s Government”.67 
Indian legislators demanded an Indian head to get rid of the allegation against 
Indians that they are reiterating the British views in international fora. The 
British possessed the feeling of racial superiority. It never justified their con-
science that the head of the delegation could be an Indian leader.68 Due to 
the untiring efforts of the Indian legislators like P. C. Sethna, the demand was 
met by the British when Mohammad Habibullah was appointed as the head 
64   Verma, supra note 18, at 98.
65   Id. at 52.
66   Id. at 56.
67   Id. at 68.
68   Id. at 70.
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of the Indian delegation to the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations. 
The uniqueness of the report submitted by this delegation was that it made 
some recommendations to elevate the position of India in the League. One 
of the recommendations was on India’s candidature in the Council elections. 
The recommendations were not materialised due to the disagreement of the 
government. After that, an Indian headed the delegation.
Another problem faced by the delegates was inexperience because, every 
time, new representatives were appointed for representation. They were 
never part of committees of the League due to their lack of experience. 
Demand was raised for continuity in the appointments, which was met in 1930. 
With the help of such reappointments, Aga Khan was elected as Vice-President 
of the Assembly, Denys Bray became a part of many sub-committees, and 
H. Mehta was appointed as General Rapporteur of the Fourth Committee. 
The Indian legislators, through debates and negotiations with the British, 
struggled to solve the abovementioned issues through debates and constant 
demands to the British. However, the representation was British dominated, 
and even if it included a few Indians, it avoided women and Dalits. In present 
times, the representation of women and Dalits remains less.
6 Issues Discussed in the League on India
The League of Nations analysed a plethora of problems. Some discussions 
concerned India and her interests. For example, a special report submitted 
in the Assembly was on the claim of India to be represented in the Governing 
Body of the International Labour Office. The representation in the Govern- 
ing Body was emphasised in one of the sessions of the Assembly in July– 
August 1920.
Another issue that touched upon colonial India was that of disarmament. 
The representatives of India in the League did not support disarmament 
because of the general notion that it would mean putting India’s security at 
stake. The British opinion was that the tribes of Afghanistan were dangerous 
in the frontiers and were waiting to attack without following any principles 
of international humanitarian law. The British exaggerated the power of 
these tribes, and the actual threat was assessed from Russia.69 Moreover, 
under British rule, Indian opinion in the League reflected that of the British. 
69   Id. at 103.
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The British could not pull out the army deployed in India also because of the 
ongoing freedom struggle against them.70
The clamour caused by the issue of opium trade caught the attention 
of the League. Opium became a menace in many parts of the world. Opium 
wars were fought between India and China. An action against opium trade 
became imperative. In this regard, the US government organised two confer-
ences on opium traffic in Shanghai (1909) and Hague (1912). India ratified the 
Hague Convention in 1920 but did not comply with it. Indian opium was sold 
even after the ratification.
Indian delegates to the League in 1921 and 1922 cited the medical and sci-
entific use of opium in India and hence, could not support the ban of opium 
totally. The Geneva Conferences, under the aegis of the League, in 1924 and 
1925 also dealt with opium issue. The US and China opposed the Government 
of India’s policy as the sale of opium was rampant in these States. They blamed 
India for the production of opium. India opined that an agreement should be 
reached between the opium-producing countries.
Opium was vastly used in India. The use of opium in India was severely 
criticised by medical experts. The use of opium in India was to such an extent 
that women who worked in industries drugged their babies with opium to 
prevent them from crying. The Government of India’s policies on opium were 
criticised as inadequate. Since the Government earned a lot of revenue from 
opium trade (national as well as international), it did not want to restrict its 
use.71 It appointed the Royal Commission on Opium. The Commission submit-
ted a report in 1895. It was known to be a farce because it stated that Indians 
used opium for medicinal purposes and that the Government’s policy was 
based on it.72
The Government of India’s opium policy was criticised by Mahatma Gandhi 
and the Indian National Congress. Due to pressures from international and 
national spheres, the consumption of opium in India was reduced drastically 
despite the fact that it was a blow to India’s revenue.73 In March 1926, a reso-
lution was passed by the Indian legislature to stop the export of opium for 
any other purpose except medicinal and scientific reasons. The Government 
of India tried to control domestic consumption with the enactment of the 
Opium Act.
70   Id. at 105.
71   Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 150.
72   Verma, supra note 18, at 216.
73   Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 153.
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Further conventions on opium and other narcotic drugs entered in the 
League era were “the Geneva Convention of 1925, the Geneva Agreement on 
Opium Smoking of 1925, the Drugs Limitation Convention of 1931, the Bangkok 
Agreement on Opium Smoking of 1931, and the Convention for the Suppression 
of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936”.74 India also participated in 
these conventions.
These conventions were a result of deliberations in the League on the use 
of other narcotic drugs. Smuggling of narcotic drugs like cocaine in India led 
the Indian delegates to request the League in 1926 to check the widespread 
problem of narcotic drugs. Due to the pressing need for a solution, a confer-
ence (the Conference on Limitation on the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs) 
was convened under the League through a resolution passed in 1930 by the 
Assembly. The outcome of the conference was a convention in 1931 based 
on the Geneva International Opium Convention of 1925. India signed the 
Convention. The Convention was an unprecedented step towards the regula-
tion of an industry under “international co-operation” and “that manufacture 
in its economic aspect has been wholly subordinated to higher humanitarian 
and moral aims”.75
The League also discussed issues concerning women and children. One 
of the important conventions on women and children signed by India under 
the aegis of the League is the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in 
Women and Children of 1922. The Indian Penal Code declared trafficking as an 
offence and prescribed punishment for the same. The laws were inadequate, 
and the penal code was amended to provide more protection to women below 
18 years of age. The provincial governments also passed legislations to curb 
trafficking like the Madras Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act of 1930. These 
steps were taken to bring national laws in consonance with international laws.
Child health, infant mortality, and child welfare caught the attention of 
the League. The Government of India cited that the conditions in India were 
not amicable to introduce legislations for child welfare. In 1928, a report 
was submitted to the Fifth Committee stating that the age of marriage was 
gradually rising and that child marriages were decreasing in number.76 Some 
legislations on children were passed like the Madras Juvenile Offenders Act 
(amended 1930). Laws were passed in provinces raising the age of marriage. 
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and 
74   Anique H.M. Van Ginneken, Historical Dictionary of the League of 
Nations 142 (2006).
75   Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 121.
76   Verma, supra note 18, at 187.
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Traffic in Obscene Publications was signed in 1923. In India, obscene literature 
and advertisements were prevalent at that time. India ratified this convention 
in 1924. To implement this international convention, India made amendments 
to the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.
In one of the sessions of the Assembly in 1922, the issue of slavery was dis-
cussed. After that, the Secretariat formed a Temporary Committee on Slavery. 
The Slavery Convention was signed under the auspices of the League in 1926. 
India was ready to sign the treaty provided that she could make some reser-
vations with the exclusion of territories practising some forms of slavery and 
those on which the Government of India did not have direct control. Another 
motive behind such a reservation was that the Government wanted to main-
tain good relations with the Princely States. In pursuance of signing the treaty, 
the Government released all slaves from the Hukawng Valley in Burma.
With regard to the issue of statelessness, a Special Protocol Concerning 
Statelessness was formulated under the aegis of the League. On 28 September 
1932, India signed the Special Protocol as a separate member of the League of 
Nations. Article 1 of the Protocol provided the following international obliga-
tion on the signatories:
If a person, after entering a foreign country, loses his nationality with-
out acquiring another nationality, the State whose nationality he last 
possessed is bound to admit him, at the request of the State in whose 
territory he is:
(i) If he is permanently indigent either as a result of an incurable dis-
ease or for any other reason; or
(ii) If he has been sentenced, in the State where he is, to not less than 
one month’s imprisonment and has either served his sentence or 
obtained total or partial remission thereof.
In the first case, the State whose nationality such person last possessed 
may refuse to receive him if it undertakes to meet the cost of relief in the 
country where he is as from the thirtieth day from the date on which 
the request was made. In the second case, the cost of sending him back 
shall be borne by the country making the request.
From the above highlights of issues on disarmament, opium, slavery, or oth-
ers, the British Empire’s interests were predominant while talking on behalf of 
India. However, the opinions of the Indians helped change some of the aspects 
like restrictions on the opium trade and using the positive aspects of interna-
tional law for the benefit of the Indians. This was a result of constant struggle 
against the British rule in colonial India.
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7 An Assessment of India’s Membership in the League
India’s membership in the League had both positive and negative aspects. 
The negative aspects of European dominance, the manifestation of Empire 
in the League in the name of India, have already been elucidated in the pre-
vious sections of this article. However, in the words of scholars, the League 
was a significant step. In this regard, quoting Stephen Legg, “The League can 
be considered an apparatus, through the way in which it attempted to re- 
territorialise the imperial world into an international order, but this also 
involved deterritorialising and de-scaling imperial sovereignty”.77 In the words 
of J.G. Starke,78 the League of Nations was a significant step in the evolution of 
international law.
The League of Nations Covenant, that is to say, Part I of the Treaty of 
Versailles, 1919, reflected a new theory of the scope and purpose of the 
international organisation. This was the conception of an international 
institution, with universal or almost universal membership of the states 
of the world and devoted to the fulfilment of most general aims in the 
interests of the international community, namely the promotion of 
international cooperation, the preservation of international peace and 
security, the fostering of open, just, and honourable relations between 
nations, the firm establishment of International Law as the actual rules 
of conduct between States, and the maintenance of justice and a scrupu-
lous respect for all treaty obligations.
The greatest flaw of the League was that it could not prevent the Second 
World War. Despite the drawbacks, the League was not a failure as it laid 
foundations for the United Nations. Kewal Singh states the importance of 
the League in institutionalising international relations, “By its commitment 
to the principles of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to 
live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another whether they be 
strong or weak, the League marked the first effort to democratize the interna-
tional relations”.79
77   Stephen Legg, Of Scales, Networks and Assemblages: The League of Nations Apparatus and 
the Scalar Sovereignty of the Government of India, 34 Transactions of the Institute 
of British Geographers 234, 243 (2009).
78   J.G. Starke, The Contribution of the League of Nations to the Evolution of International Law, 
Indian Yearbook of International Affairs 207, 209 (1964).
79   Kewal Singh, UN’s Efforts at Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, in United 
Nations and India 52 (S.C. Parasher ed., 1985).
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With regard to India, some positive aspects of membership in the League 
cannot be avoided. The first aspect was that India could better develop an 
international personality and could be recognised as a political entity in the 
world. It helped her “for the creation of a special international status”.80 Indian 
diplomacy got in shape after membership in the League.81 The representatives 
to the League and inter-related organisations imbued diplomatic skills like 
negotiations that was carried forward by next generation of diplomats. Indian 
Political Department members were sent as British Ministers to Afghanistan 
and Nepal. Consular Officers from India were despatched to many parts of 
the world like Kashgar, Persia, Muscat, Jeddah, etc. In 1927, India was empow-
ered to enter into commercial treaties directly without the backing of the 
British government.
“The debate over Indian rights at the League was but one indication of how 
newly defined international political space in the 1920s threatened domes-
tic governments’ ability to control their domestic political governance and 
discourse”.82 The membership also appeased the national leaders who were 
demanding independence in an unprecedented manner.83 They understood 
that the British wanted to show the outside world that Britain was supporting 
India. The membership gave an impetus for the “constitutional development” 
of India.84 Montagu, by providing the rationale that India was a member of the 
League, put forth the Government of India Bill before the House of Commons. 
The British also tried to disprove the allegations that strengthening her vot-
ing power was the motive behind including India in the League. Therefore, 
granting some autonomy to India to govern herself was imperative.85 The 
Government of India Act of 1919 kept out of the Indian legislature’s purview 
to discuss matters on the League.86 The first resolution on an international 
treaty was put forward by Sir Atul Chatterjee in the Legislative Council and 
by Thomas Holland in the Legislative Assembly to frame laws in consonance 
with the Washington Conference, 1919, which fixed the hours of work. Thus, 
80   Sundaram, supra note 28, at 452.
81   Verma, supra note 18, at 35.
82   Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s 
140 (2012).
83   Verma, supra note 18, at 25.
84   Id. at 35–36.
85   Id. at 41.
86   Article 8(i) of the rules under the 1919 Act states that “no question shall be asked regarding 
any matter affecting the relations of His Majesty’s Government or the Governor-General 
in Council with any foreign power”.
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the Indian legislature attained the status of “competent authority” to decide 
on such matters.87
One of the advantages of membership of the League was that the Indian 
legislature moved beyond national issues and discussed international issues.88 
Some of the inter-imperial problems were raised in the League of Nations by 
India. For instance, the issue of Indians residing in the mandated territories 
was raised by Maharaja of Nawanagar. Srinivas Sastri criticised the treatment 
of Indians in the mandated territories in strong words before the League 
Assembly.89 These issues were discussed in international fora by the Indian 
delegates until a decision was made to restrict such speeches in the Imperial 
Conference of 1923. In the 1930s, there was a debate in the League of Nations 
to decide a scale wherein national and international matters would be demar-
cated. This issue came up during the discussions on trafficking in women and 
children. The British said that the League could deal only with international 
matters whereas the League denied such bifurcation.90 The Government of 
India was more “contemptuous” of the League of Nations and did not want to 
share intricacies of the Empire.91
Membership in the League led to India’s presence in the non-League con-
ferences like the Washington Conference on Naval Armaments of 1921, the 
Genoa Economic Conference of 1922, etc. India’s membership in the League 
of Nations made her a part of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
the International Labour Organisation, the International Committee of Intel-
lectual Cooperation,92 the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and 
Other Dangerous Drugs, the International Institute of Agriculture, the Health 
Organisation, etc.
The interaction with other States led to further civilisational exchanges 
and brought India’s culture to the front through her delegates. The delegates 
upheld the values like non-violence that the Indian civilisation stands for and 
spread them in international fora.
87   Verma, supra note 18, at 43.
88   Id. at 78.
89   Gorman, supra note 82, at 126.
90   Legg, supra note 77, at 234.
91   Id. at 244.
92   Jagdish Chandra Bose and Radha Krishnan were the members of the International 
Committee of Intellectual Cooperation. The aims of the committee were to develop “the 
interchange of knowledge and ideas among peoples and improving the conditions of 
intellectual work”. Ram & Sharma, supra note 22, at 130.
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8 Conclusion
The present article aims at narrating an alternative history of the struggle 
of the Indians when colonial India became a member of the League of Nations. 
Its membership is lauded as a British boon. However, the narration behind the 
inclusion and the finance, and human resources India provided to the British 
gets receded to the background. There are many aspects that have changed in 
the post-colonial era. India is considered economically strong. However, his-
tory needs reiteration for self-introspection and for taking ideas of the past 
to create a better future. Colonial India’s membership is a reminiscence of 
how the Empire shaped the international organisations for its own benefits. 
At the same time, it hides behind various struggles of Indians at the national, 
regional, and international levels.
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Breaking Bad Customs: Involving the Idea of  
Opinio Juris Communis in Asian State Practice
Thamil Venthan Ananthavinayagan*
1 Introduction: The Formation of Customary International Law
Customary International Law (CIL) is one of the sources of Article 38.1 of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute, consisting of two elements, namely 
state practice as its objective element, and the belief in such state practice as 
its subjective element.1 An action forms custom only if it can formulate the 
articulation of the legality of the action.2 Opinio juris is considered to be state-
ments of belief, but not actual beliefs. Against this background, treaties and 
declarations that represent opinio juris are considered to be statements about 
the legality of action, rather than examples of that action.3 However, Posner 
and Goldsmith claim that:
It lacks a centralized law-maker, a centralized executive enforcer, and a 
centralized, authoritative decisionmaker. The content of CIL seems to 
track the interests of powerful nations. The origins of CIL rules are not 
understood. We do not know why nations comply with CIL, or even what 
it means for a nation to comply with CIL. And we lack an explanation for 
the many changes in CIL rules over time.4
Surely, CIL can be considered a last resort in disputes over international law. 
When there is no applicable legally-binding treaty, it is always possible to 
*  Lecturer in International Law at Griffith College, Dublin, Ireland.
1   Zhang Yue, Customary International Law and the Rule Against Taking Cultural Property as 
Spoils of War, 17 Chinese Journal of International Law 943, 947 (2018).
2   Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 The American Journal of International Law 757, 758 
(2001).
3   Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in International Law, 63 American 
Journal of International Law 211, 214 n. 14 (1969) (citing Francois Francois Geny, 
Methode D’interpretation et Sources en Droit Prive Positif (2nd ed. 1919)).
4   Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 University 
of Chicago Law Review 1113, 1114 (1999).
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argue that a certain rule has crystallised within CIL. However, it is a rather 
complicated task to prove the existence of a customary rule because to do 
so requires strong evidence of the existence of two fundamental elements. 
When this source of law was formed, the vast majority of the states that exist 
today were inexistent due to economic conditions and the structure of social 
relations.5 In consequence, these newly formed states criticise or reject the 
norms under CIL, while not refuting public international law in general.6 And 
yet, despite the acceleration of actors under international law, “Western devel-
oped countries have continued to construct and reconstruct the norms of 
international law in their favour to the detriment of the third-world countries”.7 
The Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) wishes, to this end, 
to dismantle the prevailing norms that benefit the powerful few. B.S. Chimni 
suggests that TWAIL gives meaning to international law, as it transforms it into 
international law of emancipation and reshapes international law as interna-
tional legal norms that offer a life of dignity for the poor, deprived, oppressed 
and subjugated in the Third World.8 The argument in this article is not that CIL 
is useless or solely a Western product, but it wishes to advance the idea that 
CIL needs to include and proliferate the subaltern voices to a greater extent.
To this end, the widespread and consistent practice is followed by the belief 
in it. Another aspect of this practice is its general practice. Regardless of locali-
ties and regional practices, a large share of affected states must be engaged in 
the practice. The density of practice required, however, is difficult to determine 
with precision.9 Moreover, there are genuine questions about the legitimacy 
of CIL. While treaties express promises in written forms, they foresee dispute 
resolution mechanisms engineered into the treaties for the signatories who are 
bound by them. In opposition to this, CIL is unwritten arising from decentral-
ised practices of nations, while the criteria for its identification are unclear.10 
Arteem Negev holds the view that:
5    See S. Prakash Sinha, New Nations and the International Custom, 9 William & Mary 
Law Review 788, 792 (1968).
6    Id.
7    Brian-Vincent Ikejiaku, International Law is Western Made Global Law: The Perception of 
Third-World Category, 6 African Journal of Legal Studies 337, 338 (2013).
8    B.S. Chimni, The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World 
Approach, 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 499, 499–500 (2007).
9    Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 115, 150 (2005).
10   Posner & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1116.
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CIL may not be legally legitimate because it can be too ambiguous, 
bypasses the requirement of tacit consent, and breaches the principle of 
sovereign equality of states. However, CIL is morally legitimate due to the 
benefits it provides for international law. The moral value of CIL lies in 
its ability to be widespread, avoid withdrawal from obligations, and fill 
in gaps in international law. Lastly, CIL is socially legitimate because it is 
de facto accepted by the international community.11
Anthony D’Amato and others have pointed out that CIL creates law based 
on which it requires action in conscious accordance with law preexisting 
the action. This practice requirement of CIL needs more scrutiny, as more 
efforts need to be put into the investigation of the creation of custom and its 
consistency.12 What does, however, consistency mean? In the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Sea case, Judge Lachs from the ICJ postulated:
What can be required is that the party relying on an alleged general rule 
must prove that the rule invoked is part of a general practice accepted as 
law by the States in question. No further or more rigid form of evidence 
could or should be required.
In sum, the general practice of States should be recognized as prima 
facie evidence that it is accepted as law. Such evidence may, of course, 
be controverted – even on the test of practice itself, if it shows “much 
uncertainty and contradiction” … It may also be controverted on the 
test of opinio juris with regard to “the States in question” or the parties to 
the case.13
A prominent theory explains the legitimacy as one which is understood as a 
rule with its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy. Here, 
legitimacy is rooted in the rule-making institution and exertion of compliance 
on those addressed normatively. Those who are addressed believe in the rule 
or institution and operate in accordance with generally accepted principles of 
legitimate process.14
11   Artem Sergeev, The Legitimacy of Customary International Law: Legal, Moral, and Social 
Perspectives, 8 International Review of Law 13 (2017).
12   D’Amato, supra note 3, at 4.
13   North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 232 (Feb. 20) (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Lachs).
14   Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law 
in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 The American Journal of International 
Law 88, 93 (1990).
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CIL’s doctrine is, in the end, “contradictory, inconsistent, indeterminate and 
informal”.15 To this end:
These characteristics are in some respects problematic, but they also cre-
ate enough space to empower anyone invoking custom, whether in the 
First World or elsewhere, to pursue their own vision of the international 
rule of law. In other words, the fluidity and malleability of the doctrine 
allows the identification of custom to operate both as a tool of oppression 
by the First World and as empowerment of the periphery.16
2 The Role of Customary Law in Asian State Practice
However, can a custom born and developed in the Western Hemisphere 
extend to and dictate state practice of the states that were restricted in their 
governance? How can cultures, long neglected and disregarded in cultural evo-
lutions, see themselves represented in the development of CIL? Shall these 
cultural and legal practices, instead, languish? B.S. Chimni, in his groundbreak-
ing piece, explains that CIL reflects “the dominance or hegemony of certain 
[Western] ideas and beliefs” for which a Third World scout tries to assist 
in its promotion.17 He further argues that CIL “safeguards the interests of 
the advanced capitalist nations even as it at times addresses the concerns of the 
entire international community”,18 while also “naturaliz[ing] and validat[ing]” 
certain Western assumptions and preferences.19 Ultimately, Chimni argues in 
favour of a postmodern doctrine that would overcome these shortcomings. 
The ICJ had taken into account the existence of regional customary law in the 
Asylum case20 and particularly in the Rights of Passage over Indian Territory 
case.21 Indigenous Asian laws continue to play an important role vis-à-vis 
Western law. Having postulated this, the article will examine the structural 
legal discussions in relation to the Preah Vihear case and the South China case.
15   Jean d’Aspremont, A Postmodernization of Customary International Law for the First 
World?, 112 AJIL Unbound 293, 295 (2018).
16   Id.
17   B.S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 The American 
Society of International Law 1, 28 (2018).
18   Id. at 9.
19   Id. at 28.
20   Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgement, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266 (Nov. 20).
21   Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgement, 1960 
I.C.J. Rep. 6 (Apr. 12).
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2.1 Case Studies from the Asian Region
In the following two sections it is worthwhile to draw experiences on the devel-
opment of CIL in the Asian region. To this end, the Preah Vihear case and the 
South China Sea dispute are relevant for consideration.
2.1.1 Preah Vihear Case
In 1904, a treaty between Cambodia and Thailand created a joint commission 
to demarcate their border according to a watershed, which placed the ancient 
Hindu temple of Preah Vihear in Thai territory. However, a 1907 map drawn 
by French authorities relocated the boundary without explanation, placing the 
temple squarely in Cambodian territory. The ICJ determined that both parties 
accepted the French map in 1908 as an “interpretation” of the treaty text: “the 
Parties at that time adopted an interpretation of the treaty settlement which 
caused the map line, in so far as it may have departed from the line of the 
watershed, to prevail over the relevant clause of the treaty”.22 Even though 
the first judgment rendered in 1962 proved that Cambodia had sovereignty 
over the Temple of Preah-Vihear and its vicinity, due to heated situations along 
the borders that were threatening peace in that region and unsuccessful bilat-
eral consensus, the ICJ was solicited again by both countries, in order to clear 
the misunderstandings that cropped up by interpreting the initial judgment 
again in 2013. Whilst the ICJ reached a decision in unanimity with its previous 
judgment, it can be noted that it relied greatly on the legal basis that the treaty 
claim asserted.23 Moreover, there are strong arguments for why, although 
Thailand never contested the French map’s placement of the temple, it was 
inappropriate to describe its silence as an acceptance.24 While this issue might 
be addressed in the bilateral context by requiring a high threshold showing 
that a state’s silence was knowing and intentional over an extended period of 
time, as is required for desuetude, it will be nearly impossible to be demon-
strated in a multilateral treaty regime. As one commentator notes:
[T]he Temple of Preah Vihear case exhibits, international law in Asia 
seems to undermine its legitimacy by a wilful abdication of non-Western 
knowledge systems and practices, particularly those from the margins. 
Arguably, periphery and not centre should then construct the modern 
22   Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgement, 1962 I.C.J. 
Rep. 6, 34 (June 15).
23   Solida Svay, Analysis of the Preah-Vihear Temple Case, Cambodia v/s Thailand at the 
International Court of Justice under Common Territorial Claims Involving Land Disputes, 36 
Journal of Law, Policy And Globalization 12, 12 (2015).
24   Cambodia v. Thai., 1962 I.C.J. at 4.
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state. Such an untangling, even if politically brave, would prioritize the 
Siamese alternate-modern polity over colonial territorial conceptions of 
state. The conception of political spaces that Siam harboured does not 
only have an Asian application. Any revision of the international law of 
territory by conceptually displacing territory and planting people at its 
core in a world blinded by sovereignty-induced boundaries and territory 
is a knowledge production of universal application.25
Is it fair to assert that majority rulings by the Court are a general rule of CIL? 
Does this bind the rest of arbitrators involved?26 Moreover, can peoples from 
the Global South accept that their Third World elite, complicit in the exten-
sion of Western knowledge production within CIL, deprives them of their 
understanding of belonging, demarcations, culture and localities? In reality, 
it becomes evident that international law’s potency is limited and disregards 
indigenous geographies, knowledge and customs at large.27
2.1.2 South China Sea Dispute
Being one of the most contested areas on our planet’s surface due to fishing, 
shipping and presumed oil and gas resources, many incidents between China 
and the Philippines after 2011 led to unsuccessful bilateral consultations.28 
Two options were at hand to settle the dispute: first, proceedings before the 
ICJ; second, compulsory jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The former option was not feasible, considering 
that China never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and the 
Philippines excluded the Court’s jurisdiction for these kinds of disputes under 
Article 36.2 of the ICJ Statute.29
25   Life of Imperialism: Thailand, Territory and State Transformation, Institute for Inter -
national Law and Justice, https://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Semi 
SiamSINGH.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
26   Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Nullity and Validity: Challenges to Territorial and Boundary 
Judgements and Awards, in Asian Approaches to International Law and the 
Legacy of Colonialism 45, 49 (Jin-Hyun Paik et al. eds., 2014).
27   See Prabhakar Singh, Of International Law, Semi-colonial Thailand, and Imperial Ghosts, 9 
Asian Journal of International Law 46, 68 (2019).
28   Andreas Zimmermann & Jelena Bäumler, Navigating Through Narrow Jurisdictional 
Straits: The Philippines – PRC South China Sea Dispute and UNCLOS, in 12 The Law & 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 431, 432 (2013).
29   See Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Republic of the Philippines, Declarations Recognizing 
the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, International Court of Justice (Jan. 18, 
1972), http://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations/ph. Also, it would have been unlikely that 
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Hence, the only resort was the UNCLOS. As of now, all countries bordering 
the South China Sea are states parties to the UNCLOS, including China and the 
Philippines.30 Being states parties to the UNCLOS, they are subject to the dis-
pute resolution provisions under part XV. The Philippines argued there were 
several disputes between the Philippines and China concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of the UNCLOS.31
China would have accepted an invitation of the Philippines to agree on the ICJ’s jurisdic-
tion under the concept of forum prorogatum, ICJ Statue Article 38.5.
30   U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of Ratifications 
of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements, http://
www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2019). The dates of ratification of the fiver concerned states are as follows: 
Brunei Darussalam, November 5, 1996; China, June 7, 1996; Malaysia, October 14, 1996; the 
Philippines, May 8, 1984; and Vietnam, July 25, 1994.
31   In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013–19, ¶ 112 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20
-%20Award.pdf [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration]; Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, 2017 Law of the Sea Bulletin 91, https://doi.org/ 
10.18356/66155955-en. These dispute submissions were:
   (1)  China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines, 
may not extend beyond those expressly permitted by the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea;
   (2)  China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to “historic rights”, with respect 
to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called “nine-
dash line” are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that 
they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements 
expressly permitted by UNCLOS;
   (3)   Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or con-
tinental shelf;
   (4)   Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that do 
not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continen-
tal shelf, and are not features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or 
otherwise;
   (5)   Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf of the Philippines;
   (6)   Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations 
that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf, but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is 
measured;
   (7)   Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf;
   (8)   China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign 
rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources of its 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf;
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After initiation by the Philippines on the 22nd of January 2013,32 a tribunal 
was constituted under Annex VII to the UNCLOS and delivered its award on 
the 12th of July 2016. This award followed an earlier Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility dating from the 29th of October 2015. In the award of the 12th of 
July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal decided as follows:
   (9)   China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the 
living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
   (10)   China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their liveli-
hoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;
   (11)   China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the 
marine environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, 
Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef;
   (12)   China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef
   (a)   violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, installa-
tions and structures;
   (b)   violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine environment under 
the Convention; and
   (c)   constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in violation of the 
Convention;
   (13)   China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its law 
enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner, causing serious risk of collision to 
Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal;
   (14)   Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China has unlawfully 
aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things:
   (a)   interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, and adja-
cent to, Second Thomas Shoal;
   (b)   preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at 
Second Thomas Shoal;
   (c)   endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed at 
Second Thomas Shoal; and
   (d)   conducting dredging, artificial island-building and construction activities at 
Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, 
Hughes Reef and Subi Reef; and
   (15)   China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines under the Convention, 
shall comply with its duties under the Convention, including those relevant to the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment in the South China Sea, and 
shall exercise its rights and freedoms in the South China Sea with due regard to those 
of the Philippines under the Convention.
32   Dep’t of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Phil., Notification and 
Statement of Claims (2013), https://www.dfa.gov.ph/images/UNCLOS/Notification 
%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim%20on%20West%20Philippine%20Sea 
.pdf; Memorial of the Philippines, Arbitration under Annex VII of the UNCLOS (Phil. 




1. China does not have historic maritime rights in the South China Sea 
(nine dash line).33
2. None of the disputed features in the South China Sea are islands (within 
the meaning of Article 121 of the UNCLOS) and thus do not trigger any 
rights in consistency with the UNCLOS.34
3. Chinese activities in the South China Sea violated Philippines’ rights 
within their Exclusive Economic Zone.35
4. Chinese construction activities have caused damage to the natural 
environment.36
China, unsurprisingly, rejected the findings and refused to abide by them. 
Noteworthy is that China had submitted a declaration under Article 298 of 
the UNCLOS, excluding itself from compulsory jurisdiction.37 Most notably, 
33   The nine-dash line is a cartographic denotation that was developed, first by the Republic 
of China in the 1940s, and then by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1950s, and 
subsequent years to affirm Chinese sovereignty over the islands and maritime areas of the 
South China Sea.
34   Under Part VII UNCLOS, Article 121 distinguishes between islands and rocks as follows:
    1.   An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide.
    2.   Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
    3.   Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
35   The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is one of the major innovations in the law of the sea, 
Its legal regime are characterized as follows:
    1.   The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea: it can extend to a maxi-
mum 200 nautical miles from the baselines.
    2.   Within the EEZ, a coastal State enjoys sovereign rights over its natural resources. It 
can exercise its jurisdiction over certain activities for the purpose, among others, of 
protecting the environment. But it is also obliged to respect the rights of other States 
(thanks to the maintenance of certain freedoms laid down by the law of the high seas, 
such as freedom of navigation), to be found under Article 55 UNCLOS.
36   South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 31, ¶ 983.
37   See U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Declarations and Statements, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm; 
see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea ARbitration Initiated 
by the Republic of the Philippines, ¶ 58 (2014), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/ 
eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm (Declaration of China in pursuant to Article 298: “The 
Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures 
provided for in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories 
of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention”).
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China not only rejected the claims of the Philippines, but also rejected juris-
diction of the Tribunal with its position paper.38 Schoenbaum writes that 
“[t]he result of China’s refusal to participate was a lawyer’s dream – litigating a 
case before a court that will hear only one side of the case – his own”.39 China 
has submitted a declaration under Article 298.1(a)(i) of the UNCLOS, exclud-
ing itself from compulsory dispute settlement under Article 287 and 288 of 
the UNCLOS. However, the existence of Article 9 Annex VII and Rule 25 of the 
Rules of Procedure is designed to prevent any adverse consequences imposed 
on a non-appearing party in proceedings. As noted, the non-appearing party 
is still a party to the case and is still bound by the decision of the tribunal 
whether it agrees with it or not – the famous Nicaragua-USA case before the 
ICJ is exemplary.40
38   Id. ¶ 86. Here, China provides that:
    It is the view of China that the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction over 
this arbitration, unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, with regard to disputes between 
China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.
    Firstly, the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty 
over the relevant maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of 
the Convention and is consequently not concerned with the interpretation or application 
of the Convention.
    Secondly, there is an agreement between China and the Philippines to settle their dis-
putes in the South China Sea by negotiations, as embodied in bilateral instruments and 
the DOC. Thus the unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines has 
clearly violated international law.
    Thirdly, even assuming that the subject-matter of the arbitration did concern the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, it has been excluded by the 2006 decla-
ration filed by China under Article 298 of the Convention, due to its being an integral part 
of the dispute of maritime delimitation between the two States.
    Fourthly, China has never accepted any compulsory procedures of the Convention 
with regard to the Philippines’ claims for arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal shall fully 
respect the right of the States Parties to the Convention to choose the means of dispute 
settlement of their own accord, and exercise its competence to decide on its jurisdic-
tion within the confines of the Convention. The initiation of the present arbitration by 
the Philippines is an abuse of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures under the 
Convention. There is a solid basis in international law for China’s rejection of and non-
participation in the present arbitration.
39   Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The South China Sea Arbitration Decision and a Plan for Peaceful 
Resolution of the Disputes, 47 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 451, 453 
(2016).
40   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14, ¶ 30 (June 27). Here the Court held: “[T]he Court cannot by its own enquiries 
entirely make up for the absence of one of the Parties; that absence, in a case of this kind 
involving extensive questions of fact, must necessarily limit the extent to which the Court 
is informed of the facts. It would furthermore be an over-simplification to conclude that 
the only detrimental consequence of the absence of a party is the lack of opportunity to 
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China’s argument was that the question of territorial sovereignty over cer-
tain islands and reefs did not fall within the ambit of the UNCLOS.41 When 
coming to the aspect of the nine-dash line, the Tribunal had to overcome this 
jurisdictional obstacle, and declared that the nine-dash line was “[I]n brief, 
a dispute over the source and existence of maritime entitlements does not 
‘concern’ sea boundary delimitation merely because the existence of overlap-
ping entitlements is a necessary condition for delimitation”.42 The Tribunal 
reasoned that since this was a dispute over the maritime entitlements gener-
ated by the various dispute features in the South China Sea, the dispute did 
not concern maritime delimitation. In relation to historic titles, the most cru-
cial issue to determine jurisdiction under Article 298.1 of the UNCLOS, China 
claimed that the South China Sea belonged to it for a prolonged period.43 
The Tribunal stated that this depended on the nature of historic claims and the 
scope of the Article 298 UNCLOS exception. However, the Tribunal stated 
that “[i]n the absence of a more specific indication from China itself, it nec-
essarily falls to the Tribunal to ascertain, on the basis of conduct, whether 
China’s claim amounts to ‘historic title’”.44 The Tribunal determined that 
the Chinese claim did not involve title and following this did not fall under 
the scope of the exception under Article 298(1)(a)(i).45 Finally, the Tribunal 
declared that any rights China stipulated on the basis of historic title were 
“superseded  … by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the 
[UNCLOS]”.46
Problematic is that China propounds its international legal weight depend-
ing on its circumstances – whereas B.S. Chimni correctly observed that the 
UNCLOS was largely CIL and developed by the Western powers in their quest 
submit argument and evidence in support of its own case. Proceedings before the Court 
call for vigilance by all”. Very interestingly, one of the counsels in that case for Nicaragua 
was also the counsel of the Philippines, Mr. Paul S. Reichler.
41   Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Philippines’ Efforts in 
Pushing for the Establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal in Relation to the Disputes Between 
China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1035577.shtml.
42   South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 31, ¶ 204.
43   See Masahiro Miyoshi, China’s “U-Shaped Line” Claim in the South China Sea: Any Validity 
Under International Law?, 43 Ocean Development & International Law 1 (2012); 
Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and 
Implications, 107 American Journal of International Law 98 (2013).
44   South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 31, ¶ 206.
45   See id. ¶ 229.
46   Id. ¶ 262.
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for colonial expansion, exploitation and pillage,47 China picks and chooses the 
customs of the West to suit its own power aspirations.48 Indeed it is true that 
European landlocked states had little to nothing to contribute to the develop-
ment of the laws of the sea. However, isn’t it also true that on the flip side a few 
Western states had dominated the creation and further development of the 
law of the sea that morphed into the UNCLOS?49 The UNCLOS is another evi-
dence that law based on Western knowledge leads to the entrenching of the 
power paradigm for the global power in Asia, namely China. To this end, it 
needs to be reconsidered that development of a customary law of the com-
munity is the way for a true custom of the peoples. It is accepted at the same 
time that Asian state practice under the UNCLOS has evolved and taken 
ownership – Asian states are invoking dispute settlement mechanisms and are 
trying to reinterpret parts of the UNCLOS to give effect to their regional aspira-
tions. To this end, Shunji Yanai held that:
It could be understood that Asian States, which were considered to be 
reluctant to use judicial or arbitral dispute settlement procedures, are 
slowly changing their attitude toward accepting third party adjudica-
tion for the settlement of disputes, thus contributing more actively to the 
development of international law.50
And yet, there is no uniform Asian state practice, and it is rather the opposite: 
CIL is used under different interpretations and narratives by Asian states to 
pursue their sovereign goals in the region – dispute mechanisms are there 
to propound those ambitions. Judge Xue Hanqin writes:
Asia’s attitude to international law, if deemed ambivalent, is deeply 
rooted in its history. As is rightly pointed out, that only offers a partial 
explanation. More relevant is the contemporary practice of international 
law, particularly of the Western world. Asian States are more sensitive of 
delegating sovereignty, not because they are ambivalent of international 
47   See Chimni, supra note 17.
48   See Mark J. Valencia, US ‘Picking and Choosing’ from the Law of the Sea, East Asia Forum 
(Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/08/17/us-picking-and-choosing 
-from-the-law-of-the-sea.
49   See Alan Boyle, EU Unilateralism and the Law of the Sea, 21 The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 15 (2006).
50   Judge Shunji Yanai, Keynote Speech at the International Symposium on the Law of the 
Sea, The Rule of Law in the Seas of Asia: Navigational Chart for the Peace and Stability 
(Feb. 12–13, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000074503.pdf).
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law, but because they do not believe that international law as thus advo-
cated and practiced would protect their fundamental rights and interests. 
In many a case, their under-participation is not a matter of willingness, 
but capacity to influence. To be a meaningful rule-maker, Asia still has a 
long way to go.51
This begs the question: how can a law based on opinio juris communis overcome 
such divergent interpretations, serve the goal of a common Asian practice and 
enable the view of the community to proliferate?
3 What is Opinio Juris Communis?
3.1 Generating the Law of the Community
The law of the community can be deduced from the United Nations General 
Assembly’s (UNGA) growing importance as a centre for the concerns of the 
Global South, as it represents the vast majority of the members of the UNGA. To 
this end, resolutions of the UNGA have morphed into customary international 
law, as it represents the voices of the world community.52 Is there perhaps 
room for the perception of instant customary law?53 Can the UNGA turn into a 
law-making entity within the United Nations, a forum of global conscience? Is 
there something to be referred to as opinio juris communis? The UNGA is a body 
from which a sense of global consciousness has to evolve.
However, while Article 2.1 of the United Nations Charter stresses the sov-
ereign equality of states in international law, it can be questioned if there is 
such. Formal equality must be complemented by substantive equality, as it 
needs to meet the requirements of justice or fairness.54 Substantive equality 
necessarily implies that existing inequalities in inter-state relations must be 
taken into account in all decision-making processes at the international level. 
Consequently, in such situations the realization of substantive equality brings 
about the need to treat unequal states unequally. Thus, differential treatment 
51   Xue Hanqin, An Asian Perspective, Opinio Juris (Jan. 18, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/ 
2017/01/18/an-asian-perspective.
52   M.C.W. Pinto, Responsibility to Protect (‘R2P’), in Asian Approaches to Inter-
national Law and the Legacy of Colonialism: The Law of the Sea, 
Territorial Disputes and International Dispute Settlement 146 (Jin-Hyun 
Paik et al. eds., 2014).
53   Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary 
Law?, 5 The Indian Journal For International Law 23, 36 (1965).
54   See Ulrich Beyerlin, Bridging the North-South Divide in International Environmental Law, 
66 ZaöRV 259, 272 (2006).
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can prove to be the only means of ensuring substantive equality that is part of 
international justice.
3.2 Fostering a Law of Community
The right to self-determination, a right that was invoked by the Global South as 
a floating international legal device to accelerate the decolonisation process, 
was recently declared by the ICJ as customary international law. To this end 
Muttucumaraswamy Sornarajah writes that:
Unlike existing norms of international law which were ascribed to 
the conduct of states and as constituting customary principles, most 
of the new norms were articulated by Third World states on behalf of 
peoples and were asserted on the basis of justice. A core sense of justice 
animated the norms that were proposed. The equality of people and the 
ending of domination of one people by another was the basis of the prin-
ciple of self-determination.55
The ICJ had held in the Chagos Advisory Opinion that:
[T]he nature and scope of the right to self-determination of peoples, 
including respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of a 
State or country, were reiterated in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.56
This Declaration was annexed to General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) 
which was adopted by consensus in 1970. “By recognizing the right to self-
determination as one of the “basic principles of international law”, the 
Declaration confirmed its normative character under customary interna-
tional law”.57 The idea of the opinio juris communis, in this vein, is based on 
the premise that individuals, indigenous groups, civil society actors and non-
governmental organisations are taking on a greater role in the formation of the 
views and opinions on international legal relations and matters. B.S. Chimni 
writes in his widely considered and discussed article that:
55   See Muttucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in Inter-
national Law, 10 Sybil 19, 20 (2006).
56   Press Release, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of the Separation 




A postmodern doctrine would therefore go further and look at the weight 
of resolutions through the prism of the global common good. Those 
resolutions that reflect opinio juris communis and further the goals of 
international human rights law and associated jurisprudence would be 
considered to have binding effect. In operative terms this would mean 
that in instances where a qualifying resolution is adopted by an over-
whelming majority of votes, undue weight will not be attached to 
opposing votes if it furthers the cause of global justice.58
The development of the persistent objector doctrine is one which evolved 
in the 1970s to deal with the independence of Third World states and its effects 
on the international legal order, when “Western States feared losing control 
over the development of customary law”.59
In this sense, the doctrine would be a sort of “counter-reformation” by the 
West against the attempts of Third World countries to use their major-
ity in multilateral organizations to reshape international law, or, in other 
words, an exhaust valve, so that traditional states would not be bound by 
the norms put forward by the Third World.60
To this end, the Republic of Korea remarked that the role of persistent objector 
was one that needed more clarification and elaboration after the ILC’s identi-
fication of customary international law in its 67th session of the International 
Law Commission in 2015.61
4 Conclusion: Towards a New Custom
For some, international law is best created exclusively through treaties, as 
to which states can opt out by non-action, simply by declining to ratify the 
instrument. So long as customary norms take many decades to ripen into 
58   Chimni, supra note 17, at 42.
59   Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of Persistent Objector Revisited, 
59 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 779, 783 (2010).
60   George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo & César Yip, Customary International Law and the Third 
World: Do Not Step on the Grass, 16 Chinese Journal Of International Law 251, 
267 (2017).
61   Comments by the Republic of Korea, 70th session of the International Law Commission 
(2018), https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/sessions/70/pdfs/english/icil_republic_of_
korea.pdf&lang=E (last visited May 5, 2020).
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law, customary international law does not seem threatening. But it is another 
matter, if customary law can be formed within just a few years and is deemed 
binding on the states that have not affirmatively manifested their persistent 
objection. In such cases, they may fear the concept of law formation that 
appears more revolutionary than evolutionary. At the same time, the case stud-
ies of Grotian Moments demonstrate international recognition that customary 
international law must have the capacity in unique circumstances to respond 
to rapidly evolving developments by producing rules in a timely and adequate 
manner. They also demonstrate that not every momentous technological, 
geo-political or societal change results in accelerated formation of customary 
international law. There are complaints about overarching positivism. They 
argue for the creation of regional international courts and the prioritisation 
of legal certainty. It could be thought of as invoking and considering regional 
customary laws and regional general principles, seen in their common cultural 
tradition.62 But most importantly, it is about democratising CIL, given all its 
nuances, narratives and visions of the world, to make CIL a reflection of the 
law of the peoples. There is the assumption by those scholars of international 
law, mostly representing the Eurocentric vision of international law, that cus-
tomary international law exists also for the newly independent states, as a gift 
from state practice of Western states. It is argued that these states, civilised 
in their history, were caretakers for the development of an international legal 
infrastructure. This needs and has to be refuted. Anghie and Ghatii write that:
Customary international law (CIL) is in many respects the foundation of 
international law. It comprises the principles that govern international 
relations even in the absence of a treaty, and is one of the means by 
which states register changes in the international system and represent 
them as law. It is understandable, then, that CIL has been the subject of 
intense and extensive theorizing, and that the most distinguished inter-
national lawyers, members of the International Law Commission, and 
the International Law Association have devoted so much time to its study 
and systematization. While CIL has traditionally been dominated by the 
West, scholars from the former Soviet Union and the non-European 
world have emerged to formulate their own distinctive views on CIL, see-
ing it as a Western invention designed to further Western interests.63
62   Andreas Buss, The Preah Vihear Case and Regional Customary Law, 9 Chinese Journal 
Of International Law 111, 126 (2010).
63   Antony Anghie & James Gathii, Introduction to the Symposium on B.S. Chimni, “Customary 
International Law: A Third World Perspective”, 112 AJIL Unbound 290, 290 (2018).
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The social order of property, propriety and power has to be radically revised. 
That is without question. The issue is what must be the strategy, the tactics and 
the way forward to a place that is not what we have now. The Global South is a 
place of great struggle and of various tactics and strategies experimented with 
on the streets and in the halls of government. Individual state consent cannot 
be regarded as the sole source of law creation and obligation, as it was stated 
in the Lotus case.64 Rather there needs to be the shift towards a type of inter-
national democratisation of international law, in which a greater reflection of 
the international community is necessary.65
64   The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
65   Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist 
Analysis, 95 The American Journal of International Law 459 (2001).
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Understanding Human Rights from an Eastern 
Perspective: A Discourse
Ravi Prakash Vyas* and Rachit Murarka**
1 Introduction
Human rights, though assumed as a Western concept, is not an exclusive con-
struct of the Western world. As a matter of fact, if one analyses the rich debate 
around human rights and the obstacles which Human Rights Commission 
have overcome to establish certain universal values as rights,1 one would not 
fall into the trap of engaging in an East versus West debate on human rights. 
There is an overwhelming influence of the West on the discourse around 
human rights, owing to the World Wars. However, it would be a travesty to 
conclude that Asian views were not considered while drafting the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, the drafting committee of Human 
Rights had two prominent Asian scholars, Charles Malik from Lebanon and 
P.C. Chang from China. Later, Charles Malik served as a president of the Human 
Rights Commission.
Despite having a long history of practices which can be equated with the 
principles of human rights in the Asian region, it is established globally that 
human rights is largely a Western concept. The misconception lies in the inter-
pretation of Asian texts. Most of the ancient Asian texts are analysed from the 
lens of religion. Another misconception is that the Judeo-Christian religion 
is a Western religion, and that Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism are oriental 
religions. However, the fact of the matter is that all major religions have their 
roots in Asia. Christianity, though claimed as a Western religion, is rooted in 
Asia and, from there, spread to the West. Therefore, juxtaposing Christianity 
as a Western religion against Eastern religions like Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Islam is a factual error. But it is also true that the West is more influenced by 
Christianity than any other religions.
* Assistant Professor of Public International Law and Human Rights, Kathmandu School of 
Law, Nepal.
** Assistant Professor of International Relations and Legal Research, Kathmandu School of 
Law, Nepal.
1   Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights (2008).
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Religion is an integral part of daily life in Eastern societies, and it dictates 
many facets of lives. Religion provides guidelines for day to day behaviour, and 
these guidelines are in the form of directives that can be equated with duties. 
These duties, many scholars claim, are the predecessors of the grammar of 
human rights. Some scholars also mention that the teachings of Eastern reli-
gions could be said to be proto-human rights.2 The main emphasis of religion 
is on the obedience of duties, rather than the realisation of rights. And this is 
a common thread in all the religions. That is why Subedi claims human rights 
are universal and found in all great civilisations and religions of the world.3 
The claims of human rights being the product of Western Christian civilisa-
tion have sought to project the selective nineteenth century values during the 
epitome of colonial domination.4 However, we cannot undermine the atroci-
ties experienced in deprivation of such human rights in such phases of time 
period.5 This does not mean that Western civilisation has been reluctant to 
practice human rights values, but this is to understand that the ideal concept 
of peaceful coexistence has never existed, and therefore, Asian societies also 
have had their uncertain period of practice in human rights.
Human rights practice can be found in different parts of Asia since ancient 
times, if not explicitly using the term ‘human rights’ itself, then through dif-
ferent customs, norms and practices. The practice delves into the very way 
of life that people possess. It is closely associated with religious and social 
conditions and specific history, culture and values of a particular country. 
However, it is also to understand that we should not compare the human rights 
concept of such Asian societies with the existing liberal framework. Societies 
existed in their sphere of autonomy and harmony and coexisted irrespective of 
their religious differences.6 They considered emperor and king as guardian 
of their nations therefore, it was people’s willingness to correspond to an 
important role and responsibility in the society, and not merely entitlement 
was forced due to the social hierarchy. Countries at different development 
stages or with different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also 
have a different understanding and practice of human rights.7
2   Id.
3   Surya P. Subedi, Are the Principles of Human Rights ‘Western’ Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim 
of the ‘Asian’ Concept of Human Rights from the Perspective of Hinduism, 30 California 




7   Pieter van Dijk, A Common Standard of Achievement: About Universal Validity and Uniform 
Interpretation of International Human Rights Norms, 13 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 105, 105 (1995) (quoting a speech by Liu Huaqui, the head of the Chinese 
delegation at the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 15, 1993).
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The Western civilisation has significantly contributed in formulating human 
rights notions, and countries around the world have acknowledged the contri-
bution of their effort especially after the Second World War. However, this does 
not mean that the traditional framework of governing the society and respect 
of every human being never existed before. The relation of modern and the 
West has severely disintegrated such values. The division of economy and 
labour was seen as discrimination even where people seek the highest amount 
of welfare. In other words, it is unfortunate to correspond that the colonial mis-
sion of making societies into consumer market means that values and customs 
of human rights in societies have disappeared.8 This makes us understand that 
the denial to accept that the concept of human rights existed in Asian societies 
would be a mindless proposition.9
Looking at all the major ancient civilisations, it is found that every one of 
them had a separate way to protect the safety and dignity of people both in 
times of war and peace. After outlining a brief survey of human rights history 
in State practice, Shelton rightly concludes that “[d]ifferent cultures and differ-
ent legal systems vary in the priorities and emphases given to particular rights, 
and vary according to traditions and perceived threats. Yet there exist today 
commonly shared legal norms accepted and recognized by all states”.10
2 Significance of Human Rights in Eastern Societies
Expressing the entire custom and human rights norm inclusive in Asian 
communities is difficult. Due to the existence of wide and unique systems of 
governance and societal practice, Asian communities highlight the very exis-
tence of diversity. Oriental perspective in such a situation tries to express the 
custom of Asian societies especially in relation to ‘cultural enterprises’. It 
should be clear; this connotation of orientalism in no way should correspond to 
the discriminatory nature or inferior classification of the orient or orientalism.11 
The Eastern understanding of human rights differs from the democratic 
8    John H. Bodley, Victims of Progress (3rd ed. 1990).
9    Surya P. Subedi, Land and Maritime Zones of Peace in International Law 
67–69 (1996).
10   Dinah Shelton, Universal Recognition of Human Rights (1987) (unpublished paper 
presented at the 18th Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg) (on file with author).
11   According to Edward Said, the relationship between the west and the Orient is a relation-
ship of power, of domination, and of varying degrees of a complex hegemony. Hence, the 
concept of the Orient being inferior in civilizational or value-based terms was created by 
the West. See Edward W. Said, Orientalism 5–6 (1978).
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institution and liberal framework. The perspective is more centred on coex-
istence, and rationality lies on sustainability which is much aligned with the 
reciprocity rule (i.e., except the treatment from another person on the basis 
of your treatment of another person). In this concept, the institutions created 
in the earlier period without having democratic values were suitable in local 
government in the particular areas. The anarchical rule from some rulers does 
not overrule the entire cohesion maintained in the historical time frame as 
suggested from various writings and scriptures from ancient periods.12
Another important matter of investigation is that the values related to 
human rights existed in Asian societies much before the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, but the principles were not seen from the lens of modern 
human rights. In fact, modern human rights was not conceived out of a vac-
uum. Modern human rights is like an organism which is evolved out of various 
set of ideas prevailing at different times. It is influenced by ideas from the 
Renaissance and the age of enlightenment; at the same time, it also takes into 
account various religious guidelines. Human rights, like an organism, is still 
evolving. An interesting point here is that the language of duties in religious 
texts took the form of rights in the modern world. In fact, the idea of human 
rights in Asia itself is a product of historical developments that started taking 
place over hundreds of years ago. For instance, Rene Cassin recognised the 
natural law and religious foundation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The first article of the Declaration talks about the equality and spirit 
of brotherhood. This article can be said to have been influenced by the Bible: 
‘Love thy neighbour as thyself ’ and ‘love the stranger as you love yourself ’.13 
Cassin maintained that one should not lose the values of fundamentals, 
according to him:
[T]he concept of human rights comes from the Bible, from the Old Testa-
ment, from the Ten Commandments. Whether these principles were 
centred on the church, the mosque or the poils, they were often phrased 
in terms of duties, which now presume rights. For instance, Thou shall 
not murder is the right to life. Thou shall not steal is the right to own 
property, and so on and so forth. We must not forget that Judaism gave 
the world the concept of human rights.14
12   Yubaraj Sangroula, Concepts and Evolution of Human Rights: Nepalese 
Perspective (2005).
13   Ishay, supra note 1.
14   Id.
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It could be a coincidence that Cassin was a Jew and that he emphasised 
Judaism, but at the same time, he maintained that Christianity and Islam are 
also the significant fundamentals.
Ironically, some scholarly writings show that the sanctimonious oriental 
values were understood and even transplanted into the Western world. C.H. 
Alexandrowicz, an acclaimed historian of the law of nations, explained the 
significant contribution of the Asian countries in the early sixteenth, seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries by stating, ‘[t]he European agencies in the 
East learned the lesson of coexistence of Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity in 
India (particularly on the west coast) and transplanted their experience to the 
West, which had been so long incapable of extricating itself from the obsession 
of religious wars’.15
3 Brief History of Human Rights in Asian Societies
This article looks to understand the significance of custom and proposition 
of Eastern values generally from the religious institution which shaped the 
way of life of people. As clarified, religious preaching is not a supernatural 
understanding but tries to understand the very nature of human action and 
considers the action appropriate and acceptable for a common good. In this 
view, it is important to analyse philosophy and human rights within such dis-
tinct understandings.
Scholars like Matthew A. Ritter has justified Judeo-Christian heritage as a 
predecessor of modern human rights. However, he has conveniently equated 
Judeo-Christianity with the West and forgot to mention the Eastern ori-
gin of Judeo-Christian heritage. He has analysed meticulously the tenets of 
Judeo-Christian heritage and convincingly showed that the Judeo-Christian 
religion comes closer to modern human rights.16 This article will discuss three 
major religions: Buddhism, Islam and Hinduism. This article will not discuss 
Judeo-Christian heritage despite the fact that Judaism and Christianity are 
Eastern religions because many scholarly works justify the tenets of Judaism 
15   C.H. Alexandrowicz, The Law of Nations in Global History 45 (David 
Armitage & Jennifer Pitts eds., 2017); Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (Special Representative on 
the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Rep. on the Human Rights 
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/23 (Jan. 28, 1987).
16   Matthew A. Ritter, Human Rights: The Universalist Controversy. A Response to Are the 
Principles of Human Rights “Western” Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the “Asian” Concept 
of Human Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism, by Dr. Surya P. Subedi., 30 California 
Western International Law Journal 71 (1999).
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and Christianity as a predecessor of modern human rights, but all these works 
are done keeping in mind that they are Western religions. This article at the 
outset has mentioned that the Judeo-Christian religion is as Eastern as other 
major religions. Therefore, any justification with regards to the Judeo-Christian 
religion is an advancement of Eastern discourse.
4 Buddhism
Buddhism was introduced in a caste-stratified society which contradicted its 
basic tenet of being equal in an absolute sense. Hence, Buddhist moral teach-
ings substantially contained many precepts of duties and rights. The doctrine 
of ‘ahimsa’ in Buddhism elucidates the view that every individual respects the 
inherent dignity of their own life, furthering love and protection to others in a 
selfless manner, and does not deserve the suffering which is extended to others.
In Buddhist philosophy, the cycle of rebirth that serves as a justification for 
the basis of the individual’s existence indicates that everyone is related and 
connected in a universal manner and cannot exist independent of each other. 
Hence, the actions of a single individual affect the rest. The Dalai Lama, con-
sidered to be the reincarnation of Bodhisattva of Compassion and the spiritual 
leader of the ‘Gelug School’ of Tibetan Buddhism, has stated that there exists 
a universal responsibility to promote human survival. He has reiterated the 
inseparable link that exists between the human heart and the environment 
that needs to be fostered through love and understanding. He delivered an 
address to a Conference on Human Rights organised by the UN in Vienna, 
where he highlighted the Buddhist approach to human rights.17
It is argued that there are non-Western ethical traditions that can espouse 
human rights, such as Theravāda Buddhism. Human rights can be deduced 
from Buddhist moral teachings by assessing the association between the 
Buddhist precepts and social justice as seen in the Theravāda tradition. Con-
cerns regarding ‘self-fulfilment, respect for others and the quest to contribute 
to others’ have been found in Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist traditions, hence 
implying correlative duties for a just and peaceful society. Hesanmi expounded 
the reasonability of affirming the mutual entailment of rights and duties rather 
than erecting a false dichotomy between the two.18
17   Daisaku Ikedia, A Forum for Peace: Daisaku Ikeda’s Proposals to the U.N. 
(Olivier Urbain ed., 2014).
18   Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction 5 (2nd ed. 
2015).
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Ananda Gurugé notes that “Professor Perera demonstrates that every 
single Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even the labour 
rights to fair wages, leisure and welfare has been adumbrated, cogently 
upheld and meaningfully incorporated in an overall view of life and society by 
the Buddha”.19
Kenneth Inada has suggested a definitive foundation for human rights in 
Buddhist metaphysics. In a discussion of ‘The Buddhist Perspective on Human 
Rights’, Inada refers to ‘an intimate and vital relationship of the Buddhist norm 
or Dhamma with that of human rights’.20
The Buddhist virtue of compassion emboldens us to develop the human 
capacity for empathy to the extent as to relate completely with the suffering 
of others. Several texts elucidate the process of exchanging self and other and 
suggest a meditative ritual where we imagine ourselves in the other’s position. 
This is referred to as sentimentalism in the West, which emphasises the role 
of the emotions in moral judgments. According to this perspective, the ascrip-
tion of human rights is ‘an expression of a deep human ability to recognize the 
other as like oneself; to experience empathy for the other’s needs and suffer-
ings; to consent to, support, and rejoice in the fulfilment of the other’s human 
capacities and well-being’.21
It’s stated in orthodox Buddhist teachings that torture or killing that is clas-
sified as abuses of human rights will induce negative karmic consequences. 
Karma, which is the law of causation, has an ontological foundation in natu-
ral law resembling physical laws that dictate biological growth or heat. It has 
been suggested that the concept of human dignity can be derived from doc-
trines of a Buddhist nature. While the contemporary idea of human rights has 
a distinguished cultural origin, its basic preoccupation with human good is 
experienced by Buddhism.
The followers of Buddhism in the contemporary age have founded the Soka 
Gakkai International (SGI), a community-based Buddhist organization that 
promotes peace, culture and education based on the inherent dignity of life by 
upholding and propagating Nichiren Daishonin’s Buddhism.
19   L.P.N. Perera, Buddhism and Human Rights: A Buddhist Commentary on 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights xi (1991).
20   Kenneth K. Inada, The Buddhist Perspective on Human Rights, in Human Rights in 
Religious Traditions 71 (Arlene Swindler ed., 1982).
21   L.S. Cahill, Rights as Religious or Secular: Why Not Both?, 14 Journal of Law and 
Religion 45 (1999); Yoichi Kawada, The Buddhist Perspective of Life and the Idea of Human 
Rights, 21 Journal of Oriental Studies 123, http://www.iop.or.jp/Documents/1121/
Journal21_Y.Kawada2.pdf.
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The Lotus Sutra, which expounds the essence of Buddhist teachings was 
founded 80 years ago was initially dismissed as a congregation of sick 
and poor in Japan. However, the members took this as a badge of the 
highest honour and resonating with a burning conviction undertook the 
work of engaging in dialogue with people in order to encourage and nur-
ture hope.22
It believes that ‘the inherent role of religion can be defined as taking human 
hearts that are divided and connecting them through a universal human spirit. 
It is the religion that supports, inspires and provides an impetus for people 
searching for the good and the valuable in their lives’.23
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights claims that human rights 
addresses the relationship between society and individuals, safeguarding the 
latter from exploitation and persecution, with its aim being legal in nature. 
It is expected by Western ideologists that clauses which refer to equal treat-
ment and dignity of life should be universally applicable. There is a valid 
consensus among the scholars that these universal rights are congenial with 
Buddhist morality.24
5 Islam
Islam originated in Mecca and Medina of Saudi Arabia in the early seventh 
century and since then gradually spread all over central and southeast Asia as 
well as Africa via trade and commerce. Since the time of Mohammad when 
it first originated, Islam had championed for human rights such as the right 
to life, right to freedom of expression, right to equality before the law, rights 
of women and as such. One might even argue that Islam has not only advo-
cated for the human rights that are contained in the present-day human rights 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but went 
beyond that and ensured more human rights such as the rights of parents as 
well as children, rights of neighbours, inheritance and other rights which are 
not mentioned in modern human rights documents and all these develop-
ments took place in Asia through Islam, centuries before the West came up 
with the modern notion of human rights.
22   Ikeda, supra note 17.
23   Id. at 259.
24   Andrew May, Buddhism and Human Rights: A Book Review, Andrew-May.com (2001), 
http://www.andrewmay.com/bhr.htm.
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Islam preaches the right to life of every human being.25 With regard to when 
taking of a life is justified, it is mandated that even when someone is guilty 
of murder or spreading corruption on the earth, such can only be decided 
only by a proper and competent court of law. Even when there is any war with 
any country, only by the decision of a properly established government can 
a life be taken away. In fact, no human being has the right by himself to take a 
human life without any reason, and even when such retaliation is justified, 
due process must be followed. If anyone, however, murders a human being, it 
would be as if he has slain the entire human race.
In another place, the Holy Qur’an also distinguished homicide from that of 
destruction of life for justified reasons by ordering the Muslims not to kill any 
human being (herein referred as soul) without following due process of law, 
because Allah has made all human life sacred (6:151). Prophet Mohammad has 
also referred to murder as the greatest sin besides associating something with 
God. All these instances strengthen the fact of how strongly Islam strives to 
respect the right to life of every human being.
Immediately after mentioning the right to life, the Holy Qur’an addresses 
the right to the safety of life of human beings.26 The Holy Qur’an lays down 
that whenever someone saves the life of another human being, it would be 
deemed as if she had saved the entire humankind. This saving can be inter-
preted to mean diverse situations. If someone is ill or wounded and in need of 
help, it is the duty of everyone to help that man irrespective of his race, gen-
der, skin colour, nationality or belief. If someone is dying of starvation, every 
Muslim is obligated to feed him.27 Therefore, Islam strives to ensure the safety 
of the life of every human being on earth without any discrimination.
Islam does not solely depend on voluntary help and charity. Rather, Islam 
had made charity compulsory to the rich through a practice known as zakat 
to help poor people obtain the basic necessities of life.28 In fact, according to 
Al-Bukhari, the Prophet has clearly stated that this portion of the wealth over 
which the poor and needy have claim will be taken from the wealth of the rich 
and then be given to those in need. Islam has forbidden the primitive practice of 
capturing a free man and making him a slave or selling him into slavery. In this 
regard, the Prophet Mohammad clearly stated that he shall stand as a plaintiff 
against three categories of people, slavers being one of them. Moreover, this 
injunction is general in nature and applies to every human being regardless 
25   Syed Abul A’la Maudoodi, Human Rights in Islam (2nd ed. 1981).
26   Id. at 1.
27   Id.
28   Id.
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of their nationality, race or belief. Islam also gives protection against arbitral 
arrest. According to Caliph Umar, “no one can be imprisoned for any other pur-
pose except for the pursuance of justice in Islam”.29 Therefore, in Islam, every 
human being is considered to be innocent until proven guilty, and even when 
justice is served, it must be in accordance with due process of law.
In Islam, all human beings are equal before God regardless of where they 
were born, their social position, their race, colour or gender. The Holy Qur’an 
mandates, ‘O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female’.30 
Therefore, in Islam, all men are considered to be brothers as they are the 
descendants from one father and mother.31
There are other rights prescribed by Islam which can be found mandated in 
the Holy Qur’an and in the recording of the words and conduct of the Prophet, 
as well as his ‘Sahabi’, also known as Hadith. Some other rights as incorporated 
and practiced in Asia through Islam are the right to freedom of association, 
the right to religion, the right to take part in the affairs of the State, the right to 
freedom of conscience and conviction and as such.
6 Hinduism
The present notion of human rights is based on universal values found in 
all major civilisations of the world: In Asia, Africa and of course, in Europe. 
One such instance is the reflection of human rights in Hinduism which was 
practiced in ancient Asia. Secularism in the conduct of the domestic and inter-
national affairs of the state, equality of all human beings and adherence to the 
principle of peaceful co-existence, regardless of faith and beliefs were some 
of the core elements that can be found deeply-rooted in ancient Hinduism. 
Though the Hindu approach towards human rights has changed drastically 
since the Dark Age, the ancient Hindu scriptures from which the religion 
originated from only contain the principles of universal fraternity, peaceful co-
existence and the equality of all human souls.
A significant reflection of modern constitutional monarchy can be deemed 
in the writings of Kautilya which stated that ‘[i]n the happiness of his subjects 
lies [the king’s] happiness; in their welfare his welfare. He shall not consider 
as good only that which pleases him but treat as beneficial to him whatever 
29   Farhad Malekian, Principles of Islamic International Criminal Law: A 
Comparative Search 375 n. 1 (2011).
30   Qu’ran 49:13 (Mohsin Khan).
31   Maudoodi, supra note 25.
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pleases his subjects’.32 Here, Kautilya was stating a king’s obligation to follow 
an order based on dharma. Furthermore, the scripture also attaches some 
qualification on the king himself such as: The king must be a dharmic per-
son (one who follows dharma), always be responsive to what the wishes of 
his people are and lastly, he must be guided by the sound advice of the elder 
statesmen of society when making decisions about the affairs of the State.
With regards to how a dispute should be resolved, Kautilya mandates 
that such disputes are to be judged in accordance with four bases of justice, 
namely-Dharma (based on truth), evidence (based on witness), custom (based 
on the tradition accepted by the people) and lastly, royal edicts (based on law 
as promulgated).33 The concept of right and wrong in Hinduism is contained 
in a collection of sacred scriptures and divine revelations such as the four 
Vedas34 and Dharma sastras. These scriptures include the 108 Upanishads,35 
the 18 Puranas,36 the 100 Up-Puranas and a number of Smritis.37 The Vedic 
texts reflect how peaceful and orderly people engaged in the fulfilment of their 
lives in accordance with Rita are.38 These scriptures are evidence that peace, 
justice, rights and wrong were concepts introduced through Hinduism long 
before they were in the West.
The very notion of dharma alone contains many facets of the modern prin-
ciples of human rights. The word dharma originated from the verbal root dhr, 
which means to uphold or to maintain the law and order or eternal order of the 
world.39 All the dharmas, though articulated in different senses, refer to obliga-
tions that must be fulfilled to maintain and support the individual, the family, 
social class and the whole society.40 In fact, the various dharmas are simply dif-
ferent rules of action one must apply to different stages of life, different social 
class, to being a king or a human being and so on.
On the other hand, dharma used in a legal sense ‘refers to the laws and 
traditions governing society, informing every citizen of the rules governing 
32   Kautilya, The Arthashastra 125 (L.N. Rangarajan trans., 1992) (1987).
33   Id. at 351.
34   Advaita Ashrama, The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad: With the Commentary 
of Sankaracarya (Swami Madhavananda trans., 3rd ed. 1950).
35   Hindu Scriptures (Robert Charles Zaehner trans., 1966).
36   Upendra Nath Ghoshal, A History of Indian Political Ideas: The Ancient 
Period and the Period of Transition to the Middle Ages 580 (1959).
37   Id. at 8.
38   Pratima Bowes, The Hindu Religious Tradition: A Philosophical 
Approach (1976).
39   Subedi, supra note 3.
40   John M. Koller, The Indian Way 62 (1982).
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social life’.41According to Kollar, ‘dharma is usually classified according to the 
requirements of one’s position in society and stage in life, for these represent 
the main factors of time, place and circumstance that determine one’s own 
specific dharma’.42Ariel Glucklich similarly stated that ‘Dharma is not a what, 
it is how: there is the dharma of conduct, of course, and this we usually under-
stand as law and morality’.43 Dharma is the concept of righteousness which is 
used to regulate the relationship between individual, family, community and 
the State.
In its original sense, dharma implies the maintenance of peace and security 
through the rule of law and order within a larger cosmic framework. Therefore, 
perceived this way, the concept of dharma seems to be secular and univer-
sal in nature and has little to no connection with the various Hindu gods and 
goddesses. In fact, Eyffinger rightly states that ‘indeed a quite unique charac-
teristic of ancient Indian thinking with respect to international relations was 
its insistence on universalism. This notion had religious as well as political 
connotations, as is illustrated by the postulated universality of the individual 
soul. In political theory, this concept was exemplified by a view of world gov-
ernment based on non-violence towards all creation and the indiscriminate 
quality of mankind. With regard to inter-state conduct, no distinction was rec-
ognized between believers and non-believers’.44
Since the advent of Hindu philosophy, the religion has championed the idea 
of harmony and fraternity among all individuals and the quality of human 
beings, regardless of any factors such as belief, gender, race or colour which 
are the main cause of discrimination even in the twenty-first century. Indeed, 
it was this non-discriminatory, universalist culture of ancient India and 
Southeast Asia which made it possible for the European traders to establish 
trade with this region of the world on equal terms with that of the natives. 
These traders entered into various treaty relations with these Asian States as 
equal partners and received the benefits of the region’s rich system of trade 
and commerce. During those earlier periods, there existed no issues of inferior 
or superior civilization, and commercial relations between European States 
and Asian States were free from religious bias.
With regard to secularism and peaceful co-existence, Arthasastra con-
tains several mandates which only strengthen the fact that secularism in the 
41   Id. at 12.
42   Id.
43   Ariel Glucklich, The Sense of Adharama 7–8 (1994).
44   Arthur Eyffinger, The International Court of Justice 1946–1996, 204–205 
(1996).
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governance of State affairs, universalism with regard to human approaches 
to the outside world and the principle of peaceful co-existence when dealing 
with foreign powers of different faiths and beliefs, were some key elements 
which were embedded in ancient Hinduism. Alexandrowicz opined that:
Arthasastra constitutes a divorce of politics (internal and external) from 
moral philosophy and creates a dichotomy typical of Brahmin learning 
which contrasted sharply with the Buddhist concept of the supremacy 
of moral law over and above politics. In terms of European philosophy, 
it might be comparable with the efforts of those theologians and lawyers 
who tried to extricate the jusgentium from the grip of theology.45
This gives a genuine outlook to the statement that the concept of human rights 
was well entrenched in the all major beliefs of oriental philosophy. The means 
to suggest to the people their obligation to perform obedience for human rights 
is governed from general stories and, if observed, serves a general utilitarian 
purpose so that people can understand and adapt to practices without having 
to deal with complex ideas. This is largely significant when addressing a large 
portion of society rather than only understanding it as mythical beliefs. The 
concept of human rights is incorporated in every sector and walks of life. It is 
more important that the understanding of such concept is based on acknowl-
edging the capacity of each person to perform such acts.
7 Asian Countries in Development and Origin of Human Rights
We have had a distinct observation on various understanding of oriental 
perspective. The theoretical clarity remained, however, ineffective in the 
implementation and practice of such customs, even more when economic 
development could not serve the people’s needs. In the current situation, a 
homogeneous view of Asian society reflects that particular groups which are 
the governing elites that receive global recognition. To this effect, Asian soci-
eties have also been willing to accept democracy more openly than the past. 
From the mid-twentieth century, political systems lacked the openness and 
democratic nature which justified authoritarianism and incidental suppres-
sion. States understood necessities of democratic institutions and therefore, 
45   Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the 
Law of Nations in the Nations in the East Indies: (16th, 17th and 18th 
Centuries) (1967).
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prioritised their effort on establishing such norms. The Bangkok Declaration, 
which was ratified by all the Asian governments at the 1993 Asian regional pre-
paratory meeting for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, remains 
a relevant example and many of these Asian governments have solid engage-
ments with regard to human rights. Their commitment is admirable. One 
illustration is India who, along with other States, is pledged to human rights 
through its constitutional apparatus with an independent and robust judiciary 
and in spite of several disputes and complications, has tried to sustain the 
struggle for human rights.46
Asia has had a long humanist culture whose progression is associated with 
the formation of norms of behaviour based on consideration and apprecia-
tion for human decency and morality throughout the world. Philosophical 
discourses found in religious mythologies such as Mahabharata or rules and 
customs that maintain rights for the most defenceless groups or individuals 
were included in the Hammurabi Code, the Laws of Manu, the conventions of 
Empress Jingu and the writings of Sima Qian and Confucius.47
In India, there have been instances of jurisprudence principles since around 
4000 B.C. that included descriptions of rules and procedures for civil and crim-
inal cases, specifically concentrating on punishment. The Vedic Rishis always 
urged for the protection of everyone in society, and this was considered as the 
duty of the State or king. Hence, the premise of the rights of individuals is not 
entirely a Western concept.48
The Rig Veda also alludes to three types of civil rights: Tana (body), Skridhi 
(dwelling place) and Jibhasi (life). In the book ‘Hindu Narratives and Human 
Rights’, the author explicates that the Hindu texts include a comprehensive 
and intricate analysis of ‘the particular and universal dimension’ on human 
rights. It involves an examination of the questions that Draupadi asked in the 
Mahabharata after she was coerced to attend the assembly of Kauravas. 
The author also claims that the conflict between Kauravas and the Pandavas, 
with the issue being ownership of land, is also one of, ‘the contested rights’. The 
prevalence of Indian literature which includes both short and long narratives 
like Mahabharata, Ramayana, Panchantantra, Bhagwad Gita, etc. presents the 
debate on human rights in the manner of folk tales and stories. These anec-
dotes have been investigated by the author who assert that Indian thinkers 
46   Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 15 Australian Year Book 
of International Law 1 (1994).
47   Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights, Demystifying Human Rights Protection 
in Asia (2015), https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/FIDH-2015-Demystifying_Human_
Rights_Protection_in_Asia-red.pdf.
48   Giriraj Shah & K.N. Gupta, Human Rights: Free and Equal (2001).
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not only championed for human rights but also exhibited that the violation of 
such rights may have ramifications that ‘extend beyond the individual’.49
The Mahabharata is customarily classified as an archaic oral Indian epic 
which incorporates many significant systems of codes, values and narratives 
for Indians to contemplate on human destinies, births and deaths, the futility 
of war, the nature of divinities, the ambiguous nature of human action and 
unavoidable consequences of individual actions.50
Hinduism itself had some core values which protected and promoted 
human rights. Those rights never came from the West. Hinduism originated 
from and was developed in the Indian sub-continent, which proves that 
human rights existed in this region from the very beginning. In fact, the con-
cept of non-discrimination between believers and non-believers originated in 
India 2000 years ago.51 Moreover, King Ashoka, after the Kalinga War (261 B.C.), 
proclaimed universal peace and respect for the rights of others in the follow-
ing words: ‘His Sacred Majesty Ashoka desires that all living beings should 
have security of existence for which men should exercise self-control and 
not to take by force what others possess. All should enjoy peace of mind by 
co-existence and not by mutual interference and recrimination’.52
Even before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, during the colo-
nial period, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the father of Indian Renaissance, fought 
against the age-old system of Sati (burning of widows in her dead husband’s 
funeral pyre). With his active persuasion, Lord William Bentick, the then-
Governor General of British India, passed the famous Regulation XVII in 1829 
that declared Sati as illegal and punishable by courts.53 Even though the British 
claim it as a Western contribution, as the Act was passed by Lord Bentick, it 
was Raja Ram Mohan Roy who actively raised his voice against it and brought 
it to the attention of the authorities. Despite many challenges, he made it pos-
sible and abolished the Sati system because it was a huge violation of right to 
life. He also condemned polygamy, denounced the caste system, advocated for 
the right of Hindu widows to remarry, etc.
49   Ashok Vohra, Discourse on Human Rights, The Tribune (May 16, 2010), https://www 
.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100516/spectrum/book1.htm (reviewing Arvind Sharma, 
Hindu Narratives on Human Rights (2009)).
50   M.D. Muthukumaraswamy, Mahabharata: Texts and Performances (2017).
51   Nagendra Singh, History of the Law of Nations Regional Developments: South and South-East 
Asia, in Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclopaedia of International Law 237, 239 
(1984).
52   Id. at 241.
53   Priya Soman, Role of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and the Abolition of Sati System in India – A 
Study, 7 International Journal of Development Research 14465, 14466 (2017).
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Carrying this legacy, it was Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, a great academician, 
scholar and social reformer during the colonial period, who championed for 
women’s rights and was the first to marry his son with a widow, which was 
strictly condemned in Indian society. After the abolition of Sati, widows were 
treated in the society like inferior human beings and were looked down upon 
by the entire society. Ishwar Chandra was the first to point out their equal rights 
as human beings and raised the issue of widow remarriage. It was an unimagi-
nable proposal back then. However, because of his contribution towards such 
issues, the Widow Remarriage Act was passed in 1856, making the marriage 
of widows legal.54 Therefore, it not only became a practice in the Indian soci-
ety, but it also turned into a complete law which strengthened the basis of the 
practice through the formal legal system.
Another ancient source of human rights is Babylonian Law, also known 
as Hammurabi’s Code, which was a set of laws and rules formulated by King 
Hammurabi. It encompassed the concept of fair wages, extended protection of 
property and prescribed charges to be heard and proved at trial.55
The Hammurabi Code was written in systematic categories of columns and 
paragraphs which consisted of nearly 300 separate provisions of commer-
cial, criminal and civil law covering contracts, judicial procedures, penalties 
or punishments, including nature of crimes, family relationships, inheritance 
and specific aspects of human rights. The Code contains original examples of 
the right to freedom of speech, presumption of innocence, the right to present 
evidence and the right to a fair trial by judges. It also postulated protections 
for different classes of Babylonian society, including women, widows, orphans, 
the poor and even the slaves. The most important contribution of the Code 
is the enactment of a vital principle of the rule of law which stated that few laws 
are so crucial that they apply to every individual, including the king (State). 
This has cultivated an essential issue for human rights which is reflected in 
the association between duties and rights. There are duties that exist which 
everyone is beholden to, but, if they remain unperformed, others would have 
a right to claim them.56
The precepts of Islam which were made clear 500 years later and were 
acknowledged in the writings of the prophet Muhammad also emphasize the 
54   Ramandeep Kaur, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar – A Great Reformer, My India (Sept. 25, 
2019), https://www.mapsofindia.com/my-india/history/ishwar-chandra-vidyasagar-a 
-great-reformer.
55   Pravin H. Parekh, Human Rights Year Book 2010 (2010).
56   Paul G. Lauren, The Foundations of Justice and Human Rights in Early Legal Texts and 
Thought, in The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law 163 
(2013).
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responsibility or duty ( jard) to protect the well-being of others. It underscores 
a command to safeguard the weakest members of society and to perform char-
ity. The Holy Qur’an covers topics ranging from social justice, the sanctity of 
life, personal safety, mercy, compassion to respect for every individual. Islam 
also realized an affiliation between religious beliefs and the law of a politi-
cal community. The Constitution of Medina, which was written to administer 
the first Islamic State, approached matters of freedom and injustices result-
ing from additional privileges due to a hierarchical tyrannical distinction and 
provided a buffer for individuals by including provisions concerning religious 
tolerance.57
Muhammad Ali Zinnah stated in his speech to the first constituent Assembly 
of Pakistan on September 11, 1947 that:
You are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or 
to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to 
any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of 
the state. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all 
citizens and equal citizens of one State.58
In China, there were several philosophers who advanced their ideas regard-
ing justice and human rights. Mo Tzu (c. 470–391 B.C.) established the Mohist 
school of moral philosophy. During his time, there was constant warfare, vio-
lence and widespread abuse; he denounced acts that were harmful to others 
such as hierarchies and divisions in society that prescribed varying treatment 
and any instance where the powerful suppressed the weak.
He set, as guiding principles, the notion of self-sacrifice, the institution 
of uniform moral standards and the discharge of responsibilities for others’ 
security. MengZi (372–289 B.C.), also known as Mencius, stated that every 
individual inherently shares a common humanity, moral worth, dignity and 
goodness and is able to empathize. He believed that it is the duty of govern-
ments to foster these qualities. He insisted that rulers or kings who indulged 
in oppression and persecution lost the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, relinquishing the 
authority to rule.59
There are several notable leaders who have expounded Buddhism and 
expressed concerns about socio-political issues in the context of human rights 
like Aung San Suu Kyi, A.T. Ariyaratne, Maha Ghosananda and Sulak Sivaraksa. 
57   Ann E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (5th ed. 2012).
58   Subedi, supra note 3.
59   Wm. T. deBary & Weiming Tu, Confucianism and Human Rights (1998).
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There have also been institutions established by Buddhists to promote human 
rights including the Cambodian Institute of Human Rights, the Tibetan 
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy and the Thai National Human 
Rights Commission. Several Asian countries with large Buddhist populations 
(Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) are also members of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) founded 
in 2009.60
8 Conclusion
Hence, the concept of human rights, mainly a post-World War II concept, 
developed largely during the formative years of the United Nations (UN) by 
Western countries. Even though there is no other option other than to agree-
ing that the East does not have sufficient evidence or literature to establish 
that human rights existed in this region prior to the establishment of the 
UN, merely accepting human rights as a Western concept for the sole reason 
stated above is to ignore the practices of other great ancient civilizations of the 
world. This clearly undermines the existence and practice of human rights in 
the Asian region. Due to the denial of scholars and academicians of the West, 
who mostly dominated the legal literature, that this notion that human rights 
is a Western concept has now been wrongly established, whereas the trend of 
human rights practice and development was in existence in Asia much before 
it was even thought of by the West.
It is true that human rights norms have not been guaranteed to the people 
in large sections of Asian societies. However, certain generations of poverty 
cannot wipe out the positive aspect a society possesses. Eastern philosophy, in 
its distinct and very similar connotation as highlighted, has brought appropri-
ate, generalized and existing concepts of welfare and security. It is true that 
there is not much clarity regarding the democratic foundation of the State 
practice. However, States are realizing the importance of such institution to 
ensure that people’s human rights are upheld and to avoid anarchy. It can be 
observed that isolated communities forced into a consumer market requires 
time to adapt and manifest its values and tradition. Therefore, not merely 
taking it as a hostile situation, Western States should avoid the tendency to 
compare the nature and concept of human rights in binary opposites.
60   Damien V. Keown, Are There “Human Rights” in Buddhism?, 2 Journal of Buddhist 
Ethics 3 (1995).
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The tendency of the colonial power to wrongfully undertake communi-
ties, other than Western communities, as uncivilized should not be practiced. 
Therefore, the concept of Asian societies and Eastern philosophy should be 
recognised. The development of human rights and the inclusion of the con-
cept of human rights should not be under the veil of mythical or primitive 
perspective. Rather than analyses of concepts such as mutual cohesion and 
equality which was effectively practiced, the concept of human rights should 
be extensively reviewed and included to maintain a better framework of 
human rights for all.
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Subcontinental Defiance to the Global  




This article emerges from, among other factors, my identity and my lived expe-
riences and understanding of South Asian history. Those who had firsthand 
experiences of the malaises of the Partition of India in 1947 are long gone, and 
the current generation of people have effectively become “custodians of such 
collective memory” that have been deeply etched in the identity and ethos 
of a subcontinental being.1 The memories of the Partition of India, though 
not mainstream, serve to signify the development of modern-day South Asia 
and also “humanize and pluralize Partition stories” – characteristics that 
escaped British imagination and colonial historiographies which projected 
distorted tropes that served to demonize the subaltern and further their own 
political goals.2 I believe that I too have the responsibility to not only articu-
late such memories through academic interventions, but also provide some 
steps towards understanding refugee history that has overlooked the subjec-
tive experiences of displacement in the aftermath of the Partition. This article 
forms a small part of a larger project – to write into international refugee law 
the alternate modes of international protection that resist and challenge the 
Eurocentric and hegemonic norms as outlined by the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, which projects a faux universality with respect to 
its application.
The article’s objective is to analyze the marginalization of South Asian experi-
ences of refugeehood and provide some insights into the alternate mechanisms 
of refugee protection that have been developed in response. The first part of 
this article will engage in discussions on South Asian states’ relationship to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. While many scholars have 
*  Doctoral Candidate (2015–2020), Department of Law and Legal Studies, Carleton University, 
Canada.
1   Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan xxv 
(2017).
2   Id.
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called for South Asian nations to sign and ratify the 1951 Convention, this arti-
cle will rationalize the regional disillusionment to the Convention’s approach. 
The second part of the article will attempt to engage with discussions on Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and its role in understanding 
South Asian approach to the global refugee regime, in an attempt to decenter 
the narrative to bring postcolonial states within the purview of such discus-
sions. The third part of the article will articulate moments of defiance with the 
help of case law and archival records. The article will conclude with a short 
analysis on the significance of alternate locations of practice to enable a more 
holistic understanding of the global refugee regime.
A rich body of literature has analyzed the Partition and its repercussions on 
the subcontinent’s reconstruction after the formal end to colonialism. However, 
a regional myopia is noticeable in its understanding.3 The Partition of India 
should be understood as a global event akin to post-WWII reconstruction of 
Western Europe that also resulted in mass displacement across newly formed 
nation-states. As Vazira Zamindar outlines the mechanics of the Partition, sim-
ilarities of such dispossession and disenfranchisement can be drawn from the 
European experience. She explains: “[A] Partition Council began exacting 
the task of counting and dividing the vast machinery of colonial statecraft into 
two – everything from tables and chairs, weather instruments and military 
hardware, to railway engineers and office clerks.”4 Millions were dispossessed 
by both India and Pakistan as a result of this violent end to formal colonial-
ism. Stories of the Partition invoke and capture the quintessential nature of “all 
the aporias of belonging in a cartography of nation-states. Where … is India? 
Where is Pakistan? Who is Indian? Who is Pakistani?”5
The international community’s response to the displacement in Western 
Europe post-WWII was accompanied by institutionalization of refugee protec-
tion mechanisms. However, contemporaneous displacement during and after 
the Partition of India did not capture as much attention at an international 
level. This article argues that displacement was as much a defining feature of the 
Partition of India as it was during post-WWII reconstruction of Europe. Despite 
forced displacement being a defining feature across the globe during this time, 
much of the literature has extensively focused on the latter. This article will 
attempt to demonstrate the gaps that persist with respect to conceptualizing 
forced displacement in South Asia. Given the lack of deeper examination of 
3   Id. at xxi.
4   Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of 
Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories 1 (1st ed. 2010).
5   Id. at 2.
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refugee protection in the region, this article will establish how resistance to the 
global refugee regime has been articulated with the establishment and imple-
mentation of ad-hoc alternatives to hegemonic refugee protection.
1.1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
The international community’s efforts in post-WWII repatriation of European 
refugees and forced migrants were marked by the United Nations proposing 
the “assimilation of all stateless persons, including refugees, under a new inter-
national regime.”6 Despite political antagonism that proved to be obstacles 
to effectively actualizing a holistic vision of refugee protection, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established and an 
effective international refugee protection instrument was proposed, i.e., the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.7 The Convention was 
viewed as the cornerstone in refugee protection norms. It was also an attempt 
to codify legally binding international refugee protection mechanisms. Given 
that the Convention was built on the heels of post-WWII disenfranchise-
ment in Europe, the definition of a refugee was constrained temporally and 
geographically.8 This meant that the Convention applied only to those who 
were fleeing specific circumstances, during specific periods in history, in 
Europe.9 The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees abolished the 
temporal and geographical restrictions so as to allow for a more univer-
sal application of the 1951 Convention’s norms.10 Despite the 1967 Protocol 
removing the temporal and spatial constraints, South Asian States remained 
disillusioned with the Refugee Convention’s core objectives. Perhaps for this 
6    James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law 91 
(2005).
7    Id.
8    See id. at 96.
9    Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention (For the purposes of the present Convention, 
the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who: As a result of events occurring before 
1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is out-
side the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it); Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees art. 1(A)(2), opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force 
Apr. 22, 1954).
10   Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 8791 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
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reason, States in the region have instead chosen to regard refugee protection 
as matters between States and have reasserted their position that the Conven-
tion and Protocol fail to capture the experiences of displacement in the region 
by not ratifying these instruments.
1.2 Imprecision of the Global Refugee Regime
Over the years, a growing body of academic literature and judicial interven-
tions have interrogated normative characterizations of forced displacement, 
which has led to problematizing pre-existing narratives on this issue. McAdam 
and Goodwin-Gill argue that the current refugee regime “imperfectly [covers] 
what ought to be a situation of exception” and continues to be an incomplete 
legal framework.11 The refugee framework was established in light of conflicts 
and upheavals faced by the international community, which caused mass 
migration and disenfranchisement. Hathaway points out that the system 
of protection for refugees was imprecise and did not clearly set up specific 
responsibilities for states. The initial perception of the refugee protection, 
as a temporary mechanism, also added to the imprecision.12 The current sys-
tem of refugee protection “rejects the goal of comprehensive protection for 
all involuntary migrants.”13 The responsibility of states to step in to protect 
those involuntary migrants is limited. Additionally, Hathaway argues that the 
assistance provided to refugees is done so without taking into account their 
subjective experiences, due to the standardized characterization of a refugee.14 
Existing refugee protection mechanisms only take into account the asylum 
states’ well-being and are the result of an uneasy “compromise between the 
sovereign prerogative of states to control immigration and the reality of 
coerced movements of persons at risk.”15 This compromise results in a weak 
framework and a “narrow scope of legal protection,” as it fails to meet the 
needs of forced migrants.16
Gil Loescher in his work also points to the shortcomings and limitations 
of the current refugee protection framework. By problematizing the current 
characterization of refugees, Loescher argues that a majority of forced or 
11   Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 1 
(3rd ed. 2007).
12   Id. at 86.
13   James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 
Harvard International Law Journal 129, 132 (1990).
14   See id.
15   Id. at 133.
16   Id.
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involuntary migrants today are fleeing circumstances other than those outlined 
in the 1951 Convention.17 State incompetence and failure are more prominent 
circumstances as opposed to state persecution. By pointing to the example 
of the decade long economic and political disarray in Zimbabwe in the early 
2000s, Loescher argues that only small minority of those who fled the coun-
try were doing so due to individualized persecution.18 He points to normative 
gaps in the current framework of refugee protection by arguing that wide-
spread human rights deprivations, state fragility and environmental distresses 
have also caused displacement in recent years. Loescher calls for a better 
understanding of human mobility to better afford protection for those facing 
such crises.19
2 Regional Disillusionment to the Refugee Regime
2.1 From the League of Nations to the United Nations
India’s experience with refugee protection predated post-Partition displace-
ment. A founding member of the League of Nations,20 India had provided 
assistance, sanctuary, and identity certificates to Russian refugees21 and 
refugees from the Saar.22 As part of efforts to settle Jewish refugees in India, 
a Jewish colony was created in the suburbs of Delhi to aid those expelled 
from Germany.23
17   Gil Loescher, Human Rights and Forced Migration, in Human Rights: Politics and 
Practice 311 (Michael Goodhart ed., 3rd ed. 2016).
18   Id.
19   Id.
20   Lanka Sundaram, The International Status of India, 9(4) Journal of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 452, 455 (1930).
21   File No.: C1435/331/Rr.401/001/9/33, Distribution of Nansen Stamp – India (30 May 1928). 
[League of Nations Archives, Geneva]. This file contains a series of memoranda, and cor-
respondence that took place between representatives of the Economic and Overseas 
Department of the India Office and the Nansen International Office for Refugees, on 
Russian Refugees in India.
22   Dossier No 20A/22493/19255, Feb. 20, 1936 (League of Nations Archives, Geneva). At the 
Imperial War Conference of 1917, India was granted special representation on an equal 
footing with the self-governing dominions and played an important role in various inter-
national conferences. See Sundaram, supra note 20, at 454 n. 20.
23   Letter from Indian civil servant Badri Prasad Mital to The Right Honourable Edward 
Fredrick Lindley Wood, Baron Irwin of Kirby Underdale on the ‘Proposed Settlement 
of Jewish Refugees in India’ (Jan. 16, 1939), in Settlement of Jewish Refugees in India, 
FO 371/24098/1737, Registry No W 1737/1737/48 (National Archives, London). The request 
was forwarded by A. Dibdin, Esq, India Office to AWG Randall, Esq, Foreign Office 
(Document No P & J 671/39 in the same file, dated 17 February 1939). The request was 
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Despite India’s engagement in these processes, it was with mixed senti-
ments. Some Indian nationalist leaders declared that “the League of Nations 
was a fraud and was meant for the perpetuation of imperialism”,24 while a 
member of India’s Council of State, Phiroz Sethna, argued that “India cannot 
take her rightful place in international affairs unless she has her right place as 
a nation”.25 India subsequently became a full member of the United Nations 
while it was still under British rule.26
2.2 Partition of India and Drafting of the Convention
The Partition of India, which divided British India into India and Pakistan, con-
stituted a violent end to formal colonialism in South Asia and resulted in mass 
displacement across newly created international borders – Hindus and Sikhs 
to India, and Muslims to Pakistan.27 Both States faced tremendous challenges 
in responding to the protection needs of the displaced, which led to “extraor-
dinary interventions”28 and the groups being pitted against one another.29 This 
coincided with the early deliberations for a post-war international refugee 
treaty. Reflecting on these deliberations during a visit to Europe in 1946, India’s 
Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, stated that “[the] outstanding and over- 
all impression left on my mind are very limited reference to our internal 
problems and difficulties”,30 a matter that coloured both India and Pakistan’s 
engagement with the formal drafting process of the Refugee Convention.
After the Partition, India and Pakistan attempted to engage construc-
tively with the formal drafting process of what was to become the Refugee 
Convention.31 A UN General Assembly resolution adopted in January 1946 
stated that the “main task concerning displaced persons [was] to encourage 
and assist in every way possible their early return to their countries of origin”.32 
subsequently approved by the latter without objection on 23 February 1939, as per a 
handwritten note in the same document.
24   R.P. Anand, The Formation of International Organizations and India: A Historical Study, 23 
Leiden Journal of International Law 5, 12 (2010).
25   Id. at 13.
26   Id. at 17.
27   Zamindar, supra note 4, at 1.
28   Khan, supra note 1, at xxiii.
29   Zamindar, supra note 4, at 1.
30   Government of India, External Affairs Department, Report by V.K. Krishna Menon on 
Visits to Various European Capitals, at 41 (Government of India Press 1946) (cited in Oberoi 
18 n. 1).
31   Pia Oberoi, South Asia and the Creation of the International Refugee Regime, 19(5) Refuge 
36, 38 (2001).
32   ‘The Question of Refugees, UNGA res. 8(I) (Jan. 29, 1946). See also Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organization (adopted Dec. 15, 1946, entered into force Aug. 20, 
1948) 18 UNTS 3.
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At the 77th meeting of the Third Committee on Social, Humanitarian and 
Cultural Questions, the representative from Pakistan drew attention to that 
resolution and stated that “[to] avoid disturbing friendly relations between 
nations, refugees should not be settled in a region in which the majority of 
the inhabitants were opposed to such resettlement”.33 The representative 
noted that the resolution provided that States should be willing to encour-
age and assist in every possible way the early return of persons of concern to 
their country of nationality or habitual residence. However, given the unique 
circumstances of the Partition of India, which created new borders along 
ethno-religious lines, the idea of returning people to their place of habitual 
residence or country of nationality could not be considered. At a subsequent 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting in 1949, India sought to rec-
ognize its efforts in assisting refugees during the Second World War. However, 
from 1947 onwards it had been faced with its own refugee problem, post-
Partition, and ‘had been unable to give anything more than moral support to 
the International Refugee Organization’.34 The Indian representative pointed 
out that this ‘was not from lack of sympathy with its aims, but from lack of 
resources’.35 Despite their initial reluctance, India and Pakistan continued to 
engage with the formal drafting process of the Refugee Convention. However, 
both States expressed concerns on various issues, most importantly the defini-
tion of a refugee. Noting the option contained in article 1B of the Convention 
to limit the definition to people displaced on account of ‘events occurring 
in Europe before 1 January 1951’, the representative from Pakistan ‘was of the 
opinion that the definition … should not be limited by any territorial bound-
aries’, and furthermore expressed the hope ‘that the scope of the definition 
would be extended by the General Assembly so as to cover unfortunate people 
both inside and outside the boundaries of Europe’.36 In separate meetings of 
the Third Committee, India and Pakistan’s permanent representatives to the 
United Nations requested that the Convention address racial and religious dis-
crimination directed towards some refugees.37 They also expressly requested 
33   Third Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions, Summary Record of the 
Seventy Seventh Meeting held at Lake Success, New York (Nov. 6, 1947), U.N. Doc. AC.3/
SR.77, 189 (statement of Mrs. Hussain).
34   Economic and Social Council, Summary Record of the Ninth Session, Three Hundred and 
Twenty-Sixth Meeting (Aug. 6, 1949) U.N. Doc. E/SR.326, 628 (statement of Mr. Desai).
35   Id.
36   Economic and Social Council, Summary Record of the Eleventh Session, Four Hundred 
and Sixth Meeting (Aug. 11, 1950) U.N. Doc. E/SR.406, 278 (statement of Mr. Amin).
37   Third Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions, Summary Record 
of the Seventy Ninth Meeting, held at Lake Success, New York (Nov. 7, 1947) U.N. Doc. 
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that displacement resulting from the Partition be addressed. However, they 
were met with resistance, resulting in their disillusionment with both the 
Convention and UNHCR’s mandate.38 India stated that the ‘objections raised 
confirmed [their] belief that fundamental differences existed’.39
Despite efforts to draw attention to post-Partition displacement the inter-
national community failed to see this as a situation of mass displacement. 
The complex history of the Partition of India captures the depth of dispos-
session and disenfranchisement of South Asians amidst incomprehensible 
bureaucratic and physical violence that was the result of cartographic divi-
sions mapped on to people. States in the region were left to find solutions in 
their own terms given the international community’s disregard. Pakistan, for 
instance, included muhajir or refugee as a category in its 1951 census. Muhajirs 
were those who had moved to Pakistan as ‘a result of Partition or fear of dis-
turbances connected therewith.’40 The newly formed government of Pakistan 
provided them settlement in urban areas in the province of Sindh. Similarly, 
India and Pakistan signed the 1950 Nehru-Liaquat Pact whereby the two gov-
ernments agreed to protect people who had been displaced as a result of 
violence along religious lines.41 The pact also guaranteed minorities through-
out ‘complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of 
security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom 
of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and 
worship, subject to law and morality’.42 South Asian States’ responses to mass 
exodus since the Partition of India show that, in essence, they have adhered 
to the core principle of non-refoulement in article 33 of the Convention.43 A 
number of ad hoc mechanisms have developed to provide sanctuary, material 
assistance, and protection to refugees. Tibetan, Sri Lankan, and Bangladeshi 
refugees in India, Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, 
AC.3/SR.79, 200 (statement of Mr. Sen). See also Third Committee 189 n 9 (statement of 
Mrs. Hussain).
38   Oberoi, supra note 31, at 42.
39   Third Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions, Summary Record of the 
Eightieth Meeting held at Lake Success, New York (Nov. 7, 1947) U.N. Doc. AC.3/SR.80, 211 
(statement of Mr. Sen).
40   Id.
41   Agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan regarding Security and 
Rights of Minorities (adopted Apr. 8, 1950) 1 India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements 243 
(Nehru-Liaquat Agreement) https://mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/PA50B1228.pdf 
[last visited Apr. 30, 2020].
42   Id. para. A.
43   Veerabhadran Vijayakumar, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Protection in South Asia, 19(2) 
Refuge 10 (2001).
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and Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh have all been provided either temporary 
sanctuary or long-term protection.44
2.3 A Myth of Difference: Racialization of the Refugee Regime
B.S. Chimni’s work suggests another reason for regional disillusionment from a 
more contemporary sense. He argues that a new approach that challenged the 
established notions of refugee law “created the myth of difference (the idea 
that great dissimilarities characterized refugee flows in Europe and the Third 
World).”45 The myth of difference contributed to an understanding that “the 
nature and character of refugee flows in the Third World were represented 
as being radically different from refugee flows in Europe since the end of the 
First World War.”46 This approach created “an image of a ‘normal’ refugee” 
who could be identified as “white, male and anti-communist – which clashed 
sharply with individuals fleeing the Third World.”47 This approach, as Chimni 
argues, not only created an inherent difference in the way forced migration was 
perceived in the Third World, but also laid the blame of disproportionate refu-
gee flows on postcolonial states. This underestimated the role that colonialism 
played in creating such instabilities and postcolonial anxieties of individuals.
Such a disparate perception of groups of refugees originating from the Global 
South is not new, given the exclusion of such narratives during the establish-
ment stage of the Convention. The subcontinent’s disillusionment with the 
global refugee regime could also be attributed to the racialized and colonial 
origins of the idea of ‘human,’48 which resulted in a widespread disposses-
sion and disenfranchisement in the region. As Mayblin argues, the myth of 
difference, in addition to historically constrained notions of persecution, was 
foundational in conceptualizing specific practices of international protection; 
this points to the “hegemonic epistemology of colonial modernity  … as the 
most adequate framework within which one might begin to understand 
the exclusionary politics of asylum today.”49 The inadequacy of integrat-
ing postcolonial anxieties, theories of race and racism within the historical 
development of the global refugee regime is essential to understanding South 
Asia’s disillusionment.
44   Id. at 9.
45   B.S. Chimni, The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South, 11 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 350, 350 (1998).
46   Id. at 351.
47   Id.
48   Lucy Mayblin, Asylum After Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of 
Asylum Seeking 30 (2017).
49   Id.
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The effects of the Partition of India are far-reaching and have continued to 
define the experiences of modern-day South Asia. However, as Khan points 
out, the Partition risks being viewed as an exceptional circumstance that 
induced massive mobility across such borders. Such understandings further 
place the history of displacement that foregrounded the founding of modern-
day South Asia, beyond the means of comparative accounts. This has resulted 
in the systematic silencing of post-Partition woes of many who continue to feel 
its effects.50
While the objective is not to subsume the subcontinent’s colonial and post-
colonial refugee history into European or Western history, it is significant to 
note that this narrative of exclusivity has largely left out questions on what 
constitutes forced displacement or who can be identified as a refugee in South 
Asia, which could serve as a rationale for regional disillusionment. Despite the 
Partition of India resulting in one of the largest displacements in the 20th cen-
tury that were comparable to the events of post-WWII Europe, they failed to 
make an impact on the establishment of the international protection frame-
work that characterized refugeehood based on strict characteristics that were 
uniquely European and excluded the experiences of the subcontinent.51 A 
narrow definition of what constituted persecution or its well-founded nature, 
under the auspices of the 1951 Convention, failed to capture the subjective 
experiences of colonial violence within its purview. As Zamindar argues, the 
subcontinent’s experience of colonial and postcolonial displacements “has 
largely gone unexamined … because of its peripheral location to postwar inter-
national order.”52
3 TWAIL and Its Impact on Understanding South Asian Perspectives 
on the Refugee Regime
It is evident that refugee frameworks that pre-existed the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol have mandated states 
to operate under the terms as set out by Eurocentric norms. States contravening 
such terms have been viewed as transgressors. This legacy of Eurocentricity has 
continued to be the basis for the current refugee framework as well. The nar-
ratives on India’s relationship to an international legal framework like that of 
the global refugee regime have often been viewed as a form of ‘subcontinental 
50   Khan, supra note 1, at xxiii.
51   Zamindar, supra note 4, at 6.
52   Id. at 6–7.
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defiance.’ This then begs the question on whether ‘Indian exceptionalism’ 
with respect to the global refugee regime could be viewed as a defiant or devi-
ant position.
At the heart of TWAIL is the idea that Western states have always enjoyed a 
sense of dominance through presumed superiority, enabling them to suggest 
other nations are like-minded when it comes to the international legal order.53 
They have not only been successful in maintaining the status quo of imbalance 
inherent in international law but have also been instrumental in establish-
ing the rules governing that legal order. This perpetuates the West’s practice 
and tendency to use global legal institutions to continuously persecute and 
demonize the Global South.54 At the heart of this lies international law’s deep 
connections to structures of power and inequality. However, international 
legal order remains a contested space in which some states continue to chal-
lenge this sense of hegemony through their acts of defiance and resistance by 
developing ad-hoc and parallel mechanisms towards international protection 
of refugees. Jan Hendrik Willem Verzijl in his 1957 article wrote:
Now there is one truth that is not open to denial or even to doubt, namely 
that the actual body of international law, as it stands today, not only is 
the product of the conscious activity of the European mind, but has also 
drawn its vital essence from a common source of [European] beliefs, and 
in both of these aspects it is mainly of Western European origin.55
This quote is reinforced in the work of Antony Anghie, who argues that “inter-
national law regards colonialism … and … non-European societies and their 
practices  … as peripheral to the discipline  … because international law was 
a creation of Europe.”56 This sense is reflected clearly in several frameworks 
of international law, more specifically the global refugee regime. As men-
tioned earlier, South Asia’s sidelining during the initial discussions around 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is a clear example. 
This goes to the heart of what Anghie describes: “[c]olonialism … [is] far from 
53   See Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns 
in the International Legal Order 6 (2004).
54   Id.
55   J.H.W. Verzijl, Western European Influence on the Foundation of International Law, 1 David 
Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies Annual Memorial 
Lecture 137 (1957). 
56   Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, in 
27 Third World Quarterly 739, 739 (2006).
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being peripheral to the discipline of international law [as it] is central to its 
formation.”57 The false sense of universalism projected by international law 
frameworks is the result of colonialism.58 As a result of the process by which 
positivist jurists devised doctrines founded on “explicitly racial and cultural 
criteria to decree certain states [and peoples as] civilized,”59 non-European 
societies were sidelined and expelled from the realm of international law 
since they were considered devoid of any cognizable legal personality. Such 
societies, in the eyes of the Europeans, were incapable of raising any objec-
tions to dispossession and disenfranchisement which were integral parts of 
conquest and exploitation.60 Therefore, it is easy to recognize the systematic 
process by which colonialism managed to define and subsume personhood 
and identity of colonial subjects within the bounds of European experience, 
which then enabled the entrenchment of a deeply flawed system of interna-
tional legal order that continued to advance the interests of hegemonic states 
in the Global North.61
Finally, international law frameworks like the 1951 Convention can be viewed 
as exclusionary from TWAIL lens. As Anghie points out, with the emergence of 
colonial territories into sovereign states, their involvement in and challenges to 
the predominant system were viewed as a disruption to the pre-existing global 
legal order.62 International law, which was undoubtedly European in nature, 
began to view newly independent states as outsiders who had to be accommo-
dated within the system. The lack of reflexivity is clear from the establishment 
of the Convention as European solution to a European problem. While the 
Convention deemed those disenfranchised post-WWII in Europe as worthy of 
protection, postcolonial anxieties that led to mass displacement across newly 
created international borders in the subcontinent failed to feature within 
this framework. This clearly captures the notion that non-European states 
and their issues were viewed as “peripheral to … international law.”63 Larger 
European states continue to find ways to exclude and marginalize states in the 
Global South with the help of the international law that the former created.
57   Id. at 742.
58   Id. 
59   Id. at 745.
60   Id.
61   Id.
62   Id. at 740.
63   Id. at 739.
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4 Deviance v. Defiance: How is Resistance to Hegemony Expressed by 
South Asia?
Having established that the existing global refugee regime constitutes an 
imperfect and incomplete framework in providing protection to people of 
concern, it is critical to confront the historical imbalances that have defined 
the development of the regime. TWAIL has certainly proven to be a convenient 
crucible for theoretical musings to identify structures that are inherently dis-
advantageous to the welfare of Third World states and peoples. This emerges 
from B.S Chimni’s criticisms of TWAIL, the very discipline and scholarship he 
helped propel; he argues that “[u]nfortunately, TWAIL … has [never] been able 
to effectively critique neo-liberal international law or project an alternative 
vision of international law.”64 However, this argument questions the efficacy 
of TWAIL and “bemoans [the] collective failure [of Third World] to articulate 
an alternative to the mainstream international legal regime.”65 As Al Attar and 
Miller argue, despite decades of TWAIL scholarship “redress[ing] the historical 
biases that  … undermine Third World well-being[,]” power imbalances con-
tinue to persist.66 For instance, this is evident from the lacunae that exists in 
contextualizing forced migration in South Asia. The newly independent states 
in the region were compelled to establish reactionary or ad-hoc measures to 
protect forced migrants. This echoes Al Attar and Miller’s counter argument 
to Chimni’s prevailing view of Third World states’ inability to articulate a 
cohesive counter-vision to structural imbalances. Al Attar and Miller argue 
that the clarity in this vision is not for the states’ lack of trying but the “result 
of … forceful counter-challenges waged by First World actors, unmoved by the 
Third World plight.”67
However, India’s role in developing ad-hoc protection mechanisms con- 
tinues to be met with reproach. For instance, a March 2008 article titled 
India Needs a Refugee Law in the Economic and Political Weekly by Saurabh 
Bhattacharjee quite articulately presents a case for India’s need to develop a 
comprehensive domestic refugee law, while simultaneously adhering to its 
64   B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, in The Third 
World and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization 47, 48 
(Antony Anghie, B.S. Chimni, Karin Mickelson & Obiora Okafor eds., 2003).
65   Mohsen Al Attar & Rosalie Miller, Towards an Emancipatory International Law: The 
Bolivarian Reconstruction, 31 Third World Quarterly 347, 348 (2010).
66   Id. at 347.
67   Id. 
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commitments and obligations to customary international law.68 The arguments 
are based on the Constitution of India that presents a directive principle that 
India shall envisage to respect international law and treaty obligations.69 While 
the article acknowledges that India’s disillusionment with the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees was based on the framework’s Eurocentrism, 
it criticizes India for seeking assistance from the UNHCR during the arrival 
of Iranian and Afghan refugees in the 1980s. Bhattacharjee also makes the 
assumption that India has absolved itself of its responsibilities towards 
the principles of non-refoulement and other refugee protection standards by 
not acceding to the Convention.70 He concludes by arguing that “Indian law and 
practice provides a distorted and incomplete protection to refugees [and] … 
fails to recognize them as a distinct category of persons.”71 Bhattacharjee goes 
on to say that India has failed in its commitments to human rights standards 
and has denied basic protection to a large number of refugees.
Bhattacharjee’s characterization of India as divergent with respect to its 
commitments to refugee protection is not uncommon given the predominant 
narrative expressed by the international community to characterize non- 
signatory states. The ongoing policies and legislative interventions of the 
Indian government, namely the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, certainly 
point to such indifference. However, a more pragmatic approach to India’s 
disillusionment with the international frameworks like the Convention and 
the Protocol provides a more comprehensive view of some of the regional or 
national developments on refugee protection. Historically, India has shown 
resistance to the global refugee regime, which moderately embodies the 
vision of TWAIL scholarship and provides an opportunity to actualize some 
of the visions to temper the pre-existing structural imbalances in the global 
refugee regime.
4.1 Examples of Resistance
For instance, in the 1960s, when Tibetan Refugees arrived in India, then Prime 
Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru declined the assistance of the Office of 
the UNHCR on the basis that India’s treatment of Tibetan refugees would 
be internationally inspected and scrutinized. Non-cooperation was demon-
strable from India’s rejection of a proposal to have a UNHCR representative 
68   Saurabh Bhattacharjee, India Needs a Refugee Law, 43 Economic and Political 
Weekly 71 (2008).
69   Id. at 72.
70   Id.
71   Id. at 74.
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present in the country to oversee the operations of resettling Tibetan refugees. 
A deep sense of paternalism and colonial characterization of the conditions 
of refugees in India is also obvious from another Interoffice Memorandum 
between the UNHCR Representative from London and the UNHCR Geneva 
dated January 8, 1963.72 This particular memorandum refers to the visit of Lady 
Alexandra Metcalfe (daughter of the former Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon) to 
India to inspect the status of Tibetan refugees. References were being made 
not only to the “deplorable conditions of Indian citizens” but also to India’s 
“apathy towards Tibetan refugees.”73
The archives also show an Interoffice Memorandum dated November 6, 
1961 from Gilbert Jaeger, then Deputy Director of the Office of the UNHCR in 
Geneva, during the peak of the Tibetan refugee influx in India. The memo 
referred to the visit of a representative Mr. P.N. Sharma from an Indian-based 
NGO Lok Kalyan Samiti.74 The memorandum indicated that Mr. Sharma had 
asserted that the UNHCR “could not and should not impose its assistance upon 
the Indian government and could not start collecting aid for Tibetan refugees 
in India in the present circumstances.”75
One final moment of resistance can also be noticed with the rejection 
of international institutions to be established and accredited in India with 
respect to resettling Tibetan refugees in India. A letter dated January 25, 1962 
from the Central Relief Committee’s General Secretary Mr. Kalyan Singh Gupta 
to Mr. Gilbert Jaeger shows that the Government of India was welcoming aid 
from voluntary organizations, be they foreign or Indian. However, Mr. Gupta 
made it abundantly clear that the Central Relief Committee was the agency 
“responsible for receiving and coordinating such aid.”76 Mr. Gupta asserted 
that such circumstances mandated that aid would be acceptable “provided 
these are made direct to the Central Relief Committee India, which is the 
operative agency.”77
72   Memorandum from the UNHCR Rep. London on Tibetan Refugees to the High Comm’r 
for Refugees, G.XV.1.15/46 – 4/11 (Jan. 8, 1963).
73   Id.
74   Interoffice Memorandum from Gilbert Jaeger, Deputy Dir. of the High Comm’r, on Tibetan 
Refugees in India – Visit of Shri PN Sharma, File No. 11/1-15/0/IND/TIB (Nov. 6, 1961) 
(UNHCR Archives, Geneva).
75   Id.
76   Letter from Kalyan Singh Gupta, Gen. Secretary of the Central Relief Committee (India) 
to Gilbert Jaeger, Deputy Dir. Off. of the High Comm’r for Refugees, File No. 11/1-15/0/IND/
TIB, Ref. No. 16(62)-9030 (Jan. 25, 1962) (UNHCR Archives, Geneva).
77   Id.
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The archival documents demonstrate India’s resistance to the global refugee 
regime and international assistance. The assertion of an independent over-
sight body to extend protection to refugees also demonstrates the rejection of 
normativity with which refugees were being characterized under the refugee 
regime. This was one of the many moments of the subcontinent’s defiance and 
iconoclasm to an assumed universality of a Eurocentric global refugee regime. 
This also provides a glimpse into an alternate location of practice of refugee 
protection that has been in existence in the global sphere for several decades.
Despite non-accession to international refugee law instruments, states in 
the region have continued to provide protection in a way that is different from 
Western notions. For instance, from a contemporary sense, South Asian states 
are not new to widespread involuntary migration. The Partition of India in 
1947, the Tibetan influx of the 1960s, the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 
and the Sri Lankan Civil War that ravaged the island nation for close to three 
decades from the 1980s have all led to massive human mobility within the 
region. South Asian states are also experiencing an influx of Rohingya refu-
gees from Myanmar in the recent years. However, the relegation of South Asia’s 
contextual specificities by a hegemonic refugee framework has resulted in the 
establishment of domestic ad-hoc solutions to respond to periods of human 
mobility in the region. In addition to the constraints and imprecisions inher-
ent in the international refugee regime, nuancing refugeehood in countries 
that do not possess a national asylum law is more complex.
4.2 Case Law and Jurisprudence
An examination of such ad-hoc solutions also points to the fact that coun-
tries like India have developed policies, complex case laws and jurisprudence 
to tackle issues of refugee protection despite not being signatories to the 1951 
Convention. For instance, the case of Khudiram Chakma v. State of Arunachal 
Pradesh78 emerged from a writ petition filed by Chakmas, a group that sought 
refuge in India from Bangladesh in 1964. Under a resettlement scheme drawn 
up in 1996, the Chakmas were resettled to the North East Frontier Agency, 
which later became the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. However, a few years 
later, local villagers lodged complaints against the Chakmas alleged that they 
were encroaching on their lands and dealing with arms and ammunition.79 
An enquiry into the matter led to the Chakmas being vacated and moved back. 
The Supreme Court of India looked into Article 14 of the Universal Declaration 
78   State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Chakma, (1994) 1 SCC 615 (India).
79   Id.
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of Human Rights80 to uphold the obligation of refugee protection. Though the 
principle of non-refoulement marks the foundation of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Supreme Court of India in its own defiant 
sense held that Chakma refugees who had escaped persecution in Bangladesh 
could not be forcibly sent back due to the threats they may have faced. The 
Court further held that this could in turn result in the deprivation of their right 
to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.81
This approach was further reinforced in the case of National Human Rights 
Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh.82 This emerged from a public inter-
est petition, filed by the National Human Rights Commission and sought to 
enforce the rights, under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.83 The Court in 
the National Human Rights Commission case held that “[the] Constitution 
confers certain rights on every human being and certain other rights on citi-
zens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection 
of the laws.”84 The Court in this case also held that the “[s]tate is bound to 
protect the life and personal liberty of every human being, be he a citizen or 
otherwise, and it cannot permit anybody or group of persons … to threaten the 
Chakmas to leave the State,” and included state institutions must take steps 
to “carry out its legal obligations to safeguard the life, health and well-being 
of Chakmas residing in the state without being inhibited by local politics.”85 
A brief analysis of case law and archival analysis provides an indication that 
an alternative regime of protection is noticeable in refugee protection in the 
region. The larger research agenda is to present findings on whether there is 
coherence in the way the refugee definition has been applied in alternate loca-
tions of practice like the subcontinent.
The case of Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v Union of India originated from 
a special civil application to the High Court of Gujarat, which sought direc-
tion to release two Iraqi asylum seekers from detention in the western Indian 
state of Gujarat.86 The petitioners sought a stay of deportation, based on the 
principle of non-refoulement, and release from detention. The court noted 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in NHRC that the Constitution guarantees certain 
80   Id.
81   Id.
82   National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Another, (1996) 
1 SCC 742 (India).
83   Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that “No person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” India Const. art. 21.
84   Id.
85   Id.
86   Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India, (1999) CRI LJ 919 (India).
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fundamental human rights to non-citizens,87 and held that ‘[the principle 
of non-refoulement] prevents expulsion [sic] of a refugee where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.88 The court 
further stated that this aligned with ‘Article 21 of the Constitution, so long as 
the presence of refugee is not prejudicial to the law and order and security of 
India. All member nations of the United Nation [sic] including our country 
are expected to respect for international treaties and conventions concerning 
Humanitarian law’.89
4.3 Alternate Locations of Practice as Moments of Resistance  
to Hegemony
The colonial ethos that institutionalized international law is highlighted by 
Falk and others. They question the role of international law by highlighting 
the notion that mainstream scholarship on the subject has failed to include 
perspectives from the Global South.90 They argue that many within the South 
and the rest of the world have viewed the Third World as an object of regu-
lation and repression, that have continued to ignore traditional legal norms. 
International law has been instrumental in homogenizing all legal traditions 
which tend to subsume identities of those in the Global South.91 They also 
point out that the role of resistance in shaping international law doctrines and 
institutions and the need to recognize its role are equally critical while dis-
cussing TWAIL.92 This notion is reinforced by Upendra Baxi in his account of 
TWAIL. He argues that the “Third World emerges through practices of resis-
tance and struggle” by those under the yoke of coloniality. He further argues 
that such practices “offer the best possible readings of the critique” of the faux 
universalization of international law practices.93
This article has set out to analyze the defiant role the subcontinent has 
played in developing alternate locations and mechanisms of practice by ignor-
ing the hegemonic prescriptions that mandate specific standards for refugee 
87   Id. at para. 10.
88   Id. at para. 18.
89   Id.
90   See Richard Falk et al., Introduction, in International Law and the Third World: 
Reshaping Justice 1, 1 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 2008).
91   See id.
92   See id.
93   Upendra Baxi, What may the ‘Third World’ expect from International Law?, in Inter-
national Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice 9, 10 (Richard Falk 
et al. eds., 2008).
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protection. The standards outlined by the global refugee regime have not been 
representative of the South Asian experience; hence resistance to such mech-
anisms is significant in this discussion. Therefore, as Falk and others argue, 
“normative implications of taking the resistance of the ‘Other’, ‘subaltern’ 
seriously, are significant” in discussions on TWAIL.94 Baxi argues that “Third 
Worldism as offers histories of mentalities of self-determination and self-
governance, based on the insistence of the recognition of radical cultural and 
civilizational plurality and diversity.”95 Though a critical reading of the inter-
national refugee regime has been quite prevalent, incorporating Baxi’s stance 
on civilizational plurality is not only a work in progress, but significant in the 
South Asian case. A holistic understanding of the role of the global refugee 
regime is possible with the help of writing into refugee history the postcolo-
nial anxieties that continue to define South Asian identity and personhood. As 
Baxi argues Third Worldism offers some critical modes of reading the historical 
practices of resistance, “complicate … [the] reading[s] [of] … the normative” 
international law principles and “pose some profound challenges to the [‘]
legalised hegemony[’] of the ‘Great Powers’ in relation to their [o]ther” or out-
law states.96
5 Conclusion
The contemporary foundation of refugeehood in South Asia was built on the 
origins of the Partition of India. The subsequent instability that led to involun-
tary migration across newly created international borders marks a significant 
aspect in history to map conceptualizations of refugeehood in the region. This 
enables an analysis on what the alternate conception is. But most importantly, 
articulating moments of defiance to the global refugee regime and exploring 
alternate locations of practice with respect to how forced migration is con-
ceptualized and responded to could prove to be steps in the right direction 
in overcoming hegemonic approaches to how significant gaps in historical 
narratives and discourses on forced migration could be mitigated. The nature 
of international institutions in charge of refugee protection is intrinsically 
Eurocentric, a quality that is deeply entrenched in mechanisms and proce-
dures adopted in their approach to their mandate. This demonstrates a need 
94   Falk et al., supra note 90, at 4.
95   Baxi, supra note 93, at 10.
96   Id. at 11.
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to project a sense of plurality in perspective with respect to what constitutes 
response to mobility as opposed to an assumed universality of the global ref-
ugee regime. The regime’s grandiose aspirations of universalism present an 
illusory picture of accessible protection and humanitarianism, which makes 
all other forms of alternate histories, conceptions, locations of practice and 
discourses optional and relevant only as critiques to this larger hegemonic 
framework. Therefore, a few thoughts, as expressed in this article, on South 
Asia’s place within forced migration studies are steps to initiate discussions on 
defiance to the global refugee regime.
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Harmonizing UNCITRAL Model Law:  
A TWAIL Analysis of Cross Border Insolvency Law
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1 Introduction
Globalization has had a twofold effect on the world of commerce. On one 
hand, it has resulted in dramatic increases in the exchange of goods, services, 
factors of production, and the revenues that such forms of exchange generate.1 
This, advocates of neoliberalism have argued, has resulted in higher GDP, 
higher GDP Per Capita, and better standards of living the world over.2 Sceptics 
remain unconvinced by these arguments due to the lack of concern for the 
distributional consequences of this newly created wealth.3
However, on the other hand, this increase in the volume of exchange across 
borders has led to an increase in the number of practical issues concerning 
juridical boundaries in the regulation of transnational commercial activity. In a 
global context characterized by the interplay between multilateral institutions4 
and sovereign nations, the former have devised global norms, authored by the 
Global North and premised on a normative belief in the efficacy of the mar-
ket mechanism, to coordinate legislative and policy-making processes across 
the world.5 Through the mechanism of conditionalities that, when imposed, 
permit or restrict access to financial resources, these multilateral agencies can 
pressurize nations into adopting these global norms.
*  Independent Researcher.
**  Advocate, High Court of Delhi and Supreme Court of India.
1   Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Diana Beltekian, Trade and Globalization, Our World in Data 
(2018), https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
2   Jeffrey A. Frankel & David H. Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth?, 89 American Economic 
Review 379, 379–99 (1999).
3   Federico Cingano, Trends in Income Inequality and Its Impact on Economic Growth (OECD 
Soc., Emp’t & Migration Working Paper, Paper No. 163, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1787/1815199X.
4   Dean Coldicott, The World Trade Organization, Legitimacy and the Development Problem- 
atic, World Bank (2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRAD/Resources/
DColdicott.pdf.
5   Antony Anghie, University and the Concept of Governance in International Law, in Legiti- 
mate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives 
20, 21–40 (Edward K. Quashigah & Obiora C. Okafor eds., 1999).
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This imposes exogenously determined constraints on States, particularly in 
the Third World, and limits their ability to constitute their own institutional 
contexts and developmental path. Thus, one adverse product of the increased 
globalization of commerce and the multilateral institutions’ push to impose 
its neoliberal agenda on the Global South is the intertwined problem of local 
governance and economic development in the Third World. One domain in 
which these issues find clear articulation is the case of cross-border insolvency 
law. In order to examine this case meaningfully, we situate our study in the 
context of the current debate surrounding India’s attempts to reform their 
insolvency law through the introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy 
Code, 2016 (hereafter, “the Code”).
The attempts to reform this legislation is of particular interest due to the fact 
that the prevailing idea, emanating from and emphasized by the multilateral 
institutions, is the adoption of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (hereafter, the “UNCITRAL”) Model Law on Cross Border 
Insolvency, 1997 (hereafter, “the Model Law”).6 The logical foundations of this 
idea rest on the universalist notion that differences between domestic legal 
systems and their associated modes of governance inhibit the costless move-
ment of capital from one economy to another, and, as such, must be made 
more legible through the removal of such differences. Differences in modes 
of governance, in the neoliberal discourse of global governance, provide a 
disincentive to investors. This is due to the fact that they impose additional 
transaction costs,7 the costs of using the domestic systems, on investors. And 
such increases in costs have an adverse effect on their willingness to invest.
The aim of our study is to examine the trajectories and implications of India’s 
State Practices that began with the Eradi Committee Report, 2000, coursing 
through the judgement of Macquarie Bank Limited v. Shilpi Cable Technologies 
Limited, now culminated in the form of a draft chapter on cross border insol-
vency that adopts the Model Law based on the recommendations of the Report 
of the Insolvency Law Committee, 2018 (hereafter, “the Committee”) which was 
constituted by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, and, 
most recently, the Cross Border Insolvency Protocol (hereafter, the “CBIP”) 
6   U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997, 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-border_insolvency (adopted 
May 30, 1997).
7   Transaction Costs, Encyclopedia of Law & Economics (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit 
De Geest eds., 1998), https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/literature-reviews/ 
0740-transaction-costs.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
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that has emerged between the parties involved in the Jet Airways case.8 A key 
element to understanding India’s motivations in choosing to adopt the Model 
Law finds articulation in the rationale the Committee employed in arriving at 
its conclusions. Crucially, the Report also renders visible the gaps in their con-
siderations and spaces where they have deferred to the wisdom of the Central 
Government in the exercise of its legislative functions.
By drawing on the Third World Approaches to International Law (hereafter, 
“TWAIL”) as our interpretative lens, we seek to push back against the dominant 
thrust of the literature on cross border insolvency. The concern of this branch 
of scholarly activity has largely been about developing increasingly refined 
justifications for the adoption of the Model Law.9 A glaring gap in the litera-
ture that emerges as a consequence of this pursuit is an examination, from the 
bottom up, of the domestic policy considerations that go into the process of 
adopting the Model Law.
By situating our study in the context of the political processes of the Indian 
State that are concerned with enabling the adoption of the Model Law, we 
provide a tangible ground on which to enter into the theoretical debate – uni-
versalism versus territorialism – that characterizes the diversity of experiences 
in the adoption of the Model Law. Harmonization, posited as a forward march 
towards the inevitable unification of cross border insolvency law, is challenged 
through a comparative analysis of the State Practices of countries from the 
Global North around their experience of adopting the Model Law.
The remainder of this article is divided into three additional sections. 
Section two lays out the entwined logic of cross border insolvency and har-
monization by examining the rationale underlying the UNCITRAL’s efforts 
to promote the adoption of the Model Law, introduces the concept of State 
Practices, and examines the State Practices that have gone into India’s eventual 
decision to adopt the Model Law. Section three compares India’s experiences 
with the experiences of common law countries from the Global North. Section 
four stands in lieu of a conclusion and offers a sense in which TWAIL allows 
interpretation of sections two and three.
8   Jet Airways (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (2019) C.P. (IB)-1968/(MB)/2019 (India).
9   An article by Mohan is a representative example. S. Chandra Mohan, Cross-border Insol-
vency Problems: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law the Answer?, 21 International Insolvency 
Review 199, 211 (2012).
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2 The Rationale Underlying the Model Law and India’s State 
Practices
In the wake of the Second World War, nations of the Third World began to cast 
aside their colonial yoke and won the right to self-government. At the interna-
tional stage, this resulted in a chorus of articulation of Third World sovereignty 
that looked for, and eventually, found succour in the internationalism of the 
United Nations. The United Nations did not remain unmoved to these global 
changes and responded to them by amending its organizational form. One 
response, in the domain of international trade and investment, was the devel-
opment of the UNCITRAL. The UNCITRAL was established as a subsidiary body 
of the United Nations General Assembly and was tasked with the facilitation of 
international trade and investment. It is important to note that the official 
mandate of the UNCITRAL is “to promote the progressive harmonization and 
unification of international trade law.”10 It pursues this goal by organizing itself 
into Intergovernmental Working Groups that examine various facets of inter-
national trade law that develop “conventions, model laws, and other instruments 
that address key areas of commerce, from dispute resolution to the procurement 
and sale of goods.”11
It is important for us to distinguish between the two goals of the UNCITRAL – 
harmonization and unification. The former is considered a short-term goal 
characterized by greater coordination between States. The latter is a longer-
term goal characterized by the removal of substantive differences, the source of 
variations in cost, in the legal modes of governance. The logic of harmonization, 
in essence, rests on a foundation of cost efficiency, that is, cost minimization.12 
It espouses a belief that greater international trade can be produced by reduc-
ing the disincentives to international trade, namely, high transaction costs. 
Harmonization, in general, is seen as having “mythical qualities”13 that is syn-
onymous with harmony. As a result, the absence of harmonization is seen 
10   Provisional Agenda of the Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/62/100, at 146 (2007).
11   Frequently Asked Questions – Mandate and History, UNCITRAL, https://uncitral.un.org/
en/about/faq/mandate_composition/history (last visited June 9, 2019).
12   Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in Inter-
national Commercial Law, 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 683 (1992).
13   Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 699 (1991).
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as disharmony, an undesirable quality whose undesirableness is seen as self- 
evident. Thus, harmonization is a panacea to the ills of negative externalities 
and high transaction costs.14
In order to coherently understand the implications of the UNCITRAL’s 
commitments to the principles of coordination and the forms that State Prac-
tices take in the domain of international trade law, namely, harmonization 
and unification, we will examine the idea of State Practices in the context of 
a Third World nation – India. We will do so in relation to India’s decision to 
accept provisions of the Model Law as the operational framework for cross 
border insolvencies. The objective of this exercise is simple – an examination 
of State Practices that gives us a sense of the local priorities, including sub-
stantive aspects of local law, that are kept aside in order to meet international 
obligations.
2.1 The Concept of State Practices
International law is comprised of generally accepted laws, treaties between 
nations, and Customary International Law. Within this framework, the con-
cept of State Practices is a constituent element of customary international law. 
State Practices are characterized by the general practices that States engage 
in that can be accepted as law. This includes actions of the State, its constitu-
ent bodies – executive, judiciary, legislature – and the individuals that occupy 
positions within them that keep with the international obligations of the State 
to the global community at large.15
2.2 The Adoption of the Model Law as State Practice
To understand why the adoption of the Model Law is contingent on State 
Practices, we may observe a debate on the form in which cross border insol-
vency law should be harmonized by Member States:
The Commission recalled the considerations by the Working Group 
on Insolvency Law on whether the text should be prepared as model 
legislation or as a treaty or model treaty (NCN.9/422, paras. 14–16, and 
NCN.9/433, paras. 16–20). The prevailing view was that the text should 
be completed as model legislation, the form that, because of its flexibil-
ity, was best suited to induce in the shortest possible time harmonized 
14   Eleanor M. Fox, Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a Globalized World: Why, What, 
and How?, 60 Antitrust Law Journal 593 (1991).
15   A. Mark Weisburd, The International Court of Justice and the Concept of State Practice, 31 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 295 (2009).
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modernization of national laws in the area of cross-border insolvency, an 
area of law that hitherto had not been subject to unification.16
Owing to the fact that the Commission, as quoted above, decided to structure 
the Model Law as a Model Treaty, the burden of keeping in line with these obli-
gations rested on how States chose to incorporate them into their local laws. In 
the context of India, this can be seen by examining three key pieces- the Eradi 
Committee Report, 2000, the judgement of Macquarie Bank Limited v. Shilpi 
Cable Technologies Limited, and the draft chapter on cross border insolvency 
that adopted the Model Law17 based on the recommendations of the Report of 
the Insolvency Law Committee, 2018 (hereafter, “the Committee”) which was 
constituted by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India.
2.3 India’s State Practice
2.3.1 Eradi Committee Report, 2000
The Central Government constituted a High-Level Committee on Law Relating 
to Insolvency of Companies to examine and suggest reforms in the existing 
laws associated with winding up proceedings of companies and in the various 
stages of insolvency proceedings of companies to make them more efficient 
in tune with international best practices. This Committee recommended that 
part VII of the Companies Act, 1956 should be suitably amended to incorporate 
provisions of the Model Law in regard to issues on cross border insolvency.
2.3.2 Macquarie Bank Limited v. Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd.,  
AIR 2018 SC 498
In this judgment, the Supreme Court of India interpreted (i) Section 9 (3)(c) 
of the Code which states that the operational creditor shall, along with the 
application for initiating insolvency proceedings, furnish a copy of the certifi-
cate from the Financial Institutions confirming that there is no payment of an 
unpaid operational debt by the corporate debtor; and (ii) Section 8(1) under 
which demand notice of an unpaid operational debt is to be issued in favour 
of the foreign creditor.
16   Report of the United Nations Commission on International Law on the work of its thirti-
eth session, ¶ 26, 13 U.N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997), reprinted in [1999] 28 United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law: Yearbook 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
SER.A/1997.
17   Ministry of Corp. Affairs, Report of Insolvency Law Committee on Cross 
Border Insolvency 5 (Oct., 2018) (India), http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Cross 
BorderInsolvencyReport_22102018.pdf.
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The Supreme Court held that the certificate to be issued under Sec- 
tion 9(3)(c) of the Code is a procedural provision, which is directory in nature, 
and also held that a fair construction of Section 9(3)(c), in the spirit sought to 
be achieved by the Code, leads to a conclusion that certification by a Financial 
Institution cannot be construed as a threshold bar or a condition precedent to 
initiating insolvency proceedings. The Supreme Court further read Section 30 
of the Advocates Act with Sections 8 and 9 of the Code, together with the 
Adjudicatory Authority Rules and Forms, and concluded that a notice sent 
on behalf of an operational creditor by a lawyer would be valid, proper, and 
“in order.” Thereby the Supreme Court enabled greater access to foreign opera-
tional creditors not associated with financial institutions under the Code to file 
applications and pursue insolvency proceedings in India.
2.3.3 Report of the Insolvency Law Committee, October 201818
This report examined the problem of unintended exclusions under Section 29A 
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (that disqualify certain persons from 
submitting resolution plans under the Code), the treatment of homebuyers as 
financial creditors, promotion of the resolution process through re-calibration 
of voting thresholds for different decisions of the committee of creditors, etc. 
The Committee deliberated on cross border insolvency and the insufficiency 
of Sections 234 and 235 of the Code, dealing with cross border insolvency 
in a separate chapter, though reserving exhaustive recommendations on 
the same.19
The Committee, in this report, noted that there was a need for a compre-
hensive examination of the cross border insolvency framework in India in 
comparison with other international jurisdictions and hence reserved the rec-
ommendations vis-à-vis a cross border insolvency to beyond the purview of 
this present report.20
2.3.4 Report of Insolvency Law Committee on Cross Border Insolvency, 
October 2018
Thus, pursuant to the March 2018 Report, the Insolvency Law Committee took 
a deep dive into the state of regulation of cross border insolvency in India and 
examined existing provisions in various statutes relating to cross-border insol-
vency, in light of adopting the Model Law. The Committee limited “application 
18   Id. at 1.
19   Id. at 5.
20   Id. at 13.
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of cross-border insolvency provisions to corporate debtors” and considered 
further extending them to individual companies and enterprise groups.21
The October 2018 Report sets out some key “advantages” to adopting the 
Model Law,22 like increasing foreign investment by aligning India with global 
best practices in insolvency resolution and liquidation having a flexible option 
in light of differences among national insolvency laws, and it is viewed as a 
mode of resolution that protects public interest, gives priority to domestic 
insolvency proceedings over foreign proceedings, and enables a mechanism of 
co-operation among courts that would facilitate faster and effective conduct 
of concurrent proceedings.23
This October 2018 report has broadly inspected various provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and categorically commented on the extent to which 
such provisions may or may not be adopted, including various extents of modi-
fication in adoption. A brief examination of the same is as follows:
The Report firstly identifies the four main principles on which the Model Law 
is based:
1) Access: In order to enable foreign insolvency professionals and foreign 
creditors access domestic courts, the Committee, inter alia, recommends 
that the Central Government ought to devise a mechanism to enable 
such access in the current legal framework in India.
2) Recognition: The Committee identifies the system of recognition of for-
eign proceedings and relevant remedies by domestic courts as provided 
in the Model Law. The Committee recommends such recognition based 
on the determination of the debtor’s Centre of Main Interests (hereaf-
ter, the “COMI”). Relief is recommended to be provided for likewise, on 
whether the foreign proceeding is a main or a non-main proceeding.
3) Cooperation: The Committee, recognising the still-evolving infrastruc-
ture of Adjudicating Authorities under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy 
Code (hereafter, “the IBC”), has restricted and subjected the coopera-
tion between Adjudicating Authorities and foreign courts to guidelines 
to be notified by the Central Government in due course, while retaining 
the Model Law provisions on inter se cooperation among Adjudicating 
Authorities, foreign insolvency professionals, and foreign and domestic 
insolvency professionals.
21   Id. at 6.
22   Id. at 5.
23   Id. at 5–6.
88 Fernandes and Pathak
4) Coordination: The Committee also makes recommendations on how 
to coordinate insolvency proceedings when they have been initiated 
domestically and/or when a foreign insolvency proceeding has already 
commenced.24
Through this Report, the Insolvency Committee, having assessed existing juris-
prudence related to cross border insolvency as well as existing material “issued 
by the UNCITRAL for guidance on the Model Law,” recommended adoption of 
the Model Law in the form of a draft cross border insolvency legislation (here-
inafter, also referred to as “Draft Legislation” or “Draft Part Z”).25 Additionally, 
the Committee also recommended how various other amendments may be 
necessitated in subordinate legislations in light of this Report.
In fact, the Report suggests amendments to the IBC to streamline inclusion 
of the proposed chapter to it. These include, inter alia, amending Sections 234 
and 235 to exclude corporate debtors, the inspection powers of the IBBI for 
adjudication of penalties against foreign representatives, amendment of sec-
tion 375(3)(b) of the Companies Act, etc.26
2.3.5 Cross Border Insolvency Protocol, 2019
On the 17th of April, 2019, Jet Airways (India) Ltd. (hereafter, “Jet Airways”) 
stopped operations after it ran out of cash needed to continue its services and 
was unable to persuade its lenders to finance further expenditure.27 Subse-
quently, its largest lender – the State Bank of India – initiated insolvency 
proceedings against Jet Airways under the IBC. Concurrently, the Dutch Court 
Administrator began insolvency proceedings against Jet Airways towards debts 
owed to lenders operating in Dutch jurisdiction.
The National Company Law Tribunal in India had initially declared all other 
foreign insolvency proceedings against Jet Airways null and void. However, 
the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal recognized the Dutch proceed-
ings on the condition that no assets of Jet Airways in Netherlands be sold.28 
The various lenders in Jet Airways proceedings agreed to the adoption of a 
24   Id. at 14.
25   Id.
26   Id. at 14–15.
27   Anirban Chowdhury, Jet Airways Bankrupt, Goyals under Scanner, Scion Floats New 
Company, The Economic Times, Sept. 11, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/jet-amid-clouds-naresh-goyals-son-launches-travel-tech 
-startup/articleshow/71058293.cms.
28   Press Trust of India, NCLAT Asks Jet Airways IRP to Cooperate with Dutch Court Admin-
istrator, The Economic Times, Sept. 4, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/nclat-asks-jet-airways-irp-to-cooperate-with 
-dutch-court-administrator/articleshow/70975541.cms?from=mdr.
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CBIP,29 due to the absence of well-defined cross border insolvency norms and 
delays in the adoption of the recommendations of the report discussed in the 
earlier Section, so as to ensure the efficient resolution of the proceedings.
Keeping in mind the Model Law, the CBIP acknowledges that Jet Airways, 
an Indian company, had interests in various jurisdictions around the world. 
However, the Centre of Main Interest of the Airline was in India and, as such, 
Indian proceedings would assume priority over all others and the Dutch Court 
Administrator would defer pronouncement of any judgement until its Indian 
counterpart did so. Further, parties to the CBIP agreed that they would uphold 
principles of coordination, communication, information, and data sharing in 
such a way as to maximize the value of assets of Jet Airways.
Section 13 of the CBIP articulates that the principle of comity will hold for 
all Courts involved in the proceedings and that the agreement to cooper-
ate will, in no way, undermine the powers each of these Courts have in their 
respective jurisdictions.30
3 Interpretation of the Model Law in Other Common Law Countries
The Model Law is interpreted differently in different countries. Australia 
enacted the Model Law by annexing the Model Law as Schedule 1 to the Cross- 
Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) (the Act) and applied it to both corporate and 
personal insolvency. The Model Law in Australia does not attempt to amend 
or insert itself into the domestic law relating to insolvency. The Model Law 
was enacted in Canada by “An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act, the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection 
Program Act and Chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada 2005, which inserted 
the same into Part IV of the [Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, 
c C-36] in respect of large corporate insolvency, and restructuring and by 
inserting it into Part XIII of the [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, 
c B-3] in respect of other insolvencies.”31
New Zealand enacted the Model Law with minor variations as Schedule 1 
to the Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006 by making specific provisions in 
relation to the High Court of New Zealand acting in aid of overseas courts 
by enabling it to refer to “any document that relates to the Model Law on 
29   Supra note 8, at 2.
30   Id. at 17.
31   Neil Hannan, Cross-Border Insolvency: The Enactment and Interpre-
tation of the UNCITRAL Model Law 16 (2017).
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Cross-Border Insolvency that originates from the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law, or its working group for the preparation of the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.”32 Likewise, the Insolvency Act 2000 
in the UK authorized the introduction of the Model Law with or without mod-
ification by regulation. The Secretary of State enacted an amended form of the 
Model Law in the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006.33
Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code was introduced in 
October 2005 by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005, to govern transnational bankruptcies and is applicable to insol-
vency of a debtor that conducts its business in more than one country, based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Section 1501(a) of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code enumerates the five objectives of Chapter 15: (1) cooperation between 
United States courts and foreign courts; (2) “greater legal certainty for trade and 
investment”; (3) “fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies 
that protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested entities, includ-
ing the debtor”; (4) “protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s 
assets”; and (5) “facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, 
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.” Chapter 15, more-
over, requires American courts to “cooperate to the maximum extent possible 
with a foreign court or a foreign representative.” Chapter 15 further defines a 
foreign main proceeding as one pending in the country where the debtor has 
their Centre of Main Interests, and contemplates that to be the place of its 
incorporation, unless the contrary is proved. If the debtor is able to obtain rec-
ognition of a foreign main proceeding, then the bankruptcy law of its home 
country will govern the insolvency proceedings.34
Cross border insolvency issues are governed by applying two theories: the 
universality theory and the territoriality theory. The universality theory states 
that all assets of the insolvent company are administered by the court in 
the place of incorporation, and if assets of the company are located in for-
eign jurisdictions, then the court has the power to apply for assistance from 
courts in those jurisdictions. The territoriality theory instead recommends 
separate proceedings to be conducted for each country, and under the theory, 
no recognition is given to proceedings that have taken place/completed in 
32   Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006, s 5(1) (N.Z.).
33   Hannan, supra note 31, at 15–20.
34   John J. Chung, Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and Its Implicit Assumptions Regarding 
the Foreign Exchange Market, 76 Tennessee Law Review 74 (2008).
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other jurisdictions. The Model Law adopts the universality approach to cross 
border insolvency.35
Our focus in this section is on two aspects: (i) Recognition of Foreign 
Proceedings and Relief and (ii) Concurrent Proceedings.
3.1 Extent of Adoption/ Rejection/ Modification of the Model Law in 
Chapter Z
Examination of the nature of recommendations of the Insolvency Committee 
towards adoption of the Model Law is pivotal for the purpose of this article. 
Thus, we do not simply summarise the recommendations made in this article 
but instead examines these suggestions in light of the nature of adoption of 
the Model Law from a TWAIL perspective. These recommendations, broadly, 
are as follow:
3.1.1 General Provisions
The Committee recommended that the Draft Legislation be extended to cor-
porate debtors only since Part III of the IBC has not yet been notified, and the 
Committee felt that extending cross border insolvency provisions of the Model 
Law to individuals and partnership firms would be premature. However, the 
Committee suggested extending the definition of a “corporate debtor” to 
foreign companies as well to enable access to creditors and insolvency profes-
sionals registered outside of India to avail remedies in India.36
The Committee proposed that with the introduction of cross border insol-
vency provisions, there arose a need to modify provisions in the Companies 
Act, 2013 (hereafter, also referred to as the “2013 Act”) that deal with insolvency 
of foreign companies, such as Section 375(3)(b) that provides for winding up of 
companies (that may include foreign companies) for insolvency. The proposed 
solution for the existence of such parallel provisions was for the Ministry of 
Corporate Affairs to analyse the efficacy of retaining these provisions in the 
2013 Act. The Committee further suggested transferring proceedings pending 
under the provisions of the 2013 Act for adjudication under the Code to avoid 
duplicating judicial efforts.37 Further, the Committee recommended amending 
Sections 234 and 235 of the Code to apply only “to individuals and partnership 
35   Rachel Morrison, Avoiding Inherent Uncertainties in Cross-Border Insolvency: Is the 
UNCITRAL Model Law the Answer?, 15 Queensland University of Technology 
Law Review 103 (1999).
36   Ministry of Corp. Affairs, supra note 17, ¶ 1.2.
37   Id. ¶ 1.3.
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firms” since the proposed insolvency provisions related to corporate debtors 
are proposed in these recommendations.38
The Committee recommended that, initially, the Model Law would be 
adopted with legislative reciprocity, and thereafter, on a need basis, the reci-
procity requirement would be diluted. The Committee further clarified that the 
reciprocity requirement was only proposed to govern the cross border insol-
vency provisions and not the rest of the provisions under the IBC, meaning 
that “foreign creditors will still be able to … participate in … proceedings under 
the Code regardless of reciprocity.”39 However, the Committee refrained from 
explaining or even highlighting what it meant when it said that the reciproc-
ity requirement may be diluted “based on the experience in implementation 
of the Model Law and development of adequate infrastructure in the Indian 
insolvency system.” The meaning of “development of adequate infrastructure 
in the Indian insolvency system” is vague and difficult to assess. Does it mean 
a more robust implementation of the Model Law? In which case, the proposal 
to dilute reciprocity is incongruous.
Likewise, the Committee restricted changes to the definition of “estab-
lishment” as provided under Clause 2(c) of Draft Part Z to accommodate the 
meaning on “establishment” as provided in the Model Law (where limited rec-
ognition as a “foreign non-main proceeding” has been given to proceedings 
in countries where the debtor has an “establishment”).40 Further, in terms of 
having a three month look back period for determining existence of an estab-
lishment, the Committee suggested not building the same into the draft law, as 
adequate space has been provided to the courts in the Model Law to prevent 
forum shopping by defining the term economic activity with the adjective non-
transitory. This was also considered in light of the fact that the three month 
look back period may not be earmarked “from the date of filing insolvency 
application in the foreign non-main proceeding.” This is because it is possible 
that, even by such time, “no economic activity exists”.41
As such, in terms of having a threshold for recognition, the Committee 
suggested that “the definition of non-main proceedings be limited to proceed-
ings in countries where the corporate debtor has an “establishment”” and left 
out the requirement of a COMI.42 The Committee suggested retaining “the 
definitions of “foreign court,” “foreign representative,” “foreign proceeding,” 
38   Id. ¶ 1.10.
39   Id. ¶ 1.8.
40   Id. ¶ 2.3.
41   Id. ¶ 2.7.
42   Id. ¶ 2.8.
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“foreign main proceeding,” and “foreign non-main proceeding” as … provided 
in Article 2 of the Model Law.”43
Finally, the Committee recommended that, “in line with the spirit of the 
Model Law, the language used in Article 6 of the Model Law must be retained 
as it is, including usage of the term “manifestly”” in the context of interpret-
ing public policy exceptions restrictively.44 The Committee recommended 
that in a situation where the Adjudicating Authority is of opinion that there 
is likelihood of public policy violation, a notice ought to be sent to the Central 
Government. The Committee further recommended that “it may be advisable 
to include a provision akin to [S]ection 241(2) of the 2013 Act to empower the 
Central Government” to take cognizance of an action that “would be mani-
festly contrary to public policy in India” in case notice “has not been issued by 
the Adjudicating Authority.”45
3.1.2 Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding and Relief
The Committee recommended that Articles 15 and 16(1) and (2) of the Model 
Law “may be adopted in the present [D]raft Part Z.”46 The Committee sug-
gested that “adoption of a look-back period of three months while enforcing 
the COMI presumption would be suitable in the Indian context.”47 This recom-
mendation is in light of “the EU Insolvency Regulation (Recast) that seeks to 
prevent … forum shopping by” presuming that a corporate debtor’s registered 
office is its COMI “inapplicable in cases where the corporate debtor has relo-
cated its registered office to” a different country within the three-month period 
prior to requesting for insolvency proceedings.48
The Committee for the same reasons adopted the two factors provided 
in the UNCITRAL Guide to Enactment to identify the COMI, namely, “(a) where 
the central administration of the debtor takes place; and (b) which is readily 
ascertainable by creditors,” in order to “assist the Adjudicating Authority” to 
identify “the COMI when it does not coincide with the registered office.”49 The 
decision of recognition was suggested to be made within a timeline of 30 days 
by the Adjudicating Authority with a possible extension of another 30 days, in 
view of Article 17 of the Model Law.50 In Australia and the UK, it must be 
43   Id. ¶ 2.9.
44   Id. ¶ 3.4–3.7.
45   Id. ¶ 3.7.
46   Id. ¶ 10.5.
47   Id. ¶ 11.4.
48   Id. 
49   Id. ¶ 11.5.
50   Id. ¶ 12.3.
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shown on readily ascertainable evidence that the COMI is in another State. 
In the USA and Canada, the court requires evidence to be put before it as 
to the COMI, and if any of that evidence is inconsistent with the rebuttable 
presumption, then the court must make its own determination on the evi-
dence presented.51
The Federal Court of Australia considers various factors while deciding the 
COMI, such as the place of residence of the directors, place of incorporation, 
place of all executive decisions, place of residence of the majority of employ-
ees, place of residence of the company’s creditors, place where majority of the 
company’s assets are located, etc. On the other hand, Canada does not have 
a definition or reference to an establishment nor does it state that the debtor 
having a COMI as a necessary element of a non-main proceeding in their adop-
tion of the Model Law.52
New Zealand adopted the meaning of COMI as considered in the definition 
of the same in the EC Regulation, and “the court referred to the Virgos-Schmidt 
Report which describes a place of operations as one from which economic 
activities are exercised on the market (that is externally), whether the said activ- 
ities are commercial, industrial or professional to give meaning to COMI.”53 The 
English Court of Appeal, on the other hand, has relied upon the Virgos-Schmidt 
report to state that it depends on ‘whether it has in that other country a “place 
of operations” where non-transitory “economic activity” is carried on with 
human means and goods.’54 The court further stated that the determination 
of a COMI will require more than simply having a branch office or place where 
the debtor is located.55
Further, the United States Bankruptcy Court found that an establishment 
ought to constitute a ‘seat for local business activity’ for the debtor. Terms such 
as “operations” and “economic activity” require demonstration of a local effect 
on the marketplace, more than mere incorporation, record-keeping, and sim-
ple maintenance of property therein.56 Both the UK and the USA may have 
put their domestic interests above the desire to achieve a degree of unifor-
mity in the recognition of foreign insolvency and reconstruction proceedings 
between States. In doing so, they are evidently working against the universalist 
principles they espouse and upon which the Model Law is based.57
51   Hannan, supra note 31, at 113.
52   Id. at 49.
53   Id. 
54   Id. at 50.
55   Id. 
56   Id. at 52.
57   Id. at 53.
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The Model Law provides for two kinds of relief-interim relief and relief on 
recognition. However, the Code gives no power to the Adjudicating Authority 
to provide interim relief in CIRP. Hence, “the Committee recommended that 
power to grant interim relief may not be provided in the [D]raft Part Z.”58 This 
was done particularly in light of India’s experience with the Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 that “set a precedent for misuse of 
interim relief.”59
In terms of mandatory relief, the recommendation was that a moratorium 
in the nature of what is provided in Article 19 be implemented in the Draft 
Part Z, applicable in “recognition of a foreign main proceeding,” along with 
“the exceptions and limitations applicable to the moratorium in Section 14 of 
the Code.”60 This is interesting from a TWAIL perspective, as Article 20 of the 
Model Law calls for “an automatic moratorium  … on recognition of foreign 
main proceedings” which aligns with the overall approach, as recognized in 
this Report, of an overarching significance given to “domestic insolvency pro-
ceedings of the enacting country over foreign proceedings.”61
The Committee suggested that “a provision similar to Article 20(3) of the 
Model Law may be inserted in the [D]raft Part Z to ensure” the subsistence of 
“the right to commence individual actions or proceedings against the corpo-
rate debtor to the extent necessary to preserve claims against the corporate 
debtor,” in the face of automatic moratorium.62 Likewise, the Committee sug-
gested complete adoption of Article 20(4) of the Model Law which provides 
that the moratorium as given in Article 20(1) does not impede the right of the 
creditor to initiate domestic insolvency proceedings.63
However, when it comes to discretionary relief and the scope of the adjudi-
cating authority to assess the same, the Committee makes a cautionary case, 
and suggests that the same ought to be exercised in light of the moratorium 
provisions under Section 14 of the Code.64 Similarly, the Committee recom-
mended not adopting Article 21(d) that provides “examination of witnesses 
and collecting information and evidence regarding the debtor,” since such 
power is already available to the insolvency professional under the Sections 18, 
29, and 23 of the Code.65
58   Ministry of Corp. Affairs, supra note 17, ¶ 13.4.
59   Id. ¶ 13.4.
60   Id. ¶ 14.3.
61   Id. ¶ 14.2.
62   Id. ¶ 14.6.
63   Id. ¶ 14.7.
64   Id. ¶ 14.9.
65   Id. ¶ 14.10.
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While discarding the provisions for discretionary relief (Article 21) and 
interim relief (Article 19), the Committee sounded a note of caution for them 
to be exercised sparingly, and recommended full implementation of “Article 22 
of the Model Law [that] provides courts with the flexibility to impose condi-
tions on the reliefs” provided under Articles 19 and 21 and/or their modification 
and termination.66
The Model Law proposes prioritizing relief given in terms of insolvency 
proceedings against the debtor in foreign main proceedings over foreign non-
main proceedings. This hierarchy of relief as provided to foreign main and 
non-main proceedings, as a general principle of the Model Law, has been 
accepted by the Committee without any deviation.67
Article X of the Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency- 
Related Judgments (“MLREIJ”) provides that the relief available under the 
corresponding legislation in the State enacting Article 21 of the Model Law 
includes recognition and enforcement of an insolvency judgment includes 
recognizing and enforcement of such judgment.68 The Committee agreed 
with this proposition and suggested including enforcement of judgments as 
a relief as well, “if deemed fit by the Adjudicating Authority.”69 However, the 
Committee reserved discussion on the legislative changes pertaining to this for 
a later stage.70
Article 23 of the Model Law describes actions that are detrimental to 
creditors. Article 23(2) for instance states that when the foreign proceeding is 
a foreign non-main proceeding, the court ought to ascertain that the action 
relates to assets that, under the law of that particular state, should be admin-
istered in the foreign non-main proceeding.71 The Committee recognizes this 
as another remedy on recognition of foreign proceedings, in addition to Arti- 
cles 20 and 21 of the Model Law. However, the UNCITRAL Guide to Enactment 
left it open to domestic legislation to deal with, resolve, and implement such 
remedy “to foreign representatives to initiate avoidance actions on recog-
nition of foreign proceedings.”72 As such, the Committee concluded that 
Article 23 of the Model Law may be adopted as recommended in the Model 
Law, subject to the access available to the foreign representative according to 
66   Id. ¶ 14.12.
67   Id. ¶ 14.14.
68   Id. ¶ 14.15.
69   Id.
70   Id. 
71   Id. ¶ 15.4.
72   Id. ¶ 15.3.
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paragraph 15.4 of the Report (that invokes adopting a conservative approach 
in providing access to foreign representatives till “the development of infra-
structure regarding cross-border insolvency in India” and development of 
subordinate legislation), with the date of commencement of insolvency pro-
ceedings for obtaining the relief against avoidance actions being the date of 
opening of the foreign proceedings.73
In the UK, a foreign representative has the power to issue proceedings 
under various Sections of the UK Insolvency Act, however, leave of the court 
must be granted to the foreign representative by an appropriate court before 
issuing any proceedings where there is a concurrent British insolvency pro-
ceeding ongoing pertaining to the same debtor, as provided under Article 23(6) 
of the Model Law.74 Likewise, in the USA, the foreign representative, once rec-
ognized, is granted power to bring proceedings in a separate proceeding issued 
under another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code which is pending.75
“No amendments of substance have been made to [Article 19] in Australia, 
New Zealand, or the UK. However, New Zealand imposes an obligation upon 
the foreign representative to notify the debtor in a prescribed form as soon 
as practical after an interim relief has been granted.”76 There is also no cor-
responding provision in the Canadian legislation; however, the court can 
apply legal and equitable rules regarding recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings. The US also provides that such interim relief cannot be granted 
if it might enjoin a police, regulatory or government unit. Further, the grant 
of relief is subject to the “standards procedures and limitations applicable to 
injunctions.”77 However, the US Bankruptcy Court has held that the standards 
for obtaining a preliminary injunction under Section 1519(e) are not the same 
as those for obtaining an injunction in adversary proceedings and that the 
court has the power to grant stays under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.78
An interesting application of Articles 21(3) and 22(2) of the Model Law was 
when the English High Court granted conditional interim relief staying the 
enforcement of a lien in England pending the determination of an appeal over 
the quantity of the creditor’s provable debt in Korea, the place of the main 
proceeding, upon an undertaking being given that the fact that the credi-
tor who appeared in the Korean proceeding would not create an estoppel in 
73   Id. ¶ 15.5.
74   Hannan, supra note 31, at 143.
75   Id. at 144.
76   Id. at 125.
77   Id. at 124.
78   Id. at 125.
98 Fernandes and Pathak
England to the creditor enforcing its lien, as decided in Norden v. Samsun Logix 
Corporation [2009] BPIR 1367.79
3.1.2.1 Australia
In Australia, the Full Federal Court held that where there is, “an application for 
assistance from a prescribed country under the statutory provisions in respect of 
personal bankruptcy, recognition must be granted.”80 The court does not have 
discretion in this regard. Thus, recognition is given to a foreign representative 
who seeks to collect the debtor’s property and then distributes it according to 
law. The Federal Court had also indicated that an application for recognition 
to be made under the Model Law was not necessary, instead an application for 
assistance can be made under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) 
(Bankruptcy Act).81 Hence, this suggests that the domestic law that allows the 
court to extend assistance to other foreign courts in nominated countries exer-
cising bankruptcy jurisdiction takes precedence over similar provisions in the 
Model Law. The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) Sections 29–30 pro-
vide that to the extent the provisions of the existing law are inconsistent with 
the Model Law, the provisions of the Model Law shall prevail.
The common law principles of comity apply in Australia, according to which 
foreign representatives can be recognized. When a foreign court requests for 
recognition of a foreign representative to whom the Model Law does not apply 
or who cannot avail him/herself of the statutory rights of recognition, the 
principle of comity will allow a court to do the same. If recognition is granted 
under either Statute or the principles of comity, the court has a discretion to 
decide what assistance it will give to that court or representative.82
3.1.2.2 Canada
In Canada, Section 48(4) of the CCAA states that seeking an order for recogni-
tion under the provisions of its enactment of the Model Law does not prevent 
proceedings from being commenced under the BIA or the Winding-up and 
Restructuring Act. Likewise, Section 284 of the BIA provides that nothing in 
that Act prevents a court from applying the legal and equitable rules governing 
recognition of foreign insolvency orders on applications of any foreign repre-
sentative or other interested party.83 However, in Canada, there is no provision 
79   Id. at 134.
80   Id. at 24.
81   Id. 
82   Id. 
83   Id. at 29.
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for the adequate protection of creditors and interested persons within the 
meaning of Article 22 of the Model Law. Section 187(5) of the Canadian BIA 
allows a court to review, rescind or vary any order made under its bankruptcy 
jurisdiction.84
3.1.2.3 New Zealand
“Section 8 of the Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006 of New Zealand provides 
that if a court of another country in an insolvency proceeding makes an order 
requesting the aid of the High Court in respect of a person to whom Article 1 of 
the Model Law applies, the High Court may if it thinks fit, act in aid of and be 
auxiliary to that court in insolvency proceedings.”85 The Companies Act 1993 
similarly allows an application to be made to the High Court for the liquidation 
of a foreign company; such applications are not contingent upon the debtor 
having assets in New Zealand.86
3.1.2.4 United Kingdom
The default position for English Courts is that the principle liquidation 
would be deemed to be the place of incorporation of the company. It is often 
argued, for instance in Schmitt v Deichmann [2012] 2 All ER 1217, 1232–3 [62–
65], that under the English common law, the courts “have the power to assist 
foreign courts to help a foreign representative, pursuant to the principles of 
comity[, by acts] pursuant to domestic English law.”87
The Insolvency Act 1986 (UK Insolvency Act) provides that a court having 
insolvency jurisdiction shall assist the court of another relevant jurisdiction as 
prescribed. This power has been said to be limited to requests made by foreign 
court where there is an insolvency proceeding on foot in that State. Common 
law allows the court to apply either the UK domestic law or the law of the 
relevant State and apply the rules of private international law. Moreover, noth-
ing in such provisions restricts UK courts’ powers to request assistance from a 
foreign court which is derived from the common law. Hence, recognition can 
occur as a result of an application under the Model Law or by way of a letter of 
request from a foreign court.88
84   Id. at 141.
85   Id. 
86   Id. at 29.
87   Id. at 31.
88   Id. at 32–33.
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3.1.2.5 USA
The common law position of comity has been recognized by the courts in the 
USA as early as 1883 and continues to apply. Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code 
recognizes that the granting of recognition and any assistance given following 
recognition of a foreign proceeding must be consistent with the principles of 
comity. Where the party seeking recognition of a foreign judgment is not a 
foreign representative, then the relevant State law principles for recognition 
apply. However, the issue that persists is whether by using the word ‘comity’ in 
Chapter 15, it is a core matter under the Bankruptcy Code and whether the US 
Bankruptcy Court can continue to apply the common law principle of comity 
since the introduction of the Model Law provisions in Chapter 15.89 In the 
USA, Article 22 permits a court to grant relief under Articles 19 or 21 “only if 
the interests of creditors and other interested parties, including the debtor are 
sufficiently protected” within the meaning of Section 111 USC § 1522(a)(2012).90
3.2 Concurrent Proceedings
The Committee examined Articles 28 and 29 and the lowering of the thresh-
old of commencement of insolvency proceedings by enabling initiation of 
proceedings after recognition of a foreign main proceeding, provided “the 
debtor has assets in the enacting country.”91 The Committee read Article 28 
with Article 29 to analyse that the subsistence of a foreign proceeding will not 
impede commencement of a local insolvency proceeding, in other words, both 
the foreign and domestic insolvency proceedings can take place concurrently, 
subject to the possible modifications of relief as provided in Article 29. The 
Committee thus recommended that Articles 28 and 29 of the Model Law may 
be included in the Draft Part Z.92
Similarly, the Committee suggested adoption of Article 30 of the Model 
Law that provides for “modification of relief given under Articles 19 or 21 for” 
the purpose of “coordinating multiple foreign proceedings.”93 However, the 
Committee excluded references to interim relief as the same has not been rec-
ommended by the Committee earlier in their Report.94
Article 30 deliberates how the pursuit of concurrent insolvency proceed-
ings may culminate in receiving claims in more than one jurisdiction, hence 
this article seeks to address such double award of claims due to concurrent 
89   Id. at 40.
90   Id. at 141.
91   Ministry of Corp. Affairs, supra note 17, ¶ 17.2.
92   Id. ¶ 17.4.
93   Id. ¶ 17.5.
94   Id. ¶ 17.4.
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proceedings through effective coordination among jurisdictions. This is pro-
vided for, with the just exception that the creditor will not be denied a higher 
benefit in one jurisdiction if she has received part of a claim of a “lower value 
in a prior insolvency proceeding” against the same debtor.95 The Committee 
recommended the adoption of Article 30 in the Draft Part Z with two modi-
fications: “(i) in case of a domestic insolvency resolution process in India, the 
payment to creditors would be according to the resolution plan and (ii) in case 
of liquidation under the code, the bar for comparison ought to be creditors of 
the same class and ranking.”96
Article 31 of the Model Law provides a presumption of insolvency “on rec-
ognition of a foreign main proceeding … for the purposes of … initiation of 
a domestic insolvency proceeding.”97 However, a test of insolvency already 
exists in India under Section 4 of the IBC whereby, the CIRP can be initiated on 
default of INR 1 lakh.98 As such, the Committee suggested that in place of a test 
of insolvency, “recognition of a foreign main proceeding may be presumed” as 
“proof of default by the corporate debtor” to initiate CIRP.99
And finally, the Committee recommended adding a proviso that for a default 
to be deemed within the meaning of Part II of the IBC “based on recognition of 
a foreign main proceeding, the foreign main proceeding recognized in India” 
ought to have been “initiated based on an inability to pay debts or pursuant to 
a state of insolvency.”100 This was suggested in light of how certain jurisdictions 
recognise foreign proceedings though they do not strictly adhere to the defini-
tion of a “foreign proceeding.”101
The UK interpretation of Article 28 does not restrict representatives to deal 
only with the local assets within Great Britain once a foreign main proceed-
ing is recognized. In the USA, however, the subsequently appointed domestic 
representative is restricted to deal only with the assets which are within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the USA and not subject to the control of the for-
eign proceedings. Likewise, in the UK, when domestic proceedings are issued 
after recognition of a foreign proceeding, the court ought to review any leave 
granted to the foreign representative under Article 23 to issue proceedings for 
recovery of antecedent transactions.102
95   Id. ¶ 18.2.
96   Id. ¶ 18.3.
97   Id. ¶ 19.1.
98   Id.
99   Id. ¶ 19.2.
100   Id. ¶ 19.3.
101   Id.
102   Hannan, supra note 31, at 160.
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In UK, USA, and Australia, where two foreign non-main proceedings are 
recognized, the court is required to modify its relief in the first proceeding to 
facilitate coordination between the two proceedings. The Canadian legisla-
tion, however, does not deal with this possibility.103
4 Lessons – In Lieu of a Conclusion
The bulk of our article, sections two and three, consists of demonstrating 
the nature of State Practices emanating from India, a Third World nation. The 
emphasis on the Third World status of India has not been emphasized in our 
earlier sections. This is deliberate. It serves the function of demonstrating the 
actions that the Indian State has taken. This section is an attempt to analyse 
and interpret the aforementioned actions in the context of the TWAIL.
There is considerable literature, from earlier in the TWAIL movement, that 
define what TWAIL is.104 It was envisioned as a movement that is political in 
nature but its politics was informed by a small set of coordinates105 that allow 
it to navigate the illegitimacies of international law.106 These coordinates are; 
that historical context matters, that both the Global North and its institutions 
move, that the South moves as well, and that attempts to struggle against the 
stranglehold of multilateral institutions are multiple.107 TWAIL is a response 
to the methodological syncretism that dominated Hans Kelsen’s thinking. In 
this, the law and the authors of it are not to be bothered by the context, social, 
political, economic, or otherwise, in which a set of rules operate but rather 
emphasize the doctrinal integrity of the rules themselves.108
Our second section demonstrates two major conclusions. The first of 
these two conclusions is that a historical inquiry into India’s State Practices 
demonstrates that it has acted in a manner that, over time, has enabled the 
adoption of the Model Law (see Section 2. C. I). By highlighting the role that 
a sound cross border insolvency law has in the context of a growing modern 
economy, the Eradi Committee opened the doors for the adoption of Model 
103   Id. at 163.
104   Makau W. Mutua, What Is TWAIL?, 94 Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law Annual Meeting 31 (2000).
105   Luis Eslava, TWAIL Coordinates, Critical Legal Thinking (Apr. 2, 2019), http:// 
criticallegalthinking.com/2019/04/02/twail-coordinates/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
106   Mutua, supra note 104, at 31.
107   Id.
108   Research Handbook on Global Justice and International Economic Law 
251 (John Linarelli ed., 2013).
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Law in India. The Macquarie Bank Limited v. Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd. 
judgment enabled the foreign operational creditors to pursue insolvency 
proceedings in India. And the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee, 2018 
finally recommended that the Model Law be adopted. Our second conclusion 
is that India’s State Practices are operating within the context of a discourse 
emanating from the multilateral institutions.109 This conclusion is consistent 
with Antony Anghie’s analysis.110 Third World States such as India operate 
within the “rules of the game”111 set by these multilateral institutions112 that 
has far exempted the scope their Articles of Agreement envisioned for them.113
Through mechanisms like the Ease of Doing Business Rankings that prom-
ise increases in foreign investment, a country like India is incentivized to 
reform its local laws in a manner conducive to the adoption of Model Law 
and its ilk. India’s surge in the most recent rankings can directly be attributed 
to this induced reform.114 The problem with this is that it remains consistent 
with what Anghie demonstrates is the positivist core of international law that 
is inherently to blame for the violence committed against the inhabitants of 
the Third World due to the colonial origins of international law.115 This legiti-
mation of violence against the peoples of the Third World brutally underscores 
the idea that sovereignty is the preserve of European nations and not the 
Third World.116
As such, an adherence to the International Monetary Fund and its directives 
and the other softer forms of global governance makes the Third World state 
impotent117 and, therefore, constrains its ability to execute its basic responsi-
bilities towards its citizens’ interests.
109   Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of Inter-
national Law 251 (2004).
110   Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Insti-
tutions, and the Third World, 32 New York University Journal of International 
Law & Politics 243 (2000).
111   Douglass C. North, Institutions, Ideology, and Economic Performance, 11 Cato Journal 477 
(1992).
112   Anghie, supra note 110, at 243.
113   Id. at 272.
114   ET Bureau, Ease of Doing Business: India among 20 Most Improved Countries, The Eco-
nomic Times (Sept. 29, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/
indicators/ease-of-doing-business-india-among-20-most-improved-countries/article 
show/71357483.cms.
115   Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law, 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 7 (1999).
116   Id.
117   Boris Kagarlitsky, The Twilight of Globalization: Property, State and 
Capitalism 14 (2000).
104 Fernandes and Pathak
In our third section, through an exhaustive comparative exercise, we arrive 
at one crucial conclusion. First World common law countries, when compared 
with a Third World common law country like India, display differences in a 
manner in which they have chosen to adopt the Model Law based on domestic 
priorities. As India has not yet adopted the Model Law, there are important 
lessons for India to keep in mind when the legislature takes over the process 
of formally adopting the Model Law. Among the most significant domestic 
priorities to keep in mind is the fact that the largest source of credit, that is – 
financial capital, are the Public Sector Banks118 which are in the midst of a 
crisis of bad loans.119
Thus, India’s adoption of the Model Law should reflect the realities of 
domestic credit markets lest we end up throwing the baby out with the bath-
water when adopting the Model Law. More fundamentally, this would serve 
as an effective response to one of international laws’ inherent tendencies – a 
regime bias against the Third World nations120 and thus confront the existing 
state of global power relations.121 This confrontation matters.
Too often, international law operates in a manner that works against an idea 
of the common good.122 That is, international law promotes too narrow an 
understanding of best interests while simultaneously working to undermine 
alternative conceptions of the idea of the good life.123 Examining international 
law at one of its peripheries in the Third World enables us to carry stories from 
these peripheries,124 identify its discontents,125 and to confront its hegemonic 
118   See India Commercial Guide, International Trade Administration, https://www 
.export.gov/article?id=India-Banking-Systems (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
119   See Ministry of Finance, Bank NPA, Press Information Bureau, Government 
of India (June 24, 2019), https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=190704 (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2019).
120   Usha Natarajan et al., Introduction: TWAIL – On Praxis and the Intellectual, 37 Third 
World Quarterly 1946, 1954 (2016).
121   Gus Van Harten, TWAIL and the Dabhol Arbitration, 3 Trade, Law and Development 
131 (2011).
122   Michael Fakhri, Questioning TWAIL ‘s Agenda, 14 Oregon Review of International 
Law 1, 4 (2012).
123   B.S. Chimni, The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World 
Approach, 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 499 (2007).
124   Michael Fakhri, Law as the Interplay of Ideas, Institutions, and Interests: Using Polyani (and 
Foucault) to Ask TWAIL Questions, 10 International Community Law Review 464 
(2008).
125   Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Its Discontents: Rethinking the Global 
South, 106 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of Inter-
national Law) 176 (2012).
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discourses. Moreover, it enables us to reframe the discourse of the outcomes 
produced by international law in the context of the Third World and, therefore, 
opens up conversations on global responsibility that are crucial to a fuller real-
ization of justice.126
126   Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Ethical Dimensions of Third-World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL): A Critical Review, 8 African Journal of Legal Studies 209, 235 
(2015).
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Use of Force as Self Defence against Non-State 
Actors and TWAIL Considerations: A Critical 
Analysis of India’s State Practice
Srinivas Burra*
1 Introduction
International law on the use of force has been prominently a contentious 
issue in the last two decades. This has been mainly after the September 11 
incident. International law dealing with the use of force, principally on self 
defence, is sought to be applied in contexts which arguably are contentious. 
While Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force in 
international law, Article 51 provides for the possibility of the use of force as 
self defence. In accordance with the text of Article 51, it is generally under-
stood that the use of force as self defence takes place by a state against another 
state. However, in the recent instances of uses of force, it is asserted that this 
right of self defence can be invoked by a state while using force against non-
state actors (NSAs) operating from another state. States which are in favour of 
the invocation of Article 51 in such situations of force argue that if the state 
from which the non-state actor is operating is unwilling or unable to deal 
with the non-state actors, the state which is the target of the non-state actor 
has the right of self defence. This argument is primarily relied upon by a few 
states while justifying their use of force in the recent past. These states mainly 
include the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Turkey and France, 
who claimed individual self defence against the Islamic State (IS).1
*  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University, New Delhi, India. A draft 
of this article was presented at the 2019 DILA-KOREA International Conference on ‘Asian 
State Practice in International Law from the Lens of TWAIL’, November 7–9, 2019, Seoul, 
Korea. The author thanks the participants of the conference for their valuable comments on 
the draft. He also thanks DILA-KOREA for facilitating his participation in the conference.
1   Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated September 23, 2014 from 
the Permanent Rep. of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the U.N. 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 14, 2014); Permanent Rep. of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N., Identical letters dated November 25, 
2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
addressed to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014); Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N., Letter dated September 7, 2015 from the 
Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United 
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India has been involved in situations of use of force on several occasions. 
Some of these situations clearly amounted to armed conflicts. However, there 
were instances in which India resorted to the use of force against another state, 
primarily claiming to target non-state actors. In such situations, it was not 
clearly argued that the use of force was in self defence against non-state actors. 
At the same time, it was also not clearly spelt out as to what it would amount to. 
This article analyses India’s state practice in relation to the use of force that it 
resorted to targeting the non-state actors on the territory of another state. 
It intends to critically evaluate India’s positions to draw conclusions on the 
issue of the right of self defence against NSAs operating from the other state. It 
explores India’s position at the multilateral fora on the issue. It also evaluates 
TWAIL methodological insights in relation to the right of self defence against 
NSAs. Part one of this article provides the introduction. Part two deals with 
the legal framework on the use of force. This is followed by part three which 
provides India’s state practice in relation to its use of force against the non-
state actors on the territory of another state. Part four presents Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) reflections on the issue. Part five 
provides the conclusion.
2 Legal Framework on the Use of Force
The use of force in interstate relations is arguably comprehensively dealt 
with by the United Nations Charter. While prohibiting the use of force by 
states under Article 2(4), the UN Charter permits and regulates it in certain 
circumstances as exceptions to the general prohibition. Therefore, the gen-
eral prohibition is qualified with two exceptions. One exception is in the form 
of permissibility of the use of force as self defence under article 51 of the 
UN Charter. The other exception is the use of force with the authorization of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which is governed by Article 42 
of the Charter. Self defence under Article 51 primarily visualizes the immedi-
ate response of a state which is the victim of an armed attack. This immediate 
response may take the form of individual or collective self defence. Article 42 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/688 (Sept. 8, 
2015); Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated 
July 24, 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/563 (July 24, 
2015); Permanent Rep. of France to the U.N., Identical letters dated September 8, 2015 
from the Permanent Rep. of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 
and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/745 (Sept. 9, 2015).
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of the UN Charter envisages institutional collective security response to the 
use of force against a state in violation of Article 2(4).
2.1 Legal Framework on the Right of Self Defence
In the last two decades, mainly from the September 11, 2001 incident, there 
has been an increase in scholarly discussions as well as contending views of 
states on the scope of Article 51 of the UN Charter. These views also relate 
the discussion to the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council after the 
September 11 incident. These resolutions mainly are: 1368 and 1373 adopted 
in September 2001 which make references to self defence.2
This discussion is different from others that took place on the right of self 
defence that revolved around anticipatory self defence and issues relating to 
necessity and proportionality. The present discussion is related to the scope of 
Article 51, focusing on when the right of self defence of a state gets activated. In 
other words, whether the right of self defence can be exercised by a state even 
if the armed attack comes from NSAs. This discussion continues to attain sig-
nificance in the context of fights against terrorism and other non-state actors. 
This situation is experienced in the contexts of Syria, Libya, Yemen and other 
similar contexts. The possibility or impossibility of exercising the right of self 
defence by the victim state, the state which is the target of an armed attack, is 
evaluated from various standpoints. These standpoints can be categorized as 
textual analysis, customary international law perspective and analysis based 
on state practice. The justification for the use of force as self defence against 
NSAs is predominantly justified, not from political or policy considerations, 
but in formalist legal analyses. The first proposition of this justification comes 
from the interpretation of the existing law. This justification primarily relies 
on the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Proponents on the view 
2   S.C. Res. 1368, (Sept. 12, 2001). In its preamble, it includes the following paragraphs:
   “Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts,
   Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter”.
   Similarly, in S.C. Res. 1373, (Sept. 28, 2001), the Security Council includes:
   “Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001,
   …
   Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat 
to international peace and security,
   Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the 
Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001),
   Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.
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that the right of self defence exists against non-state actors operating from 
another state even if the second state does not have any role to play in the 
activities of the NSA, rely on the text of Article 51 as one of their arguments. 
They argue that the textual reading of Article 51 does not support the view 
that the armed attack should come from states only. They underline that the 
text of Article 51 does not refer to the attack from the state but merely refers to 
armed attacks. The relevant part of Article 51 states, “Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security”.3
The text only says “if an armed attack occurs” without specifying that the 
armed attack should come from a state. Therefore, it is argued that the armed 
attack can also come from NSAs and that what matters is the armed attack 
and not the attacker.4 Hence, it is argued that “the focus of Art. 51 refers to the 
definition of the term ‘armed attack’. If states suffer from an armed attack in 
the sense of Art. 51 they have the right to react by using force irrespective of 
who is the author of the attack, a state or a non-State actor”.5 While the merit 
of this argument is drawn from the plain text of the provision, it apparently 
fails to take into consideration the nature of Article 51 in the Charter frame-
work. Article 51 provides an exception to the general prohibition on the use 
of force as provided in Article 2(4) of the Charter. The text of this provision 
clearly provides for the prohibition of use of force in interstate relations. This 
provision reads, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations”.6
It states that all members of the UN refrain from the threat or use of force. 
Article 3, which talks about states that are original members, and Article 4, 
which talks about the new members, refer only to states. Therefore, the prohi-
bition of the use of force in the Charter framework is confined only to interstate 
use of force. When the prohibition of the use of force is confined only to 
interstate relations, an exception in the form of Article 51 cannot be read as 
covering the use of force involving NSAs. There is a logical link between the 
3   U.N. Charter art. 51.
4   Karin Oellers-Frahm, Article 51 – What Matters is the Armed Attack, not the Attacker, 77 
ZaöRV 49 (2017).
5   Id.
6   U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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legal prohibition and an exception to such prohibition because the confines 
of the latter are determined by the scope of the former. An exception always 
needs to be read and understood only in relation to the general framework 
because the latter decides the contours of the former. Thus, in the present case 
as Article 2(4) prohibits interstate use of force, the exception in the form of 
Article 51 needs to be understood only within those confines. Understanding 
Article 51’s reference only to armed attack as inclusive of armed attack from 
NSAs would at best remain as speculative, devoid of coherence enshrined in 
the UN Charter. On the other hand, reading the scope of Article 51 in relation 
to Article 2(4) and therefore understanding it as governing only the interstate 
use of force is very much within the framework of the UN Charter. For a longer 
period, there was no doubt that the reference to armed attack was understood 
as armed attack between states only.7 Despite this logical coherence between 
Article 2(4) and 51, there are arguments that the drafters introduced a dis-
connect between the two provisions. This view underlines that if the drafters 
wanted a logical continuity between Article 2(4) and 51, they would have con-
structed Article 51 similar to Article 2(4) which prohibits the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.8 
Therefore, they are of the view that though Article 51 provides an exception to 
Article 2(4), its nature is different as it encompasses non-state actors also. This 
argument, however, does not overcome the logical incoherence it leads to in 
the larger Charter framework.
2.2 Right of Self Defence and Customary International Law
The second important proposition that is relied upon to justify the right 
of self defence against NSAs is based on customary international law. It is 
argued that there exists the right of self defence as part of customary interna-
tional law. This argument attempts to establish customary international law 
on the right of self defence of a state against non-state actors operating from a 
third state based on the text of Article 51 itself. It is argued that Article 51 does 
not create the right of self defence and only recognises an existing right. The 
7   However, there is a contrary opinion that “[w]hether States can use force in response to 
armed attacks by non-State actors operating from abroad is not a new issue that suddenly 
became relevant after 9/11. Views have no doubt changed over the past fifteen years, as more 
States have invoked, or endorsed the invocation of, self-defence against attacks by non-
State actors. However, change is more gradual than is usually admitted”. Christian J. Tams, 
Embracing the Uncertainty of Old: Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors Prior to 9/11, 77 ZaöRV 61, 
61 (2017).
8   Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the 
ICJ?, 99 The American Journal of International Law 62, 64 (2005).
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text of Article 51 states that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”.9 It is, therefore, 
argued that the reference to “inherent” in this provision is underlined as basis 
to argue that customary international law on self defence exists. Here, “inher-
ent” is seen as referring to the existence of the right of self defence outside the 
UN Charter framework, and the Charter only recognises that right. Outside 
the UN Charter, the right of self defence exists in the form of customary inter-
national law. This view further argues that the right of self defence under 
customary international law is more expansive than the right of self defence 
under Article 51. This expansive right also includes the use of force against 
non-state actors.
This argument is traced to the origins of customary international law on 
self defence which relies on the Caroline incident.10 The Caroline incident 
took place in the nineteenth century. It mainly involved the United Kingdom 
and the United States. It was related to the territory of Canada, which was still 
under British control. Those who were fighting against the British rule were 
involved in violent resistance. This violent resistance sometimes took place 
from the territory of the United States. In 1837, the Caroline, a vessel used in one 
such attack, was destroyed by the United Kingdom while it was in US waters. 
The content of the exchanged letters between Daniel Webster, on behalf of 
the United States, and Lord Ashburton, on behalf of the United Kingdom, 
arguably laid the foundation for establishing the law on self defence. In his 
letter to Webster, offering an explanation for the United Kingdom’s use of force 
against the Caroline while it was on US waters, Ashburton declares that there 
are “possible cases in the relations of nations, as of individuals, where neces-
sity … may be pleaded”.11 In response, Webster, while admitting the existence 
of self defence, notes that it is “confined to cases in which the ‘necessity of that 
self defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation’”.12 Along with those conditions that are neces-
sary before self defence became legitimate, the action taken in pursuance of it 
9    U.N. Charter art. 51.
10   For details of the Caroline incident, see Michael Wood, The Caroline Incident-1837, in The 
Use of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach 5 (Tom Ruys 
et al. eds., 2018); see also Abraham Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-Emption, 14 European 
Journal of International Law 209, 214–20 (2003).
11   John Basset Moore, 2 A Digest of International Law as Embodied in 
Diplomatic Discussions, Treaties and Other International Agreements 
411 (1906).
12   Id. at 412.
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must not be unreasonable or excessive, “since the act, justified by the necessity 
of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it”.13
The Caroline incident is not only taken as the beginning of the right of self 
defence under customary international law, but it is also being relied upon for 
the purpose of justifying the use of force as self defence against NSAs. It is 
argued that the use of force by the United Kingdom was against the acts of 
NSAs, though it took place in United States waters. Thus, it is argued that the 
use of force as self defence against NSAs was not opposed then and contin-
ues to be part of contemporary customary international law understanding 
of the right of self defence.14 This expansive understanding of customary 
international law on self defence has its conceptual and historical gaps. One 
conceptual gap arises from the fact that the comprehensive prohibition of the 
use of force took place only in 1945 as part of the UN Charter. Prior to that, 
states had fairly established freedom to go to war, with certain restrictions at 
some historical junctures, for example, in the form of just war. When we relate 
this historical position with the right of self defence, it becomes difficult to 
establish the scope of customary international law on the right of self defence. 
This is so, because it is difficult to imagine the right of self defence when there 
was no clear legal prohibition on the use of force. When there was no clear 
prohibition of use of force, there was no legal necessity to prove that the right 
of self defence existed for the purpose of legally justifying the use of force.
Thus, it is underlined that that the exchange between Ashburton and 
Webster in the Caroline incident which constituted customary international 
law is filled with inconsistencies. This fairly coherent assertion views that “For 
the exchange in the Caroline incident to be formative (or even reflective of a 
rule of customary international law), the resort to force had to be prohibited 
under international law at the time of the exchange. Self-defence, as an excep-
tion under international law, can only make sense where international law 
prohibits the resort to force”.15 Another important historical as well as concep-
tual issue is that a single incident involving only two states led to the formation 
of a rule of customary international law. The critics rightly argue that it “is not 
clear how the Caroline incident meets the requirements of a widespread or 
general practice. Those advancing it as constitutive of customary international 
law make no attempt to show acquiescence on the part of other States. The 
13   Malcom N. Shaw, International Law 1131 (6th ed. 2008).
14   Elizabeth Wilmshurst, The Chatham House Principles of International Law of the Use of 
Force in Self-Defense, 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 963 
(2006).
15   Dire Tladi, The Use of Force in Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors, Decline of Collective 
Security and the Rise of Unilateralism: Whither International Law?, in 1 Self-Defence 
Against Non-State Actors 14, 53 (Ann Peters & Christian Marxsen eds., 2019).
113Use of Force as Self Defence against Non-State Actors
Caroline incident does not meet the generally accepted criteria for customary 
international law”.16
As explained above, the right of self defence of a victim state against NSAs 
operating from other states is sought to be justified on several grounds. Two 
important grounds for justification, as discussed above, are based on the tex-
tual position of Article 51 and the customary law nature of the right of self 
defence beyond the UN Charter. To give further clarification to the existing 
legal understating, clarificatory principles were also adopted in scholarly 
engagements. These are: the Chatham House Principles,17 the Leiden Policy 
Recommendations18 and the Bethlehem principles.19
In light of the arguments in favour of and against the right of self defence 
against non-state actors operating from the territory of another state even 
without latter’s involvement, there has also been a focus on the state prac-
tice to justify respective contending views. One of the reasons for focusing 
on state practice is to establish whether that state practice led to an “agree-
ment between the Parties” regarding the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.20 There is a possibility of a state practice being elicited from collec-
tive actions. It is equally important to know individual state actions for the 
purpose of understanding the formation of customary international law and/
or for the purpose of looking at the emergence of an agreement between the 
parties through subsequent practice. With that purpose, the next section will 
deal with India’s state practice with respect to the use of force as self defence, 
particularly in situations in which it was involved in such use of force.
3 India’s State Practice
In the backdrop of the above discussed legal doctrinal position, the follow-
ing discussion evaluates India’s state practice. India was involved in several 
armed conflicts of interstate nature since its independence in 1947. It was 
 
16   Id.
17   Wilmshurst, supra note 14.
18   Nico Schrijver & Larissa van den Herik, Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter- 
Terrorism and International Law, 57 Netherlands International Law Review 531 
(2010).
19   Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate 
Actors, 106 American Journal of International Law 770 (2012).
20   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“[A]ny subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”).
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involved in wars since 1948–49 till now with its neighboring states, particularly 
Pakistan and China.21 However, for the purpose of the present chapter, the 
focus will be on recent military use of force, particularly after the September 11, 
2001 incident. The reason behind choosing this timeline is based on the view 
that the question of the right of self defence against non-state actors gained 
prominence mainly after the September 11 incident. Though the discussion 
around the scope of Article 51 and the right of self defence existed prior to 
the September 11 incident, post this incident, discussions shifted towards 
self defence against non-state actors operating from another state. It is also 
important that the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 1368 and 1373 
after the September 11 incident. Often, there have been allegations and coun-
ter allegations between India and Pakistan on cross border terrorism. Sporadic 
incidents of military firing are reported, however, without leading to any war-
like situation. There are also instances of the use of force with an intensity 
and reach which would amount to the use of force in the legal sense. There 
are two instances of such nature which took place in 2016 and 2019. These two 
incidents will be evaluated for the purpose of assessing India’s state practice in 
relation to the right of self defence against non-state actors.
3.1 Surgical Strikes of 2016
On September 29, 2016, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) 
of India announced that the Indian army had conducted surgical strikes 
against terrorist launch pads across the Line of Control (LoC). LoC separates 
the Indian-and-Pakistani-administered Kashmir.22 The DGMO, in his briefing, 
contextualised the circumstances in which the surgical strikes were conducted. 
He informed that “there has been continuing and increasing infiltration by 
terrorists across the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir”.23 He further said 
that this infiltration “is reflected in the terrorist attacks at Poonch and Uri on 
11 and 18th of September respectively. Almost 20 infiltration attempts have 
been foiled by the Indian army successfully during this year. During these 
terrorist attacks and infiltration attempts we have recovered items including 
Global Positioning Systems and stores which have had Pakistani markings”.24 
21   1948–49 India-Pakistan war, 1962 Sino-Indian War, 1965 India–Pakistan, 1971 India–
Pakistan War and 1999 India–Pakistan War. For a discussion, see Rudra Chaudhuri, War 
and Peace in Contemporary India, 42 Journal of Strategic Studies 567 (2019).
22   In India, Indian administered Kashmir is known as Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan admin-
istered Kashmir is known in Pakistan as Azad (free) Kashmir.
23   Transcript of Joint Briefing by MEA and MoD, Ministry of External Affairs, 
Government of India (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings 
.htm?dtl/27446/Transcript_of_Joint_Briefing_by_MEA_and_MoD_September_29_2016.
24   Id.
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The DGMO also informed that the matter was taken up with Pakistan in the 
past, and despite their urging “that Pakistan respect its commitment made 
in January 2004 not to allow its soil or territory under its control to be used 
for terrorism against India, there have been no letup in infiltrations or terror-
ist actions inside our territory”.25 Therefore, they went for this surgical strike. 
He further underlined that “[b]ased on very credible and specific informa-
tion which we received yesterday that some terrorist teams had positioned 
themselves at launch pads along the Line of Control with an aim to carry out 
infiltration and terrorist strikes in Jammu & Kashmir and in various other met-
ros in our country, the Indian army conducted surgical strikes last night at these 
launch pads”.26 The DGMO of India was clear that the strikes specifically tar-
geted terrorists. He said that the “operations were basically focused to ensure 
that these terrorists do not succeed in their design of infiltration and carrying 
out destruction and endangering the lives of citizens of our country”.27 He fur-
ther informed that “significant casualties have been caused to the terrorists 
and those who are trying to support them. The operations aimed at neutral-
izing the terrorists have since ceased”.28
Some argued that India could justify its surgical strikes as self defence under 
international law.29 Another view justified surgical strikes on two counts. It 
was observed that:
[I]t was clearly an act of self-defence after the Uri attack; the Charter does 
not say the right of self-defence must be exercised within a prescribed 
time limit. Secondly, it was not legally speaking, an armed action in the 
territory of another state. After the partition of the Subcontinent, Pakistan 
signed a Standstill Agreement with the ruler of the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. India did not sign this instrument. Pakistan launched an inva-
sion of Kashmir despite having signed the Agreement. The ruler asked for 
India’s help, but India refused in the absence of the ruler concluding the 
Instrument of Accession with India. Only after he did so did India rush 





29   See Yateesh Begoore, An Apologia for India’s “Surgical Strikes” Against Terrorist Groups: The 
Conflict with Pakistan, Just Security (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33409/
apologia-indias-surgical-strikes-pakistan/; George Thomas, The Right to Self-Defence, The 
Indian Express (Oct. 24, 2016, 1:04 PM), https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/
columns/surgical-strikes-kashmir-loc-indian-army-jihadist-terrorism-3099392/.
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all subsequent such actions, including the one on September 29, were 
within our own territory and hence not a violation of international law.30
Some other scholarly writings also favored categorizing Indian surgical strikes 
as justifiable under the right of self defence. They argued that “self defence” 
provides a solid international legal basis for Indian surgical strikes against ter-
ror launch pads, bases, or even states that provide ‘aid’ and ‘assistance’ to such 
terror groups to play havoc in India”.31 There was an opinion favoring its justi-
fication under customary international law, rather than under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, as the right to use armed force pre-emptively for self-defense.32 
Another view attempted to justify it under the “unable and unwilling” version 
of right of self defence. It argued that:
[U]nder the emerging customary status of the ‘unable and unwilling’ 
test, India has the right to use force in self-defence based on Pakistani 
inability or failure to prevent its territory from being a safe haven for ter-
rorists. This is perhaps India’s strongest argument not only to justify the 
strikes, but also to legitimately sanction further use of force against ter-
rorists in Pakistan.33
There were also views which were skeptical of the justification of surgical 
strikes under self defence and under the unwilling or unable doctrine.34
While the scholarly and academic writings, mainly coming from India, 
attempted to justify the surgical strikes by India, they remained largely specu-
lative or conjectural. The reason for this speculative or conjectural analysis can 
be attributed primarily to the imprecise legal position articulated by India. The 
30   Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, An Act of Self-Defence, The Indian Express (Oct. 10, 2016, 
1:12 PM), https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/surgical-strikes-india 
-pakistan-un-security-council-uri-attack-3074227/.
31   Bharat H. Desai, Surgical Strikes’ by India: Taking International Law Seriously, 52 
Economic and Political Weekly 23 (2017), https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/5/
commentary/%E2%80%98surgical-strikes%E2%80%99-india.html.
32   Sanoj Rajan, Legality of India’s Pre-emptive Surgical Strike in PoK, The Week (Oct. 10, 
2016), https://www.theweek.in/content/archival/news/india/legality-of-india-pre 
-emptive-surgical-strike-in-pok.html.
33   Arpan Banerjee, Indian Surgical Strikes: Accelerating the Emergence of Nascent Norms of 
Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, Cambridge International Law Journal, 
(Sept. 6, 2017), http://cilj.co.uk/2017/09/06/indian-surgical-strikes-accelerating-the 
-emergence-of-nascent-norms-of-use-of-force-against-non-state-actors/.
34   Srinivas Burra, How Does India’s Decision to Conduct Surgical Strikes Hold Up in Inter- 
national Law?, The Wire (Oct. 13, 2016), http://thewire.in/72642/does-indias-decision 
-to-conduct-surgical-strikes-hold-up-before-international-law/.
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Indian government’s justifications do not seem to fit within the framework of 
the UN charter or international law. Additionally, India did not report the mat-
ter to the UNSC. While the DGMO’s statement suggests that India had taken 
up the matter with Pakistan, it does not clearly attribute the terrorist activities 
to Pakistan. However, it does seem to indicate that there was unwillingness 
on the part of Pakistan to control the activities of the terrorist groups. What 
is clear from the DGMO’s statement is that India does not wish to contextual-
ise the strikes within the international law framework as it only emphasises 
on terrorist activities and their infiltration without giving any legal justifica-
tion for the military use of force. Pakistan insisted that surgical strikes did not 
take place. Both countries seem to imply that it did not amount to use of force 
under international law as they seem to be aware of the implications of such 
assertions. The important implication here is that any use of force under 
international law effectively amounts to an armed conflict between two states 
in the legal sense. This imposes responsibility on India to justify its actions in 
accordance with the UN Charter and further legal and diplomatic assertions 
from Pakistan.
3.2 Balakot Strikes of 2019
On February 14, 2019, more than 40 Indian Central Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF) personnel were killed in a suicide bomb in Pulwama of Jammu and 
Kashmir in India. Pakistani-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) reportedly 
claimed responsibility. This led to an escalated military situation between 
India and Pakistan. As a response, India sent its Air Force (IAF) aircraft into 
Pakistan on February 26, 2019, and claimed that they targeted a JeM training 
camp near Balakot in Pakistan. The Foreign Secretary of India stated that “India 
struck the biggest training camp of JeM in Balakot”,35 The statement stated:
The Government of India is firmly and resolutely committed to taking 
all necessary measures to fight the menace of terrorism. Hence this non-
military preemptive action was specifically targeted at the JeM camp. The 
selection of the target was also conditioned by our desire to avoid civilian 
casualties. The facility is located in thick forest on a hilltop far away from 
any civilian presence.36
35   Statement by Foreign Secretary on 26 February 2019 on the Strike on JeM Training Camp at 





The statement claimed that it was a non-military preemptive action tar-
geted specifically at the JeM camp. Pakistan condemned37 the airstrikes and 
called it as “Indian violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. 
Pakistan also referred to it as “Indian aggression”. On February 27, Pakistan 
declared that their “Air Force undertook strikes across Line of Control from 
within Pakistani airspace”.38 Pakistan further stated that their action was not 
retaliation to Indian belligerence and that its sole purpose was to demonstrate 
their “right, will and capability for self defence”.39 They said, therefore, they 
struck at a non-military target, avoiding human loss and collateral damage.40 
On the same day, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson, in a 
press briefing, confirmed that Pakistan has conducted airstrikes. He informed 
that India foiled Pakistan’s attempts to target military installations and that 
one Pakistani fighter aircraft was shot down by the Indian Air Force. He further 
stated that India lost one MiG 21 and that a pilot was missing in action.41
Further, on the same day, it was informed in a press release by India that India 
condemned Pakistan’s actions. The press release stated that “[t]he Acting High 
Commissioner of Pakistan was summoned … by MEA to lodge a strong protest 
at the unprovoked act of aggression by Pakistan against India …, including by 
violation of the Indian air space by Pakistan Air Force and targeting of Indian 
military posts”.42 The press release further stated, “[t]his is in contrast to the 
India’s non-military anti-terror pre-emptive strike at a JeM terrorist camp in 
Balakot on 26 February 2019” and “Pakistan has acted with aggression against 
India”.43 These statements show that both sides were careful in legally catego-
rizing their military actions. Both sides did not want to project their military 
actions as the use of force as a right of self defence. Thus, India stated that its 
use of force was non-military and that Pakistan wanted to show that it was 
37   Pakistan Strongly Protests Indian Aggression, Violation of Its Airspace and Promises a 
Befitting Response, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 
(Feb. 26, 2019), http://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-strongly-protests-indian-aggression 
-violation-of-its-airspace-and-promises-a-befitting-response-2/.
38   Pakistan Strikes Back, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 
(Feb. 27, 2019), http://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-strikes-back-2/.
39   Id.
40   Id.
41   Statement by Official Spokesperson on 27 February 2019, Ministry of External 
Affairs, Government of India (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.mea.gov.in/media 
-briefings.htm?dtl/31098/Statement_by_Official_Spokesperson_on_27_February_2019.
42   Pakistan Demarched on the Act of Aggression Against India, Ministry of External 
Affairs, Government of India (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.mea.gov.in/press 
-releases.htm?dtl/31100/Pakistan_demarched_on_the_act_of_aggression_against_India.
43   Id.
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their “right, will and capability for self defence”.44 However, both sides wanted 
to show that the other side’s military action was an act of aggression.
Remarkably, India relied upon international humanitarian law in seeking 
the release of its pilot who went missing in action on February 27 and was 
captured by Pakistan. It stated:
India also strongly objected to Pakistan’s vulgar display of an injured per-
sonnel of the Indian Air Force in violation of all norms of International 
Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Convention. It was made clear that 
Pakistan would be well advised to ensure that no harm comes to the 
Indian defence personnel in its custody. India also expects his immediate 
and safe return.45
India’s reference here to the Geneva Convention seemed to point to the 
third Geneva Convention dealing with the protection of prisoners of war. 
The Geneva Conventions, including the third Convention, would apply in 
situations of international armed conflicts. India’s insistence on the Geneva 
Conventions implied the existence of an armed conflict. For the purpose of 
the application of the Geneva Conventions, there is a need for the existence 
of an international armed conflict in the present context. It is important to note 
that initially there was a general caution in terming the situation as attracting 
the jus ad bellum framework. However, with the capture of the Indian pilot 
by Pakistan, India insisted that he should be treated in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention.
On February 28, Mr. Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, announced 
that the Indian pilot would be released. Accordingly, on March 1, the Indian pilot 
was released and handed over by the Pakistani authorities to Indian author- 
ities at the India-Pakistan border. Pakistan stated that “Prime Minister of 
Pakistan Mr. Imran Khan announced his return as a goodwill gesture aimed 
at de-escalating rising tensions with India”.46 This statement says that the 
release of the pilot was aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions and was 
not a response to the deescalated situation. It further stated that the pilot 
was “treated with dignity and in line with international law”.47 Reference 
to international law presumably indicates international humanitarian law 
44   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, supra note 38.
45   Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, supra note 42.
46   Return of Indian POW, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, Ministry of 




and international human rights law. However, both states seemed to have pre-
ferred to maintain legal uncertainty.48
This military exchange is another instance to evaluate India’s state prac-
tice on the issue of the use of force, particularly on the right of self defence. 
As a background to the use of force by India, the foreign secretary’s state-
ment underlined as follows: “Credible intelligence was received that JeM was 
attempting another suicide terror attack in various parts of the country, and 
the fidayeen jihadis were being trained for this purpose. In the face of immi-
nent danger, a preemptive strike became absolutely necessary”.49 The words 
“imminent danger” and “preemptive strike” would suggest the involvement 
of the right of self defence. However, the statement does not expressly men-
tion the same. India could have invoked the right of self defence by attributing 
the actions of JeM to Pakistan. However, attribution was avoided by India. 
Instead, the Foreign Secretary informed that “non-military preemptive action 
was specifically targeted at the JeM camp”.50 Reference to “non-military” must 
have been intended to convey that the attack only targeted the non-state actor 
on the territory of Pakistan and was not in violation of Pakistan’s territorial 
sovereignty or political independence. However, this distinction does not serve 
much purpose as it does not help in creating any legal distinction between two 
positions. This was asserted by the International Law Association (ILA). The 
ILA observes in this regard that:
Accordingly, using force within the territory of another State – even if the 
forcible measures are limited to strikes against a non-state actor – must be 
considered as within the notion of force as it exists in Article 2(4) of the 
Charter. Distinguishing between forcible measures within but not against 
the State does not, therefore, provide a solution for the jus ad bellum con-
cerns. As a consequence, the use of force in such circumstances will not 
be lawful unless justified by self-defence or Security Council authorisa-
tion. By accepting that self-defence may be invoked against a non-state 
actor located in another State, even absent attribution to this other State, 
the ensuing non-consensual force would not be a violation of Article 2(4) 
as it would be a lawful exercise of an exception to the prohibition.51
48   See Srinivas Burra, Legal Implications of the Recent India-Pakistan Military Standoff, 
Opinio Juris (Mar. 19, 2008), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/08/legal-implications-of 
-the-recent-india-pakistan-military-standoff/.
49   Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, supra note 35.
50   Id.
51   Int’l Law Ass’n, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force, at 16 (2018) (footnote 
omitted).
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ILA favors the possibility of the right of self defence, without even attribut-
ing NSA actions to the host state. However, it is clear from India’s positions 
that it did not want to call its military actions as self defence against the NSA 
activities. India could have claimed this position by attributing the actions of 
the JeM activities to the State of Pakistan. However, it did not mention it in any 
of its statements. It is also argued that there has been a growing view that even 
if a non-state actor’s actions are not attributable to the host state, the victim 
state can exercise the right of self defence. It is argued that for this to happen, 
it should be established that the host state is “unwilling or unable” to deal with 
the activities of the non-state actor on its territory.52 India does not rely on the 
“unwilling or unable” proposition, despite the fact that it clearly emphasises 
the unwillingness of Pakistan in dealing with the activities of the JeM. India 
asserts that:
Information regarding the location of training camps in Pakistan and 
PoJK has been provided to Pakistan from time to time. Pakistan, however, 
denies their existence. The existence of such massive training facilities 
capable of training hundreds of jihadis could not have functioned with-
out the knowledge of Pakistan authorities.
India has been repeatedly urging Pakistan to take action against the 
JeM to prevent jihadis from being trained and armed inside Pakistan. 
Pakistan has taken no concrete actions to dismantle the infrastructure of 
terrorism on its soil.53
These statements reveal India’s view that Pakistan was unwilling to take 
action against JeM activities on its territory. Going by India’s description of the 
situation, this would have attracted the “unwilling or unable” test. However, 
India did not rely on the “unwilling or unable” test to justify its attack as self 
defence. This unwillingness to use this test gains importance in the light of 
the fact that India was informed of its right of self defence after the Pulwama 
suicide bombing by the United States. On February 15, 2019, there was a tel-
ephonic conversation between India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval 
and the United States’ National Security Advisor Amb. John Bolton. A read-
out of the telephonic conversation said, “Ambassador Bolton supported India’s 
right to self-defence against cross-border terrorism. He offered all assistance to 
India to bring the perpetrators and backers of the attack promptly to justice. 
52   Id. at 14–15.
53   Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, supra note 35.
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NSA Doval appreciated U.S. support”.54 Despite these suggestions, India did 
not go forward to claim it has a right of self defence to use force against 
NSA activities.
While looking at the state practice in relation to the “unwilling or unable” 
doctrine, a study identified India’s position as falling under the ambiguous 
cases. The study said that ambiguous cases are those states “that have used 
force against non-state actors in third countries without clearly expressing 
their views on the legality of their actions under international law, and States 
that provided legal justifications but did not invoke the ‘unwilling or unable’ 
test or a similar concept in their justifications”.55 While this criteria makes a fair 
proposition, it is equally important to take into consideration India’s position 
in a multilateral context. India is part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
The NAM continuously emphasises that “consistent with the practice of the 
UN and international law, as pronounced by the ICJ, the Article 51 of the UN 
Charter is restrictive and should not be re-written or re-interpreted”.56 Clearly 
articulated multilateral positions and ambiguously presented explanations of 
its use of force so far reveal that India evidently refrains from supporting or 
using the “unwilling or unable” doctrine.
4 A TWAIL View
Arguments for the right of self defence against NSAs prominently come from 
a few states. These few states are mainly from North America and Europe. 
However, there are also a few states from the Global South that subscribe to 
this position. While it is important to know which states support or oppose this 
position, a methodological stance can be taken independent of states’ posi-
tions. State practice helps us understand the existing international law. This 
happens mainly in the form of understanding customary international law as 
state practice constitutes an important component to elicit the formation of 
54   Readout of Telephonic Conversation Between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and 




55   Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Which States Support the ‘Unwilling and Unable’ Test?, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:55 PM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/which-states-support 
-unwilling-and-unable-test.
56   Non-Aligned Movement [NAM], 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
Non-Aligned Movement: Final Document, at 20, NAM 2016/CoB/DOC.1. Corr.1 (Sept. 17–18, 
2016).
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customary international law along with opinio juris. Similarly, state practice is 
relied upon for the purpose of interpreting existing international treaty law. 
State practice is relied upon for the purpose of interpreting existing interna-
tional treaty law as provided under Article 30(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.57 The evaluation of state practice would also help to 
defend or critique a particular methodological position, like for the purpose 
of present article, providing a TWAIL critique. However, there need not be a 
necessary correlation between the third world state practice and the TWAIL 
approach in all circumstances. Coercive geopolitical considerations play a sig-
nificant role in a particular practice of states often coming from the Global 
South. This can be the result of certain coercive measures by the dominant 
states from the Global North. Therefore, any evaluation of state practice should 
take these factors into consideration.
A TWAIL critique in general arguably, predominantly underlines the histori-
cal continuities in structurally oppressive international law. This structurally 
oppressive nature of international law’s origin and its evolution took shape 
during the colonial period. Despite the decolonization and the subsequent 
changes in international law, its structural bias against the third world or 
Global South continues to shape the form and substance of contemporary 
international law. Extending this structural continuity argument to the current 
debates on international law on the use of force, it is argued that the structural 
bias of the past continues to occupy the substance of the present. In other 
words, the civilised and uncivilised distinctions of colonial times are reenacted 
in the arguments of the “unwilling or unable” doctrine debates. In this regard, 
Ntina Tzouvala argues that the “unwilling or unable” doctrine carries within it 
imperial aspirations and that they “form a ‘red thread’ that connect ‘the stan-
dard of civilization’ with the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine”.58 However, this 
critique comes with a caution that at “an epistemological level, one should 
also keep in mind that there are limits to the explanatory potential of histori-
cal, genealogical accounts”.59 Tzouvala further argues that the “‘unwilling or 
unable’ doctrine replicates both the substance and the methodological prefer-
ences of nineteenth-century international law. The discourse of ‘civilization’ 
keeps returning in the discipline in a manner that questions its self-portrayal 
57   According to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), state practice 
becomes relevant for the purpose of interpretation of an existing treaty. It reads as follow: 
“[A]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation [;]”.
58   Ntina Tzouvala, TWAIL and the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine: Continuities and Ruptures, 
109 American Journal of International Law Unbound 266, 268 (2016).
59   Id. at 270.
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as a force of progress, freedom and peaceful co-existence”.60 Tzouvala also, 
however, cautions that we need to keep in mind that contemporary interna-
tional law is more than an “undercover” continuation of older international 
legal structure. “Striking the right balance between history and the present 
situation, continuity and rupture, constitutes the greatest challenge for TWAIL 
as a project that aspires to approach international law through emancipatory 
lenses”.61 What comes out from this observation is the movement of inter-
national law from its oppressive past to the progressive or benign present. 
Thus, this movement bears ruptures which create certain discontinuities with 
certain progressive outcomes. This phenomenon is underlined in relation to 
the use of force with a justifiable argument that the law relating to the use of 
force is “perhaps one of the starkest examples of rupture in international law, 
and indeed of rupture generally, favorable to the interests and concerns of the 
states of the Global South”.62
This apparently may be seen as presenting a challenge to the TWAIL meth-
odology. This challenge may emerge from at least two conceptual follies. 
The first problem is that TWAIL’s methodological framework is sought to be 
confined to critiquing historically ordained oppressive structures of interna-
tional law in a linear fashion, from its origins to the present. This view tends 
to present the TWAIL methodology in a narrow and limited sense. Contrary to 
this, TWAIL not only has the potential to capture the “ruptures”, but it also 
has the potential to generate methodological tools to critically analyze these 
changes in international law. Therefore, TWAIL’s emphasis on international 
law’s historical complicity in colonial oppression and its continuing role in 
perpetuating similar oppressions in the present cannot be seen as mechanical 
extension of TWAIL’s methodological contours. Rather, it needs to be seen as 
underlining international law’s historically embedded oppressive and instru-
mentalist role in different forms, while also recognizing the transformations 
that international law undergoes. Therefore, the TWAIL methodology has the 
potential to capture international law’s movement not just in a linear way but 
with all its ruptures.
Secondly, to argue that the law on the prohibition of the use of force in itself 
is a virtue to be celebrated by the Global South would be to ignore the fact that 
it is the same law which gives the possibility of interpretation and application 
for the “unwilling or unable” doctrine. The same law which prohibits the use of 
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articulated. But everything happens in reference to the existing law and not in 
total deference to it. Hence, it is necessary that what is argued as the product of 
a rupture from the past needs to be seen in continuities. However, pre-rupture 
and post-rupture international law cannot be equated as one and the same 
nor can they be rejected as oppressive in their totality. Such an equation or 
rejection leads to an argument of nihilism or nothingness which is difficult to 
sustain as a transformative and politically relevant alternative to the dominant 
mainstream. Therefore, it is necessary that any critique of the “unwilling or 
unable” doctrine needs to take note of the relevant United Nations Charter 
framework on the use of force in critiquing the doctrine. This may also involve 
defending the existing legal framework, despite the fact that it is the same law 
which gives rise to the formulations like the “unwilling or unable” doctrine.
However, this kind of dualism of comprehensive critique of the structures 
of international law in the historical sense and selective invocation of some 
aspects of international law for critiquing formulations like “unwilling or 
unable” doctrine can be seen as selectivity and opportunism. But this can be 
defended as the “principled opportunism” as conceptualised by Robert Knox 
in a similar situation.63 This principled opportunist position comes from the 
view that there are certain fundamental problems with international law 
from its past to the present. However, international law also provides contex-
tual opportunities in a short term which can be invoked to sustain the internal 
critique of international law. Based on this proposition, the TWAIL argument 
may be built by seeking the need for confining to the textual position of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter or invocation of chapter VII “Powers of the UN 
Security Council”, rather than relying on the conceptually flawed “unwilling or 
unable” doctrine.
5 Conclusion
The law relating to the use of force as a right of self defence has been under 
strain in the last two decades, particularly after the September 11 incident. One 
of the controversial issues relating to the right of self defence is the argument 
for its permissibility against the NSAs operating from another state. This per-
missibility view relies on the existing treaty and customary international law. 
Opposite to it is the restrictive approach which rejects the permissibility view. 
The permissibility view also emphasises that there is an emerging state practice 
63   Robert Knox, Strategy and Tactics, 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 193, 
222–27 (2010).
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in favour of the right of self defence against NSAs. Evaluating India’s state prac-
tice reveals the fact that India so far has not subscribed to the permissibility 
view despite its involvement in situations of military use of force against NSAs 
in other states. It can be argued from this analysis that existing legal frame- 
work in the form of treaties and customary international law does not sup-
port the right of self defence against NSAs. A similar assertion is drawn from 
state practice, and the same is established through the analysis of India’s 
state practice. A TWAIL critique while focusing on the historical continu-
ities of structurally oppressive international law, also has the methodological 
potential to capture the ruptures which produce structural discontinuities in 
international law. UN Charter framework on the use of force can be seen as 
one of such structural ruptures which may be tactically defended against the 
problematic doctrinal deviations like the “unwilling or unable” test.
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The “ASEAN Way”: A Sore Thumb for ASEAN 
Solidarity in the Face of an Ailing Global  
Trade System?
Noel Chow Zher Ming*
1 Introduction
“Standards and integrity are for Oscar winners. Everybody else has to bend 
over”. (lan Arkin’s character, Norman Newlander, to Sandy Kominsky (Michael 
Douglas) in The Kominsky Method, 2019).
The Kominsky Method is a comedy series starring Michael Douglas as 
Sandy Kominsky, a once successful actor turned acting coach, and Alan Arkin 
as Norman Newlander, his recently widowed agent. Both are in their latter 
years. Newlander retorts with this line when Kominsky attempts to explain 
why he turned down numerous career enhancing opportunities in his younger 
years. When we strip away the fictional characters, setting and circumstances, 
the substance of this retort represents a struggle that is far from fictional. For 
many years, scholars who identify themselves as being advocates of Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) have argued that the “Oscar 
winners” of the international community, the America and the Eurocentric 
West, who could afford to have standards and integrity, proceeded to shape 
international law with these standards and then imposed them on everyone 
else under the brand of human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law. TWAIL 
developed as a response from the “everybody else”, the colonized Third World, 
which had to bend over.
Southeast Asia’s participation in international law is uniquely recent, but 
important. The region was only recently decolonized, culturally and politi-
cally diverse, experiencing unprecedented economic and population growth, 
and integrated into the international legal order. But it is at the same time 
considered to be the birthplace (geographically at least) of the Third World’s 
response to mainstream international law scholarship traditionally dominated 
by Western powers with a colonial lineage. The Bandung Conference of 1955 
became an assembly of like-minded, recently independent and mostly Asian 
*   General Manager, Singapore & Malaysia, Tradewin Asia.
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and African states tired of colonialism and hungry for self-determination.1 
Whether or not the TWAIL movement itself actually emerged from this confer-
ence is a subject of some subjectivity and of less importance in comparison to 
the significance of the fact that it remains today both a TWAIL landmark and 
a rallying point.2
As an ideology, the TWAIL scholarship challenges the mainstream “Euro- 
centric” international legal order in that it “1) uses colonial history to frame 
the impact of international law on the South; 2) avoids prioritizing the univer-
sal above the local; and 3) focuses on the interrelation between international 
capital and non-European cultural traditions”.3 A monolithic approach to 
characterizing international law in [South] and Southeast Asia, as one South-
east Asian scholar describes, “does little justice to the regions’ rich diversity 
and complex history”.4 Herein lies the central theme of this article. What is 
Southeast Asia’s ideological identity to begin with? What would a multilateral 
legal system that could do justice to the region’s rich diversity and complex 
history look like? If such a thing were to exist, how would it work? Enter the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
While ASEAN is often portrayed as being culturally, socio-economically, 
ethnically and of course ideologically diverse, with very little common ground 
as an impetus for integration, many of these prickly differences interestingly 
emerged during decolonisation, Newly formed sovereign states started grap-
pling for regional influence, trying to make the most of what their respective 
former colonial masters left behind, inevitably trampling over each other’s toes 
in the process, especially naturally when it came to issues of borders, national 
security and national identity.
Early Southeast Asian legal culture really only emerged from three princi-
pal clusters of legal tradition. Desierto explains that “Buddhist kingdoms in 
Burma, Thailand, and Laos drew from Buddhist texts providing ethical rules 
of conduct through theistically-driven conceptions of obligation”.5 Coastal 
1   See R.P. Anand, Studies in International Law and History: An Asian Per- 
spective 1, 1–23 (2004); The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 
Asia-Africa Speak from Bandung 161–69 (1955), http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_
Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf.
2   Id.
3   Andrew F. Sunter, TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry, 20 Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 475, 487 (2007).
4   Diane A. Desierto, Postcolonial International Law Discourses on Regional Developments in 
South and Southeast Asia, 36 International Journal of Legal Information 387, 392 
(2008).
5   Id. at 416.
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kingdoms along the Malay peninsula that make up modern-day Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore and the Southern Philippines drew heavily from 
Islamic law, characterized by the Quran and Sharia.6 Early inland societ-
ies in Burma, Siam, Champa and Khmer (roughly spanning the modern-day 
Indo-Chinese cluster of Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) 
as well as Java owe most of their legal traditions to Hindu rules of moral and 
social conduct which “codified law in ten categories and solved disputes 
through collective decision-making (mushawara-mufaqat)”.7 This concept of 
mushawara-mufaqat, of consensus and collective decision-making, is exactly 
what has found its way into modern-day ASEAN regionalism, in what has 
evolved into the “ASEAN Way”. Sometimes used fondly as a collective regional 
identity almost akin to “ASEAN state(s) practice”, it was too often also used as 
a derogatory euphemism for talk and no action. If there was such a thing that 
embodied a multilateral system that “does justice to a [non-European] region’s 
rich diversity and complex history” in a way that TWAIL scholarship imagines, 
this is probably as close as it gets.8 But does it work? The next several chap-
ters critically analyse this.
2 What is Wrong at the Global Level and How is It Affecting ASEAN?
We will consider several sides of the story in this article, each one briefly. For 
the sake of simplicity, let me start with Donald Trump and the US. Trump and 
his advocates have from even before his presidency accused the WTO of being 
the “worst trade deal ever”.9 Then at the start of his presidency, he threatened 
to pull out of the WTO, accusing the organization of needing to “shape up”,10 
citing abuse of the “special and differential” treatment provision for develop-
ing countries as a principal reason. In 2018, the White House issued a memo to 
the US Trade Representative, calling on the WTO to review the way in which 
it grants “developing country” status. The memo cites 11 countries, including 
6    Id.
7    Id.
8    Id. at 392.
9    David A. Wemer, What is Wrong With The WTO?, Atlantic Council (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-is-wrong-with-the-wto/.
10   John Micklethwait et al., Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of WTO if It Doesn’t ‘Shape 
Up’, Bloomberg (Aug. 31, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-08-30/trump-says-he-will-pull-u-s-out-of-wto-if-they-dont-shape-up.
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Kuwait, Macao, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, South Korea, Turkey, the United 
Arab Emirates and China.11 Trump himself tweeted:
When the wealthiest economies claim developing-country status, they 
harm not only other developed economies but also economies that truly 
require special and differential treatment. Such disregard for adherence 
to WTO rules, including the likely disregard of any future rules, cannot 
continue to go unchecked.12
US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer echoed the tweet saying:
[F]ar too long, wealthy countries have abused the WTO by exempting 
themselves from its rules through the use of special and differential treat- 
ment. This unfairness disadvantages Americans who play by the rules, 
undermines negotiations at the WTO, and creates an unlevel playing 
field. I applaud the President’s leadership in demanding fairness and 
accountability at the WTO.13
The EU and Japan have similarly expressed the need for reform at the WTO 
and have also been largely critical of China and others who have benefitted 
tremendously from “gaming” the WTO system, only nowhere near the inten-
sity of Trump’s US, and are certainly not in favour of using tariffs to reform 
the WTO.14 This may seem like the tipping point, but it would be naïve to 
think that this was the sole grievance the multilateral system had to contend 
with. Rather, it is one of many festering within the multilateral trading system. 
Differences between trading partners existed from the start and pre-date the 
WTO. In fact, so deep-rooted, numerous and varied were the challenges affect-
ing multilateral trade that it came to be the reason a rules-based governing 
organization in the form of the WTO never came into being until 1994.15 It is 
11   The White House, Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in the 
World Trade Organization (July 26, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential 
-actions/memorandum-reforming-developing-country-status-world-trade-organization.
12   Kenneth Rapoza, Trump the Trade Tyrant Targets the WTO, Forbes (July 29, 2019, 
10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/07/29/trump-the-trade-tyrant 
-targets-the-wto/#42c5c60165f8.
13   Id.
14   EU Trade Commissioner Expresses Support for Japan’s Goal to Reform WTO, The Japan 
Times (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/24/business/eu-trade 
-commissioner-expresses-support-japans-goal-reform-wto/#.XYXmYC2Q1TY.
15   Daniel Drache, The Short but Significant Life of the International Trade Organization: 
Lessons for Our Time (Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working 
Paper No. 62/00, 2000), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/47530.pdf.
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not the interest of this article to visit each one of them. They are complex and 
multi-faceted in nature.
What is important, though, is to accept that every member of the mul-
tilateral trading system has at some point chosen national interests over 
multilateralism, and will continue to do so for a variety of reasons, sometimes 
out of necessity and sometimes even against its own leader’s desire. This is not 
a matter of Europeans and Americans vs. the Third World. Whatever the rea-
son, each time a state elects to choose national interests over multilateralism, 
the rules-based institution erodes, no matter how apologetic the perpetrator is. 
With 164 current WTO members,16 the odds only stand to increase.
In saying that, we now consider the perspective of the WTO itself. The WTO 
itself is the product of a compromise – of a “diplomat’s jurisprudence” as 
Robert E. Hudec puts it.17 It operates on the principle of “consensus” deci-
sion making. Democratic and transparent in principle, but hugely inefficient. 
Attempting to reach a consensus among 164 members on issues laden with 
overlapping national interests is the equivalent of a hunt for a unicorn. Often 
cited as the epitome of compromise (or failure, depending on how you look 
at it), WTO members in 2001 embarked on a massive attempt to update the 
WTO’s outdated rules in Doha in what is now known as the Doha Develop- 
ment Agenda:
The participating countries spent years trying to reach an agreement. 
Ultimately, the attempt largely fizzled out and resulted in a much more 
modest agreement on trade facilitation. A central problem in negotiation 
was the difficulty of getting well over 150 countries to reach consensus. 
In the previous negotiating round, potential hold-out countries could 
be threatened with exclusion from the new WTO. That trick could not be 
repeated once they were already in.18
The “much more modest agreement on facilitation” was concluded in Bali in 
2013, known informally as the Bali Package.19 Finally, we consider the perspec-
tive of the developing world – by far the most difficult to characterize. It is 
16   Members and Observers, World Trade Organization, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
17   Noel Chow Zher Ming, Professor Hudec’s “Techniques of the Diplomat’s Jurisprudence”: 
Does It Still Apply?, 6 Asian Journal of Law and Economics 23, 26 (2015).
18   Phil Levy, What’s Wrong with the World Trade Organization, Forbes (Oct. 30, 2018, 
5:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2018/10/30/whats-wrong-with-the 
-world-trade-organization/#5df2755e3a49.
19   Bali Package and November 2014 Decisions, World Trade Organization, https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/balipackage_e.htm.
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neither a single entity, nor is it entirely united with its grievances. We will have 
to make do with some broad examples and generalisations. To draw on The 
Kominsky Method parallel again, developing countries have traditionally felt 
they were perpetually bending over, marginalised from consensus decision-
making. At the start of multilateral trade negotiations in the 1940’s–50’s, 
developing countries became increasingly fearful that liberal trade policies 
being negotiated at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would 
eventually be forced on them and impede the development of infant indus-
tries which was believed to be necessary for industrialization. This in turn was 
believed to be necessary for developing countries to progress from dependence 
on low value exports of primarily raw materials to higher value productions.20 
Over years of negotiation, they eventually felt that their needs were not suf-
ficiently addressed in the GATT.
Partly because developing countries felt that their trade concerns were 
not being effectively addressed in the GATT, they lobbied for and suc-
ceeded in the establishment of a separate organisation to deal explicitly 
with problems of trade and development. This organisation, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) came into 
being in 1964, and became the main institution through which devel-
oping countries tried to pursue their international trade agenda during 
this period. The establishment of a system of preferences for developing 
country exports of manufactures in developed country markets and sta-
bilisation of commodity trade were important topics on the Agenda of 
the new institution over the decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s.21
By 1968, developing countries had succeeded at extracting preferences from 
developed countries under a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), a sys-
tem allowing developing countries a variety of trade preferences without the 
need to reciprocate. It is not legally binding but observed by most developed 
countries on a voluntary basis, eventually becoming entrenched in the WTO 
agreements as “special and differential treatment” (S&D) for developing and 
least developed countries.22 Clearly, there are now incentives for being a 
developing country at the WTO and it has not been difficult to “become” one. 
No method was negotiated or agreed on as to how a “developing country” was 
20   Constantine Michalopoulos, The Role of Special and Differential Treatment for Developing 
Countries in GATT and the World Trade Organization (Policy Research Dissemination 
Center, Working Paper No. 2388, 2000).
21   Id.
22   Id. at 15.
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to be defined, so countries identified as such were regarded as such. This cer-
tainly puts Trump’s and Lightizer’s accusations against the WTO into context.
Developing countries’ responses to the US’ unilateral action naturally varied. 
India promptly retaliated with tariffs after having been struck off the US GSP,23 
and Singapore simply reiterated over media that it was not abusing develop-
ing country status at the WTO,24 while Indonesia, faced with the prospect of 
a review of its GSP status in addition to hefty anti-dumping measures against 
its biofuel and textile exports, began lobbying to maintain friendly trade ties 
with the US.25 South Korea, whose washing machine exports were amongst 
the first commodities to be struck with “America First” tariffs, brought the 
measure to the WTO where the arbitration panel ruled recently in its favour.26 
Vietnam took a goodwill approach – in its attempt to placate the US, it pledged 
to import more US goods to narrow its trade deficit.27 China, given very little 
room to wriggle, responded with retaliatory tariffs while continuing to labour 
away at a trade deal with the US.28
So where does all this leave ASEAN? The answer lies in ASEAN’s vulnerability 
to these external shocks vis-à-vis its participation in, and dependence on, the 
multilateral trade system and its institutions.
3 ASEAN’s Participation in the World Trade System
This is an important question given that much of TWAIL scholarship is a reflec-
tion on the mainstream international law’s failure to consider the plight of 
the non-European world. This was an easier argument to make in the 1950’s, 
23   India Announces Retaliatory Trade Tariffs Against the US, BBC News (June 15, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48650505.
24   US Aware Singapore Doesn’t Take Advantage of Developing-Country Status: Chan Chun 
Sing, The Straits Times (Aug. 2, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/
united-states/us-aware-singapore-doesnt-take-advantage-of-developing-country-status 
-chan.
25   Linda Yulisman, Indonesia Lobbying to Maintain US Trade Ties, The Straits Times 
(July 28, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-lobbying 
-to-maintain-us-trade-ties.
26   WTO Awards S. Korea $85 mln Against U.S. Over Washing Machine Tariffs, Reuters 
(Feb. 9, 2019, 12:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-southkorea-wto/wto 
-awards-skorea-85-mln-against-us-over-washing-machine-tariffs-idUSL5N203567.
27   Vietnam Buys More US Goods After Trump Calls It Trade Abuser, The Straits Times 
(June 29, 2019, 1:27 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/vietnam-buys-more 
-us-goods-after-trump-calls-it-trade-abuser.
28   Keith Bradsher & Ana Swanson, Despite Tough Talk, U.S.-China Trade Negotiations 
Continue, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/business/
united-states-china-trade.html.
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perhaps even up to the 70’s and 80’s when a combination of post-colonialism 
and pre-industrialisation in the East and deep south made those distinguish-
ing features prominent. Global income inequality is narrowing between 
wealthy and lower income states.29 While there is a long way to closing that 
gap, India and China are certainly not needy anymore.30 The same can be 
said for South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia. To put it quite plainly, we are 
past the stage where the global economic order can be split geographically 
between “liberal” and “protectionist”, “capitalist” and “socialist” or “developed” 
and “developing”.
What we are witnessing today is globalization in its truest form. Maybe not 
in the way economists and diplomats predicted but, rather, the ugly reality 
of it. It is everybody wanting their version of the WTO. For much of the post-
World War II period, a multilateral trading system premised on liberal trade 
values and the rule of law was championed by the US, its European allies and 
Japan. This was something met, as we discussed in the previous section, with 
resistance from emerging economies whose industries had not yet developed, 
forcing the introduction of provisions in the GATT and WTO agreements for 
special and differential treatment for developing countries. Articulating this 
resistance, Linarelli, Salomon and Sornarajah in “The Misery of International 
Law” describe S&D as “principally a failed pre-Uruguay Round approach to 
promoting the interests of developing countries”.31 They highlight four prob-
lems with S&D:
First, they specify special and differential treatment only for developing 
countries. Problems of justice found in the current trade architecture 
apply not only to states as an aggravated whole but to groups and even 
individuals within states. Second, they specify favoured treatment as 
something exceptional in the trade architecture. As explained below, 
one preferable option would be to write rules directly into the code of 
trade agreements that meet standards of justice. The aim should be to 
get the basic structure right in the first instance, not to get it wrong and 
then append dubious fixes. Third, special and differential treatment 
rules are too narrow because their aim is only to promote trade, when 




31   John Linarelli, Margot E. Salomon & Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, 
The Misery of International Law: Confrontations with Injustice in the 
Global Economy 131 (2018).
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international agreements about trade must get the basic conditions of 
justice for economic arrangements between states right. Fourth and per-
haps most importantly, they fail to produce any meaningful assistance 
through a predistributive scheme for developing countries.32
Beyond S&D, Linarelli et al highlight an entire system of ideas within the con-
text of international economics dominated by developed Western countries 
which the authors claim is responsible for “immiseration” – the term of choice, 
at the expense of low-income states. One aspect of that system we address 
more extensively in this article is the role of multinational corporations in that 
chain of immiseration. Of foreign investment, the authors argue:
While it is true that employment is created, the possibility that labour 
is treated otherwise than in accordance with accepted standards creates 
grave concerns. The environmental depletion that foreign investment 
may cause must be factored in. There are malpractices such as corrup-
tion, transfer pricing, and tax avoidance that reduce significantly the 
advantages of foreign investment.33
They further highlight:
Multinational corporations and shareholders reap the benefits of such 
liberalization. A minority of people in the developed states, who are 
shareholders of large multinational corporations, benefit from such 
foreign investment. The other citizens of the developed states might 
not directly benefit. The clear majority of the citizens of the developing 
countries into which such investments flow do not benefit from them.34
ASEAN’s collective participation in the international economic order, however, 
does not suggest that this is the contemporary regional consensus. For several 
reasons, amongst them, this view presents a dangerously distorted image of the 
symbiotic relationship between multinationals and other actors involved in a 
thriving emerging economy. The result is that it presents multinationals as, to 
borrow an expression from Gary Quinlivan, “amoral government-manipulating 
rent-seeking monoliths that exploit the lack of environmental regulations and 
32   Id.
33   Id. at 151.
34   Id.
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cheap foreign labor in developing countries”.35 Consequently, the message it 
sends is the equivalent of saying that in a mortgage transaction, the only peo-
ple who benefit are a few investors, not the home owners who otherwise would 
not be able to afford a home, not the banks who lend the money, nor the bank’s 
employees, nor the shops in the new neighbourhood.
Such a view ignores the reality that developing countries, including ASEAN 
members, have benefitted as much from foreign investment brought about 
by multinationals as multinationals have from access to their markets. It also 
refrains from recognising that multinationals “do not operate with immunity”,36 
to borrow from Quinlivan again. Very often, companies are themselves victims 
of the very malpractices and corruption the authors refer to. While transfer 
pricing and “tax avoidance that reduce significantly the advantages of foreign 
investment” do exist, to say that governments of lower income countries are 
better off without the taxes multinationals pay, even if grossly manipulated for 
argument’s sake, is a misperception of how and why corporates deploy transfer 
pricing tactics.37
Often when multinationals adjust their transfer prices, it is to mitigate tax 
exposure in high tax jurisdictions. This has the natural result of actually being 
more detrimental to developed countries, often high-tax welfare states, than 
to developing countries. There are at the same time many aspects of doing 
business in less developed countries, and in particular in developing ASEAN 
countries that are a risk and therefore a cost that either erode their profitability 
or get passed on to buyers. Ultimately, there will be winners and losers, but to 
say that an injection of capital is the only thing multinationals bring when they 
invest abroad is a very narrow view.
Very often, lower income countries welcome the direct and indirect taxes 
(e.g., through customs tariffs on imported goods) generated through the foreign 
entity’s tax residence, the building of infrastructure, transfer of knowledge, 
skills development, job creation and what Quilivan calls the “crowd economy” 
created when an ecosystem of suppliers and service providers, many of whom 
local, gather around the foreign investor and prosper. It may displace the local 
economy – far left/right advocates often play this card when advocating their 
views, but is there a more effective way to generate growth and income in a 
short time? The rising tide raises all boats as the saying goes, and the evidence 
35   Gary Quinlivan, Sustainable Development: The Role of Multinational Corporations 
(Nov. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript).
36   Id.
37   Richard Rubin, Does Amazon Really Pay No Taxes? Here’s The Complicated Answer, 
The Wall Street Journal (June 14, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
does-amazon-really-pay-no-taxes-heres-the-complicated-answer-11560504602.
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seems to suggest as much. In the case of ASEAN, its GDP grew from 23 in 1967 
to 719 in 1997, before dipping to 577 in 1999, as a result of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. It then experienced exponential growth for the next two decades, 
peaking at 2,720 in 2017.38 The reality of it all is that ASEAN has benefited 
from the legal order brought about by the multilateral trading system in its 
current structure. To borrow overused Brexit terminology, “hard” TWAIL 
probably stands only to make matters worse for ASEAN at this time. But that 
multilateral trade system is at the same time falling apart and ASEAN is in no 
position to single-handedly administer a solution to the global problem. For 
the time being, the only realistic Plan B is to tighten regional solidarity and 
weather the storm.
4 The Need for Solidarity
Weathering a storm is better done in numbers than as individuals. We again 
emphasise that this work is not a defence of the developed world or of multi-
national corporations. Nor is it an invitation for lower income countries to turn 
their backs on the multilateral system and stand on their own feet instead. The 
global multilateral system is in dire need of reform, but this requires consensus 
and states cannot be expected to wait indefinitely for consensus. At the same 
time, abandoning multilateralism in a time of increasing polarization will very 
likely lead only to even more polarization and, in the worst case, civil unrest. 
Instead, the message is this: an ASEAN pursuit of regional self-sufficiency will 
empower it, not only to weather a storm, but also to be a net contributor in the 
quest to reform the multilateral system.
By “self-sufficient” we certainly do not mean isolation from the global trade 
system. Far from it, it means building the regional alliance for more effective 
participation in it. In a global economic climate as volatile as this, ASEAN needs 
the collective strength of that regional alliance. At the same time, ASEAN as an 
alliance is probably a greater asset to the multilateral system than the sum of 
its parts. The starting point has pretty much been cut out by circumstances. 
With the US taking the lead, the developing world is already being accused of 
unfair trade practices, and a rational response is needed.
Such a response will inevitably involve change on the part of ASEAN. While 
change is difficult, it is often only immediate and radical changes that are 
38   David Wijeratne, How to Keep the ASEAN Economies Growing for Another 50 Years, 
World Economic Forum (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/09/
to-keep-growing-aseans-economy-must-adapt-heres-how.
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uncomfortable. “Soft”, gradual change on the other hand is perceived as less 
threatening. ASEAN’s first step should be to close ranks and form a stronger 
alliance. The benefits of this are multi-faceted. For one, ASEAN member states 
individually benefit from the protection of a herd. But more importantly, the 
WTO as an institution benefits from the prospect of reduced discord. In an 
ideal world, ASEAN’s differences would have been sorted within the ASEAN 
community. Of course, this is not an ideal world. So while it is easy to say, it 
is deceptively difficult to articulate and even more difficult to implement. 
We start by giving credit where credit is due. ASEAN is already on a journey 
to integration, and progressing steadily towards advanced cooperation. It is 
already recognized by global peers as a model of success for regionalism.39 It 
is only that the journey ahead is fraught with challenges that constantly delay 
progress. In the subsequent sections, we describe some of these challenges in 
more detail.
The policy angle to effect rules-based regionalism has been well studied and 
documented. In fact, the ASEAN member states have long expressed a desire 
for integration towards a rules-based community underscored by the rule of 
law. The National University of Singapore’s Center for International Law’s pub-
lished series entitled “Integration Through Law” documents this journey from 
multiple aspects, including economic, legal and trade policy. The focus of that 
series is, like in many academic works, on the state (ASEAN member states) 
and the institution (ASEAN). This article takes a different perspective by taking 
a deeper dive into non-state contributors to the ecosystem, especially the likes 
of the private sector (including the begrudging foreign multinational), public 
administrators and private interest groups that when mobilized effectively can 
be extremely effective at achieving that desired rules-based alignment. In say-
ing that, it still must start at the top – at the regional policy level. So there is 
a need to dissect the “ASEAN Way”, the DNA of ASEAN culture for many years, 
and explain why this must first modernize in order for the medicine to work, 
figuratively speaking.
5 The ASEAN Way: State Versus Region
For this “survival pact” (for the lack of a better expression) to have the best 
chance of success, it needs to be put in place before the multilateral trading 
system suffers further unexpected shocks. For a start, ASEAN needs to remain 




viable in as many ways as possible – but especially so in terms of peace, stabil-
ity and economic prosperity. This may be stating the obvious – ASEAN’s very 
foundation is premised on these principles, but it is not going to happen on 
its own. There is no shortage of ways to introduce such a pact into the ASEAN 
machinery – a memorandum of understanding, a ministerial joint declaration, 
perhaps even an amendment to the ASEAN trade agreements, with language 
appealing to ASEAN members to prioritise regional interests. Ultimately, these 
are all only vessels, and they will only be as effective as the member states 
want them to be. Of essence is the substance, not the form. What is it going 
to take for ASEAN’s individual members to adopt regional commitments over 
national (self) interest? ASEAN, or the sum of its parts rather, is well known to 
have had a long, stubborn history of resistance to reform. This stubbornness in 
turn owes part of its heritage to the “ASEAN Way”. Heydarian sums the issue 
in the following way:
To many regional leaders, the so-called “Asean Way”, where consultation 
and consensus underpin collective decision-making, is sacrosanct. After 
all, the traditional operating system allowed a highly diverse region to 
establish a community of peace and prosperity.
Yet, as years go by, the Asean Way is proving to be a primary obstacle 
rather than an enabler of deeper regional integration.
To begin with, this is because of the fundamental misinterpretation of 
“consensus” as “unanimity”. In sensitive areas of decision-making, where 
protracted discussions and irreconcilable differences are almost inevi-
table by nature, this has become a recipe for disaster. Instead of action, 
there is paralysis.
The obsessive and obstinate search for unanimity effectively gives each mem-
ber state, regardless of its size or interest, a de facto veto power over the future 
of Asean and, by extension, the whole region.40
There is one other feature of the ASEAN way which Heydarian does not 
bring up in his article, and a far more serious impediment to the outcome 
the author of this article is advocating. It is ASEAN’s obsessive and obstinate 
adherence to the principle of non-interference. As a result of which, for sensi-
tive areas of decision-making each member has the right to veto, as Heydarian 
describes, this is if the issue is even discussed. Many issues are simply passed 
off as being too sensitive to discuss on grounds of non-interference. If consulta-
tion and consensus is sacrosanct, non-interference is the first commandment. 
40   Richard Javad Heydarian, The Asean Way Needs Modifying, The Straits Times (Jan. 25, 
2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-asean-way-needs-modifying.
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Such a principle would have suited ASEAN’s development in the early days, 
when most Southeast Asian countries were newly decolonised and sover-
eignty became a treasured possession. But it is now often used as a polite way 
of expressing unwillingness to cooperate.
Because the principle of non-interference trumps all else, other states tend 
to oblige in keeping with the ASEAN way. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is 
an often-cited example of the non-interference principle impeding collective 
action,41 but this is an extreme case and in my opinion not the most help-
ful example. It is a thorny issue which involves elements of national security, 
human rights, and ethnic and socio-economic discord within a sovereign 
country’s territory, which is something any country will be extremely cautious 
with getting involved in, irrespective of any prevailing regional principle of 
non-interference. Indonesia’s repeated refusal to accept assistance to com-
bat transboundary haze is another often cited example of ASEAN’s toothless 
bite when a member country plays the sovereignty card over a cross-border 
issue.42 This is again an extreme example, given the prospect that delivering 
the assistance would involve one or more countries entering Indonesia’s sov-
ereign border, with no doubt, giving the recipient country a legitimate (if not 
moral) reason to claim interference in domestic affairs. Neither situation was 
fully within ASEAN’s control to act in the sense that firstly both involved navi-
gating prickly issues of sovereignty, and secondly help could not be imposed 
on an unwilling recipient, unless there were provisions within international 
law to permit it.
A much deeper level of trust is needed between states before cooperation 
on such sensitive issues is even conceivable. ASEAN has not yet developed 
this level of mutual trust, but there are many less prickly areas to drive reform 
without being enough of a threat for any one member to raise the non-
interference shield. Many of these reside in the realm of customs, trade and 
border clearance policies – all 10 ASEAN members desire economic coopera-
tion after all.43 From the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) to the ASEAN 
Single Window (ASW), economic cooperation came to be a significant tool for 
41   Angshuman Choudhury, Why Are Myanmar’s Neighbors Ignoring the Rohingya Crisis?, 
The Diplomat (Sept. 25, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/why-are-myanmars 
-neighbors-ignoring-the-rohingya-crisis.
42   Yiswaree Palansamy, Accept Neighbours’ Help to Fight Haze Now, Jakarta Post Urges 
Indonesia, Malay Mail (Sept. 22, 2019, 10:32 AM), https://www.malaymail.com/news/
malaysia/2019/09/22/accept-neighbours-help-to-fight-haze-now-jakarta-post-urges 
-indonesia/1793096.
43   Simon Chesterman, From Community to Compliance?: The Evolution of 
Monitoring Obligations in ASEAN 12 (Joseph H.H. Weiler et al. eds., 2015).
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ASEAN cooperation after 1976.44 It is also successful cooperation in this area 
that is in many ways driving the rules-based integration. Of course, there are 
limits to any model of success, and it is important to remain grounded, keep 
ourselves in check and reflect on the challenges that remain.
ASEAN, individually and collectively (with perhaps the exception of 
Singapore and Brunei), has remained extremely ineffective in dealing with 
bureaucracy, red tape and obstructions to business operations, which in turn 
obstructs ASEAN members’ opportunities for the income growth and prosper-
ity needed for self-sufficiency. There is a very high risk of this worsening, rather 
than improving, as tariffs across the region drop, only to be replaced by non-
tariff measures (NTMs). There are a variety of reasons for NTMs, and rarely 
are they deliberately introduced for the sole purpose of obstructing trade. 
Some may even be well intended, but an alarming statistic is the sheer num-
ber of them. This year, the joint survey by the EU-ASEAN Business Council, 
ASEAN Business Advisory Council and Asian Trade Centre published the fol-
lowing findings:
As early as 1987, surveys noted that in spite of progress being made in lift-
ing formal tariffs through initiatives such as 1977 ASEAN PTA Agreement, 
companies reported having encountered NTMs while trading in ASEAN.
This trend has persisted to this day despite renewed commitment 
by ASEAN to eliminate NTMs in the signing of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) in 2015, which promised the free flow of goods. In fact, 
according to the Global Database on Non-Tariff Measures (TRAINS), from 
2000 to 2015, NTMs in ASEAN rose significantly. Figure 3 shows that the 
number of sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers 
to trade (TBT) and other types of NTMs increased between 2000 and 2016 
by 305, 218 and 266% respectively. This trend is corroborated by other 
literature. For instance, in a study of nine priority sectors, de Dios found 
evidence that NTMs remained prevalent despite attempts by ASEAN at 
NTM-reduction.45
This article is in no way critical of NTMs in themselves. It is critical of unneces-
sary NTMs that, if left unchecked, would simply fester into red tape and present 
44   Siow Yue Chia & Michael G. Plummer, ASEAN Economic Cooperation and 
Integration: Progress, Challenges and Future Directions 167 (2015).
45   Asian Trade Ctr., Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in ASEAN and Their Elimination from a 




opportunity for corrupt practices. This in turn threatens to hinder any pros-
pect of further growth in the region and erase the success ASEAN has achieved, 
let alone facilitate progress to an advanced level of regionalism. Many busi-
nesses have simply lamented that non-tariff barriers still exist, because ASEAN 
leaders have been slow to address them owing either to a lack of funding or 
political interest. These are symptoms. The cause lies in the ASEAN way of “soft 
diplomacy” coupled with a deep-rooted fear of interfering and being interfered 
with. Undoubtedly, these inhibit effective checks and balances.
In a system that prizes consensus, consultation, diplomacy and non-
interference over “Western” styled concepts of law, order, transparency and the 
rule of law, any method introduced to monitor compliance must be, and must 
be seen to be, non-threatening. There are many ways of styling this without 
saying the “rule of law”, but I will conclude this article in the way I started it. 
Standards and integrity. It is simple and easy to understand. It is a universal 
concept which can be easily identified with. Every culture and religion either 
prescribes a form of it, or alludes to it. It does not sound as foreign, abstract 
and threatening a concept as the “rule of law”. Civil servants and the private 
sector alike, with sufficient motivation, can be taught to adhere to a set of stan-
dards and a code of conduct. With practice, it becomes habit, and with habit 
it becomes culture. This in turn should inspire a fresh environment conducive 
to overcoming the biggest obstruction to wealth creation and prosperity – the 
deep-rooted inefficiency caused by years of bureaucracy and red tape region-
wide. The scale and context of the challenge ASEAN needs to address is 
addressed in the next section.
6 Setbacks: Petty Officialdom, Bureaucracy and Red Tape
The descriptions in the far-right column are perhaps not very helpful in high-
lighting what the real issues are, but the rankings are alarming – a tell tale sign 
that red tape is not being managed. There are some issues that are common 
across the region, like over-reliance on customs collections for revenue, low 
civil service salaries and poor training of border officials. But some examples 
are more country specific than others.
Vietnam has taken strides to simplify its trading processes. But one issue 
highlighted by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) in 
2006, which it calls “petty officialdom”, remains an issue today.46 In that report, 
46   David S. Jones, Regulatory Reform and Bureaucracy in Southeast Asia: Variations and 
Consequences, 8 International Public Management Review 97, 101 (2007).
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a consultant by the name of Nguyen Anh Tuan of Bizconsult “referred to the 
way officials responsible for business registration refuse to accept an applica-
tion if minor information is missing. In many cases, businesses have to wait 
seven days to be informed of just one minor mistake”.47 More recently in 2015, 
the VCCI in its survey found that, out of 3000, 28 percent of the companies 
paid bribes to speed up customs procedures. Those who did not report dis-
crimination, including being treated impolitely and being asked for documents 
that were not required.48 The Central Institute for Economic Management, a 
47   Id.
48   28 Percent of Companies in Vietnam Bribed Customs Officers: Survey, Thanh Nien News 
(Nov. 12, 2015, 8:30 PM), http://www.thanhniennews.com/business/28-percent-of 
-companies-in-vietnam-bribed-customs-officers-survey-53585.html.
Country 2016  
Ranking/136
Top 2 Most Problematic Factors for Importing
Singapore 1 1.  High cost or delays caused by international 
transportation
2. Burdensome import procedures
Malaysia 47 1. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers
2. Burdensome import procedures
Indonesia 79 1. Corruption at the border
2. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers
Thailand 44 1. Burdensome import procedures
2. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers
Vietnam 86 1. Burdensome import procedures
2. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers
Philippines 93 1. Burdensome import procedures
2.  High cost of delays caused by domestic 
transportation
Cambodia 116 1. Burdensome import procedures
2.  High cost or delays caused by domestic 
transportation
Lao PDR 114 1. Tariff and non-tariff barriers
2. Burdensome import procedures
Source: World Economic Forum Global Enabling Trade Report 2016. (available 
at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GETR_2016_report.pdf).
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Vietnam-based think tank, estimates the costs of customs red tape alone to be 
in the region of US$10 billion a year.49
Thailand has also its fair share of border-related obstruction to business 
in the form of its incentive scheme for border officials. According to one source, 
the reward sharing system at the time of interview provided for “a generous 
55% of penalty recovered from an ‘offender’ to be distributed as a reward. Of 
this amount, 30% is provided to third-party whistleblowers, which may even 
include other government officers. The remaining 25% is shared between the 
customs officials who identified and handled the case”.50
Malaysia’s border enforcement activity is typically seasonal, characterized 
by aggressive, sometimes arbitrary, even irrational challenges to commodity 
classification. Often this occurs where the opportunity presents itself when 
a product can reasonably be classified under two or more tariff codes. On the 
receiving end are importers or their agents, who are unfamiliar with customs 
classification rules and who will often have their imports re-classified to the 
highest tariff.51 Challenges in Indonesia include excessive import controls and 
discretionary enforcement. To illustrate this point, when the tsunami disaster 
struck in 2005, the Financial Times reported that “in Indonesia 1,500 contain-
ers are stacked at the Sumatran port of Medan, according to customs records, 
with 599 of those units unclaimed or needing import permits”.52
That same report also highlighted Indonesian customs officials saying that 
“dozens of vehicles destined for Aceh province are still awaiting import per-
mits. Fourteen ambulances recently sent to Indonesia by UNICEF, the United 
Nations agency for children, took two months to clear customs”.53 In the case 
of the Philippines, there is little integration between agencies, as a result of 
which one agency disrupts another by inadvertently regulating things the reg-
ulator did not intend to regulate. In an interview with the CNN, Senator Bam 
Aquino pointed out “for example, the Philippine National Police tightened 
rules on importing chemicals to ensure their safety. But in the end, it just made 
49   Customs Red Tape Costs Vietnamese Traders $10 Billion a Year: Expert, Thanh Nien News 
(Aug. 13, 2015, 9:13 PM), http://www.thanhniennews.com/business/customs-red-tape 
-costs-vietnamese-traders-10-billion-a-year-expert-50046.html.
50   Michael Ramirez & Anand Udayakumar, Thailand’s Customs Reward System: The Slow March 
Towards Reform, Bangkok Post (May 16, 2014, 6:04 AM), https://www.bangkokpost.com/
business/409975/thailand-s-customs-reward-system-the-slow-march-towards-reform.
51   Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Expect Increased Customs Audits in Years to Come, The Nation 
Thailand (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.nationthailand.com/Economy/30201693.
52   Red Tape Leaves Tsunami Aid Stranded At Docks, Financial Times (May 12, 2005).
53   Id.
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it harder for chemical industries, like those in the paint business, to bring in 
their materials”.54
Of course, not every attempt to regulate is necessarily red tape, nor is every 
obstruction a nefarious gesture. The statistics and interviews in these exam-
ples miss one important element – the human element behind the actions, 
and I hope some personal experience can convey some perspective. In my pre-
vious role in 2016, I was part of a lobby group hoping to convince the Ministry 
of Information and Communication (MIC) in Vietnam to reconsider the 
regulator’s insistence that a tablet (already at that time decided by the World 
Customs Organization (WCO) Harmonized System Committee (HSC) to be 
classified as a computing device) be treated for import compliance purposes 
as a mobile communications device. A computing device did not require an 
import license, while a mobile communications device did. Then in a regional 
trade compliance role, my government affairs counterpart and I were tasked 
with convincing the authorities that a tablet did not connect to mobile net-
works in the same way a mobile phone did. The head of the MIC department 
we spoke with empathized but responded saying that they understood the 
principle, but because the regulation did not clearly distinguish them, “it is 
better for you to just apply for the license”. Put in this way, it is almost inno-
cently human in nature, yet we know that with the right tools, infrastructure, 
training and resources, this concern could be managed without an obstruc-
tive measure. Without this obstruction, businesses could legitimately import 
tablets that meet safety standards into Vietnam without the need for an addi-
tional license – a cost ultimately passed on to consumers. Businesses benefit 
from this reduced operational cost as much as consumers in turn benefit from 
lower device costs. The net result is wealth creation from efficiency without 
compromising consumer protection.
7 A Means to an End: Forging Rules-Based Solidarity with Standards 
and Integrity
Not for the lack of desire or political will, ASEAN has in fact committed itself 
both to a rules-based regional system55 and to eliminating NTMs in the signing 
54   Claire Jiao, Gov’t Eliminates Red Tape in Business Processes, CNN Philippines (June 14, 
2016, 1:41 PM), https://cnnphilippines.com/business/2016/06/14/eliminating-red-tape 
-business.html.
55   ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, ASEAN Secretariat 5 (2008), https://asean 
.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf.
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of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 which promised the free 
flow of goods.56 But if we know the consensus model is a perpetual deadlock 
at the inter-state level, there is very little point in continuing to bang on that 
door. The rule of law and elimination of NTMs is the end; it is perhaps time to 
turn our attention to the means. The people actually doing the work can be a 
powerful place to start – meaning, alleviate the state’s inhibitions by appeal-
ing to what would actually make people’s jobs easier (without compromising 
national security of course). At the national, district and provincial levels, 
human beings are tasked with executing tasks. And most do exactly that: 
Execute tasks.
This is precisely the reason why standards and integrity, instead of the “rule 
of law”, are more relatable, and far more effective in driving compliance at 
the execution level in a non-threatening way. A universally acceptable ASEAN 
“code of conduct” leaning in the general direction of a regional set of norms 
can be inserted into regular operational manuals and training materials for 
staff and be used to drive cross border collaboration – both for civil service and 
private sector employees. Private sector employees of multinationals do this 
very well, given the way corporations operate across borders. To use the tablets 
import case in Vietnam as an example, supposing Vietnam was truly unsure 
and hesitant, a governing, or “grandfather” set of standards in place would have 
allowed them to consult best practices regionally. This code of conduct will 
need to be localized by each country of course, but because it is not law, it 
probably does not need to be legislated in order to be implemented. Individual 
civil servants would likewise be disincentivised from insisting that local stan-
dards should prevail. They may very well still do, but probably out of pride 
or face-saving rather than out of a duty owed to the law. There may very well 
be instances where local standards must prevail without question. The idea 
here is to weed out petty officialdom that fuels red tape, like saving precious 
resources for where they are well and truly needed. This is not interference. It 
is cooperation at an advanced level.
Integrity can be written into a theme song or code of conduct that is then dis-
seminated through the media, state run channels of communication, industry 
focus groups, and most importantly, the education system. But as is the case, 
government officials answer to their respective governments, not to ASEAN. 
But suppose a standards and ethics monitoring board under the auspices 
of one of ASEAN’s organs was established. How such a body will be staffed 
and funded is complex and beyond the scope of this article, but it would be 
extremely effective under the right conditions. Conceptually, the idea must 
56   Id. at 6–10.
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first receive support and funding from member states, in particular from those 
with a chronic fear of interference. In response to such a fear, a reasonable 
amount of questioning and peer review is not interference. It is checks and 
balances, albeit one that member states must voluntarily subject themselves 
to. Interestingly, ASEAN’s greatest challenge aside from the ASEAN way is per-
haps resources and funding. Even then, when broken into practical bite size 
initiatives or “projects” with a common goal and interest, the private sector can 
be mobilized to “adopt” various phases of the projects and implement them.
The skepticism of ASEAN leaders only shows how far we need to think 
regionalism and progressiveness more generally. It will take some convincing 
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1 Introduction and Overview
This critique assesses each of the dispositive findings on jurisdiction and 
merits in the Award of South China Sea Arbitration,1 from the perspective 
of the applicable substantive and procedural rules of public international 
law. This critique does not address in detail the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award on 
Jurisdiction and admissibility,2 dated 29 October 2015. However, it refers to 
the Award on Jurisdiction where relevant for the purposes of our legal critique 
of the Award. The core conclusions in respect of the Award are summarised 
below. In short, our analysis indicates that there are substantial grounds to 
question the validity of most of the Tribunal’s central findings of jurisdiction 
and merits in the Award.
The core conclusions in respect of the Award are as follows: First, the Tri-
bunal’s finding that it had jurisdiction over the Philippines’ Submission nos. 1 
and 2 is open to substantial doubt. The principal issues at stake in establishing 
China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea are inextricably linked 
to questions of territorial title over land and maritime areas in the South China 
Sea – issues that are clearly excluded from compulsory international dispute 
settlement under UNCLOS. The Tribunal’s assessment of China’s historic 
claims in the South China Sea, within the “nine dash line”, and its conclusion 
that those claims did not include claims to “historic titles” so as to preclude 
*   This research project has been undertaken by the National Institute for South China Sea 
Studies (NISCSS). NISCSS has specialized in research on issues concerning the South China 
Sea for more than 25 years. This is an independent article and is published for public dis-
semination. A research team was formed in this regard under the direction of Dr. Shicun Wu, 
President of NISCSS and was composed of international law scholars, lawyers, historians and 
technical experts from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States and China. 
NISCSS would like to express its gratitude to each team member for their efforts and contri-
butions, and in particular to FIETTA LLP for its invaluable assistance on this project.
1   The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013–19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) 
[hereinafter Award].
2   The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013–19, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility].
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jurisdiction under Article 298 of the Convention, are also highly questionable. 
The Tribunal’s sharp distinction between “historic titles” and “historic rights”, 
and its observation that only the former can be excluded from dispute settle-
ment procedures by way of declaration under Article 298 under UNCLOS, has 
no clear basis in international law. Even if the Tribunal was correct in its find-
ing that “historic titles” for the purposes of Article 298 form only a small subset 
of “historic rights”, the Tribunal had abundant evidence before it that China 
does claim “historic titles”, in the form of claims to sovereignty, within the 
“nine dash line”. Yet another doubt arises from whether the Tribunal was com-
petent to determine that China’s nine dash line and related historic rights, as 
well as being “contrary to the Convention”, were “without lawful effect” for the 
purposes of Submission no. 2. Arguably, such a question does not concern 
“the interpretation or application of [UNCLOS]”, and thus falls beyond the 
jurisdiction of an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal.
Second, the Tribunal’s findings on the merits of the Philippines’ Submission 
nos. 1 and 2 are also subject to substantial doubt. In particular, the Tribunal’s 
critical conclusion that UNCLOS “leaves no space for an assertion of historic 
rights” is highly questionable. Historic rights can and do continue to exist 
alongside (and independent from) UNCLOS, as confirmed by the award in the 
Eritrea/Yemen case and even in some UNCLOS articles (such as Article 51(1) 
on “traditional fishing rights” in archipelagic waters). Therefore, the Tribunal’s 
conclusion that “the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sov-
ereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein” is likely 
wrong. This conclusion was central to the Tribunal’s substantive findings with 
respect to the Philippines’ Submission nos. 1 and 2. It was therefore probably 
improper for the Tribunal to discard the “nine dash line”, and the rights to which 
it refers, on the basis that UNCLOS “supersedes” all historic rights. Rather, his-
toric rights regimes in maritime areas, including the EEZ, are capable of being 
preserved in international law notwithstanding UNCLOS.
Third, the Tribunal’s findings with respect to the legal status of the features 
in the South China Sea (Philippines Submission nos. 3 to 7) are highly ques-
tionable in a number of respects. The Tribunal’s conclusion that Itu Aba and all 
of the other high-tide features in the Spratly Islands constitute “rocks”, which 
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own in the sense 
of Article 121(3), is open to challenge both as a matter of law and as a matter of 
evidence. From a legal perspective, the Tribunal interpreted Article 121(3) in a 
highly restrictive way that contradicts both the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (“VCLT”) and State practice. On the evidence before it the Tribunal 
could easily have concluded that both Itu Aba on its own and (a fortiori) the 
Spratly Islands as a whole are capable of sustaining human habitation for 
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the purposes of Article 121(3). It could also (separately) have concluded that 
both Itu Aba on its own and (a fortiori) the Spratly Islands as a whole are capa-
ble of sustaining economic life of their own for the purposes of Article 121(2) 
and (3). Either finding would have been sufficient to deprive the Tribunal of 
jurisdiction in respect of Philippines Submission nos. 5, 8, 9 and 12, and from 
making a number of its substantive findings on the merits (particularly dis-
positif nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 16(a) and (d)).
Fourth, on the evidence before it, the Tribunal could equally have concluded 
that Mischief Reef is a high tide feature and is thus capable of appropriation 
and entitled at least to a territorial sea under UNCLOS for the purposes of 
Article 121(3). Had the Tribunal reached this conclusion, it would have had no 
jurisdiction in respect of Philippines Submission nos. 5, 8, 9, 12 (so far as they 
concerned Mischief Reef and its territorial sea), and would thus have been 
unable to reach a number of its substantive findings on the merits (particu-
larly dispositif nos. 7, 10, 14 and 16(a) and (d), as they relate to Mischief Reef).
Fifth, the Tribunal’s decision not to analyse in the Award the legal status 
under Article 121 of a number of other high tide features (namely, Amboyna 
Cay, Flat Island, Loaita Island, Namyit Island, Nanshan Island, Sand Cay, Sin 
Cowe Island and Swallow Reef) is surprising. By taking such a “shortcut”, 
the Tribunal arguably violated its obligation under Article 9 of Annex VII to 
UNCLOS to confirm its own jurisdiction. In order to do so, the Tribunal had 
to assess, in a meaningful way and with reference to available evidence, the 
status of all of the high tide features in the Spratly Islands.
Sixth, as regards a number of the Philippines’ claims concerning Chinese 
activities in the South China Sea (Philippines Submission nos. 8 to 13), the 
Tribunal probably lacked jurisdiction. In particular, it probably lacked juris-
diction over Submission nos. 8, 9 and 12, due to the conclusions summarised 
above. In addition, the Tribunal arguably erred in concluding that the “military 
exception” at Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS was inapplicable, and thus in taking 
jurisdiction over the Philippines’ Submission nos. 11 and 12(b).
Seventh, to the extent that it did have jurisdiction over the Philippines’ 
claims concerning Chinese activities in the South China Sea (Philippines Sub- 
mission nos. 8 to 13), while a number of the Tribunal’s specific merits findings 
are probably correct on the law (for example, as regards the nature and extent of 
States’ environmental and due diligence obligations under UNCLOS), many 
of those findings related to isolated incidents or were based on limited evi-
dence. Further, the Tribunal’s conclusion that China’s operation of its law 
enforcement vessels near Scarborough Shoal violated COLREGS and, as a 
consequence, Article 94 of UNCLOS (Philippines Submission no. 13) appears 
incorrect because Article 94 does not apply to territorial sea areas.
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Eighth, in a number of respects, the Tribunal arguably violated its responsi-
bility under Article 9 of Annex VII to satisfy itself that the Philippines claims 
were “well founded in fact and law”. For example, in respect of the Philippines’ 
Submission nos. 4 and 6, the Tribunal engaged archivists in order to seek out 
evidence that was ultimately relied upon in order to uphold the Philippines’ 
claims against China. In parallel, the Tribunal failed to explore evidence that 
may have been readily available to it and that may have undermined the 
Philippines’ claims (such as evidence held by Taiwan in respect of Itu Aba). 
In doing so, the Tribunal arguably exceeded its mandate by relieving the 
Philippines of its burden of proof.
Ninth, the Tribunal committed a further procedural error by failing to 
provide the Parties with an opportunity to cross-examine four experts that 
it appointed after the merits hearing, and upon whose advice it relied in 
the Award.
Tenth, the Tribunal misapplied the Monetary Gold principle with respect to 
third State rights and interests in finding that the “legal interests of Malaysia 
do not form ‘the very subject-matter of the dispute’ and are not implicated 
by the Tribunal’s conclusions”. Clearly, the Tribunal’s findings that a number 
of high tide features claimed by Malaysia constitute “rocks” for the purposes of 
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS implicated Malaysia’s legal interests. They also impli-
cated Vietnam’s legal interests. This provides another basis to question the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction with respect to its critical findings as to the legal status 
of the Spratly Islands under UNCLOS.
Following this Introduction and Overview, Section 2 below analyses the 
Tribunal’s findings with respect to China’s maritime entitlements and claims 
in the South China Sea, including as regards “historic rights” and the “nine dash 
line”, as addressed at Chapter V of the Award. Section 3 analyses the Tribunal’s 
findings on the legal status of islands and other features in the South China 
Sea, as addressed at Chapter VI of the Award. Section 4 analyses the Tribunal’s 
findings with respect to Chinese activities in the South China Sea, as addressed 
at Chapter VII of the Award. Finally, Section 5 examines certain procedural 
and evidentiary issues arising from the Tribunal’s handling of the merits phase 
of the Arbitration, including as regards the important issues of the Philippines’ 
burden of proof and the rights and interests of third States. Annex 1 sets out 
two tables comparing the characteristics of Itu Aba and a number of small fea-
tures around the world claimed (or accepted) as fully-entitled islands, against 
the five criteria identified by the Tribunal for such status under Article 121(2) 
of UNCLOS.
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2 The Tribunal’s Findings with Respect to China’s Maritime 
Entitlements, China’s Claims to Sovereign Rights Jurisdiction and 
“Historic Rights” and the “Nine Dash Line” (Philippines Submission 
Nos. 1 and 2; Award Chapter V)
The Philippines’ Submission nos. 1 and 2 read:3
(1)  China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of 
the Philippines, may not extend beyond those expressly permitted 
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’ or 
the ‘Convention’).
(2)  China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to ‘historic rights’ with 
respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the 
so-called ‘nine dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without law-
ful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive 
limits of China’s maritime entitlements expressly permitted by UNCLOS.
This Commentary on Part V of the Award of 12 July 2016 consists of four fur-
ther sections. Section A discusses the determination of the Tribunal that it had 
jurisdiction to consider Submission nos. 1 and 2. Section 2.1 provides a com-
mentary on the findings of the Tribunal with respect to Submission no. 1 and 
Section 2.2 does so with respect to Submission no. 2. Section 2.3 summarises 
the general and more specific conclusions on Chapter V of the Award.
2.1 The Tribunal’s Jurisdiction in Respect of Submission Nos. 1 and 2
2.1.1 Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated 29 October 2015
In its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, rendered on 29 October 2015, the 
Tribunal stated that Submission nos. 1 and 2 concerned neither a dispute over 
territorial sovereignty over any land features within the South China Sea nor a 
dispute over maritime boundary delimitation. Rather, they reflected a dispute 
concerning the source of China’s maritime entitlements in the South China 
Sea and the interaction of China’s claimed historic rights with the provisions of 
the Convention. Therefore, in the view of the Tribunal, this was unequivocally 
a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention.
Nonetheless, the Tribunal suspended its final determination on jurisdic-
tion over Submission nos. 1 and 2 to the merits stage of the proceeding. This 
is because a finding of jurisdiction was dependent on the Tribunal’s substan-
tive findings on the nature of any historic rights claimed by China, and thus 
3   Award, supra note 1, at para. 112. An earlier formulation of these submissions appears in The 
South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013–19, Memorial of the Philippines 
(30 March 2014), Vol. I, at 271 [hereinafter Memorial of the Philippines].
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on whether the dispute was covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction in 
Article 298 of the Convention for disputes concerning “historic bays or titles”.4
In response to the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, China took once 
again the view that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because “the essence of 
this arbitration case is territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation and 
related matters.”5
2.1.2 Final Award Dated 12 July 2016
In its final Award of 12 July 2016, the Tribunal therefore returned to address 
issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. It decided that it had jurisdiction to 
consider the matters raised in Submission nos. 1 and 2 and that the claims 
contained therein were admissible.6 In doing so, the Tribunal related China’s 
claims to maritime entitlements in the relevant areas of the South China 
Sea as claims to “historic rights” to the exclusive use of the living and non- 
living resources. Furthermore, the Tribunal also found that such “historic 
rights” cannot be equated with the concept of “historic titles” as it appears in 
the jurisdiction exemption clause of Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS. Lastly, the 
Tribunal ruled that China’s claims to maritime entitlements in the South China 
Sea can only be judged upon the basis of the principles and rules contained in 
UNCLOS.7 All of these findings were essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion that 
it had jurisdiction over Submission nos. 1 and 2.
As an overarching observation, it is difficult to disentangle the determina-
tion of China’s maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea from 
the broader issue of the territorial sovereignty over the islands and maritime 
areas in the South China Sea. The principal issues at stake in establishing 
China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea are inextricably linked 
to the general issue of the territorial title over the land and the maritime areas 
in the South China Sea – issues that are clearly excluded from compulsory 
international dispute settlement under UNCLOS.8 On this basis alone, it is 
4   Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 2, at paras. 398–99.
5   China, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC on the Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility of the South China Sea Arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal Established at 
the Request of the Philippines, 30 October 2015, on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 
website at www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1310474.shtml.
6   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 276–78.
7   Id. at para. 278.
8   In a 1990 Article, one of the Members of the Tribunal (Professor Alfred H.A. Soons) recog-
nised the inseparability of questions of maritime delimitation and the status of features 
under Article 121 of UNCLOS. See Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H.A. Soons, Entitlement to 
Maritime Areas of Rocks Which Cannot Sustain Human Habitation or Economic Life of Their 
Own, 21 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 146, 181 (1990).
157A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
highly questionable whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction over Submission 
nos. 1 and 2.9
As explained further below, the Tribunal’s assessment of China’s historic 
claims in the South China Sea, within the “nine dash line”, and its conclusion 
that those claims did not include claims to “historic titles” so as to preclude its 
jurisdiction under Article 298 of the Convention, are also highly questionable.
First, the terminology of ‘historic titles’ and ‘historic rights’ cannot be so 
sharply distinguished such that the former can be excluded from the dispute 
settlement procedures by way of declaration under Article 298 under UNCLOS, 
while the latter cannot. Public international law does not recognise any such 
sharp distinction. It is unsurprising, therefore, that China has used these 
terms interchangeably in the past (see sub-section 2.2.1 below). The Tribunal’s 
assessment that the optional exception to jurisdiction in Article 298(1)(a)(i) is 
limited to disputes relating to a narrow definition of “historical title”, and thus 
to disputes involving claims to sovereignty over maritime areas only, is there-
fore subject to substantial doubt as a matter of law.
Second, even if the Tribunal were correct in its finding that “historic titles” 
for the purposes of Article 298 form only a small and specific subset of “his-
toric rights” at international law, the Tribunal had abundant evidence before 
it that China does claim “historic titles”, in the form of claims to sovereignty, 
within the “nine dash line”. Therefore, even if the Tribunal’s legal assessment 
was correct, its conclusion that China’s claims within the “nine dash line” do 
not equate to claims to “historic titles” or elements of sovereignty is subject to 
substantial doubt as a matter of fact.
The Tribunal’s basis for finding jurisdiction in respect of Submission 
nos. 1 and 2 generally is, therefore, tenuous. It is hard to see how the issue of the 
nature and scope of China’s maritime rights and entitlements can be separated 
from the issue of Chinese claims to territorial sovereignty over the islands and 
maritime areas in the South China Sea.10 It is also difficult to conclude that the 
condition mentioned in the final part of Article 298(1)(a)(i) is met, namely that 
the dispute does not “… necessarily involve[s] the concurrent consideration of 
any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental 
or insular land territory shall be excluded from such submission”.
Yet another serious doubt arises from whether the Tribunal was compe-
tent to determine that China’s nine dash line and related historic rights, as 
well as being “contrary to the Convention”, were “without lawful effect” for 
9    In relation to jurisdiction dispositif no. 1.
10   See Kwiatowska & Soons, supra note 8, at 153.
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the purposes of Submission no. 2.11 Arguably, such a question does not con-
cern “the interpretation or application of [UNCLOS]”, and thus falls beyond 
the jurisdiction of a Part XV UNCLOS tribunal. Moreover, in observing that the 
applicable law in the dispute was restricted to Article 293 of the Convention 
(in contrast to the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration), but nevertheless deciding that 
claims to “historic rights” within the EEZ areas were “without lawful effect” 
(in contrast, again, to Eritrea/Yemen), the Tribunal effectively acknowledged 
that, had the applicable law provision been broader as in Eritrea/Yemen, its 
conclusion may have been very different. Instead, the Tribunal should have 
declined jurisdiction over the question of whether China’s claims are “with-
out lawful effect” on the basis that Part XV and Article 293 of the Convention 
preclude consideration of such a question of general international law. The 
Tribunal’s approach appears to have been based merely upon a textual con-
struction which ignores the role of “historic rights” in general international law 
(as explained in the following sub-section).12
For all these reasons, it would have been more logical for the Tribunal to 
find a non liquet since it lacked jurisdiction to consider Submission nos. 1 and 2.
2.2 The Tribunal’s Conclusion that China’s Maritime Entitlements  
in the South China Sea May Not Extend beyond Those Expressly 
Permitted by unclos (Philippines Submission No. 1; Tribunal  
Merits Dispositif No. 1)
This section appraises the two main elements contained in the Award regard-
ing Submission no. 1. These are: the meaning of the notion of “historic rights”, 
“historic bays” and “historic waters” (subsection 2.2.1) and the exclusiveness 
of UNCLOS in appraising the legal nature and status of China’s claims (sub-
section 2.2.2). Subsection 2.2.3 then sets out some interim conclusions. As 
indicated in Section 2.3 below, the conclusions reached with respect to Sub-
mission no. 1 are also applicable to Submission no. 2.
2.2.1 The Meaning of the Notion of “Historic Rights”, “Historic Titles” 
and “Historic Waters”
UNCLOS itself does not employ explicitly the phrase “historic rights”. It only 
refers to “historic bays” in Article 10(6) relating to the limits of the territorial sea 
and Article 298(1)(a)(i) relating to limitations and exceptions to compulsory 
11   Award, supra note 1, at para. 278.
12   See on the “textual constructions” of the Tribunal, M.C.W. Pinto, Arbitration of the 
Philippine Claim Against China, 8(1) ASIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 5 
(2018).
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procedures entailing binding decisions. The concept of “historic title” features 
in Article 15 and Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS.
At paragraph 226 of the Award, the Tribunal asserted that, beyond the refer-
ences to “historic titles” at Articles 15 and 298, “other “historic rights”, in contrast, 
are nowhere mentioned in the Convention”. This is incorrect. The Convention 
does refer to historic rights, whether explicitly by implication, in a number 
of contexts. For example, there is a reference to historic rights in Article 51(1) 
with the preservation of “traditional fishing rights” in archipelagic waters, and 
in Article 62(3) relating to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where there is 
mention of “States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone”. In addi-
tion, some other articles include terms such as “long usage” (Article 7(5)) and 
“historically … regarded” (Article 46(b)), which carry historical connotations.
All three concepts of “historic titles”, “historic bays”, and “historic rights” are 
well known in international law and have long been governed by customary 
international law, as partly recorded in treaty law including UNCLOS. That is 
not to say that the meaning of these three concepts has always been clearly 
defined, or that their inter-relationship has been universally understood. A 
well-known study on historic bays prepared by the UN Secretariat in 1957 upon 
request by the International Law Commission concluded that the subject of 
historic waters is one “where superficial agreement among practitioners con-
ceals several controversial problems as well as some obscurity or at least lack 
of precision”.13
It is widely understood that ‘historic title’ signifies sovereignty over land or 
maritime territory. As defined by Gioia in the Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law: “The term ‘historic title’ is […] used to denote both 
the source and the evidence of a right over land or maritime territory acquired 
by a State through a process of historical consolidation”.14
It follows from the ICJ judgment in Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) that 
historic title can relate to sovereignty over a wider belt of territorial sea as well 
as special sovereign rights falling short of full territorial sovereignty beyond the 
territorial sea.15 The latter may include historic fishing rights, like in the case of 
13   Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United Nations, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.13/1 (30 September 1957). Since the concept of historic bays is not of direct rel-
evance to the South China Sea dispute, comments will be provided below on historical 
titles and historical rights only.
14   Andrea Gioia, Historic Titles, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (May 2013, online version), at para. 1.
15   Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18 (Feb. 24) 
(Judgment). In this case it concerned Tunisia’s alleged zone of long-established fishing 
activities.
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Eritrea v. Yemen which concerned traditional or artisanal fishing rights enjoyed 
for centuries,16 or in Qatar v. Bahrain regarding Bahrain’s claims to historic fish-
ing rights over the exploitation of pearling banks (which were unsuccessful 
on the evidence).17 Gioia also states that in order to be relevant such historic 
rights must amount to exclusive rights acquired by a State on the basis of a 
claim made à titre de souverain.18
According to the ICJ, the acquisition of sovereign rights falling short of full 
territorial sovereignty in another State’s territory or on the high seas could 
follow “on the basis of long practice” between two or more States “accepted 
by them as regulating their relations”,19 for example a long custom. It should 
be noted that the Tribunal limits the concept of historic title to “[being] used 
specifically to refer to historic sovereignty to land or maritime areas”,20 thus 
excluding more limited rights falling short of sovereignty. These would then all 
come within the scope of the more generic concept of “historic rights”.
“Historic waters” are based upon historical title. In the words of the Tribunal, 
“‘[h]istoric waters’ is simply a term for historic title over maritime areas”.21 This 
also means that, in its view, historic waters are bound to be part of the sover-
eign territory of a State and that sovereignty extends to the air space above 
the historical waters and the seabed and subsoil thereof. This is by no means 
certain, since the concept of historic waters may well just refer to maritime 
areas where nationals of coastal States enjoy traditional fishing rights or use to 
follow certain navigational routes.
“Historic rights” are generally seen as the comprehensive term, covering both 
historic titles to sovereignty over land and maritime areas and other historic 
rights not involving full sovereignty. This was understood by the Tribunal.22 In 
the former sense, therefore, “historic rights” and “historic titles” must overlap. 
Indeed, the two terms are often used interchangeably. The Tribunal correctly 
observed that “historic rights are, in most instances, exceptional rights. They 
accord a right that a State would not otherwise hold, were it not for the 
16   Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea (Eritrea v. Yemen), Case No. 1996-04, 
Award of the Tribunal in the Second Stage – Maritime Delimitation 92, at para. 109.
17   Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain), 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 40 (Mar. 16) (Merits Judgment).
18   Gioia, supra note 14, at para. 19.
19   Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 6 
(Apr. 12) (Merits Judgment), at para. 39.
20   Award, supra note 1, at para. 225.
21   Id.
22   Id.
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operation of the historical process giving rise to the right and the acquiescence 
of other States in the process.”23
Notably, the 1957 UN Secretariat study, cited by the Tribunal at para. 220 of 
the Award, recognised that “historic rights” can be claimed in respect of “the 
waters of archipelagos and the water area lying between an archipelago and 
the neighbouring mainland”.24 China has repeatedly claimed historic rights in 
respect of the Spratly Islands as a group, as well as their “adjacent waters”.25 
The fact that the 1957 study refers also to waters “lying between an archipelago 
in the neighbouring mainland” demonstrates clearly that such “historic rights” 
may apply in respect of waters that do not constitute “archipelagic waters” the 
purposes of Part IV of the Convention.
According to the Tribunal, Article 298(1)(a)(i) refers to “historic […] titles” 
and hence relates to claims of sovereignty over maritime areas derived from 
historical circumstances.26 This implies, in the view of the Tribunal, that 
other historical rights falling short of sovereignty, such as historic rights to 
the living and non-living resources of the sea, do not fall under the term 
“historic titles” and hence not under the optional exception clause to jurisdic-
tion as in Article 298(1)(a)(i).27 This is not very convincing, in view of the lack 
of a definition of historical titles in UNCLOS itself and the use of the plural 
form (“historical titles”) in Article 298 as opposed to the use of the singu-
lar form in Article 15 on the territorial sea. The latter fact indicates that the 
phrase historic titles in the context of the jurisdiction exclusion clause of 
Article 298(1)(a)(i) may have a wider meaning than the one used in Article 15 
relating to the delimitation of the territorial sea. As such, the term could easily 
encompass historic rights beyond those based on full and exclusive sover-
eignty. It could certainly be the case that China had its “historic rights” firmly 
in mind when it filed in 2006 its Declaration excluding disputes concerning 
“historic bays or titles” from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures 
in UNCLOS.28
23   Id. at para. 268.
24   The Secretariat of the United Nations, supra note 13, at para. 8.
25   See, for example, the statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
30 October 2015, cited at para. 187 of the Award.
26   Award, supra note 1, at para. 226.
27   Id.
28   See People’s Republic of China, Declaration Under Article 298 (25 August 2006), 2834 
UNTS 327. See in Section 2.c.II. the reference to historic rights in Article 14 of the Law on 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of 26 June 1998.
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The fact that China has never distinguished between “historic titles” and 
other historic rights in the context of its claims in the South China Sea is shown 
by the fact that, as the Tribunal itself observed, China has sometimes described 
its claims to the maritime areas around and between the Spratly Islands 
(Nansha Islands) as related to “historic title”.29
Furthermore, the fact that China has sometimes described its claims in 
those terms shows that, even if “historic title” does have the narrower legal 
meaning ascribed by the Tribunal in the Award, China’s claims fall within it. 
Indeed, beyond the singular example cited by the Tribunal in its assessment of 
China’s claims, it is notable that the Tribunal referred elsewhere in the Award 
to multiple other instances of China having articulated claims to “sovereignty” 
over waters located within the “nine dash line”.30 Clearly, some of those asser-
tions of “sovereignty” appear to have related to waters located well beyond 
12nm of the islands, and thus beyond their territorial seas. Further, although 
China has not drawn baselines around the Spratly Islands,31 we understand 
that it has raised sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands and their adjacent 
waters as a “comprehensive whole” and “since ancient times”.32
Therefore, the Tribunal had ample evidence before it that China has asserted 
“sovereignty” claims over the maritime areas of the Spratly Islands, including 
to waters which are beyond 12 NM of the islands. On the Tribunal’s own analy-
sis, such “sovereignty” claims clearly engaged matters of “historic title”, linked 
as they were to historic evidence. And yet, the Tribunal ignored that evidence 
in concluding that China’s claims did not engage questions of “historic title”. 
Again, it is reasonable to assume that China considered that these sovereignty 
claims with respect to the waters of the South China Sea as falling within in its 
2006 Declaration under Article 298.33
29   See the Chinese Note Verbale to the Philippines dated 6 July 2011, which the Tribunal con-
cluded was anomalous in the context of other Chinese claims to “historic rights” (Award 
at paras. 209, 227).
30   See, for example, instances cited by the Tribunal at paras. 654, 656, 658 and 659 of the 
Award, all of which evidence Chinese claims to “sovereignty” over the “waters” of the 
Nansha islands.
31   Unlike the Philippines, which drew straight baselines enclosing many of the Spratly 
Island features by way of its Presidential Decree 1596 of 1978.
32   See, for example, statements made by Chinese officials cited at Award, paras. 658–659. 
Of course, Chinese sovereignty claims to the Spratly Islands and their adjacent waters fell 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
33   See S. Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration: Observations on the Award of 12 July 2016, 
14 Bonn Research Papers on Public International Law 1, 10–14 (2018).
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2.2.2 Assertions of “Historic Title” and “Historic Rights” are 
Commonplace in International Litigation, Including since UNCLOS
In proceedings concerning territorial disputes submitted to the ICJ, it fre- 
quently occurs that a party invokes a historic title or right to the land or 
maritime territory in question, either in the narrow sense that title emanates 
from a specific act of discovery and occupation of terra nullius, or in the more 
general sense of title being based on immemorial possession – that is, pos-
session established for such a long period whose origins cannot be easily 
determined but are beyond question.34 A well-known example is the Minquiers 
and Ecrehos case (UK v. France),35 in which France claimed that it possessed 
an original title to the islets and rocks of the Minquiers and Ecrehos groups. 
France argued that it always maintained and never lost this title, whereas the 
UK claimed an ancient title to these territories based upon the conquest of 
England by the Duke of Normandy in 1066. However, ultimately the Court 
based its decision on evidence of possession of the disputed islands from more 
recent times.
Other examples of where international courts and tribunals have addressed 
claims of historic rights include the following cases:
1) Anglo-Norwegian (U.K. v. Norway)36 in which Norway claimed historic 
title to marine areas beyond the territorial sea;
2) Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland)37 and Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland)38 in which the UK and Germany, 
respectively, claimed historic fishing rights in high seas areas;
3) Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya)39 in which Tunisia claimed a wider 
belt of territorial sea based upon long-established fishing activities;
4) Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, 
Nicaragua intervening)40 in which the Gulf of Fonseca was claimed as a 
historical bay by the three coastal States and El Salvador and Honduras 
asserted their historical titles over some or all of the islands;
5) Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea (Eritrea v. 
Yemen)41 in which traditional and artisanal fishing rights of nationals of 
34   See A. Kozłowski, The Legal Construct of Historic Title to Territory in International Law – An 
Overview, 30 Polish Yearbook of International Law 61, 63–80 (2010).
35   Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 47 (Nov. 17) (Judgement).
36   Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 117 (Jan. 18) (Judgement).
37   Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (July 25) (Judgement).
38   Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175 (July 25) (Judgement).
39   Continental Shelf, supra note 15.
40   Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. Rep. 92 (Sept. 13) 
(Judgement) at 351.
41   Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea, supra note 16.
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both Eritrea and Yemen were at stake within areas delimited as forming 
the other State’s EEZ;
6) Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar 
v. Bahrain)42 relating to Bahrain’s claim to exclusive rights over the 
exploitation of the pearling banks;
7) Case concerning the sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia v. Malaysia), in which the Court’s finding on the long usage of 
turtle egg collection on Sipadan played a determining role in confirming 
Malaysia’s sovereignty;43 and
8) Case concerning sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Mid-
dle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), in which the Court 
acknowledged the centuries-old rule of the Sultanate of Johor over its 
maritime domains, including the Straits of Singapore.44
It is notable that several of these cases post-date the conclusion of UNCLOS. In 
fact, in Tunisia/Libya, in which the ICJ was authorised by the Parties’ Special 
Agreement to consider “new accepted trends”,45 the ICJ ruled that the emer-
gent trends in the new law of the sea are to be found in UNCLOS.
The Court held that:
… the Court would have had proprio motu to take account of the progress 
made by the Conference even if the Parties had not alluded to it in their 
Special Agreement; for it could not ignore any provision of the draft con-
vention if it came to the conclusion that the content of such provision is 
binding upon all of the international community because it embodies or 
crystallizes a pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law.46
However, this did not preclude the Court in this and subsequent cases from 
recognising the potential for the continued existence of historic rights, in par-
allel with maritime entitlements enshrined in the Convention. As the Court 
observed, “[i]t is clearly the case that, basically, the notion of historic rights or 
waters and that of the continental shelf are governed by distinct legal régimes 
in customary international law.”47
42   Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions, supra note 17, at 40.
43   Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sapadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 575 
(Oct. 23) (Judgement), at 625.
44   Sovereignty over Pedira Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. 
Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. Rep. (May 23) (Judgement), at 12.
45   Continental Shelf, supra note 15, at para. 4.
46   Id. at para. 24.
47   Id. at para. 100.
165A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
2.2.3 The Alleged “Exclusive” Nature of UNCLOS and the Tribunal’s 
Finding that It “Supersedes” Historic Rights beyond Territorial Sea
In the Award, the Tribunal asserts that UNCLOS is nowadays the sole source 
for the establishment of sovereign maritime rights and that, to the extent that 
rights are claimed beyond the limits imposed by UNCLOS, these are simply 
invalid and nullified. This is based upon the presumption by the Tribunal that 
the Convention supersedes any previously existing historic rights in general 
international law. This implies that the regimes established by UNCLOS for the 
EEZ (Part V) and continental shelf (Part VI) have replaced any prior Chinese 
historical rights over the living and non-living natural resources in the South 
China Sea. As the Tribunal holds:
… the system of maritime zones created by the Convention was intended 
to be comprehensive and to cover any area of the sea and the seabed. The 
same intention for the Convention to provide a complete basis for the 
rights and duties of the States Parties is apparent in the Preamble, which 
notes the intention to settle all issues relating to the law of the sea’ and 
emphasises the desirability of establishing ‘a legal order for the seas.48
Consequently, in the view of the Tribunal, “the Convention supersedes earlier 
rights and agreements to the extent of any incompatibility”, and “the text and 
context of the Convention [… are] clear in superseding any historic rights that 
a State may once have had in the areas that now form part of the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf of another State”.49 In short, the Tri- 
bunal concluded that “the Convention […] leaves no space for an assertion of 
historic rights.”50
This conclusion was critical to the Tribunal’s substantive conclusions 
with respect to Submission nos. 1 and 2. However, it is subject to doubt on mul-
tiple fronts.
Three preliminary points can be made. First, an essential premise of the 
Tribunal’s conclusion that the Convention “leaves no space” for China’s “his-
toric rights” claims in the maritime areas of the South China Sea was that those 
claims are limited to living and non-living natural resources. It is striking that 
the Tribunal’s substantive analysis of China’s “historic rights” for the purposes 
of Submission nos. 1 and 2 focused exclusively on “rights and jurisdiction over 
48   Award, supra note 1, at para. 245.
49   Id. at paras. 246–247.
50   Id. at para. 261.
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living and non-living resources”.51 The Tribunal did not address substantial 
attention to the possibility that China’s claims may extend beyond natural 
resources.52 To the extent that China’s claims to “historic rights” extend beyond 
natural resources, even the Tribunal confirmed that they may not contradict 
UNCLOS and thus be more readily preserved.53
A second premise to the Tribunal conclusion appears to have been that 
China claims “exclusive” rights within the “nine dash line”.54 This ignores indi-
cations to the effect that China’s claims may not be “exclusive” in nature.55 Even 
if the Tribunal was correct to conclude that there was no evidence of China 
having any historic right to the exclusive use of the resources of the South 
China Sea prior to UNCLOS,56 this should not preclude China from claiming 
non-exclusive historic rights within the “nine dash line” (for example, of the 
kind enjoyed by fisherfolk of both States in the Eritrea/Yemen case).
Third, it is striking that the Tribunal did not consider the possibility that 
China’s claims to “historic rights” arise in the connection with the waters of the 
Spratly Islands as a whole, whether as an offshore archipelago or otherwise. 
This was despite the fact that the 1957 UN Secretariat study on “historic bays”, 
cited by the Tribunal in the Award, explicitly recognised that “historic rights” 
can be claimed in respect of “the waters of archipelagos and the water area 
lying between an archipelago and the neighbouring mainland”.57 This is par-
ticularly surprising given the Tribunal’s acknowledgement later in the Award, 
in Chapter VI, of the historic presence of Chinese fishermen throughout the 
Spratly Islands as a whole.58 As explained in the critique of Chapter VI below, 
the Tribunal limited its analysis of the potential for claims based upon the 
Spratly Islands collectively to findings that the features cannot be enclosed 
within a system of archipelagic or straight baselines under the Convention. 
51   Id. at paras. 234–35, 239, 246, 262.
52   See, e.g., S. Wu & K. Zou, Arbitration Concerning the South China Sea 132, 140 
(2016). For instance, according to Dr. Wu and Dr. Zou, China’s claims of historic rights 
beyond natural resources include fishing rights, navigation rights, maritime law enforce-
ment and marine scientific research rights.
53   Award, supra note 1, at para. 238(b).
54   Id. at paras. 243, 258, 270.
55  Wu & Zou, supra note 52, at 140.
56   Award, supra note 1, at para. 261.
57   The Secretariat of the United Nations, supra note 13, at para. 8.
58   For example, the Tribunal referred in Chapter VI of the Award to evidence showing that 
Chinese fishing communities were present in the Spratlys “for comparatively long peri-
ods of time, with an established network of trade and intermittent supply”. Award, supra 
note 1, at paras. 597–601.
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This is irrelevant to the entirely separate question of whether China may have 
enjoyed “historic rights” within the waters of the archipelago.
In any event, and more importantly, for at least eight reasons the Tribunal’s 
claim of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the Convention, such that it 
“supersedes” any pre-existing historic rights in areas that became EEZ or conti-
nental shelf, is untenable under international law.
First, as opposed to a constitution or a formulation of general norms from 
which no derogation is permitted ( jus cogens), the Convention is an ordinary 
multilateral treaty, however comprehensive and significant its provisions 
may be.59 It does not contain an Article 103 UN Charter-type of provision 
according the obligations under this treaty in matters not regulated by it a 
superior status above other obligations of international law, and placing the 
treaty in a hierarchically higher position than other treaties and other sources 
of international law.60
Second, UNCLOS itself recognizes the continued validity of general interna-
tional law alongside the Convention. Thus, in paragraph 8 of its Preamble the 
Convention states that “matters not regulated by this Convention continue to 
be governed by the rules and principles of general international law”. Obviously, 
general international law includes customary international law which, in turn, 
includes historic rights. Moreover, general international law is also referred to 
in a considerable number of other provisions of UNCLOS.61
Third, the ongoing relevance of customary international law alongside 
the Convention is confirmed in the practice of tribunals established under the 
compulsory procedures of the Convention entailing binding decisions. Rele-
vant international jurisprudence demonstrates amply that the applicable law 
of UNCLOS tribunals is not limited to UNCLOS only but also includes, as per 
Article 293, other rules of international law not incompatible with UNCLOS. 
For example, in The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), the 
Tribunal stated:
59   The Convention regulates the main uses (albeit not all) of the seas and the oceans and 
establishes the principal maritime zones (i.e., territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, conti-
nental shelf, high seas and deep seabed). Currently, UNCLOS has 167 State parties and the 
EU is also a party.
60   Article 103 of the UN Charter provides: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail”.
61   These include Arts. 2(3), 19, 22, 74, 83, 87(1), 293 & 295. Wood spotted some 40 provi-
sions with express references to general international law in UNCLOS. See M. Wood, 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and General International Law, 22 
International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law 351, 359 (2007).
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Both arbitral tribunals and ITLOS have interpreted the Convention 
[UNCLOS] as allowing for the application of relevant rules of interna-
tional law. Article 293 of the Convention makes this possible. For instance, 
in M/V “SAIGA” No. 2, ITLOS took account of general international law 
rules on the use of force in considering the use of force for the arrest of 
a vessel.62
The Tribunal continued in the same award:
In determining the claims by the Netherlands in relation to the interpre-
tation and application of the Convention, the Tribunal may, therefore, 
pursuant to Article 293, have regard to the extent necessary to rules of 
customary international law, including international human rights stan-
dards, not incompatible with the Convention, in order to assist in the 
interpretation and application of the Convention’s provisions that autho-
rise the arrest or detention of a vessel and persons.63
Fourth, international jurisprudence confirms specifically that customary 
regimes of historic rights continue to exist in parallel with separate regimes 
covering maritime entitlements under international law. Thus, in Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libya), the ICJ observed in relation to the continental shelf 
(now governed by Part VI of UNCLOS) that: “It is clearly the case that, basically, 
the notion of historic rights or waters and that of the continental shelf are 
governed by distinct legal régimes in customary international law.”64 Judge 
Oda elaborated on this in his Dissenting Opinion in that case, referring to 
“the principle that any historic fishing right based on longstanding practice 
should be respected whatever the status of the submerged areas under the new 
régime. […] [T]he concept of the exclusive economic zone […] has nothing to 
do with historic titles”.65
Fifth, international jurisprudence since UNCLOS further confirms that his-
toric fishing rights of one State (or its nationals) can continue to exist as a 
62   The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia) Case No. 2014-02 (14 August 2015), 
Award on the Merits, para. 191.
63   Id. para. 198. Other relevant cases endorsing this position: The M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case 
(Saint Vincent v. Guinea), 1999 I.T.L.O.S. No. 2 (Judgment of July 1) at para. 155; Barbados 
v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case No. 2004-02 (11 Apr. 2006), Award, para. 222.
64   Continental Shelf, supra note 15, at para. 100.
65   Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18 (Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Oda), at para. 88. Here, Judge Oda did not depart from the majority 
judgment of the Court.
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matter of general international law even within the exclusive economic zone 
of another State. In Eritrea/Yemen, the Tribunal acknowledged the existence 
and continuation of pre-UNCLOS historic rights within the territorial seas 
and EEZs of each of the Parties, in the form of a traditional fishing regime. 
The Tribunal’s attempts in the Award to distinguish that case on the basis of the 
broader “applicable law” in Eritrea/Yemen, and with reference to the fact that 
Eritrea/Yemen “was not an arbitration under Annex VII to the Convention”, 
are unconvincing.66 Certainly, they do not explain the Tribunal’s conclusion, 
despite its narrower “applicable law”, that China’s claims to historic rights, 
or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction existing outside of UNCLOS, are 
“without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and sub-
stantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention”.67 
On the contrary, the Eritrea/Yemen Award explicitly recognises the ongoing 
legal validity at general international law of historic rights within EEZ areas, 
despite the fact that such rights (as in that case) can exceed the geographic 
and substantive limits of maritime entitlements under the Convention. It also 
disproves the Tribunal’s separate finding that “historical navigation and fish-
ing, beyond the territorial sea, cannot […] form the basis for the emergence a 
historic right”.68
Sixth, Article 311 of UNCLOS deals explicitly with how the Convention 
relates to other conventions and international agreements. This Article only 
stipulates prevalence of UNCLOS over the four 1958 Conventions on the Law 
of the Sea, and prevalence of Article 136 (relating to the common heritage of 
mankind) with respect to which no amendments to the basic principles 
are allowed.
Seventh, the Tribunal provides no legal rationale or justification for its con-
clusion that “[Article 311] applies equally to the interaction of the Convention 
with other norms of international law, such as historic rights, that do not take 
the form of an agreement”.69 There is nothing in the text of Article 311 that 
provides for this.70 Its scope extends only to the relation of the Convention to 
other conventions and international agreements, not to general international 
66   Award, supra note 1, at para. 259.
67   See id. at para. 278 and merits dispositif no. 2.
68   Id. at para. 270.
69   Id. at para. 235.
70   See also P.S. Rao, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): Assessment of 
the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 15 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 265, 293 (2016).
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law and customary international law. Since the Nicaragua judgment, and 
as confirmed by Judge Oda in Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya), it is widely 
acknowledged that “customary international law continues to exist and to 
apply, separately from international treaty law, even where the two categories 
of law have an identical content”.71
Eighth and lastly, the Convention itself provides for a number of limitations 
and exceptions in Articles 297 and 298 to the compulsory dispute settlement 
procedures entailing binding decisions (provided for in Part XV, Section 2 of 
the Convention).72 This is another indication of the not entirely exclusive 
nature of UNCLOS, and the fact that a broad range of law of the sea disputes 
(including those related to historic title claims) can only be resolved outside 
the Convention.
2.2.4 Interim Conclusion with Respect to Submission No. 1
The finding of the Tribunal that UNCLOS “leaves no space for an assertion 
of historic rights” is highly questionable. The concepts of “historic titles” 
and “historic rights” are not as clearly and consistently distinguished as the 
Tribunal asserts in its Award. Rather, the two terms are often used interchange-
ably. Historic rights can and do continue to exist next to and independent from 
UNCLOS, as confirmed by the award in the Eritrea/Yemen case.
In effect, the Tribunal concludes that there no longer exists a body of gen-
eral international law rules in parallel with the Convention. This is incorrect. 
Therefore, the conclusion of the Tribunal in paragraph 278 of the Award that 
“the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights 
or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein” is probably wrong. 
This provides a serious basis to challenge the Tribunal’s substantive findings 
with respect to Submission no. 1 (and thus merits dispositif no. 1). As elabo-
rated in the following Section, it also provides a serious basis to challenge the 
Tribunal’s substantive findings with respect to Submission no. 2 (and thus mer-
its dispositif no. 2).
71   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14 (June 27) (Judgment), at para. 179.
72   Disputes excluded by Art. 297 or exempted by Art. 298 of the Convention from application 
of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures may be submitted to such procedures 
only by agreement of the parties to the dispute.
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2.3 The Tribunal’s Conclusions: that China’s Claims to Historic Rights, or 
Other Sovereign Rights or Jurisdiction, with Respect to the Maritime 
Areas of the South China Sea Encompassed by the “Nine Dash Line” 
are Contrary to the Convention and Without Lawful Effect to the 
Extent that They Exceed the Geographic and Substantive Limits of 
China’s Maritime Entitlements under the Convention: and that the 
Convention “Superseded” Any Historic Rights, or Other Sovereign 
Rights or Jurisdiction, in Excess of the Limits Imposed Therein 
(Philippines Submission No. 2; Tribunal Merits Dispositif No. 2)
The Philippines’ Submission no. 2 reads:73
China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to “historic rights” 
with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed 
by the so-called “nine dash line” are contrary to the Convention and 
without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic 
and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements expressly per-
mitted by UNCLOS.
The so-called “nine dash line” plays a central role in the discussion on the 
extent of China’s historic rights in the South China Sea. The background, 
meaning and implications of this line are discussed subsection (1). Subsection 
(2) surveys some of China’s relevant post-war declarations and legislation on 
the law of the sea, followed by interim conclusions in subsection (3).
2.3.1 The “Nine Dash Line”: Background, Meaning and Implications
The “nine dash line”, originally an eleven-dash line and also called the U-shaped 
line or dotted line, first appeared in some Chinese atlases following the end 
of WWII and the end of Japan’s occupation of the Xisha and Nansha Islands. 
In 1947, the Chinese Ministry of the Interior published a list of 172 geographi-
cal names, in both Chinese and English, for the islands in the South China 
Sea. Subsequently, in February 1948 the Chinese government released through 
the Commerce Press in Beijing an official atlas of all national administrative 
districts, which also depicted the eleven-dash line. In 1949, the four island 
groups in the South China Sea (Xisha or Paracel Islands, Dongsha or Patras 
Islands, Zhongsha Islands, and Nansha or Spratly Islands) and other attached 
73   Memorial of the Philippines, supra note 3, at 271.
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islands were placed under the authority of the Hainan District of Guan 
Dong Province.74
In 1953, two of the eleven dashes were removed following an understand-
ing between China and Viet Nam on their maritime borders in the Gulf of 
Tonkin. Ever since, the “nine dash line” remained in this form on Chinese 
maps and in its atlases. It was this map showing the “nine dash line” which, on 
7 May 2009, was appended to two Notes Verbales to the UN Secretary-General, 
through which China responded to the joint submission of Malaysia and Viet 
Nam on 6 May 2009 to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf.75 This prompted a series of exchanges of diplomatic notes with Viet 
Nam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. In such exchanges the “nine 
dash line” consistently features as a point of reference for China’s claim to 
rights “formed throughout the long course of history and […] maintained by 
the Chinese government consistently”,76 and “supported by abundant histori-
cal and legal evidence”.77
There is considerable logic to the observation by Ghao and Bing Bing that 
around 1947: “The underlying reason for the eleven-dash line was presumably 
to reaffirm and reiterate China’s sovereignty over the islands group in the South 
China Sea at the beginning of a new, postwar era.”78 It appears that the dotted 
line signifies the general geographical scope of China’s authority (imperium 
or domaine réservé) over the South China Sea rather than a specific boundary, 
demarcating precisely its territory, internal waters and territorial seas in the 
South China Sea.
There has also been speculation that the dashed line roughly follows the 
200-meter isobath, in the context of the emergence of international discus-
sions on rights to the continental shelf following the 1945 Truman Proclamation 
on this, or served a potential delimitation purpose by drawing more or less 
74   See for a summary of the historic evolution of the nine-dash line, Z. Ghao & B.B. Jia, The 
Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107 American 
Journal of International Law 98, 100–08 (2013).
75   Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009); 
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009).
76   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Briefing by Xu Hong, Director- 
General of the Department of Treaty and Law on the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated 
by the Philippines (12 May 2016), on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website at 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1364804.shtml.
77   Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/8/2011 (14 April 2011).
78   Ghao & Jia, supra note 74, at 103.
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the median lines between the Chinese islands in the South China Sea and the 
opposite coasts of the neighbouring States.79 In either of these scenarios, 
of course, the “nine dash line” would constitute a claim to “historic titles”, 
even within the meaning ascribed to that term by the Tribunal in the Award, 
and would thus fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by virtue of China’s 
Article 298 Declaration.
2.3.2 Declarations and Legislation of China in the Field of the Law of 
the Sea
As regards legislative and declaratory acts in the post-war period, China issued 
its Declaration on the Territorial Sea on 4 September 1958, promulgating a 
12 NM territorial sea for both its mainland and its coastal and off-lying 
islands.80 On 25 February 1992, in the context of the forthcoming ratification 
of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, China enacted a new Law on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (“1992 Law”), including for the four 
island groups of the South China Sea as well as for all other islands belonging 
to China in its Article 2.81
China ratified UNCLOS on 7 June 1996. On the occasion of depositing its 
instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General, China expressly 
reaffirmed “its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in arti-
cle 2 of the [1992 Law]”. In accordance with the Convention, China proclaimed 
its EEZ in an official declaration on 7 June 1996. Thereupon, it promulgated the 
Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf on 26 June 
1998 (“1998 Law”).82 Article 14 of the 1998 Law provides that: “No provisions 
of this Law can prejudice historic rights of the People’s Republic of China”. 
Notably, China uses the general concept of “historic rights” which, as discussed 
in Section II.B above and acknowledged in the Award, is broadly considered as 
including the concept of “historic titles”.
Several other declarations are of relevance. As discussed above, China 
made on 25 August 2006 a Declaration under Article 298(1)(a)(i), excluding 
various categories of disputes, including those concerning maritime boundary 
delimitations or those involving “historic bays and titles”, from the compulsory 
79   Id. at 109.
80   These and other legal documents referred to in this paragraph can be found in 
Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China (3rd ed. 2001).
81   See Art. 2 of the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
82   Adopted at the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress on June 26, 1998 and promulgated by Order No. 6 of the President of 
the People’s Republic of China on June 26, 1998.
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dispute settlement procedures entailing binding decisions as contained in 
Part XV of UNCLOS.83
Notwithstanding its policy of non-appearance and non-participation in 
the arbitration proceedings initiated by the Philippines, China issued on sev-
eral occasions public statements or position papers on the South China Sea 
Arbitration. On 7 December 2014 it deposited a Note Verbale with the PCA, 
attaching an extensive Position Paper in which it reiterated its historic rights 
in the South China Sea and explained why in its view the Tribunal lacked juris-
diction in the case.84 Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China issued a statement on 30 October 2015 in response to the 
Tribunal’s Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the day before, in which 
the Ministry declared that Award to be “null and void” and to have “no binding 
effect on China”.85
In the Award, the Tribunal found that China’s claim to historic rights, or 
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas 
of the South China Sea encompassed by the “nine dash line” were contrary 
to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed 
the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements 
under the Convention. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded with respect to 
Submission no. 2 that the Convention leaves no space for an assertion of his-
toric rights based upon the “nine dash line” beyond the rights emanating from 
the maritime zones included in the Convention, most notably the territorial 
sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf.86
For the reasons set out at subsection 2.2.2 above, this conclusion, which 
formed the heart of the Tribunal’s dispositif no.2, is subject to substantial doubt 
as a matter of law (even if the Tribunal had jurisdiction over this question, 
which it likely did not for the reason set out at subsection A(ii) above).
83   See People’s Republic of China, Declaration under Article 298 (25 August 2006), 2834 
UNTS 327. The relevant part reads: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China 
does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the 
Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to it in paragraph 1(a)
(b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention”.
84   See the English text of the Position Paper of the Government of China dated 7 December 
2014, also published in Chinese Society of International Law, The South China Sea Arbitra-
tion Awards: A Critical Study, 17(2) Chinese Journal of International Law 207 at 
655 (2018) (hereinafter Critical Study), on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website 
at www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm.
85   Id. at 679.
86   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 261–62, 278.
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2.3.3 Interim Conclusion with Respect to Submission No. 2
The “nine dash line” has for more than half a century been a consistent point 
of reference for China and for a long period prompted no coherent responses 
by neighbouring coastal States until 2009. Its particular background is the 
re-assertion of control over the island groups of the South China Sea in 
the immediate post-war period and the pre-empting of potential interference 
by third States. It is too simplistic for the Tribunal to completely discard the 
line, and the rights to which it refers, on the basis that the Convention “super-
sedes” all historic rights which do not exactly accord with the provisions of 
UNCLOS. Rather, as explained above and as international jurisprudence con-
firms, historic rights regimes in maritime areas, including the EEZ, are capable 
of being preserved in international law notwithstanding UNCLOS.
2.4 Assessment and Conclusions on the Findings of the Tribunal on 
Submissions Nos. 1 and 2
2.4.1 Jurisdiction
There are strong arguments indicating that the Tribunal incorrectly found 
jurisdiction in the Award over Submission nos. 1 and 2. First, in order properly 
to decide on the maritime rights and entitlements of China in the South China 
Sea, the Tribunal had to assess the underlying issue of the territorial title of 
China to sovereignty over the islands and maritime areas of the South China 
Sea. However, these issues are explicitly excluded from the compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures under Part XV of UNCLOS and as per the Declaration 
made by China under Article 298(1)(a)(i). Second, the Tribunal’s conclusion 
that China’s claims within the “nine dash line” involve issues of “historic rights” 
but not “historic title” (for the purpose of China’s Article 298 Declaration) is 
legally unsound. Third, evidence before the Tribunal confirmed that, in any 
event, China claims elements of “sovereignty” (and thus “historic title”) within 
the “nine dash line” (thus satisfying the Tribunal’s legal test for the purpose of 
China’s Article 298 Declaration). Fourth, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction 
to declare that China’s “nine dash line” and related “historic rights”, as well as 
being “contrary to the Convention”, were “without lawful effect”. Indeed, to the 
extent that it had such jurisdiction, it should (like the Eritrea/Yemen tribunal) 
have declared that such “historic rights” can persist alongside the Convention.
2.4.2 Continued Relevance of Historic Maritime Rights: UNCLOS Does 
Not Mark the End of History
A central issue in the South China Sea Arbitration is the continued validity 
and the legality of historic maritime rights after the conclusion and entry into 
force of UNCLOS. Should these rights be judged only in the context of UNCLOS 
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or also from a general international law perspective? This is the principal ques-
tion raised in the context of Philippines’ Submission no. 1, but is also of critical 
relevance in connection with its Submission no. 2. The Tribunal reduced this 
key question to the status of historic rights in the context of UNCLOS only. 
This is a classic case of “tunnel vision”. The Tribunal concluded that UNCLOS 
“superseded” and thus wiped out, all historic rights within maritime areas that 
would otherwise constitute EEZ and continental shelf under UNCLOS.87 This 
is a radical proposition from a legal perspective and has far-reaching con-
sequences, nullifying in principle (beyond the South China Sea context) all 
historic rights that coastal States may have to maritime areas beyond their 
territorial seas. Moreover, the proposition lacks legal foundation as it is con-
tradicted by the text of UNCLOS and by international jurisprudence, both 
of which provide for the ongoing co-existence of historic rights in maritime 
space. In addition, the Tribunal did not consider in any detail the possibility 
that China’s claims to “historic rights” within the “nine dash line” might extend 
beyond rights with respect to natural resources, or might not be exclusive in 
nature, or might be centred around the Spratly Islands collectively, as a group 
or offshore archipelago.
However comprehensive a treaty UNCLOS may be, and however significant 
its status, it cannot and does not extinguish or supersede all historical mari-
time rights existing under general international law. The alfa et omega of the 
international law of the sea comprises more than UNCLOS. Rather, the con-
cept of “historic rights” is one which is long supported by state practice and 
international jurisprudence, both before and since UNCLOS. As such, historic 
rights to and within maritime areas continue to be part and parcel of general 
international law. Contrary to what the Tribunal appears to suggest, UNCLOS 
does not mark the end of history or extinguish historic rights that may exist in 
a variety of guises around the world.
On the contrary, UNCLOS itself provides ample room for the continued 
validity and applicability of general international law, including customary 
international law, which can obviously serve as the source of historic rights. 
These can relate to both territorial claims to certain land and maritime areas 
around or between it and to certain sovereign rights to the living (in the sense 
of ‘habitual fishing by nationals’ ex Article 62(3) of UNCLOS) and non-living 
resources in a certain area.
87   Id. at paras. 246, 247, 262, 278.
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2.4.3 The “Nine Dash Line” is Not “Without Lawful Effect”
Submission no. 2 focuses on the continued validity and legality of the “nine 
dash line” and related claims to “historic rights”. Also, here the Tribunal takes 
a radical position: it concludes that the line and related claims to sovereignty 
and historic rights are contrary to UNCLOS and therefore without legal effect 
to the extent that China’s maritime claims exceed the geographic and substan-
tive limits of its entitlements under the Convention. China has never claimed 
all maritime waters encompassed by the “nine dash line” as internal waters, 
territorial sea or even EEZ. Nor is it clear that China ever claimed exclusive 
sovereignty over the natural resources of the South China Sea. Rather, it has 
stated that it respects freedom of navigation in and overflight over the waters 
in (at least part of) the maritime areas encompassed by the “nine dash line”. 
The “nine dash line” has been, for 50 years, a consistent point of reference 
for China. But there is no particular international obligation incumbent upon 
China to specify what exactly is meant by this historic line and its related his-
toric rights. A comprehensive exposition could most likely only be expected 
in proceedings concerning territorial sovereignty over land and maritime 
areas of the South China Sea, or in the context of specific maritime bound-
ary delimitation with neighbouring coastal States. However, these issues are 
explicitly excluded from the scope of the international dispute settlement pro-
cedures under Part XV of UNCLOS and are matters for negotiation or other 
agreed means of international dispute settlement voluntarily chosen by the 
parties concerned.
3 The Tribunal’s Findings on the Status of Features in the South 
China Sea (Philippines Submission Nos. 3 to 7; Award Chapter VI)
3.2 The Tribunal’s Classification of Features as Low-Tide Elevations 
under Article 13 of unclos (Philippines Submission Nos. 4 and 6; 
Tribunal Merits Dispositif Nos. 4 and 5)
Article 13 of UNCLOS provides as follows:
Article 13 Low-tide elevations
1.  A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is sur-
rounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. 
Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not 
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an 
island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
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2.  Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the 
breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no 
territorial sea of its own.
The Tribunal made several observations in its interpretation of Article 13 
and legal approach to the classification of low-tide elevations, with which 
we broadly agree. The Tribunal noted that the inclusion of the term “natu-
rally formed” in the definition of both a low-tide elevation and an island 
“indicates that the status of the feature is to be evaluated on the basis of its 
natural condition”.88 The significance of the Tribunal’s observation, that 
“human modification cannot change […] a low-tide elevation into an island”, 
is uncontroversial.89 The Tribunal further observed that many of the South 
China Sea features in question had been “subjected to substantial human 
modification”90 and that UNCLOS required that “the status of the feature be 
ascertained on the basis of its earlier, natural condition, prior to the onset of 
significant human modification.”91
The Tribunal then noted, also un-controversially, that because Article 13(2) 
states that a low-tide elevation does not generate a territorial sea of its own 
(except when it falls within the breadth of a territorial sea generated from 
a high-tide feature or mainland), it is not entitled to an EEZ or continental 
shelf.92 With respect to the status of low-tide elevations, the Tribunal observed 
correctly that low-tide elevations do not form part of the land territory of a 
State in a legal sense, and that they “cannot be appropriated”. Rather, they 
coastal State only has sovereignty over low-tide elevations to the extent 
that they are situated within its territorial sea, since the State has sovereignty 
over the territorial sea itself.93
The Tribunal noted that both Articles 13 and 121 of UNCLOS use the term 
“high tide” and observed that “high tide” was “not a technical term” that could 
be interpreted in different ways.94 Consequently , the Tribunal considered that 
“States are free under the Convention to claim a high-tide feature or an island 
on the basis of any high-water datum that reasonably corresponds to the ordi-
nary meaning of the term “high tide” in Articles 13 and 121.”95
88   Id. at para. 305.
89   Id.
90   Id. at para. 306.
91   Id.
92   Id. at para. 308.
93   Id. at para. 309.
94   Id. at para. 311.
95   Id.
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When it came to the evidence, the Tribunal noted that the most accurate 
determination of whether a feature was above or below water at high tide 
would be based on a “combination of methods”, including “direct, in-person 
observation”.96 However, the Tribunal observed that such direct observation 
was “impossible where human modifications have obscured the original status 
of a feature or where political considerations restrict in-person observation”.97 
The Tribunal thus acknowledged the “absence of full information” in reaching 
its findings as regards the status of the features.
The Tribunal considered that, “given the impossibility of direct, contempo-
rary observation”,98 the most relevant evidence relating to the status of features 
in the South China Sea was to be found in nautical charts, records of surveys 
and sailing directions.99 All of this evidence was necessarily historic in nature, 
much of it deriving from British and Japanese surveys conducted during the 
19th and early 20th centuries and nautical charts at a scale of no better than 
1: 150,000.100
The Tribunal’s approach goes against international jurisprudence and lead-
ing commentary, which clearly favours contemporaneous evidence, where 
available, over historical charts or surveys, unless these form an integral part of 
a particular treaty.101 In Nicaragua v. Colombia, the ICJ questioned the probative 
value of historical surveys and preferred contemporary (including photo-
graphic) evidence presented by Colombia for the purposes of determining the 
status of Quitasueño and other disputed features under the Convention.102
The Tribunal’s findings were therefore, even on its own view, based upon 
imperfect evidence. Had the Tribunal had access to evidence based upon con-
temporary, direct observation of features such as Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal in their natural form, its conclusions that those features are 
96   Id. at para. 321.
97   Id.
98   Id. at para. 327.
99   Id.
100   Id. at paras. 327–32.
101   See, in particular, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 583 
(Judgment), at para. 56, “Since relatively distant times, judicial decisions have treated 
maps with a considerable degree of caution […] maps can still have no greater legal value 
than that of corroborative evidence endorsing a conclusion at which a court has arrived 
by other means unconnected with the maps. In consequence, except when the maps are 
in the category of a physical expression of the will of the State, they cannot in themselves 
alone be treated as evidence of a frontier, since in that event they would form an irrebut-
table presumption, tantamount in fact to legal title”.
102   Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), 2012 I.C.J. Rep. (Nov. 19) (Judgment), at 
paras. 35–38.
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low-tide elevations may have been very different. Therefore, to the extent that 
such contemporary (including photographic and survey) evidence is available, 
it would likely be of more legal weight than the historic evidence relied upon 
by the Tribunal in its Award. Of course, such evidence will only be available 
to the extent that human modifications have not concealed the natural status 
of the feature.103
3.2.1 The Tribunal’s Conclusion that Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal are Low-Tide Elevations and Thus Not Capable of 
Appropriation (Philippines Submission No. 4; Tribunal Jurisdiction 
Dispositif No. 2(B) and Merits Dispositif Nos. 3 and 4)
The Tribunal concluded that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are 
below water at high tide and therefore constitute low-tide elevations for the 
purposes of Article 13 of UNCLOS.104 As such, the Tribunal found that they are 
incapable of appropriation as a matter of international law.105
The Tribunal’s finding that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal were 
low-tide elevations was a pre-requisite for the Tribunal’s acceptance of juris-
diction in respect of Philippines Submission nos. 5, 8, 9, 12, and for a number 
of its substantive findings on the merits (particularly dispositif nos. 7, 10, 14 
and 16(a) and (d)). In addition, one commentator has observed:
by not finding any feature to be an island, the result was that two of 
the most contested features – Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal 
(which the Tribunal had found to be low-tide elevations) – are thus 
located with the established exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, 
and as it is not within 200 nautical miles of any feature to which China 
could possibly claim sovereignty, these key features remain part of the 
maritime entitlement of the Philippines. It is worthwhile pausing here to 
reflect what the Tribunal has done. It has not ruled on sovereignty but, in 
effect, it has. By finding that something is a low-tide elevation (the first-
order question), incapable of being possessed by means of territoriality, 
the Tribunal has in essence ruled out the question of sovereignty [over 
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal] (a second-order question).106
103   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 353–54. Indeed, it is notable that the Tribunal itself pre-
ferred the “more recent Chinese chart” (Chart No. 18400), based upon Chinese surveys 
between 1989 and 2001, to historical survey materials when concluding that McKennan 
Reef is a high tide feature.
104   Id. at paras. 378, 381.
105   Id. at para. 309.
106   Duncan French, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration: Republic of Philippines, 
19(1) Environmental Law Review 48, 52 (2017).
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The Tribunal’s conclusions as regards the legal classification of these small 
features therefore warrant close attention.
The Tribunal’s conclusion that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation, and is 
thus incapable of appropriation and cannot generate any maritime entitle-
ments (Tribunal merits dispositive nos. 3(c) and 4), is open to serious doubt 
from a legal and evidentiary perspective. The Tribunal had significant evidence 
before it that Mischief Reef is a high tide feature. It noted that a detailed survey 
and chart of the feature prepared by HMS Herald in 1933 refer to there being “a 
rock which dries 5 feet” on the south-east corner of the feature.107 The Tribunal 
referred also to Chinese Chart No. 18500, which depicts the same rock at a 
height of 1 metre above “Mean Sea Level”.108 The Tribunal noted that “either 
measurement would at least be close to the expected level of high water”.109 
In doing so, it acknowledged that both the historic British survey and more 
modern Chinese evidence support the existence of a high tide feature at 
Mischief Reef.
The Tribunal’s assessment of the potentially dispositive nature of the 1933 
survey evidence and Chinese Chart No. 18500 appears correct, given its own 
observation earlier in the Award that “the average range between Higher 
High Water and Lower Low Water for tides in the Spratlys is in the order of 
0.85 metres, increasing to 1.2 metres during certain periods of the year.110 5 feet 
is substantially more than 1.2 metres. The Tribunal also noted that “the leg-
end to the symbology for standard Chinese cartography indicates that Chinese 
charts will depict a rock or islet as one which does not cover if it exceeds the 
level of Mean High Water Springs”, and that Mean High Water Springs would 
be an appropriate approximation of “high tide” if determined on the basis 
of Chinese nautical charts.111 On this rationale, the Tribunal could certainly 
have concluded from Chinese Chart No. 18500 that Mischief Reef is a high 
tide feature.
The Tribunal’s finding that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation notwith-
standing the 1933 survey evidence and Chinese Chart No. 18500 arguably 
contradicts its findings in relation to other features on the basis of comparable 
evidence. For example, the Tribunal concluded that Gaven Reef (North) is a 
high tide feature, observing that Japanese and US records from the 1930s dem-
onstrated the existence of a sand cay rising to a height of 1.9 metres on that 
107   Award, supra note 1, at para. 374, citing to HMS Herald, Report of Visit to Mischief Reef, 
UKHO Ref. H3331/1933.
108   Id. at para. 377.
109   Id.
110   Id. at para. 316.
111   Id. at para. 313.
182 National Institute for South China Sea Studies
feature and noting that such a height would be “well above even Mean High 
Water Springs”.112 The Tribunal similarly concluded with respect to Johnson 
Reef that it is a high tide feature, based upon (inter alia) a detailed survey and 
chart prepared by HMS Herald in 1931 showing a 4 foot rock in the south-east 
corner of the feature, together with Chinese Chart No 18400, which depicts a 
rock rising to 0.9 m above Mean Sea Level.113
Taken individually, there was a strong argument that Mischief Reef is a high 
tide feature in its natural form. However, the Tribunal reached the opposite 
conclusion, observing that it did not have “direct evidence of tidal conditions 
at Mischief Reef”, and that the reference to “drying rocks” in the HMS Herald 
survey materials, and to the rocks being exposed “during half-tide” in the 2011 
edition of the Chinese Sailing Directions, indicated that the rock was sub-
merged at high tide, and thus that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation.114
This conclusion is open to serious question given the Tribunal’s reliance 
elsewhere in the Award on Royal Navy survey and chart evidence and Chinese 
charts, its observations about the limited tidal range in the South China Sea, 
and its conclusion that, due to advances in satellite navigation, modern sailing 
directions are “less descriptive of the features on reefs and correspondingly 
less useful” than more historic evidence.115
The Tribunal could therefore have concluded that Mischief Reef is a high 
tide feature and is thus capable of appropriation and entitled at least to a ter-
ritorial sea under UNCLOS. The argument that Mischief Reef is a rock under 
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS would be even stronger if contemporaneous evidence 
were available to demonstrate that the rock concerned remains above water at 
high tide. Had the Tribunal reached this conclusion, it would have concluded 
that it had no jurisdiction in respect of Philippines Submission nos. 5, 8, 9, 
12 (so far as they concerned Mischief Reef and its territorial sea), and would 
thus have been unable to reach a number of its substantive findings on the 
merits (particularly dispositif nos. 7, 10, 14 and 16(a) and (d), as they relate to 
Mischief Reef).
By contrast, the Tribunal’s conclusion that Second Thomas Shoal is also a 
low-tide elevation, and is thus incapable of appropriation and cannot gen-
erate any maritime entitlements (Tribunal merits dispositive nos. 3(c) and 
4), appears to accord with the evidence before it. In particular, the Tribunal 
referred to a Royal Navy survey in the 1930s, Chinese Chart No. 18500 and the 
112   Id. at para. 364.
113   Id. at paras. 344–51.
114   Id. at paras. 377–78.
115   Id. at para. 332.
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2011 edition of the Chinese Sailing Directions as demonstrating the absence of 
any high tide feature.116 We see no basis on which to challenge this conclusion.
3.2.2 The Tribunal’s Conclusions that Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South) and 
Hughes Reef are Low-Tide Elevations (Philippines Submission Nos. 
4 and 6; Tribunal Merits Dispositif No. 5)
The Tribunal concluded that Hughes Reef is a low-tide elevation, based in part 
upon the fact that it does not appear as a high tide feature on Chinese Chart 
No. 18400.117
The Tribunal concluded that Gaven Reef (South) is a low-tide elevation, 
based in part upon the 2011 edition of the Chinese Sailing Directions.118
The Tribunal concluded that Subi Reef is a low-tide elevation, based upon 
the absence of any evidence suggesting the existence of a high tide feature at 
that location.119
On the evidence that was before the Tribunal, we see no basis on which to 
challenge these conclusions. This is, of course, without prejudice to China’s 
claims to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and their adjacent waters as a 
“comprehensive whole”.120
3.2.3 The Tribunal’s Conclusions that Scarborough Shoal, Gaven  
Reef (North) Mckennan Reef, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, 
and Fiery Cross Reef, in Their Natural Condition, are High Tide 
Features (Philippines Submission Nos. 3, 6 and 7; Tribunal Merits 
Dispositif No. 3)
The Tribunal’s conclusions that the remaining features remain above water 
at high tide appear to have a sound legal and evidentiary basis, including 
(as regards some of the features) with reference to the 2011 edition of the 
Chinese Sailing Directions121 and Chinese Chart No. 18400.122 We note that 
the Tribunal’s conclusions as regards the status of McKennan Reef and Gaven 
Reef (North) contradicted the Philippines’ position that those features were 
low-tide elevations, the former based in large part upon Chinese Chart 
No. 18400.123 We see no basis on which to challenge any of these conclusions.
116   Id. at paras. 379–81.
117   Id. at para. 358.
118   Id. at para. 366.
119   Id. at para. 373. 
120   Id. at paras. 658–59.
121   Id. at paras. 333, 341.
122   Id. at para. 350.
123   Id. at paras. 354, 365.
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3.3 The Tribunal’s Classification of the Remaining Features in the 
South China Sea as “Rocks” Generating No eez or Continental Shelf 
Entitlement under Article 121(3) of unclos (Philippines Submission 
Nos. 3, 5 and 7)
The Tribunal turned next to the question of the status of the high tide features 
in the South China Sea under Article 121 of UNCLOS. It concluded that all of 
the relevant features constitute “rocks” generating no EEZ or continental shelf 
under Article 121(3).
The Tribunal’s findings that none of the high tide features in question were 
islands within the meaning of Article 121 were a further pre-requisite for the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction in respect of Philippines Submission nos. 5, 8, 9 and 12, 
and for a number of its substantive findings on the merits (particularly dis-
positif nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 16(a) and (d)). This is of particular relevance in 
the case of Itu Aba, which the Tribunal concluded was a “rock” pursuant to 
Article 121(3). Had the Tribunal found that Itu Aba was a fully-entitled island 
under Article 121(2), its EEZ would extend to include Mischief Reef, which is 
only 74 nautical miles (nm) from Itu Aba. The Tribunal itself acknowledged 
that, in order that it could make a declaration in line with the Philippines 
Submission no. 5 (that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the 
EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines), it must make “a finding that none 
of the Spratly Islands are fully entitled islands under Article 121”.124 Similarly, 
it would have to conclude that the Spratly Islands cannot be regarded as one 
integral island group generating maritime entitlements.
The Tribunal’s conclusions as regards the legal classification of the South 
China Sea features under Article 121 therefore warrant close attention.
3.1.1 The Tribunal’s Interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS
3.1.1.1 The Tribunal’s Observation that China “Has Demonstrated a Robust 
Stance on the Importance of Article 121(3)” by Reference to Its Position 
on Oki-No-Tori-Shima
Notwithstanding China’s absence from the proceeding, the Tribunal attempted 
to discern China’s position on the meaning of Article 121 of UNCLOS.125 
However, it did so exclusively with reference to China’s recorded protests 
and other responses to Japan’s November 2008 a claim of an extended con-
tinental shelf from Oki-no-Tori-Shima.126 In particular, the Tribunal referred 
124   Id. at para. 399. 
125   Id. at paras. 446–72.
126   Id. at para. 451.
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to China’s statements that Oki-no-Tori-Shima is a “rock” for the purposes of 
Article 121(3).127
The Tribunal’s assumptions as regards China’s position on the interpretation 
of Article 121, and its insinuation that such position might be transferable to 
the context of the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea, are legally dubious.
First, it is clear that China’s statements as regards the legal status of 
Oki-no-Tori-Shima are limited to the unique circumstances of that feature.128 
They are not transferable as a matter of insinuation to the entirely different 
circumstances of the Spratly Islands. As Professor Talmon has observed, “no 
conclusions can be drawn from China’s position on Oki-no-Tori-Shima for the 
legal status of larger maritime features in the South China Sea.”129
Second, the physical and other characteristics of Oki-no-Tori-Shima are 
clearly distinguishable from those of the Spratly Islands, both individually 
and collectively. Oki-no-Tori-Shima has been described as “two coral protru-
sions no larger than king-size beds”.130 It has a land area of less than 0.01 km2, 
while Itu Aba alone has a land area of 0.4639 km2. This makes Itu Aba nearly 
fifty times larger than Oki-no-Tori-Shima in its natural form. Furthermore, Itu 
Aba has a long record of human population and the presence of potable water 
and other criteria identified by the Tribunal as relevant to determination of 
whether a feature is a rock or a fully-fledged island under Article 121. By con-
trast, Oki-no-Tori-Shima fulfils none of those criteria.
3.1.1.2 The Tribunal’s Approach to Interpretation of Article 121
The Tribunal set out its approach to the interpretation of Article 121 at para-
graphs 476 and 477 of the Award. Notably, however, the Tribunal failed to 
recognise the fundamental distinction under the VCLT between the basic rule 
of interpretation under Article 31 and supplementary means of interpretation 
under Article 32. A leading international law commentary provides that:
The application of the basic rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention will usually establish a clear and reasonable 
meaning: if such is the case, there is no occasion to have recourse to other 
[i.e., supplementary] means of interpretation.131
127   Id., quoting from Note Verbale from the People’s Republic of China to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, No. CML/2/2009 (6 February 2009) (Annex 189).
128   Id.
129   Talmon, supra note 33, at 82.
130   Id.
131   Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Oppenheims’s International Law, Part 2 to 4, 
1275–76 (9th, 2008).
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This approach was reinforced by the seminal Lotus Case (which predates 
the codification of treaty interpretation rules), in which the PCIJ held that:
The Court must recall in this connection what it has said in some of its 
preceding judgments and opinions, namely, that there is no occasion to 
have regard to preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently 
clear in itself.132
Similarly, in an Advisory Opinion rendered in 1950 in the Admissions case, the 
ICJ explained:
… the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply 
the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their 
natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the 
relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their 
context, that is an end of the matter.133
The ICJ elaborated that:
When the Court can give effect to a provision of a treaty by giving to the 
words used in it their natural and ordinary meaning, it may not interpret 
the words by seeking to give them some other meaning. In the present 
case the Court finds no difficulty in ascertaining the natural and ordi-
nary meaning of the words in question and no difficulty in giving effect to 
them. Some of the written statements submitted to the Court have invited 
it to investigate the travaux préparatoires of the Charter. Having regard, 
however, to the considerations above stated, the Court is of the opinion 
that it is not permissible, in this case, to resort to travaux préparatoires.134
Article 32 lists travaux préparatoires as a supplementary source of interpreta-
tion, to be used when the meaning of the text is ambiguous or obscure, or 
132   S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 6 (Sept. 7).
133   Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 
I.C.J. Rep. 8 (Advisory Opinion).
134   Id. We note that in the Fisheries Case, the I.C.J. held that because of the non-participation 
of one of the parties, it would “undertake a brief review of the negotiations that led up to 
[the provision in question]”. However, the circumstances in that case were clearly distin-
guishable because it concerned the interpretation of a compromissory clause set out in 
an exchange of notes between two States, one of which was not present. Fisheries, supra 
note 38, at 11.
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where applying Article 31 would lead to a manifestly unreasonable result.135 
Article 32 provides that travaux préparatoires may also be relied upon “in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31.”
The Tribunal incorrectly relied on Article 32 by stating that that “recourse 
may be had to preparatory work of the treaty to confirm its meaning”,136 
without adding that this can only be done in order to “confirm any meaning 
resulting from the application of Article 31”. This is confirmed by the pre-VCLT 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.137
The Tribunal proceeded to adopt a different approach, determining that, 
alongside the text, context and object and purpose of UNCLOS under Article 31, 
it would consider the travaux préparatoires under Article 32, as if both were of 
equal legal weight.138
The Tribunal’s approach to the interpretation of Article 121, and partial reli-
ance upon the travaux préparatoires of UNCLOS in particular, was thus, in our 
view, inconsistent with the rules of interpretation of treaties is contained in 
the VCLT.
Of additional note, Article 33 of the VCLT provides that “[w]hen a treaty 
has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authori-
tative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, 
in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail”. UNCLOS, Article 320 
declares the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts to be 
equally authentic.
As pointed out by one commentary, the Tribunal failed to make any refer-
ence to the non-English language versions of UNCLOS, each of which is equally 
135   See, e.g., Ris, Martin, Treaty Interpretation and I.C.J. Recourse to Travaux Prepara toires: 
Towards a Proposed Amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, 14(1) BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW, 
118, 130–31 (1991).
136   Award, supra note 1, at para. 476.
137   See, for example, the Employment of Women During the Night Case (1932), PCIJ, Series 
A/B, No. 50, p. 380, where the Court found that “The preparatory work thus confirms 
the conclusion reached on a study of the text of the Convention [of Berne] that there is 
no good reason for interpreting Article 3 otherwise than in accordance with the natural 
meaning of the words”. Similarly, the I.C.J. found that “the history of the Article [28(a) 
of the Convention for Establishment of Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organisation] and the debate which took place upon the drafts of the same (…) confirms 
the principle [derived from the text]”, the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee 
of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 150 (June 8) 
(Advisory Opinion) at 161.
138   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 476–77.
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authoritative.139 UNCLOS does not accord priority to any one language version. 
As that commentator points out, it is often the case that “the precise meaning 
of a term in a multilingual text can only be established if the meaning of the 
term in all authentic languages is established.”140
The Tribunal therefore erred in not making any reference to the other lan-
guage versions of Article 121 in its interpretative exercise, notwithstanding the 
nuances of the English language text. Where relevant, this memorandum indi-
cates other language texts that may cast doubt on the Tribunal’s interpretation 
of Article 121.141
3.1.1.3 The Tribunal’s Interpretation of the Ordinary Meaning of  
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS
The Tribunal addressed six separate textual elements of Article 121(3), includ-
ing (a) “rocks”; (b) “cannot”; (c) “sustain”; (d) “human habitation”; (e) “or”; and 
(f) “economic life of their own”.142 This memorandum therefore addresses each 
in turn.
3.1.1.3.1 “Rocks”
As regards “rocks”, the Tribunal concludes, correctly in our view, that the 
term does not impose fixed geological or geomorphological limitations so 
as to require a feature to be composed of solid rock or otherwise to be of a 
rock-like nature.143 However, the Tribunal does not give any indication of why 
Article 121(3) adopts the term “rocks”, in contrast to the reference elsewhere in 
139   Gerhard Hafner, Some Remarks on the South China Sea Award: Itu Aba Versus Clipperton, 
34 Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 1, 5–6 
(2016).
140   Id.
141   French: “Les rochers qui ne se prêtent pas á l’habitation humaine ou á une vie économique 
propre n’ont pas de zone économique exclusive ni de plateau continental.” [Literal trans-
lation: Rocks which do not lend themselves to human habitation or an economic life of their 
own do not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.]; Spanish: “Las rocas 
no aptas para mantener habitación humana o vida económica propia no tendrán zona 
económica exclusiva ni plataforma continental.” [Literal translation: The rocks which 
are not suitable to maintain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.]; Russian: Скалы, которые не пригодны для 
поддержания жизни человека или для самостоятельной хозяйственной деятель-
ности, не имеют ни исключительной экономической зоны, ни континентального 
шельфа.” [Literal translation: Rocks which are not suitable for sustaining human life or for 
independent economic activities shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.]
142   Award, supra note 1, at para. 478.
143   Id. at paras. 479–82, 540.
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the provision to “islands”. Rather, the Tribunal proceed on the basis that there 
is no meaningful distinction between the two terms.
This is highly questionable as a matter of interpretation. The distinction 
between “rocks” and “islands” is repeated across all six original language ver-
sions of the Convention. While there are no records of the discussions of the 
“informal consultative group” which came up with the “rocks” wording in 
Article 121 (3),144 there is surely a reason why Article 121(3) refers to “Rocks 
which cannot sustain …” rather than “Islands which cannot sustain …”.
However, the Tribunal did not consider this question. It simply observed 
in the Award that “repeated attempts during [the negotiation of UNCLOS] to 
define or categorise islands or rocks by reference to size were all rejected”.145 
While this may be true, this does not mean that the drafters of, and States 
Parties to, UNCLOS considered that there was no object of difference between 
“rocks” and “islands”.
On the contrary, extensive evidence exists that the drafters and States 
Parties acknowledged that there must be a distinction between “rocks” and 
“islands”, albeit perhaps more nuanced than a distinction based solely on size.
During the deliberations of the topic “regime of islands” in the Second 
Committee of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
States clearly distinguished between “islands”, “islets”, “rocks”, and “low-tide 
elevations”. In a draft article on the regime of islands proposed by 15 African 
States in August 1974, a “rock” was defined as “a naturally formed rocky eleva-
tion of ground”, while an island or an islet was defined as a “naturally formed 
area of land.”146 Similarly, an informal proposal submitted by Ireland on behalf 
of nine States defined a “rock” as “a naturally formed rocky elevation normally 
unfit for human habitation.”147 This proposal was submitted on 25 April 1975 to 
the Second Committee’s informal working group on the regime of islands. This 
144   Id. at para. 531.
145   Id. at para. 538.
146   See UNCLOS III, Algeria, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Zambia: draft articles 
on the regime of islands, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.62/Rev.1, 27 August 1974, Official 
Records of the Third United Nations Conference on The Law of the Sea, 
Vol. III, 232–33.
147   Renate Platzöder (ed.), Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea: Documents, Vol. IV, 221–22 (1983). For the history of this proposal, see Mahon 
Hayes, The Law of the Sea: The Role of the Irish Delegation at the Third 
UN Conference, 61–63 (2011). See also Romania’s argument in Maritime Delimitation 
in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. Rep. (Feb. 3) (Judgment), at para. 180, that 
“Serpents’ Island qualifies as a ‘rock’ because: it is a rocky formation in the geomorpho-
logic sense.”
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widely overlooked proposal clearly distinguished between “islets and islands” 
on the one hand and “rocks” on the other.148
This proposal was strongly opposed by States with offshore islands, in par-
ticular the Pacific Ocean small island States and New Zealand which argued 
that there was no logical reason to distinguish between sovereign rights apper-
taining to islands and sovereign rights appertaining to other land territory. In 
addition, they argued that all islands comprising the State must be treated 
alike and should have the same ocean space as other territories.149
In a paper entitled “Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances” that had 
been widely circulated at the 1973 Geneva session of the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond 
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Robert D. Hodgson, the Geographer of the 
U.S. State Department, suggested a categorization of islands by size. Hodgson 
distinguished between “(1) rocks, less than .001 square mile [0,0025 km2] in 
area; (2) islets, between .001 and 1 square mile [2,589 km2]; (3) isles, greater 
than 1 square mile but not more than 1,000 square miles [2,589.99 km2]; and 
(4) islands, larger than 1,000 square miles.”150 The Soviet Union in June 1975 
defined “small islets” as less than 0.1 km2 and “rocks” as less than 0.01 km2. In 
exchanges with the United States Government, the Russian Government took 
the position that islets or rocks below 0.1 km2 of land area should generate no 
continental shelf or economic zone. The prime example of a high-tide feature 
that would fall under Article 121(3) UNCLOS mentioned during the negotia-
tions was the United Kingdom’s “Rockall” – a tiny geological rock in the North 
Atlantic Ocean with a size of 0.000624 km2.151
148   Platzöder (ed.), supra note 147, at 222. For example, Article IV provided: “1. Islets or islands 
without economic life and unable to sustain a permanent population shall have no 
marine space of their own. 2. Rocks and low-tide elevations shall have no marine space or 
their own.”
149   UNCLOS III, Second Committee, 39th Meeting, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.39, 14 August 
1974, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, Vol. II, 282, at para. 37 (Tonga).
150   Robert D. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances, in John King Gamble 
Jr. and Giulio Pontecorvo (eds.), Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the 
Oceans, Proceedings Law of the Sea Institute Eighth Annual Conference, June 18–21, 
1973, 137, 150–51.
151   See, for example, Law of the Sea Conference: The Overall Prospects, Memorandum by the 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [January 1975], British National 
Archives, CAB 148/149/14, Law of the Sea Conference: Report on Third Session, 
Geneva, March – May 1975.
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The drafting history, therefore, clearly shows that States considered the 
term “rocks” not to include “islets”, let alone larger islands.152 Professor Talmon 
concludes that “[t]he drafters of Article 121(3) UNCLOS considered geology and 
size determinative of the status of high-tide features”.153
Academics also widely conclude that there must be a difference between 
“rocks” and “islands” for the purposes of Article 121. For example, Professor 
Alex Oude Elferink, who is a leading Dutch law of the sea academic and coun-
sel, (in his JCLOS blog) interprets the term as imposing some size limitation on 
the features encompassed by Article 121(3).154
Professor Talmon presents a different, more nuanced, assessment. He 
observes that the Tribunal effectively “gave up the distinction between rocks 
and islands.”155 He continues:
The distinction in Article 121(3) UNCLOS is […] not between islands that 
can sustain human habitation or economic life of their own and those 
that cannot, as held by the Arbitral Tribunal, but between rocks that can 
or cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own and 
all other islands, irrespective of their capacity for human habitation or 
economic life of their own. This means that there are three categories 
of islands:
(1) rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of 
their own;
(2) rocks that can sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own; and
(3) all other islands.
Only the first category does not generate an EEZ or continental shelf.156
Therefore, Professor Talmon concludes that the decisive question under 
Article 121(3) is not whether a feature qualifies as a “rock”. However, an assess-
ment of whether or not a particular feature is a “rock” is a critical first part 
of the application of that provision because, if a feature is not a “rock but 
an “island”, Article 121(3) cannot apply. As he puts it, if a feature cannot be 
152   Talmon, supra note 33, at 80.
153   Id.
154   Alex G. Oude Elferink, The South China Sea Arbitration’s Interpretation of Article 121(3) of 
the LOSC: A Disquieting First, BLOG OF THE K.G. JEBSEN CENTRE FOR THE LAW OF THE 
SEA (September 2016), 2–4.
155   Talmon, supra note 33, at 76.
156   Id. at 81.
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considered a rock due to its geomorphology and size, “the follow up questions 
of its capacity to sustain human habitation or economic live of its own do not 
even arise”.157
Conversely, Professor Soons, one of the arbitrators on the Tribunal in the 
South China Sea arbitration, suggests in an article co-authored in 1990 with 
Barbara Kwiatowska that:
it would have been more appropriate if that paragraph [Article 121(3)] 
had simply referred to ‘islands’ and not ‘rocks’. As the term ‘rocks’ should 
be construed as not implying any specific geological features, the essen-
tial element of the definition is […] that it covers only rocks (islands) 
‘which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.158
Professor Sean Murphy concludes (correctly, in our view) that:
in asserting that the term “rock” conveys no geological or geomorpho-
logical meaning, and further that it conveys no meaning as to size, the 
tribunal seems to ascribe no significance whatsoever to the use of 
the word “rock” rather than “island” in paragraph 3. Given that the tribu-
nal saw considerable significance in the precise wording of Article 121 in 
various other respects, the lack of attention to why the word “rock” was 
used in paragraph 3 is striking.159
In conclusion, the Tribunal’s assimilation of the terms “islands” and “rocks” 
for the purposes of its interpretation of Article 121 is subject to serious doubt. 
As well as ignoring the adoption of markedly different language in the text of 
the provision, it is also undermined by the negotiating records of the Third 
UNCLOS Conference, which demonstrate a widespread appreciation that the 
terms “rocks” and “islands” mean different things.160 It is an accepted inter-
pretative principle that the use of different terms in the same treaty provision 
indicate that they mean different things. As Oppenheim notes, “the use of simi-
lar but different terms, or a change in terminology from an earlier text, may be 
presumed to involve dissimilar meanings”.161
157   Id.
158   Kwiatowska and Soons, supra note 8, at 153.
159   Sean D. Murphy, International Law Relating to Islands 94–95 (2017).
160   In this context, reference to the travaux préparatoires would have been entirely proper, as 
confirming the ordinary meaning of terms the purposes of Article 32 of the VCLT.
161   See Jennings and Watts, supra note 131, at 1273, n. 12 (citing Certain Expenses of the UN, 
1962 I.C.J. Rep. at 159). See also Simon v. Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1961 
I.L.R. 32 at 124.
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Moreover, the distinction between “rocks” and “islands” is recognised in 
State practice. Consequently, a number of remote, uninhabitable but com-
paratively large island features around the world are universally recognised as 
generating EEZ rights under Article 121(2) of the UNCLOS. For example, Jan 
Mayen (Norway) Kiritimati (or Christmas Island, which is part of Kiribati) and 
Clipperton Island (France) are all comparatively large features lacking many 
of the “principal factors” (such as potable water) that the Tribunal identified as 
contributing “to the natural capacity of a feature” the purposes of Article 121(3). 
Nevertheless, all of those features are widely recognised as generating EEZ 
rights under Article 121(2) and are thus not considered to constitute “rocks” 
under Article 121(3). The most obvious reason for this is that the features are 
not “rocks” at all, with the result that Article 121(3) cannot apply.
This is the first respect in which the Tribunal’s approach arguably contra-
dicts the basic rules of treaty interpretation under the VCLT. Had the Tribunal 
considered, for example, its size and geology or geomorphology as part of a dis-
tinction between “rocks” and other “islands”, it could have concluded that Itu 
Aba is not just a “rock”, such that it falls outside Article 121(3). Notably, Itu Aba 
is substantially larger than any of the features that are universally recognised 
as “rocks” for purposes of Article 121(3). Furthermore, from a geological or 
geomorphological perspective, it is clear that Itu Aba is not the type of “rocky 
elevation” referenced by a number of States during the negotiation of Part VIII 
of UNCLOS in the context of the “regime of islands”.
3.1.1.3.2 “Cannot”
As regards “cannot”, the Tribunal concluded, correctly in our view, that the 
word “indicates a concept of capacity”, being concerned with “whether, 
objectively, the feature is apt, able to, or lends itself to human habitation or 
economic life”, and that “historical evidence of human habitation and eco-
nomic life in the past may be relevant for establishing a feature’s capacity”.162 
The Tribunal emphasised that this is an “objective criterion”.163 This interpreta-
tion is also consistent with the remaining five authoritative language versions 
of Article 121(3).164
162   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 483–84, 541.
163   Id. at para. 545. Professor Sean Murphy concurs that the words “cannot sustain” “appear to 
speak to the objective ability of the feature to sustain human habitation or economic life, 
rather than whether the feature is actually doing so at any given time”. See Murphy, supra 
note 159, at 79.
164   French: the French version states “Les rochers qui ne se prêtent pas à …”, which translates 
as “rocks which do not lend themselves to human habitation”. This is consistent with the 
Tribunal’s interpretation of lack of capacity; Spanish: The Spanish version is consistent 
with the Tribunal’s interpretation of the term “cannot” as an objective criterion in its 
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However, when it came to applying the “capacity” criterion to the fea-
tures in the South China Sea, the Tribunal arguably contradicted its finding 
that the word “cannot” relates only to an objective concept of “capacity”. This 
is discussed below in connection with the Tribunal’s interpretation of the 
word “sustain”.
3.1.1.3.3 “Sustain”
As regards “sustain”, with reference to the Oxford English Dictionary the 
Tribunal identified three components: (i) “the concept of the support and pro-
vision of essentials”; (ii) a “temporal concept”, entailing support and provision 
that is not one-off or short-lived; and (iii) a “qualitative concept”, entailing at 
least a minimal “proper standard”.165
Of these, components (i) and (ii) are relatively uncontentious. However, 
component (iii), which introduces a “qualitative” element of sustainability, 
imposes a substantial additional threshold that results in more substantial 
island features being treated as “rocks” under Article 121(3).
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term “sustain” is defined, 
inter alia, as “[s]trengthen or support physically or mentally”, “[c]ause to con-
tinue for an extended period or without interruption” and “[u]phold, affirm, 
or confirm the justice or validity of”. The definition in itself does not gener-
ally include any “qualitative” element. On the contrary, used in connection 
with sustaining a person, the Oxford English Dictionary provides that sustain 
means to “maintain […] in life and health; to provide with food, drink and 
other substances necessary for remaining alive; to feed, to keep.”166 Nothing 
here implies that sustainability requires the attainment of any particular sub-
jective “standard” of human habitation, beyond that necessary to maintain life 
and basic health.
Moreover, the question of whether support and provision reaches a “proper 
standard” is inherently subjective and, given the major advances in global liv-
ing standards since 1982, liable to the imposition of higher thresholds today 
than at the time of negotiation of UNCLOS. This is difficult to reconcile with 
the Tribunal’s (correct) observation elsewhere that the term “cannot” in 
connection with “sustain”. The word “no” is linked to “aptas”, i.e. “no aptas”, whereas in 
English is only “cannot”. However, both sentences structures, “cannot” and “no aptas” are 
consistent as indicating an objective lack of capacity.
165   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 485–87.
166   The Oxford English Dictionary, definition of “sustain”, on the oxford dictionary website at: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sustain.
195A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
Article 121(3) relates to the “objective capacity of the feature to sustain human 
habitation or economic life”.167
Notably, a number of the other official language versions of Article 121(3) 
undermine the Tribunal’s conclusion of a “qualitative” aspect as part of its 
interpretation.168
The “qualitative” aspect of the Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 121(3), 
combined with the requirement for the sustainability of a “stable community” 
referred to below, was determinative of the Tribunal’s conclusion on the sta-
tus of a number of the larger features, most obviously Itu Aba.169 However, 
that “qualitative” component arguably imposes a threshold to the attainment 
of fully-fledged “island” status that is unwarranted by the text, context and 
object and purpose of UNCLOS. Further, the “qualitative” component is dif-
ficult to reconcile with the Tribunal’s conclusion that the concept of “human 
habitation” might be met with respect to “a few individuals” in remote atolls 
(of which the Spratly Islands are clear examples), and by “periodic or habitual 
residence” (of which there is a long record in Itu Aba, particularly by fishing 
communities prior to UNCLOS).170
3.1.1.3.4 “Human Habitation”
As regards “human habitation”, the Tribunal again started its interpretation 
with reference to the Oxford English Dictionary. However, it then intro-
duced an additional, subjective element to the term, deciding that “the use in 
Article 121(3) of the term “habitation” includes a qualitative element”.171 The 
Tribunal stated that such an element “implies a non-transient presence 
167   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 504(b), 545.
168   French: according to the online Larousse dictionary “se prêter à” means, inter alia, “being 
suitable for an activity, being appropriate”. Spanish: According to the “Dictionary of La 
Real Academia de la Lengua Espanola”, the term, “mantener” (in English “maintain”) has, 
inter alia, the following definitions: “to provide someone with the necessary food”; “to 
assume someone’s financial needs”; “to keep something in its existence, to give it endur-
ance and permanence”. Thus, the French and Spanish versions do not seem to include 
any qualitative concept inherent to “sustain” (or “maintain” – which is the term used in 
Spanish). Rather, “maintain/sustain” relate more to a period of time (permanency) than 
a quality standard. Russian: According to the Official Dictionary of Russian language 
(available on the website “Gramota. Ru”), the term “поддержать” (in English “sustain” 
or “maintain”) is defined as, inter alia, “to save the existence of smth” (e.g. “the existence 
of rare animals”) or “keep [smth] in proper form, condition”. Again, this does not imply a 
separate quantitative element.
169   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 618–22.
170   Id. at para. 542.
171   Id. at para. 489.
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of persons who have chosen to stay and reside on the feature in a settled 
manner”.172 Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the term “habitation” 
should also imply “habitation of the feature by a group or community of per-
sons”, in a “stable community” that “can fairly be said to constitute the natural 
population of the feature”.173
Again, there is no textual basis in Article 121 for these “qualitative” elevations 
of the threshold for attainment of fully-fledged island status. While aspects of 
the Tribunal’s findings are not unreasonable (for example, its observation that 
a community of persons “need not necessarily be large, and in remote atolls a 
few individuals or family groups could well suffice”),174 the insertion of addi-
tional requirement of “stable communities” and “natural populations” will 
inevitably lead to the classification of more substantial features as “rocks” for 
the purposes of Article 121(3). Indeed, if, as explained above, the term “rocks” 
in Article 121(3) must have its own meaning with reference to criteria such as 
geomorphology and size, then it may be difficult to conceive of a “rock” that 
could sustain a “stable community” or “natural population” up to the “qualita-
tive” standards imposed by the Tribunal’s interpretation.
A commentator observed that:
… it is not clear what the legal basis is for requiring “a group or commu-
nity of persons” to establish habitation, as one simply cannot infer any 
such requirement from the text of Article 121. […] If clearly one person 
does not make a group or community, will two or a few more do? Thus, it 
should be possible that even two persons can form such a “group or com-
munity of persons over sustained periods of time.175
The Tribunal’s inclusion of a “qualitative” element in relation to each of the 
concepts of sustainability and human habitation deflects from the important 
fact that, as the Tribunal found elsewhere, Article 121(3) is concerned with the 
objective “capacity” of a feature to sustain human habitation. This should not 
require the actual existence of human “communities” or “populations”, nor 
even the capacity to sustain substantial groups of people over long periods. 
The imposition of “qualitative” elements into its interpretation brought with it 
inherently subjective criteria that undermine the application of Article 121(3) 
172   Id.
173   Id. at paras. 491, 542.
174   Id. at para. 542.
175   Jiangyu Wang, Legitimacy, Jurisdiction and Merits in the South China Sea Arbitration: 
Chinese Perspective and International Law, 22(2) Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 185, 205 (2017).
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to small features that do not display permanent populations. Certainly, this 
was not the intention of the drafters of the Convention.
Moreover, similarly to the qualitative element read in by the Tribunal to the 
term “sustain”, the Tribunal’s reading of an additional “qualitative element” 
into the term “human habitation” is not supported by a number of the other 
official language versions of UNCLOS.176
3.1.1.3.5 “Or”
As regards “or”, the Tribunal disagreed with the Philippines’ argument that a 
capacity to sustain both human habitation and economic life are required in 
order for a feature to be a fully-fledged island, entitled to an EEZ and conti-
nental shelf. Instead, the Tribunal concluded that “if a feature is capable of 
sustaining either human habitation or an economic life of its own, it will qual-
ify as a fully entitled island”.177 We agree with this conclusion.
As Professor Elferink observes:
The word “or” between “human habitation” and “economic life of their 
own” implies that these requirements do not have to be met at the 
same time.178
The drafting history of Article 121(3) further indicates that the require-
ments of human habitation and economic life were introduced as separate 
requirements.179
176   French: “Les rochers qui ne se prêtent pas á l’habitation humaine ou á une vie économique 
propre n’ont pas de zone économique exclusive ni de plateau continental.” [Literal trans-
lation: Rocks which do not lend themselves to human habitation or an economic life of their 
own do not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.]; Spanish: “Las rocas 
no aptas para mantener habitación humana o vida económica propia no tendrán zona 
económica exclusiva ni plataforma continental.” [Literal translation: The rocks which 
are not suitable to maintain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.]; Russian: Скалы, которые не пригодны для 
поддержания жизни человека или для самостоятельной хозяйственной деятель-
ности, не имеют ни исключительной экономической зоны, ни континентального 
шельфа.” [Literal translation: Rocks which are not suitable for sustaining human life or 
for independent economic activities shall have no exclusive economic zone or a continental 
shelf.]
177   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 494–97, 544.
178   Elferink, supra note 154, at 5–6.
179   See United Nations, Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Law of the 
Sea: Régime Of Islands: Legislative History of Part VIII (Article 121) of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 60–70 (1988).
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Notably, the Tribunal also observed that island features may have capacity 
to sustain only human habitation or economic life, but not both, including in 
cases “where multiple islands are used in concert to sustain a traditional way 
of life”.180 The Tribunal was “conscious that remote island populations often 
make use of a number of islands, sometimes spread over a significant distance, 
for sustenance and livelihoods”.181 A commentator observed that:
… in practical terms the conditions will in fact be conjunctive. Nonethe-
less, the Award also details a possible exception in the case of populations 
sustaining themselves through a network of related maritime features.182
The Tribunal’s findings in this respect may be particularly pertinent as 
regards the Spratly Islands, depending on the extent of evidence of any “tradi-
tional way of life” or pattern of sustenance across the islands by fisherfolk or 
otherwise in the past. Certainly, elsewhere in the Award, the Tribunal recog-
nised the periodic inhabitation of the islands through history by Chinese and 
other fishing communities.183 However, as a result of the “qualitative” criteria 
mentioned above, the Tribunal did not consider such periods of inhabitation 
of the islands sufficient to retain the threshold for fully-fledged island status 
on the Article 121.
3.1.1.3.6 “Economic Life of Their Own”
As regards “economic life of their own”, the Tribunal concluded that the phrase 
“presupposes ongoing economic activity”, and “makes clear that the feature 
itself (or group of related features) must have the ability to support an inde-
pendent economic life, without relying predominantly on the infusion of 
outside resources or serving purely as an object for extractive activities”.
Charney strongly disagrees with this interpretation. Many years prior to the 
Award, he contended that the condition of “economic life” should be satisfied 
as long as a resource is exploited over “some period of time” and generates 
sufficient revenues to support all equipment and personnel.184 There is some 
force to this interpretation, particularly since the requirement of “economic 
180   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 497, 544.
181   Id. at para. 547.
182   Lachlan McDermott, Philippines v. China – Rocks or Islands under International Law?, 36(1) 
University of Tasmania Law Review 36, 57 (2017).
183   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 618–19.
184   Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93(4) American 
Journal of International Law 863, 870 (1999).
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life” must be interpreted disjunctively from the separate requirement of 
“human habitation” under Article 121(3).
Other commentators (e.g. Barbara Kwiatkowska, Alfred Soons, Oude 
Elferink and Jonathan Hafetz) have suggested that ‘economic life’ should be 
equated to ‘economic value’.185 It has been observed that such an approach 
would mean that the requirement could be met with the mere presence of a 
lighthouse or economic viable maritime conservation areas.186
Along these lines, Professor Soons (one of the arbitrators in the South China 
Sea case) explained in a 1990 publication:
[w]hile in the past the idea that a radio or weather observation post qual-
ified a rock as an island has been rejected, such a test seems at present 
to be acceptable. An increasing number of authors recognize that, for 
instance, a lighthouse or other aid to navigation built on an island (rock) 
gives a rock an economic life of its own in its value to shipping, ocean 
sports and so forth. If economic life need not be a commercial nature, 
why should rocks large enough to support a shelter (like Minerva Reefs), 
or used for guano harvesting (like Aves and Clipperton in the past), or 
rocks from which birds’ eggs and turtles are collected not be considered 
as capable of sustaining economic life?187
Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that “distant fishermen exploiting the 
territorial sea surrounding a small rock and making no use of the feature itself 
[…] would not suffice to give the feature an economic life of its own”.188
Certain elements of the Tribunal’s conclusions as regards the meaning of 
“economic life of their own” in Article 121(3) are not open to substantial doubt. 
For example, its observation that the term implies “the ability to support an 
independent economic life” appears reasonable. However, as explained below, 
the Tribunal’s subsequent application of these conclusions to the facts and 
185   See Kwiatowska and Soons, supra note 8, at 167–168; Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Islands 
in the South China Sea: How Does Their Presence Limit the Extent of the High Seas and 
the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland Coast?, 32(2) Ocean Development 
& International Law 169, 174 (2001); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the 
Marine Environment and Economic Development: Article 121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea 
Convention, 15(3) American University International Law Review 584, 623–627 
(2000).
186   McDermott, supra note 182, at 54–55.
187   Kwiatowska and Soons, supra note 8, at 167–68.
188   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 498–503.
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evidence before it related to, in particular, Itu Aba, which has a long history of 
sustaining different economic activities, is highly questionable.
3.1.1.4 The Tribunal’s Assessment of Context, Object and Purpose under 
Article 31 of the VCLT
The Tribunal proceeded to consider the context of Article 121(3) and the object 
and purpose of the Convention at paragraphs 507–520 of the Award.
As an overarching point of context, the Tribunal’s approach to the interpre-
tation of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS ignored the context of that provision as a 
whole within Article 121. In particular, the Tribunal ignored the fact that the 
treatment of “rocks” under Article 121(3) is an exception to the general rule at 
Article 121(2) that islands generate full EEZ and continental shelf entitlements. 
As Professor Sean Murphy has observed:
[Articles 121(2) and (3)] were a compromise between those States who 
wished all islands to generate the full range of maritime zones and those 
States who wished to limit the ability of islands to do so. The compro-
mise was to allow islands normally to generate the full range of maritime 
zones, but not in situations where the island is nothing more than a para-
graph 3 “rock”.189
Professor Myron Norquist, who was Secretary of the US Delegation to the 
UNCLOS III Conference when Article 121 was drafted, similarly observes 
that Article 121(3) “was drafted as an exception to the first two paragraphs 
of Article 121”.190 He observes, correctly in our view, that exceptions to gen-
eral rules are generally construed strictly as a matter of treaty interpretation, 
particularly where such exceptions are explicit (as here, given the wording of 
Article 121(2)) and where the exception at Article 121(3) has the effect of curtail-
ing the EEZ entitlement of islands under the general rule. Professor Norquist 
concedes that “in cases of doubt, “rocks” should be presumed to be “islands” 
granted full maritime entitlement as land territory”.191
By contrast, in focusing its analysis on whether Itu Aba and other features 
can “sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” for the purposes 
of Article 121(3), the Tribunal effectively reversed the burden of proof under 
189   Murphy, supra note 159, at 76.
190   Myron H. Nordquist, UNCLOS Article 121 and Itu Aba in the South China Sea Final Award: 
a correct interpretation? in S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh, Robert Beckman, Tara Davenport & 
Hao D. Phan (ed.), The South China Sea Arbitration: The Legal Dimension 185 
(2018).
191   Id.
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Article 121. This is because it assumed that, if the evidence did not positively 
prove the features’ ability to “sustain human habitation or economic life of 
their own”, those features must be treated as “rocks”. As Professor Murphy 
continues:
The tribunal’s approach in deciding the case almost seems to impose a 
burden of proving that an island does not fall within Article 121, para- 
graph 3, rather than the other way around. Such a burden seems incon-
sistent with the structure of Article 121, which presents paragraph 3 as 
an exception to a general rule that all islands are entitled to full mari- 
time zones.192
The Tribunal concluded that “a rock cannot be transformed into a fully entitled 
island through land reclamation”.193 This conclusion follows from the text of 
Article 121(1), which requires any island to be a “naturally formed area of land”.
The Tribunal also correctly described the purpose of the EEZ as being “to 
extend the jurisdiction of States over the waters adjacent to their coasts and 
to preserve the resources of those waters for the benefit of the population of 
the coastal State”.194
However, in a highly questionable passage, the Tribunal commented that 
Article 121(3) “serves to disable tiny features from unfairly and inequitably 
generating enormous entitlements to maritime space that would serve not to 
benefit the local population, but to award a windfall to the (potentially distant) 
State to have maintained a claim to such a feature”.195 Again, there is nothing in 
the text, object or purpose of UNCLOS to support such a broad-ranging politi-
cal assertion.
Moreover, such an approach would have broad-ranging implications, cast-
ing into serious doubt the EEZ and continental shelf claims made by a number 
of “distant” States around “tiny features”.196 For example, France claims an EEZ 
around Tromelin, an island in the Indian Ocean more than 8,000 km from 
192   Murphy, supra note 159, at 94.
193   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 508–10. Professor Nordquist has expressed a different view 
on this point, to the effect that the Tribunal “erred” by requiring that the capacity of an 
island feature to sustain human habitation or economic life should be based upon the 
feature’s “natural form”. Nordquist, supra note 190, at 177–90.
194   Award, supra note 1, at para. 513.
195   Id. at para. 516.
196   For examples of such features, see Table 1, ‘Features fully entitled under Article 121(2)’, and 
Table 2, ‘Features unilaterally entitled under Article 121(2)’, in Annex 1 to this Critique.
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the mainland with an area of 0.8 km2.197 Venezuela claims an EEZ around the 
much smaller feature of Isla Aves in the Caribbean Sea, which claim has been 
accepted by a number of States in delimitation agreements.198 Isla Aves has 
a land area of just 0.032 km2 and is generally uninhabited, other than a small 
scientific station and naval contingent.199
The Tribunal’s approach also ignores the separate question of the reduced 
weight that is often given to small island features in EEZ and continental shelf 
delimitation with continental States. The jurisprudence of the ICJ and arbitral 
tribunals consistently holds that very small island features may be accorded 
limited or no effect in EEZ or continental shelf delimitation, in order to avoid 
such features having a disproportionate effect in the delimitation.200 For exam-
ple, in Newfoundland v. Nova Scotia, the tribunal gave half effect to Sable Island 
out to its 200nm limit, “[h]aving regard to its remote location and the very 
substantial disproportionate effect this small, unpopulated island would have 
on the delimitation if it were given full effect”.201
The Tribunal then strayed into another highly questionable analysis, with 
reference to the remarks of a representative of Peru in the Seabed Committee, 
to the effect that EEZ rights should not be applied “to more or less uninhab-
ited islands, since its main justification lay not in the existence of a territory 
but in the presence of the population which inhabited it, whose needs should 
be satisfied through the use of the resources available in its environs”.202 As a 
result, the Tribunal concluded that “taken together with notions of settlement 
and residence and the qualitative aspect inherent in the term habitation, it 
197   See, e.g., Decree No. 78-146, 11 February 1978, Official Journal of the French 
Republic; and Decree No. 2007-1254, 21 August 2007, Official Journal of the 
French Republic, the United Nations, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATION 
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/fra_mzn74_2009.pdf.
198   See, e.g., the United States-Venezuela Agreement (1978), the Netherlands (Antilles)- 
Venezuela Agreement (1978) and the Venezuela-France Agreement (1980).
199   See, e.g., Global Security Note on Aves Island, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.global 
security.org/military/world/caribbean/aves.htm. See also, Hafner, supra note 139, at 8–9.
200   See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13 (June 3) (Judgment) at 
para. 64; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions, supra note 17, at 104, para. 219; 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 659 (Oct. 8) (Judgment) at para. 302; and Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea, supra note 147, at para. 185.
201   Arbitration between Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia concerning Portions 
of the Limits of their Offshore Areas, Award of the ad Hoc Tribunal in the second phase, 
26 March 2002, at para. 5.13. See also Section 3.b below, which identifies other State prac-
tice that undermines the Tribunal’s approach.
202   Award, supra note 1, at para. 518.
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should be understood to refer to the habitation of a feature by a settled group 
or community for whom the feature is a home”.203 In doing so, the Tribunal 
again ignored the critical fact that Article 121(3) is concerned with the objec-
tive “capacity” of a feature to sustain human habitation or economic life, 
not the question of whether a feature is in fact inhabited, and whether or not 
there is in fact a group or community that calls the feature “home”. Still less 
is there any prohibition against “more or less uninhabited islands” generating 
EEZ and continental shelf rights.
For example, the remote Norwegian island of Jan Mayen, which is a sci-
entific outpost that has never had any permanent population, was accepted 
by Denmark and the ICJ in the Jan Mayen case as constituting an island that 
generates substantial EEZ and continental shelf rights for Norway.204 This is 
despite the fact that the feature is located in the Arctic Circle, in an isolated 
location. Indeed, in its Memorial in that case, Denmark described the feature 
as a desolate island without natural resources of any significance, referring to 
the fact that mining and hunting had been attempted there but abandoned, 
and describing an attempt to build a harbour as a fishing base that had simi-
larly been abandoned. Other than its size (373 km²), it thus exhibits a number 
of features indicating less capacity than Itu Aba to sustain human habitation 
or economic life of its own.205 Nevertheless, at the hearing in the Jan Mayen 
case, Denmark accepted that Jan Mayen was not a rock but an island for the 
purposes of Article 121.206
As with its textual interpretation, in a number of respects the Tribunal’s 
assessment of context, object and purpose under Article 31 of the VCLT is 
therefore highly questionable. It had the inevitable effect of again raising 
the threshold to be met by any feature in order to be accorded fully-fledged 
203   Id. at paras. 518–20.
204   In its Judgment, the I.C.J. stated that “the attribution of maritime areas to the territory of 
a State, which, by its nature, is destined to be permanent, is a legal process based solely on 
the possession by the territory concerned of a coastline” and thus concluded that “there 
is no reason to consider either the limited nature of the population of Jan Mayen or 
socio-economic factors as circumstances to be taken into account”. Maritime Delimitation 
in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. Rep. 41 (June 14) 
(Judgment), at para. 80.
205   For example, in his Separate Opinion, Judge Schwebel observed that “the singular char-
acteristics of Jan Mayen Island may leave room for argument about whether it meets 
the standards of Article 121, but Denmark did not make that argument; it accepted that 
Jan Mayen Island is not a rock but an island”. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. Rep. 41 (June 14) (Separate Opinion of 
Judge Schwebel), at 126.
206   Id.
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island status under Article 121 of UNCLOS. Further, as observed by a num-
ber of commentators,207 it effectively reversed the burden of proof under 
Article 121(3) by imposing a presumption that a high-tide feature is a “rock” 
unless proven otherwise. As explained at Section III.B.(vi) and illustrated at 
Annex 1 below, the Tribunal’s approach would have a substantial impact on 
State practice and ICJ jurisprudence that accords EEZ and continental shelf 
entitlements to features that appear no more capable than Itu Aba of meeting 
the requirements of Article 121.
3.1.1.5 The Tribunal’s Assessment of the Travaux Préparatoires of 
UNCLOS under Article 32 of the VCLT
As explained above, the Tribunal moved on to consider the travaux prépara-
toires of UNCLOS, without indicating any legal basis for doing so as a 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT. The 
Tribunal simply stated that it considered that “further examination of the cir-
cumstances that led to the adoption of Article 121 is warranted for the light it 
sheds on the purpose of the provision itself”.208 This is not a valid reason for 
making reference to travaux préparatoires under the VCLT or customary inter-
national law.
The Tribunal’s lengthy discussion of travaux préparatoires in its interpre-
tation of Article 121(3), at paragraphs 521–538 of the Award, is all the more 
remarkable given its acknowledgement that there are no existing records 
around the preparation of the final text by an informal consultative group 
at the Third UN Conference in 1975. Even the Tribunal acknowledged that 
the travaux préparatoires are an “imperfect guide” to interpretation of 
Article 121(3).209 Even if it was legitimate for the Tribunal to refer to the travaux 
préparatoires, they were therefore of limited value as an interpretive tool.210
The Tribunal nevertheless drew a number of conclusions from the travaux 
préparatoires to confirm its restrictive textual interpretation of Article 121(3). In 
particular, it considered that the travaux préparatoires show that Article 121(3) 
was intended to prevent “encroachment on the international seabed reserved 
207   Murphy, supra note 159, at 94.
208   Award, supra note 1, at para. 521.
209   Id. at paras. 531, 534.
210   Jennings and Watts, supra note 131, at 1277, para. 633: “The value of preparatory work in 
shedding light on the meaning of a treaty will vary from case to case. Often the records of 
treaty negotiations are incomplete and do not adequately cover compromises arrived at 
during the final stages of a conference or those reached privately away from the negotiat-
ing table: the negotiating records inevitably relate to matters taking place before the final 
expression of the parties’ intentions has been made.”
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for the common heritage of mankind and of avoiding the inequitable distribu-
tion of maritime spaces under national jurisdiction”.211
Other aspects of the travaux préparatoires indicate caution against small, 
largely uninhabited islands in denied any EEZ or continental shelf rights, 
particularly where those features or their surrounding waters comprise an 
important part of the economy of populations permanently located elsewhere. 
For example, Micronesia is recorded as having stated:
Suggestions have also been made that uninhabited islands should not 
have a full economic zone. Almost all of our high islands, and almost all 
of our atolls, made up of low islands, are inhabited. But some islands are 
inhabited only part of the year, while others are used not as residences 
but for fishing or in some functional way other than for permanent habi-
tation. They are all the same as vital a part of our economy and livelihood 
as some islands that may have permanent dwellings on them, but may 
have little or no fish resources near them. We do not believe that the cri-
teria of inhabitation or size are practical or equitable.212
Moreover, the Article 121 classification of the Spratly Islands in the South China 
Sea, which is a semi-enclosed sea the vast majority of which falls within areas 
of national EEZ/continental shelf jurisdiction in any event, does not risk mate-
rial encroachment on deep sea-bed areas. Therefore, the concerns around 
protection of the “common heritage of mankind”, highlighted by the Tribunal 
with reference to the travaux préparatoires,213 are less pertinent in the South 
China Sea than they are in areas of ocean space.
As far as “inequitable distribution of maritime spaces” is concerned, that 
is a matter for delimitation rather than a factor in the interpretation of enti-
tlement under Article 121. After all, Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS provide for 
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf claims spe-
cifically in order to “achieve an equitable solution”. Matters of delimitation fell 
squarely outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s interpretation 
and application of Article 121(3) so as to “avoid inequitable distribution of 
maritime spaces under national jurisdiction”, and thus to deprive the Spratly 
211   Award, supra note 1, at para. 535.
212   Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Committee of the Congress of Micronesia submit-
ted on behalf of the Congress by the United States of America, Official Records of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.6 (27 August 
1974), the United Nations, http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1973_los/docs/
english/vol_3/a_conf62_l6.pdf.
213   Award, supra note 1, at para. 536, n. 574.
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Islands from generating any maritime entitlements beyond 12 NM, had the 
effect of improperly circumventing China’s Article 298 declaration withdraw-
ing matters of delimitation from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. As explained at 
Section III.B.(vi), there are many examples around the world of small island 
features being accorded limited weight in delimitation beyond 12 NM, thereby 
avoiding any “inequitable distribution”. Indeed, the need to prevent a small 
island feature (Jan Mayen) from generating entitlements that would be “exces-
sive and inequitable” vis-à-vis a large neighbouring landmass (Greenland) was 
an explicit basis for the ICJ’s delimitation of a boundary closer to Greenland in 
the Jan Mayen case.214
Notably, in a 1990 publication, Professor Soons, one of the arbitrators in the 
Arbitration, observed the practical inseparability between the legal definition 
of “rocks” under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS and considerations of equity in mari-
time boundary delimitation.215
In conclusion, the Tribunal’s reference to the travaux préparatoires of 
Article 121 of UNCLOS and related materials was legally questionable, selec-
tive and contributed to the Tribunal’s restrictive interpretation that is difficult 
to reconcile with the ordinary meaning of the text. As such, the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of Article 121, and Article 121(3) in particular, is subject to seri-
ous doubt.
3.1.2 The Tribunal’s Conclusion as Regards the “Principal Factors” that 
Contribute to the Natural Capacity of a Feature for the Purposes of 
Article 121(3)
The Tribunal considered that the “principal factors that contribute to the 
natural capacity of a feature” include “the presence of water, food, and shel-
ter in sufficient quantities to enable a group of persons to live on the feature 
for an indeterminate period of time”. However, it observed that the relative 
contribution and importance of the various factors will vary from one fea-
ture to another. Accordingly, the Tribunal did not consider that “an abstract 
test of the objective requirements to sustain human habitation or economic 
life can or should be formulated”.216 We agree with these aspects of the 
Tribunal’s findings.
214   Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, supra note 204, at para. 87.
215   Kwiatowska and Soons, supra note 8, at 146, para. 1.5.
216   Award, supra note 1, at para. 546.
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The Tribunal concluded that “the most reliable evidence of the capacity of a 
feature will usually be the historical use to which it has been put”.217 Again, we 
agree with this conclusion. To the extent that evidence can be presented dem-
onstrating a history of human habitation on any feature or connected group of 
features, including habitation that has been cut short by “intervening forces” 
such as warfare, that evidence should be dispositive of the status of the feature 
or features under Article 121.
Finally, we agree with the Tribunal’s conclusion that “evidence of human 
habitation that predates the creation of exclusive economic zones may be 
more significant than contemporary evidence, if the latter is clouded by an 
apparent attempt to assert a maritime claim”.218 That conclusion is of clear rel-
evance in the context of the Spratly Islands, a number of which display a long 
history of human habitation and economic activity that pre-dates the negotia-
tion of UNCLOS.
3.1.3 The Tribunal’s Conclusions that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson 
Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North) and 
Mckennan Reef, in Their Natural Condition, are Rocks that  
Cannot Sustain Human Habitation or Economic Life of Their  
Own under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS (Philippines Submission  
Nos. 3, 6 and 7; Tribunal Merits Dispositif No. 6)
Having set out its approach to the interpretation of Article 121, the Tribunal 
turned to the application of that provision to the individual features raised 
by the Philippines in its Submission nos. 3 and 7, together with Gaven Reef 
(North) and McKennan Reef (each of which the Tribunal had found to be high 
tide features, contrary to The Philippines’ Submission no. 6).
The Tribunal’s conclusion that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron 
Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef, in their natu-
ral condition, were “rocks” for the purposes of Article 121(3) appears correct on 
the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal. We also agree with the Tribunal’s 
conclusion that recent construction activities on these features, however 
extensive, cannot elevate their status from a rock to a fully-entitled island 
under Article 121.
217   Id. at para. 549.
218   Id. at para. 550.
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3.1.4 The Tribunal’s Conclusions Regarding the Application of  
Article 121 to the Spratly Islands as a Whole
The Tribunal turned to address certain Chinese statements to the effect that 
it enjoys exclusive economic zone and continental shelf rights based on the 
Spratly Islands “as a whole”.219
The Tribunal stated that, to the extent that China considers that the criteria 
of human habitation and economic life under Article 121(3) must be assessed 
with reference to networks of closely related maritime features, it agreed. In 
particular, it commented that Article 121(3) must not be applied “in a strictly 
atomised fashion” with respect to small island populations using groups of 
reefs or atolls to support their livelihood. We agree with this conclusion, which 
also reflects the comments made by Micronesia during the negotiation of 
UNCLOS, cited above.
The Tribunal continued that, to the extent that China asserts that the 
Spratly Islands can be enclosed within a system of archipelagic or straight 
baselines, according an entitlement to maritime zones as a single unit, it could 
not agree. This was because China is not an archipelagic State for the purposes 
of Article 46 of the Convention, and the limits imposed by Article 47 would 
prohibit the use of archipelagic baselines in any event. The Tribunal also 
commented that any application of straight baselines to the Spratly Islands 
would be contrary to UNCLOS and is, in effect, excluded by the combination of 
Articles 7, 46 and 47.
The Tribunal’s findings that China is not an archipelagic State, that an archi-
pelagic baseline around the Spratly Islands would not meet the criteria set 
for archipelagic States by Article 47 of UNCLOS, and that a straight baseline 
around the Spratly Islands could not be justified by reference to Article 7 of the 
Convention, although obiter dicta and absent from the Tribunal’s dispositive 
findings, are correct.
However, notably, the Tribunal observed that UNCLOS does not expressly 
preclude the use of straight baselines in other circumstances.220 Further, it 
stated that it was aware of the practice of some States in employing straight 
baselines with respect to offshore archipelagos.221 One commentator notes 
that the Tribunal’s reference to State practice in this context was made in 
a conclusion, but that the Tribunal did not follow through by analysing 
219   Id. at paras. 571–76.
220   Id. at para. 573.
221   Id. at paras. 575–76.
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that State practice and considering how that practice may have impacted 
its conclusion.222 Notably, for example, the Tribunal did not analyse the 
Philippines’ unilateral declaration of straight baselines enclosing many of 
the Spratly Island features in its Presidential Decree 1596 of 1978. The Tribunal 
simply concluded that UNCLOS “excludes the possibility of employing straight 
baselines” in situations other than those expressly provided under Article 7 
and Part V, “in particular with respect to offshore archipelagos”.223
The Tribunal’s summary approach to this important issue is surprising 
because there is significant State practice of enclosing offshore archipelagos 
with straight baselines.224 This includes in the South China sea itself, where the 
Philippines effectively declared such an archipelago when making its Kalayaan 
Island Group declaration (Presidential Decree 1596) in 1978. Much of this State 
practice clearly does not relate to archipelagos that form a “fringe of islands 
along the coast in its immediate vicinity” for the purposes of Article 7 of 
UNCLOS. Accordingly, those claims appear to have been made outside the 
straight baseline and archipelagic baseline provisions of UNCLOS. As stated 
above, the Tribunal confirmed that UNCLOS does not expressly preclude 
such baselines.225
Alongside the Philippines’1978 claim around the Kalayaan Island Group, 
relevant pre-UNCLOS State practice in this context includes straight baseline 
measures taken by Denmark in respect of the Faroes in 1963 (subsequently 
revised in 1976 and 2002), Norway in respect of Svalbard and its surround-
ing features in 1970 (amended in 2001), Ecuador in respect of the Galapagos 
Islands in 1971 (repeated in 2012), Spain in respect of the Canary Islands in 1977, 
and France in respect of the Kerguelen Islands in 1978226 (see Section II.B(ii) 
on claim to offshore archipelagic status based on historic rights).
State practice in respect of the drawing of straight baselines around offshore 
island groups has continued since the adoption of UNCLOS. It includes the 
United Kingdom in respect of the Turks and Caicos and the Falklands in 1989 
(and Argentina for the same, i.e., Malvinas, in 1991), China in respect of the 
Paracels in 1996, France in respect of Guadeloupe and its surrounding features 
in 1999 and in respect of the Loyalty Islands in 2002, and Myanmar in respect 
of Co Co and Peparis Islands in 2008.227
222   J. Ashley Roach, Offshore Archipelagos Enclosed by Straight Baselines: An Excessive Claim?, 
49(2) Ocean Development & International Law 176, 179–180 (2018).
223   Award, supra note 1, at para. 575.
224   Roach, supra note 222, at 179. See also appendix to the article for details.
225   Award, supra note 1, at para. 575.
226   See Table 1 and Appendix in Roach, supra note 222, at 180–81, 197–202.
227   Id.
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Only six of the fifteen claims to enclose offshore archipelagos have been 
protested, by a total of nine States. Several claims are by States that failed in 
their effort during the negotiation of UNCLOS to have the archipelagic regime 
of Part V apply to offshore archipelagos.228
It would be inaccurate to conclude, as the Tribunal appears to do, that 
the question of drawing straight baselines is a settled matter under UNCLOS 
and customary international law. In particular, as elaborated in the critique 
of Section V of the Award (above), UNCLOS does not preclude the possibil-
ity of offshore archipelagic claims based on historic rights.229 Accordingly, the 
Tribunal’s apparent conclusion that any attempt to draw straight baselines 
around the Spratly Islands as an offshore archipelago would be contrary to 
international law is open to serious question.
One commentator has observed that the Tribunal “did not apply the 
approach used in previous international arbitration for assessing claims by 
continental or archipelagic states to maritime features as a single or archipe-
lagic unit.”230 The approach, as exemplified in Nicaragua v. Colombia, involves 
“an examination for whether there is a treaty basis as well as natural and 
historical bases for such claims.”231 The commentator observes that the 
Tribunal failed to consider the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Taipei Peace 
Treaty as possible bases to regard the Spratly Islands as a single unit.232 She 
concludes that:
The parties to the peace treaties knew and understood the Spratly Islands 
to mean Sinnan Gunto, an area in the South China Sea whose limits 
were well defined and the principal components of which were identi-
fied. This provides a sufficient basis to conclude that the Spratly Islands 
is “in [international] law a unit […] [such] that the fate of the principal 
part may involve the rest,” and this includes the named features in the 
Philippines/China Arbitration.233
228   Id.
229   See Section 2.b II.
230   Melissa H. Loja, The Spratly Islands as a single unit under international law: A commen-
tary on the Final Award in Philippines/China Arbitration, 47(4) Journal of Ocean 
Development & International Law 309, 311 (2016).
231   Id.
232   Id. at 316.
233   Id.
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The Tribunal did not contemplate the possibility of such claims persisting 
following UNCLOS. For the reasons given in the critique of Section V of the 
Award, above, this conclusion is dubious.
3.1.5 The Tribunal’s Conclusion that None of the High Tide Features 
in the Spratly Islands, in Their Natural Condition, are Capable 
of Sustaining Human Habitation or Economic Life of Their Own 
under Article 121 (3) of UNCLOS (Philippines Submission No. 5; 
Tribunal Jurisdiction Dispositif No. 2(A) and Merits Dispositif  
No. 7)
3.1.5.1 The Tribunal’s Decision Not to Address Specifically the Status  
of a Number of High Tide Features under Article 121 of UNCLOS 
Notwithstanding Their Manifest Relevance to Its Jurisdiction
The Tribunal observed that, by requesting in Submission nos. 5, 8 and 9 decla-
rations about the Philippines’ own EEZ, the Philippines effectively requested a 
general determination that all of the high tide features in the Spratly Islands are 
“rocks” for the purposes of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. Accordingly, the Tribunal 
considered it necessary to interpret and apply Article 121(3) for “all significant 
high-tide features in the Spratly islands that could impact the Tribunal’s juris-
diction to decide the matters raised” in those Submissions.234
However, notably, the Tribunal focused its analysis under Article 121(3) 
upon only six features, which it described as “the six largest features amongst 
the other high-tide features in the Spratly Islands”:235 namely, Itu Aba (con-
trolled by Taiwan), Thitu (controlled by the Philippines), West York Island 
(controlled by the Philippines), Spratly Island (controlled by Vietnam), North- 
East Cay (controlled by the Philippines) and South-West Cay (controlled by 
Vietnam) (the “Primary High Tide Features”).
The Tribunal noted that a number of other high tide features of relevance 
to the extent of the Philippines’ EEZ: namely, Amboyna Cay, Flat Island, 
Loaita Island, Namyit Island, Nanshan Island, Sand Cay, Sin Cowe Island and 
Swallow Reef (the “Secondary High Tide Features”). However, it declined to 
discuss them individually, on the basis that “if the six largest features described 
above are all to be classified as rocks for purposes of Article 121(3) of the 
Convention, the same conclusion would also hold true for all other high tide 
features in the Spratly Islands”.236 Therefore, when later concluding that 
the six “largest” features were “rocks” for the purposes of Article 121(3), the 
234   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 393, 396.
235   Id. at para. 400.
236   Id. at para. 407.
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Tribunal observed that, although it had “considered, and reache[d] the same 
conclusion with respect to” the Secondary Features, it was not necessary to list 
them individually.237
This is a surprising, and arguably unlawful, approach to a critical issue 
before the Tribunal (namely, whether it had jurisdiction over a number of 
the Submissions made by the Philippines, which in turn would depend upon 
whether any of the high tide features in the Spratly Islands potentially gener-
ate EEZ and continental shelf entitlement under Article 121).
First, this approach contradicts the Tribunal’s own assessment of the draft-
ing history of UNCLOS, which shows that proposals to impose “bright-line 
rules” around criteria such as surface area or size in the context of the rock/
island distinction were explicitly rejected.238 Accordingly, the Tribunal con-
cluded that “size cannot be dispositive of the feature’s status as a fully entitled 
island or rock and is not, on its own, a relevant factor”.239 But, in concluding 
that it was not necessary to discuss the Secondary High Tide Features indi-
vidually, purely on the basis that they were smaller than the Primary High Tide 
Features, the Tribunal in effect imposed its own “bright-line rule”.
Second, as a result, the Tribunal in effect imposed an arbitrary criterion in its 
interpretation of Article 121(3) that has no legal basis or justification. Indeed, 
even the Philippines had acknowledged that size alone could not be determi-
native of the status of a feature under Article 121(3),240 such that it considered 
it necessary to make specific submissions and submit specific evidence with 
respect to the Secondary High Tide Features.241
Third, it is a fundamental principle of international law that any court or 
tribunal seized of a dispute or complaint must satisfy itself that it has jurisdic-
tion over that dispute or complaint.242 As elaborated in Section VI.B(i) below, 
Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS requires that an arbitral tribunal must sat-
isfy itself that a claim is well-founded in fact and law. By refusing to address 
specifically the question of whether any of the Secondary High Tide Features 
constituted fully-fledged “islands” with their own EEZ and continental shelf 
237   Id. at paras. 622, 625.
238   Id. at paras. 537–38.
239   Id. at para. 538.
240   Id. at para. 412.
241   Id. at para. 443.
242   See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 
(Aug. 30) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge John Bassett Moore) at 57–58: “[t]here are certain 
elementary conceptions common to all systems of jurisprudence, and one of these is the 
principle that a court of justice is never justified in hearing and adjudging the merits of a 
cause of which it has not (sic) jurisdiction”.
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entitlements, the Tribunal arguably disregarded its duty to satisfy itself of 
its jurisdiction as regards the Philippines’ Submission nos. 5, 8 and 9. In this 
regard, the Tribunal simply stated that it had “also considered” and reached 
“the same conclusion with respect to, the other, less significant high-tide fea-
tures in the Spratly Islands, which are even less capable of sustaining human 
habitation”.243 The Tribunal’s brief comment, without any accompanying rea-
soning or analysis related to the Secondary High Tide Features, is arguably 
insufficient to fulfill the Tribunal’s duty to satisfy itself that it had jurisdic-
tion over the relevant submissions of the Philippines. In default proceedings 
involving only one party, this duty is particularly acute.
Fourth, the Tribunal failed to give any reasons for its conclusions as regards 
the status of the Secondary High Tide Features under Article 121. It is a general 
principle of international law that any court or tribunal must give reasons for 
its decisions, a fortiori any decisions that are fundamental to its jurisdiction.244 
By concluding that it was not necessary to discuss any of the Secondary High 
Tide Features individually, the Tribunal openly disregarded its obligation to 
give reasons with respect to issues that were a sine qua non of its jurisdiction 
over Submission nos. 5, 8 and 9.
3.1.5.2 The Tribunal’s Decision that All of the High Tide Features in the 
Spratly Islands Constitute “Rocks” for the Purposes of Article 121(3)  
of UNCLOS
The Tribunal proceeded to review five aspects of conditions on the Primary 
High Tide Features, in turn, namely: (i) “the presence of potable fresh water”; 
(ii) “vegetation and biology”; (iii) “soil and agricultural potential”; (iv) “pres-
ence of fishermen”; and (v) “commercial operations”.245 On their face, each 
of these factors appears legitimate for the purposes of an analysis of a feature 
under Article 121. However, as explained below, in applying these factors to 
the Primary High Tide Features, the Tribunal gave substantial (and arguably 
improper) weight to the additional, “qualitative” and inherently subjective, 
legal factors that it had identified when interpreting Article 121.
Moreover, as elaborated below, the Tribunal’s assessment of the available 
evidence as to whether or not the Primary High Tide Features fulfilled its five 
factors is highly questionable.
243   Award, supra note 1, at para. 622.
244   See Case concerning Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. Rep.53 
(Nov. 12) (Judgement); see also Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United 
Nations Admin. Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 210–211 (July 12) (Advisory Opinion).
245   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 579–614.
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First, in applying its five factors the Tribunal appears to have ignored some 
of the evidence before it. The Tribunal commented that it had reviewed “a 
substantial volume of evidence concerning the conditions on the more sig-
nificant of the high tide features in the Spratly Islands”.246 It referred in this 
regard to evidence presented by the Philippines, evidence in other publicly 
available sources and materials obtained by the Tribunal from certain Western 
(British and French) archives. Notably, however, the Tribunal made no refer-
ence in this passage to the 39 evidentiary exhibits that had been provided by 
the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law in its Amicus Curiae sub-
mission of 23 March 2016, which primarily related to human habitation and 
economic life on Itu Aba.247
The photographic evidence of human habitation on Itu Aba presented in the 
Amicus Curiae submission was only indirectly referred to in paragraph 432 
of the Award, in the context of the Tribunal’s summary of the Philippines’ 
(largely rhetorical) assessment of that evidence. The Tribunal failed to refer to 
the photographic evidence when assessing, inter alia, the availability of pota-
ble fresh water, vegetation, agricultural potential commercial operations and 
the presence of fishermen.248 In effect, therefore, the Tribunal only referred 
to the evidence presented in the Amicus Curiae submission to the extent that 
it was addressed by the Philippines in its own submissions, and otherwise 
ignored it altogether.
Professor Wang notes that the Tribunal:
… ignored to analyze contrary evidence, like the ample documentary and 
other evidence submitted in the Amicus Curiae by the Chinese (Taiwan) 
Society of International Law. Taiwan’s Amicus Curiae, citing numerous 
books, reports, and other forms of empirical or scientific research, aimed 
to prove that the Taiping Island not only had a “longstanding history of 
human habitation,” but also “currently sustains the habitation of hun-
dreds of people.249
246   Id. at para. 577.
247   Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, Amicus Curiae submission on the Issue of 
the Feature of Taiping Island (Itu Aba) Pursuant to Article 121(1) and (3) of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 23 March 2016 http://www.assidmer.net/doc/
SCSTF-Amicus-Curiae-Brief-final.pdf.
248   Award, supra note 1, at 580–614.
249   Wang, supra note 175, at 205.
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Second, even on the evidence to which it did refer, it appears that Itu Aba 
(and possibly other features) satisfied all of the factors that it had identified as 
central to its Article 121(3) analysis. This is especially the case if the “qualita-
tive” aspects of the Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 121(3) are set aside. The 
following section sets out how Itu Aba appears to satisfy all five factors identi-
fied by the Tribunal.
3.1.5.3 The Tribunal’s Decision Ignores Evidence Indicating that Itu Aba 
Satisfied Its Own Five Factors for the Purposes of Article 121(3)
The Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law submitted to the Tribunal 
a series of photographs evidencing historic and continuous human habitation 
on Itu Aba.250 Some of the photographs, however, evidence the presence of 
three of the five factors considered by the Tribunal in determining whether a 
feature can sustain human habitation on its own, including: (1) potable water 
(Exhibit 29); (2) vegetation and biology (Exhibit 27); (3) soil and agricultural 
potential (Exhibits 31, 38(1) and 38(2)). As described below, the Tribunal had 
further non-photographic evidence before it on all five factors. It is notable 
that the Tribunal does not cite to any of the photographs introduced as evi-
dence with the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law’s Amicus Curiae 
submission, which provide clear evidence of human habitation on Itu Aba.
As regards its first factor (“the presence of potable freshwater”), despite 
extensive historical evidence as to the “considerable quantity” and “abundant” 
volumes of drinkable water on Itu Aba in particular, the Tribunal concluded 
that the “quality of this water will not necessarily match the standards of mod-
ern drinking water and may vary over time”.251 This is despite the absence from 
Article 121(3) of any requirement that drinking water must be up to “modern 
standards” (a term which the Tribunal did not attempt to define, but which fol-
lows from its imposition of “qualitative” elements in its interpretation of that 
provision). In fact, as Professor Nordquist has observed, no reference is made to 
water at all in the text of Article 121(3), nor was any meaningful discussion held 
about the presence (or not) of water as a relevant during its negotiation.252 
Also, as elaborated at Annex 1 below, it is clear that many fully-entitled island 
features generating EEZ entitlements do not host potable freshwater, still less 
sufficient freshwater up to “modern standards” to support a human population.
250   Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, supra note 247. The historic evidence 
includes photographs of buildings, temples and groundwater wells (Exhibit 27).
251   Award, supra note 1, at para. 584.
252   Nordquist, supra note 190, at 177–90.
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While the presence of potable freshwater is, in our view, a legitimate (though 
not decisive) indicator of the capacity of a feature to sustain human habita-
tion, the Tribunal unduly inflated the importance of that factor and subjected 
it to unreasonable “qualitative” and “quantitative” limits that are unsupported 
by the text of Article 121. As a result, while the Tribunal acknowledged that the 
freshwater resources “have supported small numbers of people in the past”,253 
it did not consider this to be conclusive as to the status of Itu Aba.
Notably, the Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence of potable freshwater on 
Itu Aba was also lacking. For example, it did not even address the evidence 
before it as to the substantial volume of drinkable water available on Itu Aba, 
and the hundreds of people that were reliant on it during certain periods.254
In particular, the Tribunal ignored the evidence submitted by the Chinese 
(Taiwan) Society of International Law with its Amicus Curiae submission, 
including evidence from the Water Quality On-site Survey stating that the 
quality of the groundwater drawn from the four wells has been proved to be 
suitable for daily human use, and in particular, the quality of the water drawn 
from Well No. 5 is suitable for drinking.255
The Tribunal also failed to consider the historical evidence of potable drink-
ing water on Itu Aba before it:
In fact, quality freshwater on Taiping Island has been recorded and 
attested to by a great deal of historical documentary evidence, including 
the China Sea Directory in 1879 and Asiatic Pilot in 1925, all evidencing 
that the water found in the wells on Taiping Island is suitable for drink-
ing, and that its quality is superior to water in other locations. In 1937, 
253   Award, supra note 1, at para. 584.
254   See, e.g., Exhibits 1, 2, 28 and 29 to the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, 
Amicus Curiae submission. See also Determination Regarding Jurisdiction of New 
Southern Archipelago will be Announced Today [新南群島の管轄決定きょう公告], 
Osaka Asahi Shimbum [大阪 朝日新聞], 18 April, 1939, Exhibit 25 and Hitoshi Hiratsuka 
(平塚均); The advanced base for expanding fishery business to southern area: New 
Southern Archipelago – Report of On-site Survey [漁業南進の 前哨地. 新南群島 – 實
地調查記], Taiwan Times [台湾時報], May 1939, at 208–210, Exhibit 30 to the Chinese 
(Taiwan) Society of International Law, Amicus Curiae submission. According to the 
Amicus Curiae submission, both empirical facts and scientific studies establish that the 
Itu Aba has an abundant natural supply of fresh water which “is easily replenished by 
precipitation”, which “averages 1800–2000 mm per year”. It was further presented that the 
four groundwater wells provided drinking and cultivating water to 237,000 tons per year. 
Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, supra note 247.
255   Id. See, e.g., Exhibit 29, Ta-Wei Chang, Water Quality and Agricultural Environ ment 
Survey – Groundwater Quality and Hydrology Survey Report.
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a Japanese government official, Hitoshi Hiratsuka (平塚均), was sent 
to Taiping Island and recorded that out of the four wells on the Island, 
one well can supply about 10 tons of drinking water per day. Osaka Asahi 
Newspapers in 1939 also reported that drinking water was available a 
long time ago on Taiping Island, and fishermen used to visit the Island 
to obtain drinking water during sailing trips. Historical documentary 
evidence also shows that Taiping Island had a freshwater supply when 
the ROC government took over, and thereby recovered Taiping Island 
in 1946.256
As regards its second factor (“vegetation and biology”), the Tribunal observed 
various evidence that the larger features in the Spratly Islands have historically 
been vegetated, including through the introduction of fruit trees and vegeta-
bles to supply food on Itu Aba before and after World War II. It observed also 
historical evidence of the farming of chickens and pigs.257 Notably, the Tribunal 
had before it (but made no reference to) evidence presented of livestock being 
raised in modern times on Itu Aba, showing that locally raised “goats, chickens, 
and eggs are a source of food for people on the island”.258
As regards its third factor (“soil and agricultural potential”), the Tribunal 
cited a 1994 scientific study indicating that “people may cultivate crops” on Itu 
Aba, and considered the “most instructive evidence to be the clear indication 
that fruit and vegetables were being grown on Itu Aba during the period of 
Japanese commercial activity”. It observed that such cultivation “most likely 
reflects the capacity of the feature in its natural condition”. Certainly, such evi-
dence indicates the presence of fertile soil and agricultural potential.
However, the Tribunal went on to say that “agriculture on Itu Aba would not 
suffice, on its own, to support a sizeable population”.259 Again, the ability of 
a feature to support “a sizeable population” is not relevant to the assessment 
of status under Article 121 of UNCLOS. Moreover, the Tribunal’s reference to it 
contradicts its observation earlier in the Award that the “human habitation” 
criterion does not require capacity to support a large population, and that in 
remote atolls “a few individuals or family groups could well suffice”.260 The 
Tribunal’s reference to an inability is to support a “sizeable population” again 
256   Id.
257   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 586–91.
258   Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, supra note 247. See, e.g., Chien-Fan Chen, 
Water Quality and Agricultural Environment Survey of Taiping Island–The Flora and 
Vegetation Survey Report, Exhibit 32.
259   Award, supra note 1, at para. 596.
260   Id. at para. 542.
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appears to follow from its restrictive interpretation of Article 121(3) and the 
imposition of “qualitative” elements.
The Tribunal had further evidence before it showing that “[s]oil on Taiping 
Island is naturally formed and supports indigenous vegetation as well as agri-
cultural crops.”261 The Tribunal observed that “the historical record before the 
Tribunal contains less information concerning soil quality on features in 
the Spratly Islands”.262 However, it failed to mention the following account 
of cultivated vegetation presented by the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of 
International Law Amicus Curiae submission:
Personnel stationed on the island have long utilized all types of resources 
on the island and cultivated various tropical vegetables and fruits, includ-
ing staple foods such as corn and sweet potato as well as 10 other types 
such as okra, pumpkin, loofah gourd, bitter melon, and cabbage.263
As regards its fourth factor (“presence of fishermen”), the Tribunal noted evi-
dence indicating “the consistent presence of small numbers of fishermen, 
mostly from Hainan, on the main features in the Spratly Islands”. It cited 
19th-century evidence that fishermen were able to “remain for years” among 
the Spratly Islands, including some that were “comfortably established” on Itu 
Aba, supplying themselves with water from that feature.
The Tribunal referred to 20th-century French evidence observing that the 
fishing communities were growing coconut, banana and potatoes on Itu Aba, 
and that “there is no doubt that since time immemorial, these islands were fre-
quented and even temporarily inhabited by the Chinese, Malay and Annamite 
fishermen that haunt these parts”.264
The Tribunal concluded that the evidence showed that fishing communities 
were present in the Spratlys “for comparatively long periods of time, with an 
established network of trade and intermittent supply”.265
As regards its fifth and final factor (“commercial operations”), the Tribunal 
observed various evidence of significant commercial activities in the early 
20th century around “the working of phosphates”, fisheries, guano mining and 
the associated presence from time to time of hundreds of workers on Itu Aba. 
Evidence showed that the workers obtained drinking water on the feature, and 
261   Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, supra note 247. See Exhibit 31, Zueng-Sang 
Chen, Brief Report of Soil Resources Survey of Taiping Island.
262   Award, supra note 1, at para. 594.
263   Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, supra note 247.
264   Award, supra note 1, at para. 599.
265   Id. at paras. 597–601.
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that the place was “considerably developed as a fishery” and “a flourishing con-
cern” before it was abandoned during World War II.266
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal concluded that “the 
principal high-tide features in the Spratly Islands are capable of enabling 
the survival of small groups of people”, and that “the principal features of the 
Spratly Islands are not barren rocks or sand cays, devoid of fresh water, that can 
be dismissed as uninhabitable”.267
On this basis, the Tribunal should have been able to conclude, at a mini-
mum, that both Itu Aba on its own and (a fortiori) the Spratly Islands as a whole 
are capable of sustaining human habitation for the purposes of Article 121(3). 
It should also (separately) have been able to conclude that both Itu Aba on its 
own and (a fortiori) the Spratly Islands as a whole are capable of sustaining 
economic life of their own for the purposes of Article 121(3).
The Tribunal considered that, since a number of the features “fall close 
to the line in terms of their capacity to sustain human habitation”, it was 
required to consider the historical evidence of actual human habitation and 
economic life before reaching any conclusions. This should not have been 
necessary, given the overriding “capacity” criterion in Article 121(3), which 
had been acknowledged by the Tribunal earlier in the Award. Nevertheless, 
that historical evidence indisputably showed that actual human habitation 
and economic life has been present on the features for significant periods in 
the past.
The Tribunal, however, concluded that “the criterion of human habitation 
is not met by the temporary inhabitation of the Spratly Islands by fishermen, 
even for extended periods”, because they did not represent the “natural popu-
lation of the Spratlys”. Moreover, fishermen had not been “accompanied by 
their families” or comprise a “stable community”. Accordingly, the shelter and 
facilities evidenced before it did not attain the level that the Tribunal “would 
expect for a population intending to reside permanently”. Similarly, labourers 
living on the islands purposes of Japanese commercial activities during the 
early 20th century had not moved “to make a new life for themselves” or estab-
lish a “settled community”.
As a result, the Tribunal concluded that Itu Aba, Thitu, West York, Spratly 
Island, South-West Cay and North-East Cay are not capable of sustaining 
human habitation within the meaning of Article 121(3).268
266   Id. at paras. 602–12.
267   Id. at paras. 615–16.
268   Id. at paras. 618–22.
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This critical conclusion is subject to criticism on a number of grounds. First, 
as explained above, it appears to be belied by the evidence that was before the 
Tribunal. As Professor Nordquist has observed, the failure of the Tribunal to 
take note of certain developments over time on Itu Aba, about which evidence 
was readily available to the Tribunal, is “baffling”.269 Second, as also explained 
above, it is based upon an overly-restrictive interpretation of Article 121, which 
imposes unjustified “quantitative” and inherently subjective considerations 
upon a definition that is inherently objective in nature. Third, the Tribunal 
ignored the fact that the most substantial historical population appears to have 
abandoned Itu Aba as a result of an “intervening force”, in the form of World 
War II, despite the fact that it had explicitly acknowledged that such factors 
are relevant in the application of Article 121. Fourth, the Tribunal accorded 
undue weight to the presence of military or other governmental personnel on 
the features during modern times, and associated concerns about States estab-
lishing “artificial populations in the hope of making expansive [EEZ] claims”, 
all of which should have been irrelevant given the substantial pre-UNCLOS 
evidence before it showing capacity to sustain human habitation.270
As regards “economic life”, the Tribunal concluded that “all of the economic 
activity in the Spratly Islands that appears in the historical record has been 
essentially extractive in nature”, for the benefit of populations elsewhere. It 
observed that “economic activity must be oriented around the feature itself 
and not be focused solely on the surrounding territorial sea or entirely depen-
dent on external resources”.271
As a result, the Tribunal concluded that Itu Aba, Thitu, West York, Spratly 
Island, South-West Cay and North-East Cay are not capable of sustaining eco-
nomic life of their own within the meaning of Article 121(3).272
Again, this conclusion is subject to criticism on a number of grounds. First, 
as explained above, it appears to be belied by the evidence before the Tribunal 
of a history of economic life that was far from being “focused solely on the sur-
rounding territorial sea or entirely dependent on external resources”. Second, 
as explained above, it is again based upon the Tribunal’s overly-restrictive 
interpretation of Article 121, which imposes unjustified “quantitative” and 
inherently subjective considerations upon a definition that is inherently objec-
tive in nature. Third, the Tribunal ignored the fact that the most substantial 
economic activity within the past 100 years appears to have ceased on Itu Aba 
269   Nordquist, supra note 190, at 197.
270   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 620–21.
271   Id. at para. 623.
272   Id. at paras. 623–25.
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as a result of an “intervening force”, in the form of World War II. Fourth, the 
Tribunal commented out of the blue, and without any justification on the text 
of Article 121, that the introduction of the EEZ by UNCLOS “was not intended to 
grant extensive maritime entitlements to small features whose historical con-
tribution to human settlement is as slight as that”. There is nothing in the text, 
or even the context, object and purpose, of Article 121 to indicate that a feature 
(or group of features) must have made a significant “historical contribution to 
human settlement” in order to be capable of generating EEZ and continental 
shelf rights.
In conclusion, on the evidence before it the Tribunal could easily have 
concluded that both Itu Aba on its own and (a fortiori) the Spratly Islands 
as a whole are capable of sustaining human habitation for the purposes of 
Article 121(3). It could also (separately) have concluded that both Itu Aba on 
its own and (a fortiori) the Spratly Islands as a whole are capable of sustaining 
economic life of their own for the purposes of Article 121(3). Either finding 
would have been sufficient to lead the Tribunal to conclude that one or more 
of the features generates EEZ and continental shelf entitlement. This, in turn, 
would have precluded the Tribunal from taking jurisdiction in respect of 
Philippines Submission nos. 5, 8, 9 and 12, and from making a number of its 
substantive findings on the merits (particularly dispositif nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 
16(a) and (d)).
3.1.6 The Tribunal’s Conclusion that Itu Aba and Other Features in the 
Spratly Islands Constitute “Rocks” for the Purposes of Article 121(3) 
Contradicts State Practice as Regards EEZ Claims Made around 
Equivalent (Or Less Significant) Maritime Features
As well as being legally questionable for the reasons set out above, the 
Tribunal’s conclusion that Itu Aba and other features constitute “rocks with no 
EEZ or continental shelf entitlement” for the purposes of Article 121(3) contra-
dicts State practice.
Notably, the Tribunal ignored this State practice in its Award. Rather, and in 
contrast with its lengthy analysis of the travaux préparatoires, it restricted its 
assessment of State practice to considering whether “one can speak of an agree-
ment reached concerning the interpretation of the provision in question”.273 
The Tribunal observed that the threshold to be met in order to establish such 
an agreement is “quite high”, and concluded that “there is no evidence for an 
agreement based upon State practice on the interpretation of Article 121(3)”.274
273   Id. at para. 552 (referring to Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT).
274   Id. at paras. 552–53.
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Accordingly, the Tribunal did not take any account of widespread State 
practice showing that small uninhabited islands, including a number that 
are uninhabited (and without any fresh water source for the most part), have 
been treated as “islands” generating full maritime entitlements, including 
Australia’s Elizabeth Island; Brazil’s Martim Vaz Island; Chile’s Sala y Gomez 
Island; Colombia’s Low Cay (Bajo Nuevo Bank) and France’s Matthew Island 
(all smaller in size than Itu Aba).275
While, in some cases, claims to EEZ and continental shelf rights around 
small uninhabited features are unilateral in nature, in others they have been 
more widely accepted by way of delimitation or otherwise. For instance, as 
discussed above in Section III.B(i), Venezuela’s delimitation agreements 
with neighbouring States conferring Isla Aves maritime entitlements beyond 
12 NM. For details demonstrating that Isla Aves is clearly less capable than Itu 
Aba of meeting the Tribunal’s five tests for fully-entitled island status under 
Article 121, see Table 1 (Small features mutually recognised as being fully entitled 
under Article 121(2)) in Annex 1 to this Critique. Table 1 also contains further 
examples of features that have been mutually accepted as being fully-entitled 
islands in delimitation, but which fail more obviously than Itu Aba to meet the 
Tribunal’s five tests. Table 2 identifies a number of further examples of features 
much more insignificant than Itu Aba that are nevertheless claimed unilater-
ally by States as being fully-entitled islands under UNCLOS.
As one commentator has observed, the Tribunal’s reasoning and conclusion 
in relation to Itu Aba alone, “if applied universally, would imply that a large 
number of such high-tide elevations in the oceans should be stripped of their 
present EEZ and continental shelf entitlements.”276
In a recent study,277 Myron Nordquist and William Phalen identified a num-
ber of islands, recognised as such through “decades of State Practice”,278 which 
would likely be considered Article 121(3) “rocks” if the Tribunal’s reasoning 
were to be applied:
(i) Johnston Island and Atoll (area 2.63km2): in its natural condition does 
not contain fresh water, food and living space and materials for human 
shelter nearly to the extent as does Itu Abu. Further, the only major in-
dustry outside of military activities that has occupied the islands has 
been guano mining, which the Tribunal classified as a “purely extractive 
275   See Talmon, supra note 33, at 83–86.
276   Hafner, supra note 139, at 10.
277   Myron H. Nordquist & William G. Phalen, Interpretation of UNCLOS Article 121 and Itu 
Aba (Taiping) in the South China Sea Arbitration Award, in International Marine 
Economy (2017).
278   Id. at 69.
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economic activity, thus disqualifying the Atoll from any ability to sustain 
an economic life of its own.279 Nonetheless, the United States has claimed 
the EEZ surrounding the atoll, without objection, since March 1983.
(ii) Clipperton Island (area 6km2): serves as another glaring example of a 
maritime feature that has long been recognized by the international 
community as an Article 121 island entitled to a 200nm EEZ and conti-
nental shelf. Yet, the island would fail the test in the Award as applied to 
Itu Aba.280 Attempts at settlement on the island in the early 20th cen-
tury failed without continuous resupply ships, so the history of the island 
suggests that the feature cannot independently sustain human habita-
tion or an economic life of its own according to the test laid down by 
the Tribunal.
(iii)  Trindade Island (area 10.1km2): the island today is almost entirely bar-
ren” and the “current physical characteristics of Trindade would make 
survival on the feature’s resources without the aid of modern technology 
extremely difficult if not impossible.281 In 2004, Brazil declared an EEZ, 
which included a 200 nm zone surrounding Trindade. There has been no 
objection from the international community.
If the Tribunal’s analysis were to be adopted as a universal standard, it would 
potentially result in the reclassification of certain islands which unequivocally 
have full maritime entitlements.
For example, in its Award, the Tribunal stated that: (i) a “feature that is only 
capable of sustaining habitation through the continued delivery of supplies 
from outside does not meet the requirements of Article 121(3);282 (ii) the eco-
nomic life “must be oriented around the feature itself and not focused solely 
on the waters or seabed of the surrounding territorial sea”;283 and (iii) “size 
cannot be dispositive of a feature’s status as a fully entitled island or rock and 
is not, on its own, a relevant factor.”284
Taking each of these in turn in relation to Kiritimati (otherwise known as 
Christmas Island): (i) the island is susceptible to severe drought and “the con-
temporary population of nearly 8,000 people is dependent upon shipments 
from Kiribati’s capital for potable water and food”;285 (ii) whilst the island’s 
reef system is productive and supports the population’s nutrition, this does not 
279   Id. at 70.
280   Id. at 71.
281   Id. at 72.
282   Award, supra note 1, at para. 547.
283   Id. at para. 543.
284   Id. at para. 538.
285   Nordquist & Phalen, supra note 277 at 67.
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satisfy the Tribunal’s preference that resources of the feature itself should be 
considered when determining habitability; and (iii) according to the Tribunal, 
the size of the island cannot be determinative in its classification, in part 
because there is no substantive difference between an “island” and a “rock”. 
Therefore, Kiritimati would apparently fail to meet the characteristics imposed 
by the Tribunal in order to be classified as an “island” under Article 121. To the 
contrary, in fact Kiritimati is internationally recognised as an island having full 
maritime entitlements.286
Nordquist and Phalen “believe, for reasons explained in [their] Study, that it 
is unrealistic to expect widespread repudiation of decades of unprotested State 
Practice relevant to the regime of islands throughout the world’s oceans.”287 In 
our view, supported by the examples set out above, the Tribunal’s decision on 
Itu Aba contradicts State practice with regards to EEZ claims made around 
equally small or much smaller features, or features that are less likely than 
Itu Aba to be able to sustain human habitation or an economic life of their 
own. The Tribunal therefore erred in dismissing the relevance of State prac-
tice in this instance. The universal application of its reasoning could result in 
reclassifications that would contradict State practice, depriving many States of 
long-standing maritime rights.
4 The Tribunal’s Findings with Respect to Chinese Activities  
in the South China Sea (Philippines Submissions Nos. 8 to 13;  
Award Chapter VII)
This section analyses the Tribunal’s conclusions and findings with respect to 
the Philippines’ submissions relating to certain Chinese activities in the South 
China Sea. After an introductory section on issues of jurisdiction, it considers 
the following Tribunal findings:
Section 4.1: that China breached its obligations under Articles 77 and 56 
of UNCLOS with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the non- 
living resources of its continental shelf in the area of Reed Bank and the living 
resources in its EEZ (Submission no. 8; Tribunal merits dispositif nos. 8 and 9);
286   Id. at 67–68. “While the island of Kiritimati has nearly all of the limitations for human 
habitation identified by the Tribunal in its analysis of Itu Aba/Taiping (i.e. minimal fresh-
water, calcareous soil, zero agricultural potential), before this Award there was consensus 
in the international community that it was entitled to a 200-nm EEZ as demonstrated by 
uncontested State Practice.”
287   Id. at 77–78.
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Section 4.2: that China failed to exhibit “due regard” for the Philippines’ 
sovereign rights over fisheries in its EEZ, and accordingly China breached its 
obligations under Article 58(3) of UNCLOS (Submission no. 9; Tribunal merits 
dispositif no. 10);
Section 4.3: that, from May 2012 onwards, China unlawfully prevented 
Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal 
(Submission no. 10; Tribunal merits dispositif no. 11);
Section 4.4: that, with respect to the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment in the South China Sea, China breached its obligations 
under Articles 123, 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, and 206 of UNCLOS (Submissions 
nos. 11 and 12(b); Tribunal merits dispositif nos. 12 and 13);
Section 4.5: that, through its construction of artificial islands, installations 
and structures at Mischief Reef, China breached Articles 60 and 80 of UNCLOS 
(Philippines Submission no. 12 (a) and (c); Tribunal merits dispositif no. 14); 
and
Section 4.6: that China’s operation of its law enforcement vessels on 28 April 
2012 and 26 May 2012 violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the Convention 
on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (“COLREGS”) 
and, as a consequence, breached its obligations under Article 94 of UNCLOS 
(Philippines Submission no. 13; Tribunal merits dispositif no. 15).
4.1 Issues of Jurisdiction
A few important points on jurisdiction are worth noting from the outset.
4.1.1 The Effect of the Tribunal’s Previous Determinations on “Historic 
Rights” and the Status of Features in the South China Sea
As discussed and critiqued above, the Tribunal had previously determined 
that:
there is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights, or other sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction beyond those provided for in the Convention, in 
the waters of the South China Sea encompassed by the ‘nine-dash line’;288
288   Award, supra note 1, at para. 692. We note that this finding is not set out in the dispositive 
on Submissions nos. 8, 9 and 12, however, it is a necessary assumption underlying the 
Tribunal’s findings on its jurisdiction.
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none of the high-tide feature in the Spratly Islands is a fully entitled 
island for the purposes of Article 121 of [UNCLOS];289 and
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are low-tide elevations 
[which], as such, generate no entitlement to maritime zones of their 
own.290
The Tribunal relied heavily on these three premises in reaching its substan-
tive conclusions in Chapter VII – in particular, with respect to its findings on 
Submission nos. 8,291 9292 and 12.293 For reasons elaborated elsewhere in this 
critique, each of these premises is subject to substantial doubt, whether from 
a legal or a factual perspective.
Had the Tribunal found differently with respect to China’s historic rights 
and/or the status of features in the South China Sea (including the status of 
Mischief Reef), it would also have faced the possibility of overlapping enti-
tlements in the disputed areas. Accordingly, it would have been required to 
decline jurisdiction over the Philippines’ Submissions nos. 8 and 9294 and it 
could not have found that China had breached Articles 77 and 56 of UNCLOS,295 
nor Article 58(3).296
Similarly, had the Tribunal found that some of the features in the Spratly 
Islands (in particular Itu Aba) were fully-entitled islands for the purpose of 
Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, or that Mischief Reef was a high-tide feature, it would 
have faced the possibility of overlapping entitlements and would thus have 
289   Id. at para. 692; see also Tribunal jurisdiction dispositif nos. 3(a) and 5(a) which state 
that: “no maritime feature claimed by China within 200 nautical miles of Mischief Reef 
or Second Thomas Shoal constitutes a fully entitled island for the purposes of Article 121 
of the Convention and therefore […] no maritime feature claimed by China within 200 
nautical miles of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal has the capacity to generate an 
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”.
290   Award, supra note 1, at para. 693; Tribunal jurisdiction dispositif nos. 3(b) and 5(b).
291   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 692–93.
292   Id. at para. 734.
293   Id. at para. 1025.
294   Id. at para. 691. Contrary to its finding in the jurisdiction dispositif no. 3. As acknowledged 
by the Tribunal with respect to Submission no. 8: “[h]ad the Tribunal found that another 
maritime feature claimed by China within 200 nautical miles of the relevant areas were 
a fully entitled island for purposes of Article 121 of [UNCLOS] and capable of generating 
an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, it would necessarily 
have had to decline jurisdiction over the dispute”.
295   Id. at merits dispositif nos. 8 and 9.
296   Id. at merits dispositif no. 10.
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been required to decline jurisdiction over Submissions nos. 12(a) and (c).297 
Accordingly, it could not have found that, through its construction of artifi-
cial islands, installations, and structures at Mischief Reef, China had breached 
Articles 60 and 80 of UNCLOS.298
4.1.2 The Tribunal’s Finding that China’s Activities were of a Civilian 
Nature and that It Therefore had Jurisdiction over Submission  
Nos. 11 and 12(B) (Tribunal Jurisdiction Dispositif No. 4)
For the purposes of the Philippines’ Submission nos. 11 and 12(b), the Tribunal 
was required to determine whether its jurisdiction was constrained by the 
“military activities” exception set out at Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS.299
Pursuant to Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS, “[b]efore making its award, 
the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it had jurisdiction over the 
dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law”.300
The ICJ, which is subject to a similar provision (Article 53 of the ICJ Statute), 
held in the Nuclear Tests cases that “[i]n view of the non-appearance of the 
Respondent, it was especially incumbent upon the Court to satisfy itself that it 
is in possession of all the available facts”.301
Judge Wolfrum, in an earlier ITLOS case, considered that the phrase 
“well founded in fact and law” was “not a standard of proof in the sense of 
‘preponderance of evidence’” and that it was “rather comparable to the stan-
dard of proof in the sense of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ as applied in 
297   Contrary to the Tribunal’s finding in the jurisdiction dispositif, no. 5.
298   Award, supra note 1, at merits dispositif no. 14.
299   Id. at paras. 934–38.
300   The Tribunal explicitly confirmed that it had the responsibility to establish the limits 
of its jurisdiction proactively (see, in particular, Procedural Order No. 4, 21 April 2015, 
at para. 1.4). The Tribunal also referred to the “special responsibility” that China’s non-
participation imposed on the Tribunal. Award, supra note 1, at para. 129.
301   See, e.g., Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253 (Dec. 20) (Judgement) at para. 31. 
The Court also considered that “It is to be regretted that the French Government has failed 
to appear in order to put forward its arguments on the issues arising in the present phase 
of the proceedings [jurisdiction], and the Court has thus not had the assistance it might 
have derived from such arguments or from any evidence adduced in support of them. 
The Court nevertheless has to proceed and reach a conclusion, and in doing so must have 
regard not only to the evidence brought before it and the arguments addressed to it by 
the Applicant, but also to any documentary or other evidence which may be relevant. 
It must on this basis satisfy itself, first that there exists no bar to the exercise of its judicial 
function, and secondly, if no such bar exists, that the Application is well founded in fact 
and in law” (at para. 15) (emphasis added).
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many national legal systems”.302 Certain commentators have explained that 
“[t]he methods applied by the [ICJ] in order to verify that the submissions 
of the appearing party are well founded in fact” include, inter alia, “expert 
inquiries” and “information in the public domain”.303 This is notwithstanding 
that the Court “cannot by its own enquiries entirely make up for the absence 
of one of the Parties”.304
In this case, the Tribunal upheld the Philippines’ argument that “China has 
repeatedly characterised its island-building as being for civilian purposes”.305 
Relying on “China’s repeated statements that its installations and island-
building activities are intended to fulfil civilian purposes” the Tribunal held 
that it “will not deem activities to be military in nature when China itself has 
consistently and officially resisted such classifications and affirmed the oppo-
site at the highest levels”.306 The Tribunal thus relied exclusively on statements 
of China’s officials supporting the Philippines’ position in determining that the 
“military activities” exception did not apply, and that it therefore had jurisdic-
tion to consider the Philippines’ complaints about China’s island-building and 
land reclamation activities.307
The Tribunal could (and, arguably, should) have looked for further evidence 
in relation to this important jurisdictional issue. We note, in particular, that 
the Tribunal asked the Philippines to comment on the statements of China’s 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, who stated on 9 April 2015, inter 
alia, that “[a]fter the constructions, the islands and reefs will be able to pro-
vide all-round and comprehensive services to meet various civilian demands 
besides satisfying the need of necessary military defense”.308
302   The M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent v. Guinea), 1999 I.T.L.O.S. No. 2 (Separate opin-
ion of Vice-President Wolfrum) at para. 12.
303   A. Zimmermann, K. Oellers-Frahm, C. Tomuschat & C. J. Tams, The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: A Commentary 1347 (2013) at para. 59. 
304   Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 71, at para. 30.
305   Award, supra note 1, at para. 893.
306   Id. at paras. 935, 938. The Tribunal relied, in particular, on statements from a Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, the Head of China’s delegation to the Meeting of States 
Parties to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and China’s President, Xi Jiping 
(Award, at paras. 936–937). See also Award, supra note 1, at paras. 1027–1028, regarding 
Philippines Sub missions nos. 12(a) and 12(c).
307   Award, supra note 1, at para. 938.
308   Philippines’ responses to the Tribunal’s 5 February 2016 Request for Comments, 11 March 
2016, at para. 5.
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Despite this statement, the Philippines argued that the “military exception” 
at Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS was inapplicable,309 and that “mixed-use proj-
ects” and situations “in which a military unit is used to protect other activities” 
were not covered by this exception.310 The Tribunal did not decide on the dual-
use of projects argument, however, and simply held that it accepted “China’s 
repeatedly affirmed position that civilian use compromises the primary (if not 
the only) motivation underlying the extensive construction activities on the 
seven reefs in the Spratly Islands”.311
The Tribunal’s reasoning does not appear to account for any “reasonable 
doubt” on the civilian nature of the constructions, which plainly existed 
based on the above-mentioned statement. The Tribunal could have asked the 
Philippines to produce further evidence on this issue or could have looked for 
information in the public domain (which in fact demonstrated military ele-
ments of the construction and land reclamation activities).312 In any event, 
had the Tribunal decided to rely on contemporaneous information in the pub-
lic domain it should have requested that the Parties comment on it. Arguably, 
this violated its duty under Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS to satisfy itself 
that it had jurisdiction over the dispute.
4.2 The Tribunal’s Finding that China Breached Its Obligations under 
Articles 77 and 56 of unclos (Philippines Submission No. 8;  
Tribunal Merits Dispositif Nos 8 and 9)
4.2.1 The Tribunal’s Finding that China’s Actions in Connection with  
the Survey Operations of M/V Veritas Voyager Amounted to a 
Breach of Article 77 of UNCLOS
The Philippines presented three complaints that China had violated its sover-
eign rights to the continental shelf. These related to: first, Chinese diplomatic 
objections to the Philippines government regarding certain offshore oil and gas 
activities; second, a Chinese statement to a Philippines concessionaire (Nido 
Petroleum Ltd) to the effect that the concession area was claimed by China; and 
third, specific actions by Chinese maritime surveillance vessels with regard to 
survey operations undertaken by the M/V Veritas Voyager around Reed Bank.
309   Id. at para. 6.
310   Award, supra note 1, at para. 893; Merits Hearing Tr. (Day 4) at 104.
311   Award, supra note 1, at para. 938.
312   See, e.g., China lands military plane on disputed South China Sea reef, 18 April 2016, BBC 
News, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-36069615; Philippines warning over 
China’s South China Sea reclamation, 20 April 2015, BBC News, https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-32377198.
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The Tribunal found no violation in respect of the first two complaints. In 
relation to the third incident, the Tribunal declared that China had breached 
its obligations under Article 77 of UNCLOS:
China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels in 
relation to M/V Veritas Voyager on 1 and 2 March 2011, breached its obliga-
tions under Article 77 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’ 
sovereign rights over the non-living resources of its continental shelf in 
the area of Reed Bank [Liyue Tan].313
In finding that China’s actions in connection with the survey operations 
of M/V Veritas Voyager amounted to a breach of Article 77 of UNCLOS, the 
Tribunal relied on the Philippines Navy’s account of events, which it accepted 
as “accurate”.314 Based on that evidence, the Tribunal considered that “China 
acted directly to induce M/V Veritas Voyager to cease operations and to depart 
from an area that constitutes part of the continental shelf of the Philippines”.315
The Tribunal further stated that “China was unequivocally aware that there 
existed a difference of views regarding the Parties’ respective entitlements in 
the South China Sea and, in particular, in the area of Reed Bank”.316 It con-
sidered that, instead of seeking to resolve the dispute through negotiation or 
other modes of dispute resolution identified in Part XV of [UNCLOS] and the 
UN Charter, “China sought to carry out its own understanding of its rights 
through the actions of its marine surveillance vessels”.317
The fact that China tried to dissuade M/V Veritas Voyager from undertaking 
further work in the disputed area does not seem to be disputed. If accurately 
reported by the Philippines, China confirmed that “[o]n 2 March, Chinese mar-
itime surveillance vessels were in the area” and that “[t]he vessels dissuaded 
the Forum vessel from further work”.318 China explained that “[t]his was an 
action that China had to take to safeguard its sovereignty and sovereign rights 
as a result of the unilateral action from the Philippine side”.319
313   Award, supra note 1, at para. 716.
314   Id. at para. 707.
315   Id. at para. 708.
316   Id.
317   Id.
318   Id. at para. 658 (referring to Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (10 March 2011) (Annex 70)).
319   Id. 
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The Tribunal’s finding that China violated Article 77 of UNCLOS with respect 
to the M/V Veritas Voyager incident is limited to that specific event and must 
be understood in that context.
The Tribunal dismissed the Philippines’ remaining two complaints. It 
accepted that China had asserted claims to rights in waters within 200 NM 
of the Philippines’ baselines “in good faith”, and did not dispute that China’s 
understanding of its rights in the South China Sea had been “genuinely held”.320 
Accordingly, it dismissed the Philippines’ complaints about China’s diplomatic 
objections generally regarding offshore oil and gas activities,321 and about the 
Chinese Embassy’s with Nido Petroleum.322
The implications of the Tribunal’s finding of violation by China of Article 77 
of UNCLOS are therefore highly limited in both time and scope. They relate to 
one solitary incident that occurred over two days in March 2011.
More generally and, as explained above (Section IV.A(i)), the Tribunal’s 
conclusion is premised on its finding that the area in dispute “can only consti-
tute the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines”323 and “constitutes part 
of the continental shelf of the Philippines”.324 Had the Tribunal not reached 
this (highly questionable) conclusion, it could not have found that China had 
breached Article 77 of UNCLOS.
4.2.2 The Tribunal’s Finding that the 2012 Moratorium on Fishing in the 
South China Sea Amounted to a Breach of Article 56 of unclos
The Tribunal also found a breach of Article 56 of UNCLOS, again based on a 
single Chinese measure:
China has, by promulgating its 2012 moratorium on fishing in the 
South China Sea, without exception for areas of the South China Sea 
falling within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and 
without limiting the moratorium to Chinese flagged vessels, breached 
its obligations under Article 56 of the Convention with respect to the 
Philippines’ sovereign rights over the living resources of its exclusive eco-
nomic zone.325
320   Id. at para. 704.
321   Id. at para. 705.
322   Id. at para. 706.
323   Id. at para. 695.
324   Id. at para. 708.
325   Id. at para. 716.
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The Tribunal found that China’s 2012 moratorium on fishing in the South 
China Sea (the “2012 fishing moratorium”) “constituted an assertion by China 
of jurisdiction in areas in which jurisdiction over fisheries is reserved to the 
Philippines through the operation of the provisions of [UNCLOS] concerning 
the [EEZ]”.326 It concluded that “such an assertion of jurisdiction amounts 
to a breach of Article 56 of [UNCLOS], which accords sovereign rights to the 
Philippines with respect to the living resources of its [EEZ]”.327
Two points can be noted in the Tribunal’s reasoning. First, the Tribunal 
failed to adduce any evidence that the 2012 fishing moratorium was enforced 
against any Philippines vessels in areas allegedly falling within the Philippines’ 
EEZ. The Tribunal asked the Philippines whether it could provide evidence 
that this had happened.328 When the Philippines failed to do so, the Tribunal 
appears simply to have changed the question, holding instead that “the rele-
vant question is whether China’s 2012 promulgation of the fishing moratorium 
itself, irrespective of whether the moratorium was directly enforced, infringes 
on the rights of the Philippines and constitutes a breach of the Convention”.329
Second, the Tribunal’s finding on the “deterring effect” of the 2012 fishing 
moratorium was similarly not corroborated by clear evidence. Rather, the 
Tribunal appears to have based its finding on a series of inferences; namely, 
that “the moratorium established a realistic prospect that Filipino fishermen, 
seeking to exploit resources of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, could 
be exposed to the punitive measures spelled out in the moratorium” and that 
“such developments may have a deterring effect on Filipino fishermen and 
their activities”.330
Again, the Tribunal dismissed with respect to this submission most of the 
acts invoked by the Philippines in support of its allegations.331 The Tribunal’s 
finding of a breach should once more be understood in that narrow context.
326   Id. at para. 712.
327   Id.
328   Id. at para. 710.
329   Id. at para. 711.
330   Id. at para. 712.
331   In particular, the Tribunal did not consider that the Hainan Regulation “infringe[d] on the 
rights of the Philippines or amount[ed] to a breach of the provisions of the Convention 
concerning the [EEZ]” (Id. at para. 713). It also held that, in the absence of evidence show-
ing that “Chinese Government vessels acted to prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing at 
either Second Thomas Shoal or Mischief Reef”, it was not “prepared to find a violation of 
the Convention on this basis” (Id. at paras. 714–15).
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4.3 The Tribunal’s Finding that China Breached Its Obligations under 
Article 58(3) of UNCLOS (Philippines Submission No. 9; Tribunal 
Merits Dispositif No. 10)
The Tribunal declared that China had breached its obligations under 
Article 58(3) of UNCLOS on the following basis:
that in May 2013, fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels engaged in fish-
ing within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone at Mischief Reef and 
Second Thomas Shoal;
that China, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels, 
was aware of, tolerated, and failed to exercise due diligence to prevent 
such fishing by Chinese flagged vessels; and that therefore China has 
failed to exhibit due regard for the Philippines’ sovereign rights with 
respect to fisheries in its exclusive economic zone.332
The Tribunal considered that the “obligation to have due regard to the rights 
of the Philippines is unequivocally breached when vessels under Chinese 
Government control act to escort and protect Chinese fishing vessels engaged 
in fishing unlawfully in the Philippines’ [EEZ]”.333 As a matter of fact, it deter-
mined that “Chinese fishing vessels, accompanied by the ships of [China 
Marine Surveillance], were engaged in fishing at both Mischief Reef and 
Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013”.334
Once more, the Tribunal made its finding on the basis of limited evidence, 
itself acknowledging that “[t]he record of Chinese fishing at these features is 
restricted to reports from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and confined 
to a single period in May 2013”.335 Despite that limited evidence, the Tribunal 
held that it was prepared to accept the Philippines’ account of events as 
“accurate”.336
332   Award, supra note 1, at merits dispositif no. 10.
333   Id. at para. 756.
334   Id. at paras. 746, 753.
335   Id. at para. 745. The Tribunal referred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Near- 
occupation of Chinese Vessels at Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin) in the Early Weeks of 
May 2012 (May 2013) (Annex 94). The Tribunal also considered that “China’s de facto con-
trol over the waters surrounding both features effectively limit the information available 
to the Philippines and to this Tribunal” (Id.).
336   Id. at para. 746. It is also noteworthy that the incidents described in the Armed Forces 
report, and which constituted the basis for the Tribunal’s finding of a breach of 
Article 58(3) of UNCLOS, happened after the “dispute” had crystallised and after the 
Philippines had initiated arbitration against China.
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The Tribunal provided two reasons for accepting the Philippines’ Armed 
Forces report’s account of events. It first found that China’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over the activities of Chinese fishermen in the South China 
Sea – evidenced through the issuance of a ‘Nansha Certification of Fishing 
Permit’ – supported the Philippines’ contention that Chinese vessels had been 
fishing at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal.337 The two documents on 
which the Tribunal relied do not, however, provide direct evidence that such 
permit was actually issued at the relevant time (i.e. in May 2013), nor for the 
relevant areas (i.e. Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal).338 Furthermore, 
as explained below in Section VI.B(iii), the fact that China asserts the right to 
fish does not mean that Chinese vessels have conducted such fishing activities; 
still less does it show that China failed to have “due regard” to any rights to 
which the Philippines may be entitled for the purposes of Article 58(3).
The Tribunal then considered that “the pattern of Chinese fishing activity 
at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal [was] consistent with that exhib-
ited at other reef formations for which the Tribunal has information”.339 The 
Tribunal here appears to have determined pertinent facts simply by analogy 
and inference:
First, the Tribunal referred to the presence of Chinese fishing vessels at Subi 
Reef in May 2013 and at Scarborough Shoal in April and May 2012.340 It con-
sidered that “the accounts of officially organised fishing fleets from Hainan at 
Subi Reef and the close coordination exhibited between fishing vessels and 
government ships at Scarborough Shoal support an inference that China’s 
fishing vessels are not simply escorted and protected, but organised and coor-
dinated by the Government”.341
Second, it noted that “Subi Reef and Scarborough Shoal [were] not, as a legal 
matter, comparable to Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal”.342 It consid-
ered, however, that “the similarities in Chinese fishing activities at all of these 
features [were] a significant indication of what has taken place at Mischief 
Reef and Second Thomas Shoal”.343
337   Id. at para. 747.
338   Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, to 
the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 15-2341 (16 June 2015) 
(Annex 690).
339   Id. at para. 748.
340   Id. at paras. 748–49.
341   Id. at para. 755.
342   Id. at para. 750.
343   Id. at para. 751.
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The evidence relied upon by the Tribunal in finding that China had breached 
its obligations under Article 58(3) of UNCLOS was thus very limited and, in 
many respects, circumstantial. Arguably, as set out in Section VI.B.(iii) below, 
the Philippines failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to this claim, 
and it should have been discussed. The implications of the Tribunal’s conclu-
sion on this Submission are in any event highly limited due to the fact that it 
arose out of one solitary incident in May 2013.
4.4 The Tribunal’s Finding that, from May 2012 Onwards, China 
Unlawfully Prevented Filipino Fishermen from Engaging in 
Traditional Fishing at Scarborough Shoal (Philippines Submission 
No. 10; Tribunal Merits Dispositif No. 11)
The Tribunal found that “Scarborough Shoal has been a traditional fishing 
ground for fishermen of many nationalities” and declared that “China has, 
through the operation of its official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 2012 
onwards, unlawfully prevented fishermen from the Philippines from engaging 
in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal”.344
A number of elements of this holding are open to question. Particularly 
questionable are the Tribunal’s conclusions that: (i) traditional fishing rights 
can exist in territorial sea areas but not EEZ areas; (ii) even then, traditional 
fishing rights can vest only in the individual in respect of traditional artisanal 
fishing, as opposed to vesting in the coastal State; and (iii) the evidence before 
it demonstrated the existence of Filipino traditional artisanal fishing rights 
around Scarborough Shoal. Each of these points is addressed in turn below.
4.4.1 The Tribunal’s Position on the Survival of Traditional Fishing 
Rights in the Different Maritime Zones after the Adoption  
of unclos
The Tribunal analysed whether traditional fishing rights had survived the 
adoption of UNCLOS in the different maritime zones.
With regard to archipelagic waters, the Tribunal observed that traditional 
fishing rights were expressly protected by Article 51(1) of UNCLOS.345
344   Id. at merits dispositif no. 11; Id. at para. 814. See also, Award, supra note 1, at para. 810: 
“since May 2012, Chinese Government vessels have acted to prevent entirely fishing by 
Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal for significant, but not continuous, periods of 
time. The Philippines has provided evidence of Chinese vessels physically blockading 
the entrance to Scarborough Shoal, and Filipino fishermen have testified to being driven 
away by Chinese vessels employing water cannon. During these periods, Chinese fishing 
vessels have continued to fish at Scarborough Shoal”.
345   Id. at para. 804(a).
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The Tribunal also held that traditional fishing rights could be recognised 
in the territorial sea. It considered that UNCLOS “continued the existing legal 
regime largely without change”.346 The Tribunal saw “nothing that would sug-
gest that the adoption of [UNCLOS] was intended to alter acquired rights in the 
territorial sea and conclude[d] that within that zone … established traditional 
fishing rights remain protected by international law”.347 The Tribunal sought 
support for this finding by “not[ing] that the vast majority of traditional fishing 
takes place in close proximity to the coast”.348 This statement is unsubstanti-
ated and we see no basis for the finding. It is also at odds with the Tribunal’s 
finding (noted above) that traditional fishing rights continue to exist in archi-
pelagic waters because UNCLOS expressly protects them.
In contrast to its findings in respect of archipelagic waters and the territo-
rial sea, the Tribunal considered that traditional fishing rights in the EEZ were 
“extinguished”.349
The Tribunal first noted that it disagreed with the Eritrea v. Yemen tribu-
nal, which held that “the traditional fishing regime in the Red Sea extended 
throughout the maritime zones of those States”.350 It considered that “that 
tribunal was able to reach the conclusions it did only because it was permit-
ted to apply factors other than the Convention itself under the applicable law 
provisions of the parties’ arbitration agreement”.351 As explained above in con-
nection with Chapter V of the Award, the mere fact that the Eritrea/Yemen 
tribunal benefited from a broader “applicable law” provision does not justify 
a finding that its substantive conclusion as regards the continuing nature of 
traditional fishing rights within EEZ areas was wrong as a matter of interna-
tional law.
The Tribunal then relied on Article 62(3) of UNCLOS, which requires coastal 
states to exercise their sovereign rights in the EEZ in such a way that mini-
mises the economic dislocation of foreign fishermen. It considered that “the 
inclusion of this provision – which would be entirely unnecessary if traditional 
fishing rights were preserved in the [EEZ] – confirms that the drafters of the 
Convention did not intend to preserve such rights”.352 It concluded that, fol-
lowing UNCLOS, traditional fishing rights can continue within the EEZ only at 
the discretion of the relevant coastal State.
346   Id. at para. 804(c).
347   Id.
348   Id.
349   Id. at para. 804(b).
350   Id. at para. 803.
351   Id.
352   Id. at para. 804(b).
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This seems mistaken. As explained earlier (see Section II), and contrary to 
the Tribunal’s conclusion, historic rights (including historic fishing rights) may 
continue as a matter of general public international law, within both EEZ and 
territorial sea areas, notwithstanding the Convention.353 It is also non-sensical 
for the Tribunal to have concluded that the protection of traditional fishing 
rights at international law is a matter within the discretion of the coastal State 
following UNCLOS.
Commentators have also highlighted the “serious anomaly” that the Tri-
bunal’s interpretation of traditional fishing rights in the different maritime 
areas would create: namely, that foreign fishermen may have greater rights to 
fish in the coastal State’s territorial sea than they would have in its EEZ.354
4.4.2 The Tribunal’s Interpretation of Traditional Fishing Rights as 
Private Rights (As Opposed to State Rights)
The Tribunal held that traditional fishing rights were private rights rather than 
States’ rights. It first noted that the “[t]he legal basis for protecting artisanal 
fishing stems from the notion of vested rights”.355 It then considered that 
“artisanal fishing rights attach to the individuals and communities that have 
traditionally fished in an area” and were “not the historic rights of States, as in 
the case of historic titles, but private rights”.356 The Tribunal relied on Eritrea 
v. Yemen, where the tribunal “declined to endorse ‘the western legal fiction 
whereby all legal rights, even those in reality held by individuals, were deemed 
to be those of the State’”.357
It is questionable as to whether the Eritrea v. Yemen tribunal’s reasoning 
should have been so readily applied to the South China Sea. In particular, the 
Eritrea v. Yemen tribunal explained that it had based “this aspect of its Award 
on Sovereignty on the respect for regional legal traditions”.358 These included, 
for instance, “[t]he basic Islamic concept by virtue of which all humans are 
‘stewards of God’ on earth, with an inherent right to sustain their nutritional 
needs through fishing from coast to coast with free access to fish on either side 
and to trade the surplus”.359 This “regional legal tradition” is of course absent 
353   See Section 2.b.
354   See, e.g., Chris Whomersley, The Award on the Merits in the Case Brought by the Philippines 
against China Relating to the South China Sea: A Critique, 16 CHINESE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 387, 413 (2017).
355   Award, supra note 1, at para. 798.
356   Id.
357   Id.
358   Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea, supra note 16, at para. 92.
359   Id.
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from the South China Sea context with respect to the bilateral relationship 
between China and the Philippines.
The Tribunal’s observation that the Eritrea/Yemen tribunal considered arti-
sanal fishing rights is vesting only in private individuals, rather than States, is 
also questionable. In Eritrea/Yemen, the tribunal observed that the “traditional 
fishing regime” in the Red Sea applied to the mutual relations between the 
two States concerned, beyond the fishermen as “immediate beneficiaries”.360 
Moreover, it is clear that traditional fishing rights themselves can vest in the 
coastal State as a matter of international law. Thus, in Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), the ICJ stated that “in order to reach an equita-
ble solution of the present dispute it is necessary that the preferential fishing 
rights of Iceland, as a State specially dependent on coastal fisheries, be recon-
ciled with the traditional fishing rights of the [United Kingdom]”.361 Moreover, 
in some situations (such as the Jan Mayen case), the extent and importance 
of fishing activity will be sufficient to shift a maritime boundary in the coastal 
State’s favour.
Furthermore, as highlighted by the Chinese Society of International Law, 
the only provision in UNCLOS which mentions traditional fishing rights, 
Article 51(1), treats those rights as rights of the States:
an archipelagic State shall respect existing agreements with other States 
and shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activi-
ties of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States …
Since the Tribunal’s analysis was restricted to artisanal fishing rights enjoyed 
by individual Filipino (and Chinese) fishermen, its findings with respect to 
China’s interference with Filipino fishing at Scarborough Shoal did not extend 
to any traditional fishing rights that maybe enjoyed by the State. For the reasons 
explained at Section II above, the Tribunal’s conclusion that States’ historical 
rights under customary international law were “superseded”, and thus effec-
tively wiped out, by UNCLOS is probably wrong.
Incidentally, Professor Talmon notes that “[i]n Submission No. 10 the 
Philippines […] did not claim a violation of its own rights under the Convention 
and general international law but a violation of the rights of its citizens – the 
Filipino fishermen”.362 He concludes that the Philippines “brought a claim on 
360   Id. at para. 93.
361   Fisheries, supra note 38, at para. 69.
362   Talmon, supra note 33, at para. 187.
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behalf of its citizen fishermen by way of diplomatic protection” and that this 
claim would accordingly be submitted to the rule of exhaustion of local rem-
edies contained in UNCLOS at Article 295 – which the Tribunal did not raise 
in its Award on Jurisdiction.363 If traditional fishing rights are to be treated 
exclusively as private rights – as the Tribunal appears to have assumed – then 
we concur with Professor Talmon that the rule on the exhaustion of local rem-
edies would apply, and should have been considered by the Tribunal.
4.4.3 The Tribunal’s Recognition of Traditional Artisanal Fishing Rights 
at Scarborough Shoal
The Tribunal adopted a restrictive approach in determining that traditional 
fishing rights existed around Scarborough Shoal. In particular, its legal and 
factual analysis of the traditional fishing rights of Filipino fishermen focused 
exclusively on the artisanal aspect of those rights, as opposed to the extent to 
which such rights vested more broadly in the coastal State.
The Tribunal considered that:
[t]he legal basis for protecting artisanal fishing stems from the notion 
of vested rights and the understanding that, having pursued a livelihood 
through artisanal fishing over an extended period, generations of fisher-
men have acquired a right, akin to property, in the ability to continue 
to fish in the manner of their forebears. Thus, traditional fishing rights 
extend to artisanal fishing that is carried out largely in keeping with the 
longstanding practice of community, in other words to “those entitle-
ments that all fishermen have exercised continuously through ages”.364
It further held that:
traditional fishing rights are customary rights, acquired through long 
usage, […] that the methods of fishing protected under international law 
would be those that broadly follow the manner of fishing carried out for 
generations: in other words, artisanal fishing in keeping with the tradi-
tions and customs of the region.365
363   Id. at paras. 187–92.
364   Award, supra note 1, at para. 798.
365   Id. at para. 806.
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The importance of the temporal aspect of traditional artisanal fishing rights 
was highlighted in Eritrea v. Yemen, where the tribunal explained that “[t]he 
traditional fishing regime covers those entitlements that all the fishermen 
have exercised continuously through the ages”.366 That tribunal recognised 
traditional artisanal fishing rights in a situation where there was “abundant 
literature on the historical realities which characterized the lives of the pop-
ulations” and a “well-established factual situation reflected in deeply rooted 
common legal traditions which prevailed during several centuries”.367 In the 
tribunal’s opinion, “What was relevant was that fishermen from both of these 
nations had, from time immemorial, used these islands for fishing and activi-
ties related thereto.”368
In the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal determined that “there 
was evidence that the surrounding waters have continued to serve as tradi-
tional fishing grounds for fishermen, including those from the Philippines, Viet 
Nam, and China (including Taiwan)”.369 It also accepted that “the claims of 
both the Philippines and China to have traditionally fished at the shoal are 
accurate and advanced in good faith”.370
In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal noted that:
the stories of most of those who have fished at Scarborough Shoal in gen-
erations past have not been the subject of written records;371
traditional fishing rights constitute an area where matters of evidence 
should be approached with sensitivity;372
it “does not have before it extensive details of the fishing methods 
traditionally used by either Filipino or Chinese fishermen, or of the 
communities that have traditionally dispatched vessels to Scarborough 
Shoal”;373 and
it was “not prepared to specify any precise threshold for the fishing 
methods that would qualify as artisanal fishing”.374
366   Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea, supra note 16, at para. 104.
367   Id. at para. 92.
368   Id. at para. 95.
369   Award, supra note 1, at para. 761; see also id. at para. 805.
370   Id. at para. 805.
371   Id.
372   Id.
373   Id. at para. 806.
374   Id.
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Despite these reservations as to the factual and evidentiary basis for estab-
lishing traditional artisanal fishing rights, the Tribunal concluded that it “was 
of the view that at least some of the fishing carried out at Scarborough Shoal 
has been of a traditional, artisanal nature”.375
The Tribunal’s finding of traditional artisanal fishing around Scarborough 
Shoal was thus reached without having conducted a full examination as to 
whether a tradition (i.e. the temporal aspect) had been established and, once 
more, on the basis of sparse evidence. In this respect also, the Award is dis-
tinguishable from the Eritrea/Yemen case, where the existence of continuous 
fishing “through the ages” was clear.
By contrast, in concluding that Filipino traditional artisanal fishing rights 
existed around Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal referred only to an extract 
from a 1953 book published by the Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and an 
article from the Philippines Farmers Journal of 1960 allegedly depicting 
“Scarborough Shoal as having historically served as one of the ‘principle fish-
ing areas’ for Filipino fishermen”.376 Neither of these documents categorically 
establishes the existence of traditional Filipino fishing around Scarborough 
Shoal “through the ages”.377
The Tribunal also referred to a Memorandum from the Philippines Navy of 
April 2012 that described Scarborough Shoal as “a traditional fishing ground 
of fishermen from neighbouring Asian countries” and stated that “[b]oth for-
eign and local fishermen are among those who venture to this atoll”.378 This 
statement, produced by the Philippines less than a year before it commenced 
the arbitration, equally cannot confirm or establish Filipino traditional arti-
sanal fishing at Scarborough Shoal.379
The Tribunal finally referred to the affidavits of six Filipino fishermen which, 
according to the Tribunal, “provid[ed] direct documentation of Philippines 
fishing activities in the area at least since 1982 and indirect evidence from 
375   Id. at para. 807.
376   Id. at para. 762; P. Manacop, The Principal Marine Fisheries, in Philippine Fisheries: 
Handbook Prepared by the Technical Staff of the Bureau of Fisheries 103, 
121 (D.V. Villadolid ed., 1953) (Annex 8); A.M. Mane, Status, Problems and Prospects of 
the Philippine Fisheries Industry, 2(4) Philippine Farmers Journal 32, 34 (1960) 
(Annex 244).
377   Award, supra note 1, at para. 798 (referring to Eritrea v. Yemen, Award, 17 December 1999 at 
para. 104).
378   Id. at para. 761 (referring to Memorandum from Colonel, Philippine Navy, to Chief of Staff, 
Armed Forces of the Philippines, No. N2E-0412-008 (April 2012) (Annex 77)).
379   Critical Study, supra note 84, at para. 762.
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1972”.380 These affidavits were key to the Tribunal’s finding of “traditional, arti-
sanal nature” fishing at Scarborough Shoal. It was these affidavits which formed 
the foundation for the Tribunal’s conclusion that “at least some of the fishing 
carried out at Scarborough Shoal has been of a traditional, artisanal nature”.381
The Award’s finding with respect to the existence of traditional artisanal 
fishing by Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal is therefore based on a lim-
ited evidentiary record. It is also unduly restrictive in focusing on traditional 
artisanal fishing rights (enjoyed by the individual) and excluding the possibil-
ity of traditional fishing rights enjoyed by the State.
We note that the Tribunal found that Chinese fishermen equally enjoy tra-
ditional artisanal fishing rights around Scarborough Shoal.382 As explained 
above, however, the Tribunal was probably mistaken to exclude the possibility 
of Chinese artisanal fishing rights extending beyond the 12-mile limit around 
Scarborough Shoal.
4.5 The Tribunal’s Finding that, with Respect to the Protection and 
Preservation of the Marine Environment in the South China Sea, 
China Breached Its Obligations under Articles 123, 192, 194(1), 194(5), 
197, and 206 of UNCLOS (Philippines Submissions Nos. 11 and 12(b); 
Tribunal Merits Dispositif Nos. 12 and 13)
The Tribunal found that, with respect to the harvesting of endangered species, 
China had breached its obligations under Articles 192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS.383 
It further found that, with respect to construction activities on seven reefs in 
the Spratly Islands, China had breached its obligations under Articles 123, 192, 
194(1), 194(5), 197 and 206 of UNCLOS.384
380   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 763, 807.
381   Id. at para. 807. The Tribunal also relied on a report from FRPLEU/QRT Officers, Bureau of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Republic of the Philippines, to the Director, Bureau of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Republic of the Philippines (2 May 2012) (Annex 80). 
Nevertheless, this article mainly relates to the activities of Chinese fishermen.
382   Id. at paras. 805–07.
383   Id. at merits dispositif no. 12.
384   Id. at merits dispositif no. 13.
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4.5.1 The Tribunal’s Finding with Respect to the Harvesting of 
Endangered Species
The Tribunal declared that “China has breached its obligations under 
Articles 192 and 194(5) of [UNCLOS]” based on the following findings:
that fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have engaged in the harvest-
ing of endangered species on a significant scale;
that fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have engaged in the har-
vesting of giant clams in a manner that is severally destructive of the 
coral reef ecosystem; and
that China was aware of, tolerated, protected, and failed to prevent the 
aforementioned harmful activities….385
The Tribunal found no breaches by China with respect to the alleged use by 
Chinese fishermen of explosives and cyanide at Scarborough and Second 
Thomas Shoal. It considered that there was “scant evidence in the case record 
[of such practices] over the last decade or Philippine complaints about its use”, 
which suggested that China “may have taken measures to prevent such prac-
tices in the Spratly Islands”.386
4.5.1.1 The Tribunal’s Finding that China Breached Its Obligations under 
Articles 192 and 194(5) of unclos to Take Necessary Measures to 
Protect and Preserve the Marine Environment with Respect to the 
Harvesting of Endangered Species from the Fragile Ecosystems at 
Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal
The Tribunal found that “fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have engaged 
in the harvesting of endangered species on a significant scale”.387 It listed vari-
ous instances in or at Scarborough Shoal between 1998 and 2012,388 and one 
instance at Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013.389 The Tribunal also noted that 
“recent evidence indicates the large-scale harvest of endangered hawksbill 
sea turtles by Chinese fishermen, whose arrest by Philippine authorities led to 
385   Id. at merits’ dispositif no. 12; see also id. at para. 992.
386   Id. at para. 975.
387   Id. at merits’ dispositif no. 12(a); see also id. at para. 950.
388   Id. at para. 950.
389   Id. at para. 951.
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protest by China”.390 In the absence of contradictory evidence, we see no basis 
on which to challenge these factual findings.
The Tribunal also held that it had “no hesitation” in finding that China 
breached its obligations under Articles 192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS to take the 
necessary measures to protect and preserve the maritime environment.391 It 
reached this conclusion in two steps.
First, the Tribunal considered that China was aware of the poaching prac-
tice by Chinese vessels,392 and that there was “no evidence in the record that 
would indicate that China has taken any steps to enforce […] rules and mea-
sures [including CITES, to which China is a party, and China’s 1989 Law of the 
Protection of Wildlife] against fishermen engaged in poaching of endangered 
species”.393
While not on the record (due to China’s non-participation), publicly avail-
able evidence did exist to show that China had taken certain measures to 
prevent the illegal harvesting of endangered species in the South China Sea. 
The Critical Study of the Chinese Society of International Law refers to some 
examples, including: (i) the adoption of joint law enforcement actions by 
various governmental entities in June 2003 and June 2012;394 (ii) the adoption 
by the Qionghai City and Tanmen Town in Hainan province in March 2015 
of an “Implementation Program for Carrying out the Special Inspection for 
Combating Illegal Acts such as Dredging, Transporting and Selling of Giant 
390   Id. at para. 952.
391   Id. at para. 964.
392   Id. at paras. 962–63.
393   Id. at para. 964. See also id. at para. 915: “the Tribunal has seen no evidence that Chinese 
fishermen involved in poaching of endangered species have been prosecuted under 
Chinese law”.
394   Critical Study, supra note 84, at para. 797. As noted by the Chinese Society of International 
Law, “on 25 June 2003, Ministry of Agriculture, State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce, General Administration of Customs and Ministry of Public Security jointly 
started a special law enforcement program to penalize illegal hunting, killing, pur-
chasing, selling, transporting, importing and exporting aquatic wild animals”; and 
“[o]n 28 June 2012, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Security and General 
Administration of Customs organized another special law enforcement program to 
combat illegal harvesting, trading and utilizing, and smuggling of aquatic wild ani-
mals”, referring to xinhuanet.com articles, China’s Ministry of Agriculture: a Special 
Action will be launched to save aquatic wild animals, http://news.xinhuanet.com/news 
center/2003-06/25/content_937686.htm; Wildlife conservation office of China’s Ministry of 
Agriculture: joint law enforcement will be conducted by China’s several Ministries for aquatic 
wild animal protection, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-06/28/c_.
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Clams”;395 and (iii) at least two cases in which Chinese fishermen were 
arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned.396
The evidence of enforcement measures and prosecutions in the specific 
areas at issue is however relatively sparse, particularly when contrasted against 
the evidence of widespread illegal and damaging activities in those areas upon 
which the Tribunal relied.397 We therefore consider that this would do little to 
disprove the Tribunal’s conclusion.
Second, the Tribunal considered that, at least for the April 2012 incidents, 
the evidence in fact “points directly to the contrary”, i.e., in its opinion, China 
protected and tolerated the harvesting of giant clams.398 The Tribunal relied 
on various pieces of contemporaneous evidence, including photographic 
evidence, in reaching its conclusion that “China must have known and deliber-
ately tolerated, and protected the harmful acts”.399
In the absence of contradictory evidence, we see no basis on which to chal-
lenge the Tribunal’s conclusions in these respects.
395   Id. at para. 799. As noted by the Chinese Society of International Law, Qionghai City of 
Hainan province and the local government of Tanmen Town have respectively issued and 
formulated such programs (see Implementation Program for Carrying out the Special Law 
Enforcement Inspection for Combating Illegal Dredging, Transporting and Selling of Giant 
Clams in Qionghai City, http://xxgk.hainan.gov.cn/qhxxgk/bgt/201503/t20150326_1539023 
.htm and Implementation Program for Carrying out the Special Inspection for Combating 
Illegal Acts such as Dredging, Transporting and Selling of Giant Clams, http://xxgk 
.hainan.gov.cn/qhxxgk/tmz/201509/t20150925_1672393.htm). Through these programs 
the Qionhai city and the Tanmen town are willing to “implement the Law of the [PRC] 
on the Protection of Wild Animals and other relevant laws and regulations, and further 
strengthen the protection of aquatic animal resources, and maintain a balanced devel-
opment of the marine ecological environment”. The programs target, inter alia, fishing 
vessels which illegally collected shells from the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.
396   Id. at para. 800. The Chinese Society of International Law reports two cases where the 
harvesting of endangered species happened in the South China Sea. In the first case, “Li, 
Fu and Yang were arrested [on 3 December 2007] for illegal purchasing, transporting, 
selling sea turtles, and subsequently prosecuted and punished by a People’s Court in the 
suburban areas of Sanya City, Hainan Province”, citing Three persons were sentenced to 
imprisonment from 9 months to 2 years respectively for purchasing, transporting, and sell-
ing 54 sea turtles, http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2008-08-07/121212.html. The 
press article reports that the fishermen illegally caught sea turtles in the Nansha sea. In 
the second case, “Yao was arrested [in May 2004] for illegal selling of red corals products, 
and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment by a People’s Court in Guangzhou City, 
Guangdong Province”. 
397   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 950–53.
398   Id. at para. 964.
399   Id.
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More generally, we consider that given the nature of the “due diligence” 
obligations enshrined in Articles 192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS, the Tribunal’s con-
clusion of a violation of these Articles was correct, regardless of whether or not 
China “tolerated” or “protected” the harmful activities. These articles respec-
tively provide that “States have the obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment” and that the measures taken “shall include those neces-
sary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life”. 
The Tribunal’s findings about the China’s alleged “tolerance” and “protection” 
were incidental, given its finding that China had failed to take such necessary 
measures to protect and preserve the maritime environment.
4.5.1.2 The Tribunal’s Finding that China Breached Its Obligation to  
Protect and Preserve the Marine Environment in Respect of Its 
Toleration and Protection of the Harvesting of Giant Clams by the 
Propeller Chopping Method
The Tribunal established that “fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have 
engaged in the harvesting of giant clams in a manner that is severally destruc-
tive of the coral reef ecosystem”.400 It held that the Tribunal was “satisfied 
based on its review of satellite imagery, photographic and video evidence, con-
temporaneous press reports, scientific studies and the materials from Professor 
Mc Manus, that in recent years, Chinese fishing vessels have been engaged in 
widespread harvesting of giant clams through the use of boat propellers to 
break through the coral substrate in search of buried clam shells”.401
The Tribunal then considered that “the small propellers vessels involved in 
harvesting the giant clams were within China’s jurisdiction and control”.402 It 
found that “China, despite its rules on the protection of giant clams, and on 
the preservation of the coral reef environment generally, was fully aware of the 
practice and has actively tolerated it as a means to exploit the living resources 
of the reefs in the months prior to those reefs succumbing to the near perma-
nent destruction brought about by the island-building activities”.403
The Tribunal overtly based its conclusion on: (i) the Ferse Report; (ii) the 
McManus Report; and (iii) an article from the website The Diplomat. Yet neither 
the Ferse Report nor the McManus Report refer to China’s awareness or “active 
tolerance” of this practice. The Tribunal’s fundamental finding is thus primarily 
400   Id. at merits dispositif no. 12(b).
401   Id. at para. 953, 957–58.
402   Id. at para. 965.
403   Id. 
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based on an article from the website The Diplomat.404 Notwithstanding the 
limited evidence, we see no basis on which to challenge the Tribunal’s finding 
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
4.5.2 The Tribunal’s Finding with Respect to Construction Activities on 
Seven Reefs in the Spratly Islands
The Tribunal declared that “China has breached its obligations under 
Articles 123, 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, and 206 of the Convention” based on the 
following findings:
… China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands, instal-
lations, and structures at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef 
(North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef has 
caused severe, irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem;
[…] China has not cooperated or coordinated with the other States 
bordering the South China Sea concerning the protection and preserva-
tion of the marine environment concerning such activities; and
[…] China has failed to communicate an assessment of the potential 
effects of such activities on the marine environment, within the meaning 
of Article 206 of the Convention.405
4.5.2.1 The Tribunal’s Position on China’s Obligation to Cooperate or 
Coordinate with Other States Bordering the South China Sea
The Tribunal held that, “[w]ith respect to China’s island-building program”, 
it had before it “no convincing evidence of China attempting to cooperate or 
coordinate with the other States bordering the South China Sea”.406 It conse-
quently found a breach of Articles 197 and 123 of UNCLOS.407
ITLOS has declared the duty to cooperate a fundamental principle of inter-
national law.408 Nevertheless, the precise scope of that duty is dependent on 
404   V.R. Lee, Satellite Imagery Shows Ecocide in the South China Sea, The Diplomat (15 Jan- 
uary 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/satellite-images-show-ecocide-in-the 
-south-china-sea/. According to this article, there “is abundant evidence that China’s navy 
and coast guard have been aware of the Tanmen fishermen’s practice of chopping reefs, 
and tolerated or condoned it”.
405   Award, supra note 1, at merits dispositif no. 13.
406   Id. at para. 986.
407   Id. at merits dispositif no. 13.
408   Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, ITLOS Rep. 82: “the 
duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment under Part XII of the Convention and general international law”; Land 
Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Case 
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the specific nature of each relevant regime.409 We understand in this con-
text that the Chinese language version of Article 197 enumerates a duty that 
is potentially more restrictive than that contained in the English language 
version.410 Had the Tribunal reviewed (and taken account of) that different 
understanding of the duty contained in Article 197, then it may have reached 
a different conclusion as to the scope of the obligation and, consequently, 
China’s breach. It goes without saying that the various official language ver-
sions of UNCLOS (in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) 
are all equally authentic (Article 320), and there is thus no reason to prefer the 
English over the Chinese.411
The Tribunal’s finding in any case overlooks the fact that China appears 
to have undertaken various initiatives at the multilateral level to enhance 
cooperation on marine environmental protection.412 For example, China and 
No. 12, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, ITLOS Rep. 92; Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted 
by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 
2, 2013, ITLOS Rep. 140.
409   See Robert Steenkamp, UNCLOS, CITES and the IWC – A Tailored International Duty to 
Cooperate? EJIL: TALK (6 November 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/unclos-cites-and-the 
-iwc-a-tailored-international-duty-to-cooperate/.
410   Article 197 of UNCLOS, in English, provides that: “States shall cooperate on a global basis 
and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international 
organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recom-
mended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional 
features”.
    The English translation of the Chinese version of this Article reads as follows: “When 
formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices 
and procedures consistent with this Convention in order to protect and preserve the 
marine environment, states shall co-operate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a 
regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, and take into 
account characteristic regional features”.
    These two provisions clearly differ: while the English language version enumerates 
a general duty to cooperate, the Chinese language version appears only to attach such 
duty to circumstances where States choose to “formulat[e] and elaborate[e] interna-
tional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this 
Convention”.
411   We note, however, that the French and Spanish language versions are more similar in 
meaning to the English than the Chinese, lending weight to a preference for adopting 
the former’s scope of obligation. We have not reviewed the Arabic and Russian language 
versions. 
412   Critical Study, supra note 84, at para. 814. The Chinese Society of International Law 
refers, inter alia, to China’s establishment in 2011 of the “China-ASEAN Maritime Fund” 
and to the adoption of the “Cooperation Framework Plan on the South China Sea and 
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the Philippines both participated in the ‘Action Plan for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the East Asian 
Seas Region’ (including the South China Sea).413 This Action Plan covers, inter 
alia, the protection of the marine and coastal environment and is steered by a 
Coordinating Body on the Seas of East of Asia (COBSEA).
The question remains as to whether such evidence, if before the Tribunal, 
would have been sufficient to alter its conclusion. In isolation, this seems 
unlikely. The Tribunal seemed to be looking for specific evidence of coopera-
tion “with respect to China island-buildings program”.414 In the MOX Plant case, 
the duty to cooperate was interpreted by ITLOS to include an obligation to 
exchange information on the risks or effects of an activity that could poten-
tially harm the other state.415 Furthermore, as pointed out by the Tribunal, 
in the ICJ’s Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, the Court noted that “by co-
operating […] the States concerned can manage the risks of damage to the 
environment that might be created by the plan initiated by one or [the] other 
of them, so as to prevent the damage in question”.416 Therefore, evidence of 
a more compelling nature would show that China also cooperated and coor-
dinated with other States bordering the South China Sea with respect to its 
reclamation and construction activities on the seven features themselves.417
its Surrounding Waters (2011–2015)” published by the SOA, which focused, inter alia, on 
marine environmental protection and marine ecosystem and biological diversity. China 
had engaged in bilateral co-operation on marine environmental protection with littoral 
countries such as Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia.
413   See COBSEA, https://www.cobsea.org/aboutcobsea/background.html. 
414   Award, supra note 1, at para. 986.
415   Mox Plant Case, supra note 408, at para. 84. See also dispositive, supra note 288 at 110–11: 
the tribunal prescribed, inter alia, that “Ireland and United Kingdom shall cooperate and 
shall, for this purpose, enter into consultations forthwith in order to (a) exchange fur-
ther information with regard to possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the 
commissioning of the MOX plant […]”. On the duty of prior information and the duty to 
cooperate, see also Land Reclamation Case, supra note 408, at paras. 92, 99.
416   Award, supra note 1, at para. 987 (referring to Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 
Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 77 (Apr. 20)).
417   We also note that the Tribunal stated that “Throughout the course of China’s island-
building project, in multiple exchanges of diplomatic notes, the Philippines has strongly 
protested China’s activities and China has rejected ‘the groundless protest and accusation’ 
by the Philippines. China has also pointed out that ‘the Philippine side has constructed 
and kept expanding facilities including airports, harbors, stilt houses and schools on 
some of the illegally occupied islands and reefs’”. Award, supra note 1, at para. 859.
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4.5.2.2 The Tribunal’s Position on China’s Obligation to Assess and 
Communicate the Environmental Impacts of the Constructions
Relying on Article 206 UNCLOS, the Tribunal considered that “given the scale 
and impact of the island-building activities […], China could not reasonably 
have held any belief other than that the construction ‘may cause significant 
and harmful changes to the marine environment’”.418 It considered that “China 
was required, ‘as far as practicable’, to prepare an environmental impact assess-
ment” and that “[i]t was also under an obligation to communicate the results 
of the assessment”.419
The Tribunal held that, while it could not make a definitive finding that 
China had not prepared an environmental impact assessment, “[t]o fulfil the 
obligations of Article 206, a State must not only prepare an EIA but also com-
municate it”.420
The Tribunal held that China had “delivered no assessment in writing to 
[competent international organisations] or any other international body as 
far as the Tribunal is aware”.421 It concluded that “China ha[d] not fulfilled its 
duties under Article 206 of the Convention”.422 In the absence of contradictory 
evidence, we see no basis on which to challenge this conclusion.423
4.6 The Tribunal’s Finding that, through Its Construction of Artificial 
Islands, Installations and Structures at Mischief Reef, China 
Breached Articles 60 and 80 of unclos (Philippines Submission  
No. 12(A) and (C); Tribunal Merits Dispositif No. 14)
With regard to this submission, the Tribunal first found that “China has 
engaged in the construction of artificial islands, installations, and structures at 
418   Award, supra note 1, at para. 988.
419   Id.
420   Id. at para. 991.
421   Id.
422   Id.
423   We note that during the Hearing on Merits, the Tribunal asked the Philippines if it was 
“aware of any experts from China or elsewhere that have published or articulated views 
about the environmental impact of China’s activities or toleration of activities by others 
within its control that are contrary or different to those of the Philippines”. Id. at para. 
921. As explained in the Award, the Philippines explained that “its searches had turned 
up only ‘a brief statement from the State Oceanic Administration’”. Id. at para. 921. The 
Tribunal also invited the Chinese Government “to indicate whether it has conducted an 
environmental impact study as per Article 206 of the Convention and, if so, to provide 
the Tribunal with a copy” and that “China did not respond to the Tribunal’s request”. Id. at 
para. 924.
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Mischief Reef without the authorisation of the Philippines”.424 It then recalled 
“(i) its finding that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation, (ii) its declaration that 
low-tide elevations are not capable of appropriation, and (iii) its declaration 
that Mischief Reef is within the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf 
of the Philippines”.425 The Tribunal finally declared that “China has breached 
Articles 60 and 80 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign 
rights in its [EEZ] and continental shelf”.426
Subject to the jurisdictional concerns raised in Section IV.A(i) above, we 
have no further comments on the Tribunal’s findings with respect to the 
Philippines’ Submission no. 12.
4.7 The Tribunal’s Finding that China’s Operation of Its Law 
Enforcement Vessels Violated colregs and, as a Consequence, 
Breached Article 94 of unclos (Philippines Submission No. 13; 
Tribunal Merits Dispositif No. 15)
The Tribunal found that China’s operation of its law enforcement vessels in 
the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal on 28 April 2012 and 26 May 2012: “created 
serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships and personnel; and … 
violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 [COLREGS]”.427
The Tribunal accordingly declared that “China has breached its obligations 
under Article 94 of the Convention”.428
4.7.1 The Tribunal’s Application of COLREGS and Article 94 UNCLOS
The Tribunal upheld the Philippines’ position that the COLREGS is “one of the 
‘general accepted international regulations’ to which flag States are required 
to conform”.429 It held that “Article 94 incorporates the COLREGS into the 
Convention, and they are consequently binding on China”.430 The Tribunal 
concluded that “a violation of the COLREGS, as ‘generally accepted interna-
tional regulations’ concerning measures necessary to ensure maritime safety, 
constitutes a violation of [UNCLOS] itself”.431 Although the Tribunal did not 
explain how it came to final conclusion, we consider that it was probably 
correct on the law. Article 94(5) of UNCLOS provides that “[i]n taking the 
424   Award, supra note 1, at merits dispositif no. 14.
425   Id.
426   Id.
427   Id. at merits dispositif no. 15.
428   Id.
429   Id. at para. 1063.
430   Id. at para. 1083.
431   Id.
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measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is required to conform to 
generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and 
to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance”. This 
Article “effectively incorporates by reference obligations found in other trea-
ties or non-binding instruments, and gives them the force of a treaty obligation 
under UNCLOS (so-called ‘rules of references’)”.432 Furthermore, “[c]ommenta-
tors generally agree that … the [COLREGS] qualify” as such “generally accepted 
international regulations”.433
Some commentators have nevertheless raised the question of the applicabil-
ity of the COLREGS in the circumstances of the South China Sea arbitration. For 
example, the Tribunal observed that the dispute related “principally to events 
that occurred in the territorial sea” of Scarborough Shoal.434 However, as noted 
by Whomersley and the Chinese Society of International Law, Article 94 is 
contained in Part VII of UNCLOS which is entitled “High Seas”.435 Whomersley 
considers that “the presumption must [therefore] be that [Article 94] only 
applies on the high seas”.436 We consider this to be a sound argument. After 
all, Article 86 (which introduces Part VII of UNCLOS) provides in pertinent 
part that:
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not 
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic 
State.
This criticism of the Award is also supported by commentators to UNCLOS, 
who note that “Article 94 sets out the duties of the flag State with regard to 
ships flying its flag … [i]n that context, it provides for flag State investigation 
432   Alexander Proelss (eds.), Commentary under Article 94, United Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, A Commentary (2017), at para. 11.
433   Id. (referring to J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the 
Development of International Law 161–62 (2011)); Robin R. Churchill & Alan V. 
Lowe, The Law of the Sea 265–72 (3rd ed. 1999); Donald R. Rothwell & Tim Stephens, 
The International Law of the Sea 359–62 (2d ed. 2016). See also International 
Maritime Organization, Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea for the International Maritime Organization, Doc. LEG/MISC.8, 30 January 2014, in 
which the IMO lists the COLREGS as regulations that “on account of their worldwide 
acceptance, [may] be deemed to fulfil the general acceptance requirement”.
434   Award, supra note 1, at para. 1045.
435   Whomersley, supra note 354, at para. 65; see also Critical Study, supra note 84, at 
para. 836.
436   Id.
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where proper jurisdiction and control have not been exercised, and for inquiry 
into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas”.437 It is 
also supported by the fact that Article 21(4) of UNCLOS separately addresses 
the question of the application of the COLREGS to foreign ships exercising the 
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.438 In parallel, Article 25(1) 
of UNCLOS safeguards the coastal State’s right to “take the necessary steps in its 
territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent”.
Whomersley also raises the question as to whether the COLREGS should 
have applied in circumstances where “the vessels involved were Chinese law 
enforcement vessels engaged in official activities in what China considers, and 
the Tribunal assumed, to be within Chinese jurisdiction”.439 He argues that, 
in such circumstances, “the normal rules of navigation cannot apply”.440 This 
is another credible line of argument. Whomersley considers that “one would 
naturally look to other rules of international law to regulate the activities of 
vessels engaged in law enforcement activities” and that ITLOS’ MV Saiga (No. 2) 
case “ought to have been the yardstick against which the Tribunal should have 
measured the acceptability of the actions of the Chinese vessels”.441
In MV Saiga (No. 2), ITLOS stated that “[a]lthough [UNCLOS] does not con-
tain express provisions on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international 
law, which is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires 
that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is 
unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the 
circumstances.”442
ITLOS recalled that “[t]hese principles have been followed over the years in 
law enforcement operations at sea”.443 It further explained that:
The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to give an auditory 
or visual signal to stop, using internationally recognized signals. Where 
this does not succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, including the 
firing of shots across the bows of the ship. It is only after the appropriate 
437   Myron H. Nordquist et al.  (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982: A Commentary Article 94, para. 94.1.
438   Article 21(4) UNCLOS provides that “[f]oreign ships exercising the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and 
all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions 
at sea”.
439   Whomersley, supra note 354, at para. 62.
440   Id.
441   Id.
442   The M/V “Saiga”, supra note 63, at para. 155.
443   Id. at para. 156.
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actions fail that the pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use force. Even 
then, appropriate warning must be issued to the ship and all efforts 
should be made to ensure that life is not endangered (S.S. “I’m Alone” 
case (Canada/United States, 1935), U.N.R.I.A.A., Vol. III, p. 1609; The Red 
Crusader case (Commission of Enquiry, Denmark – United Kingdom, 
1962), I.L.R., Vol. 35, p. 485).444
ITLOS concluded that:
[t]he basic principle concerning the use of force in the arrest of a ship 
at sea has been reaffirmed by the Agreement for the Implementation 
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea […]: (1) The inspecting State shall ensure that its duly authorized 
inspectors: … (f) avoid the use of force except when and to the degree 
necessary to ensure the safety of the inspectors and where the inspectors 
are obstructed in the execution of their duties. The degree of force used 
shall not exceed that reasonably required in the circumstances.445
Whomersley finally raises the question as to whether “China was under an 
obligation under UNCLOS to apply the COLREGS to Chinese flag vessels in the 
territorial sea of a feature which is assumed to be under its sovereignty”.446 
Based on the above analysis of Article 94 and on the fact that Article 21(4) 
UNCLOS only applies to “foreign ships exercising the right of innocent pas-
sage”, he considers that “there is nothing in UNCLOS to place an obligation on a 
State to apply the COLREGS to its own flag vessels in its own territorial sea”.447 
Again, this seems to us a sound argument. Moreover, the Tribunal would have 
had no jurisdiction to consider whether or not Chinese activities violated 
Article 21(4) or 25(1) of UNCLOS, as to do so would have required an assessment 
of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal.
4.7.2 The Tribunal’s Finding of a Breach of COLREGS
The Tribunal’s factual understanding and account of events were based on 
two documents submitted by the Philippines: (i) a report from the Philippines 
Coast Guard (SARV Coastguard Report of 28 April 2012); and (ii) a report from 
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Republic of Philippines 
444   Id.
445   Id.
446   Whomersley, supra note 354, at para. 63.
447   Id. at para. 66; see also Critical Study, supra note 84, at para. 844.
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(Arunco Report of 28 May 2012).448 The Tribunal noted that “China has 
not made specific statements with respect to the incidents of 28 April and 
26 May 2012” and that it did “not have explicit Chinese statements concerning 
the incidents alleged by the Philippines” in this submission.449
Similarly, the Philippines’ expert report (the Allen Report) and the Tribunal- 
appointed expert report (the Singhota Report) both relied on the facts 
described in those two documents, leading the Tribunal to conclude that 
China had “repeatedly violated the Rules of the COLREGS over the course of 
the interactions described by the crew of the Philippines vessels and as cred-
ibly assessed in the two expert reports”.450
In the absence of Chinese statements on these incidents, or evidence to 
the contrary, we consider that the experts and the Tribunal had no choice but 
to rely on these documents. Once more, however, the Tribunal’s finding of a 
breach of Article 94 of UNCLOS was legally questionable, based on sparse evi-
dence and related to singular isolated incidents.
5 Procedural and Evidentiary Issues Arising from the Tribunal’s 
Handling of the Merits Phase of the Arbitration
5.1 Introduction
Like any international court or tribunal, the South China Sea Tribunal had 
to operate within the bounds of the Parties’ consent and in accordance with 
applicable rules of procedure. One such fundamental rule of procedure is that 
each Party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its 
claim or defence. That fundamental obligation does not change simply because 
the respondent Party, China, did not appear in the proceedings. The unusual 
circumstance in which the Tribunal found itself meant that the Tribunal not 
only had to ensure that the Philippines carried its burden of proof, but that, 
additional, the Tribunal was satisfied that it has jurisdiction over the dispute 
and that the claim is well founded in fact and law.
448   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 1047–57 (referring to Report from the Commanding Officer, 
SARV-003, Philippine Coast Guard, to Commander, Coast Guard District Northwestern 
Luzon, Philippine Coast Guard (28 April 2012) (Annex 78), and Report from A.A. Arunco, 
et al., FRPLEU-QRT Officers, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Republic of the 
Philippines, to the Director, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Republic of 
the Philippines (28 May 2012) (Annex 82)).
449   Id. at para. 1080.
450   Id. at para. 1105.
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The Tribunal had to navigate a course that was consistent with these fun-
damental rules of procedure. Furthermore, the Tribunal also was bound to 
consider and implement applicable rules of international law, including with 
respect to due process and the principles espoused in the Monetary Gold case. 
As explained in this Section, aspects of the merits phase of the arbitration and 
the Tribunal’s Merits Award are plagued by the Tribunal’s failure properly to 
implement these rules of procedure and other rules of international law.
This section is set out as follows: Section 5.2 sets out a few striking anom-
alies in the Tribunal’s assessment and application of evidence; Section 5.3 
analyses whether the Tribunal provided the Parties with sufficient opportu-
nities to examine its appointed experts; Section 5.4 analyses the Tribunal’s 
exposition and application of the Monetary Gold principle; and Section 5.5 
analyses whether the Merits Award satisfies the well-established principle that 
an award must state the reasons on which it is based.
5.2 The Tribunal Relieved the Philippines of Its Burden of Proof
This Section sets out a few striking anomalies in the Tribunal’s assessment 
and application of evidence. Sub-section (i) explains important aspects of the 
Parties’ burden of proof and the Tribunal’s obligation to ensure that the claim 
is well founded in fact and law; Sub-section (ii) examines whether the Tribunal 
improperly relieved the Philippines of its burden of proof with respect to its 
Submissions No. 4 and 6; Sub-section (iii) examines whether the Tribunal 
afforded the Parties sufficient opportunity to examine the Tribunal-appointed 
experts and their reports; and Sub-section (iv) examines the Tribunal’s conclu-
sions in relation to China’s failure to have due regard to the rights and duties of 
the Philippines in the vicinity of Mischief Reef.
5.2.1 Rules in Relation to the Parties’ Burden of Proof and the  
Tribunal’s Obligation to Ensure that the Claim is Well Founded in 
Fact and Law
It is a well-established rule of law and principle of international adjudication 
that each party has the burden of proving its case.451 Ordinarily, international 
courts and tribunals are limited to assessing the evidence produced before 
them by the parties.452
451   See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 24.1; ICDR International Arbitration Rules, 
Article 19.1.
452   See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 25.6; ICDR International Arbitration Rules, 
Article 20.6; ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 34(1). 
257A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
Against the backdrop of these fundamental tenets of international dispute 
resolution, one would expect that, if the moving party’s evidence is not reli-
able, the court or tribunal would decide that the moving party had not met 
its burden of proof. For example, the ICJ has usually exercised caution when 
faced with circumstances that would require it to engage proactively in fact-
finding exercises involving issues and questions of a technical nature. In the 
Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 
the Court recognised that:
[a] situation of armed conflict is not the only one in which evidence of 
fact may be difficult to come by […] ultimately, however, it is the litigant 
seeking to establish a fact who bears the burden of proving it.453
Similarly, in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, the Court 
concluded that:
… it is the responsibility of the Court, after having given careful consid-
eration to all the evidence placed before it by the Parties, to determine 
which facts must be considered relevant, to assess their probative value, 
and to draw conclusions from them as appropriate. Thus, in keeping 
with its practice, the Court will make its own determination of the facts, 
on the basis of the evidence presented to it, and then it will apply the 
relevant rules of international law to those facts which it has found to 
have existed.454
The rules that governed the Arbitration are in line with the principles men-
tioned above in relation to evidence and burden of proof. Article 22 of the 
Rules of Procedure states, in relevant part, that:
1.  Each Party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support 
its claim or defence.
2.  The Arbitral Tribunal may take all appropriate measures in order to 
establish the facts […]
453   Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 71, at para. 101. This principle has been 
consistently upheld by the I.C.J. See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, supra note 147, 
at para. 68; Case concerning sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks 
and South Ledge, supra note 44, at para. 45; Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 
128, at para. 204 (Feb. 26).
454  Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 416, at para. 168.
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4.  Pursuant to Article 6 of Annex VII to the Convention, the Arbitral 
Tribunal may, at any time during the arbitral proceedings, require the 
Parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence within such a 
period of time as the Arbitral Tribunal shall determine.
Article 6 of Annex VII states that:
The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal 
and, in particular, in accordance with their law and using all means at 
their disposal, shall:
(a) provide it with all relevant documents, facilities and information; 
and
(b) enable it when necessary to call witnesses or experts and receive 
their evidence and to visit the localities to which the case relates.
These rules confirm that the Philippines had the burden of proving its case 
around, for example, the natural status of features and their capacity to sustain 
human habitation or economic life of their own.455
These fundamental principles are no different in circumstances where one 
of the parties (here, the respondent party) does not participate in the arbi-
tration. In such circumstances, the claimant party still carries the burden 
of proving facts relied on to support its claim. At the heart of international 
dispute resolution is the idea of an adversarial system in which the parties 
present, investigate, interrogate and argue facts and law. The adversarial sys-
tem naturally must adapt when one of the parties does not participate in the 
arbitration. It would make sense therefore that, in such circumstances, e.g., 
when a respondent party is not present to test the facts and evidence of a 
claimant party, the tribunal should satisfy itself that it has “jurisdiction” and 
that the moving party’s “claim” is well founded in fact and law.456 This is pre-
cisely what Article 9 of Annex VII requires:
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tri-
bunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal 
to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or 
failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the pro-
ceedings. Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself 
455   Rules of Procedure, Article 22(1).
456   See Wolfgang Kuhn, Defaulting Parties and Default Awards in International Arbitration, in 
Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The 
Fordham Papers 412 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2014).
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not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is 
well founded in fact and law.457
The fact that under Article 9, the Tribunal has an obligation to ensure that “the 
claim is well founded”, does not in any way change the fact that the Philippines 
carried the burden of proving its claims. In the words of the tribunal in Liberian 
Eastern Timber Corp. (Lecto) v. Liberia:
[T]he failure of the [… respondent] to take part in the present arbitral 
proceedings does not entitle the claimant to an award in its favour as a 
matter of right. The onus is still upon the claimant to establish the claim 
which it has put forward.458
In light of these rules of evidence, if the Tribunal determined during the course 
of the Arbitration that it required further or additional evidence, the Tribunal: 
(1) “may […] require the Parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evi-
dence”; (2) may appoint independent experts to assist with the collation of 
such further or additional evidence;459 or (3) “take all appropriate measures in 
order to establish the facts”.460 If the Tribunal decides unilaterally to seek out 
such additional evidence, however, it cannot do so in order to assist the single 
appearing party satisfy its overriding burden of proof.
Based on these fundamental principles and the related rules applicable 
to UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration, in our view, if the Tribunal deemed that 
Philippines had not produced sufficient evidence to prove its case (for example, 
457   Similarly, in respect of ITLOS, see Article 28 of Annex VI, “When one of the parties does 
not appear before the Tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the 
Tribunal to continue the proceedings and make its decision. Absence of a party or failure 
of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making 
its decision, the Tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dis-
pute, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law”; and in respect of the I.C.J., 
see Article 53 of the Statute of the I.C.J., “Whenever one of the parties does not appear 
before the Court, […] [t]he Court must […] satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction 
[…], but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law”. The common dominator is 
that in cases of default proceedings, the court or tribunal must satisfy itself that the par-
ticipating party’s claim is well founded in fact and law before rendering its decision. See 
Judith Butchers & Philip Kimbrough, The Arbitral Tribunal’s Role in Default Proceedings, 
22(2) Arbitration International 233, 238 (2006).
458   Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v. Republic of Liberia, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, 
Award, ¶ 25 (Mar. 31, 1986).
459   Rules of Procedure, Article 24.
460   Rules of Procedure, Article 22(2).
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related to the natural status of features or their incapacity to sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own), the Tribunal either should have 
requested that the Philippines produce additional evidence or, alternatively, 
determined that the Philippines had not met its burden of proof. Instead, as 
explained below, the Tribunal unilaterally obtained archival evidence (that 
the Philippines itself deemed “unnecessary”) which assisted the Philippines to 
meet its burden of proof on Submissions No. 4 and 6.
5.2.2 Did the Tribunal Improperly Relieve the Philippines of Its Burden 
of Proof?
For the purposes of Submissions No. 4 and 6, the Philippines, “[in attempting 
to overcome the absence of recent, direct observation of the features in ques-
tion”, “placed heavy reliance on remote sensing through satellite imagery”.461
The Tribunal did not rely on evidence of satellite imagery that the 
Philippines provided and, instead, decided to seek out and rely on UKHO and 
other archival records to determine whether certain maritime features are 
low-tide elevations.462
In a communication to the Parties dated 1 April 2016, the Tribunal explained 
its rationale for seeking out and relying on evidence that neither Party had 
produced in the arbitration:
(a) […] in furtherance of its mandate to satisfy itself that the Philippines’ 
claims are well founded in fact, the Tribunal considered it appropriate to 
have reference, to the greatest extent possible, to original records based 
on the direct observation of the features in question, prior to them hav-
ing been subjected to significant human modification. It informed the 
Parties that, as the most extensive hydrographic survey work in the South 
China Sea prior to 1945 was carried out by the Royal Navy of the United 
Kingdom, followed closely by the Imperial Japanese Navy, the Tribunal 
had undertaken to seek records from the archives of the United Kingdom 
Hydrographic Office (the “UKHO”), which also hold certain Japanese 
records captured during the Second World War. The Tribunal provided 
documents and survey materials obtained by the Tribunal from the 
UKHO archives and invited the Parties’ comments by 22 April 2016.463
461   Award, supra note 1, at para. 322.
462   Id. at paras. 89(a), 140.
463   Id. at para. 89(a). 
261A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
On 28 April 2016, the Philippines submitted its response to the documents 
and survey materials that the Tribunal obtained from the UKHO. According to 
the Philippines, the UKHO materials confirmed “the Philippines’ characteriza-
tion of each of the relevant features presented in the Atlas as a submerged 
feature, a low-tide elevation, or an Article 121(3) “rock””.464
Additionally, by letter of 26 May 2016, the Tribunal informed the Parties that 
it had decided rely on French Archive Materials from the 1930s “in order to 
gain a more complete picture as to the natural conditions of the South China 
Sea features at that time”,465 and provided these documents (26 scientific 
reports, diplomatic records, and newspaper articles)466 to the Parties, inviting 
comments on the same. The documents obtained from the French archives 
would allow the Tribunal to determine whether Itu Aba and other features in 
the Spratlys were capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of 
its own.467
The Philippines filed its response to the French Archive Materials on 
3 June 2016, stating that these documents confirmed that:
Itu Aba and other insular features […] were never inhabited on a per-
manent or anything resembling a long-term basis, and that they lack 
the natural resources, including fertile soil and freshwater, necessary to 
sustain human habitation or economic life […] and [that] China has not 
fulfilled the requirements under general international law for establish-
ing [historic] rights.468
As mentioned above, by obtaining these archival records, the Tribunal thought 
that it was furthering “its mandate to satisfy itself that the Philippines’ claims 
are well founded in fact”. We agree with the Tribunal’s assessment that it had 
a duty to ensure that the Philippines’ “claim is well founded in fact and law”. 
That obligation, important as it may be, has its limits. As explained above, in 
seeking to ensure that the claims are well founded, the Tribunal must ensure 
that it does not relieve the moving party of its burden of proof. Although the 
Tribunal may “take all appropriate measures in order to establish the facts”,469 
it may not, sua sponte, seek out evidence that would “establish” the “claim” of 
the moving party. But, as explained below, that is exactly what the Tribunal 
464   The Philippines’ Written Responses on UKHO Materials, 28 April 2016, at para. 3.
465   Award, supra note 1, at para. 99.
466   The Philippines’ Written Responses on French Archive Materials, 3 June 2016, at para. 1.
467   Award, supra note 1, at paras. 99, 141.
468   The Philippines’ Written Responses, supra note 466, at para. 2.
469   Rules of Procedure, Article 22(2).
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did here – it obtained evidence (that had been rejected by the Philippines) to 
establish the Philippines’ claims.
The Philippines carried the obligation to prove its claims through documen-
tary and other evidence. Prior to the Merits Hearing, the Tribunal requested 
that the Philippines confirm “whether it has sought and been able to obtain 
copies of hydrographic survey plans (fair charts), relating in particular to those 
surveys undertaken by the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century….”470 
The Philippines replied that “it has not and explained that it considered it 
unnecessary to do so”.471
This Philippines’ response demonstrates that it made a strategic deci-
sion not to produce archival materials to support its claims. Moreover, the 
Philippines refused to produce such evidence even after being prompted by 
the Tribunal to do so. This was sufficient basis for the Tribunal to conclude 
that the Philippines’ claims, which “placed heavy reliance on remote sens-
ing through satellite imagery”, was not well-founded in fact. In our view, the 
Tribunal erred by, sua sponte, finding additional facts and evidence (that 
the Philippines itself deemed “unnecessary”) that, in the Tribunal’s view was 
required prove the Philippines claims.
5.2.3 The Tribunal’s Conclusion that China Failed to Have Due  
Regard to the Rights and Duties of the Philippines in the Vicinity 
of Mischief Reef
In its Submission no. 9, the Philippines requested that the Tribunal declare that 
“China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploit-
ing the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines”.472
This submission related to “developments at Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal, both of which are low-tide elevations lying within 200 nautical 
miles of the Philippines’ baselines.”473
The Tribunal found that:
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are not capable of generating 
entitlements to maritime zones and can only form part of the Philippines’ 
exclusive economic zone. Nevertheless, in light of the fact that China has 
not accepted these areas as part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic 
zone, the Tribunal considers the similarities in Chinese fishing activities 
470   Award, supra note 1, at para. 140.
471   Id.
472   Id. at para. 717.
473   Id. at para. 718.
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at all of these features to be a significant indication of what has taken 
place at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal.
[…]
The Tribunal expects, from the general positions of the Parties, that 
Chinese vessels have continued to fish at Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal since May 2013. The Tribunal does not, however, have the 
direct evidence before it that would enable it to draw such a conclusion 
for the period subsequent to May 2013.
[…]
Having established that Chinese vessels have been engaged in fish-
ing at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013, the Tribunal 
considers that China has failed to show the due regard called for by 
Article 58(3) of the Convention to the Philippines’ sovereign rights with 
respect to fisheries within its exclusive economic zone.474
The Tribunal recognised that it had “limited evidence before it” with respect to 
Chinese fishing at Mischief Reef.475 It appears that the only evidence of Chinese 
fishing at Mischief Reef came from a Filipino source, i.e., the Philippines 
Armed Forces, which had reported that at least 33 Chinese fishing vessels were 
said to have been fishing at the Chinese-occupied Mischief Reef and nearby 
features since 08 May 2013, escorted by a PLA Navy ship and CMS vessels. The 
report of the Armed Forces does not mention the source of this information 
i.e., the identity of the person who provided this information.
The Philippines initiated arbitration against China on 22 January 2013. The 
observations contained in this report are of alleged fishing activities in May 2013 
i.e., after the “dispute” had crystallised and after the Philippines had initiated 
arbitration against China. This raises serious doubts about the reliability of 
such (hearsay) evidence, which could not be tested under cross-examination 
(or otherwise tested by the Tribunal).
The Tribunal provided two reasons for accepting the Filipino evidence 
of Chinese fishing at Mischief Reef in May 2013: (1) the fact that “China has 
asserted sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea generally, 
and has apparently not accepted these areas as part of the Philippines’ exclu-
sive economic zone […]”; and (2) “the pattern of Chinese fishing activity at 
Mischief Reef and Second Shoal is consistent with that exhibited at other reef 
formations for which the Tribunal has information”.476 Both reasons appear 
474   Id. at paras. 751–53.
475   Id. at para. 745.
476   Id. at paras. 747–48.
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to reference inadequate “evidence” of Chinese fishing at Mischief Reef. The 
fact that China asserts the right to fish does not mean that Chinese vessels 
have conducted such fishing activities. The fact that there may be evidence 
of Chinese fishing in other parts of the South China Sea is, again, not proof of 
Chinese fishing at Mischief Reef.
Arguably, the Philippines did not meet its burden of proof with respect to its 
claim that China had failed to show due regard for the Philippines’ sovereign 
rights with respect to fishing in the vicinity of Mischief Reef.
5.3 The Tribunal Denied the Parties Sufficient Opportunity to Examine 
Its Appointed Experts
Clearly, the evidence of technical experts was likely to be probative given a 
number of the issues raised by the Philippines in the South China Sea arbi-
tration. Even during the jurisdictional phase, the Tribunal invited the Parties 
to “take steps already to ascertain the availability of potential technical 
experts”.477 Separately, the Tribunal appointed its own experts in the arbitra-
tion. For example, on 7 August 2015, the Tribunal proposed Mr Grant Boyes as 
its expert hydrographer, who was subsequently appointed after the Tribunal 
invited the Parties to comment on his curriculum vitae, declaration of inde-
pendence and Terms of Reference.478 There was nothing objectionable with 
the Tribunal’s appointment of Mr Boyes, and the appointment by interna-
tional courts and tribunals of expert hydrographers is commonplace in law of 
the sea disputes. Specifically, the appointment appears to have been made in 
accordance with Article 24 of the Rules of Procedure, which states in relevant 
part that:
1.  After seeking the views of the Parties, the Arbitral Tribunal may appoint 
one or more independent experts. […]
2.  Any expert shall, in principle before accepting appointment, submit to 
the Arbitral Tribunal and to the Parties a description of his or her qualifi-
cations and a statement of his or her impartiality and independence. […]
4.  If called upon to prepare an expert’s report, the Arbitral Tribunal shall, 
upon receipt of the report, communicate a copy of it to the Parties, who 
shall be given the opportunity to express, in writing, their respective 
opinions on the report. A Party shall be entitled to examine any docu-
ment on which the expert relied in his or her report.
5.  If a Party so requests or if the Arbitral Tribunal considers it necessary, the 
expert shall, after delivery of the report, participate in a hearing where 
477   Id. at para. 56.
478   Id. at para. 58.
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the Parties have the opportunity to put questions to him or her and to 
present expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue. The 
provisions of Article 23 shall be applicable to such proceedings.
Following the November 2015 Merits Hearing, on 5 February 2016, the Tri-
bunal considered it necessary to obtain “further evidence and clarifications 
from the Parties, and from the views of independent experts”.479 At that stage, 
the Tribunal decided to appoint additional experts to opine on: (1) whether 
Chinese construction activities in the Spratly Islands have a detrimental effect 
on the coral reef systems; and (2) navigational safety issues.
The Tribunal sought the views of the Parties and, around mid-March 2016, 
proceeded to appoint Dr Sebastian Ferse and Captain Gurpreet Singh Singhota, 
to provide expert opinions on these issues.480 On 12 April 2016, the Tribunal 
decided to appoint two additional coral reef experts, Professor Peter Mumby 
and Dr Selina Ward, to contribute to the expert opinion that at the time was 
being prepared by Dr Ferse.481
The four new Tribunal-appointed experts issued their expert reports on 
15 April and 26 April 2016 (i.e., only three months before the Tribunal rendered 
its 500-page Merits Award).482 The Tribunal provided the reports to the Parties 
and, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, invited comments in writing 
on 18 and 29 April 2016, respectively.483 It is not clear from the public record 
whether, in accordance with Article 24(4), the Tribunal provided the Parties 
with an opportunity to “examine any document on which the expert relied in 
his or her report”.
These tribunal-appointed experts were not cross-examined by the Parties. 
Strictly, the Rules of Procedure did not require that tribunal-appointed experts 
be cross-examined on their reports – as mentioned above, they provided only 
that if “a Party so requests or if the Arbitral Tribunal considers it necessary, 
the expert shall, after delivery of the report, participate in a hearing where the 
Parties have the opportunity to put questions to him or her and to present 
expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue.” It appears that the 
Parties were effectively denied the opportunity to cross-examine these experts 
due to the experts’ very late appointment by the Tribunal in the proceeding 
(after the Merits hearing), the fact that the Tribunal only invited comments 
479   Id. at para. 84.
480   Id. at paras. 84–85.
481   Id. at para. 90.
482   Id. at paras. 91, 95.
483   Id. 
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in writing and did not contemplate the possibility of any hearing to examine 
their evidence prior to issuing its Merits Award.
The failure to provide any opportunity to the Parties to cross-examine the 
four experts is particularly notable given the findings subsequently made in 
the Merits Award with reference to their evidence. For example, the Tribunal 
relied on Dr Ferse’s conclusion that the Chinese navy and coast guard had 
“tolerated or condoned” the practice of “chopping reefs” by Tanmen fisher-
men and his views on the impact of construction and dredging activities on 
reef systems.484 It also relied on Captain Singhota’s evidence that “Chinese 
manoeuvres […] ‘demonstrated a complete disregard for the observance 
and practice of good seamanship […] but most importantly, a total disregard 
for the observance of the collision regulations.485 Given that the Tribunal 
extensively relied on the evidence of these experts, in our view, the Parties 
should have been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine these experts on 
their evidence.
5.4 The Tribunal Misapplied the Monetary Gold Principle with Respect 
to Third State Rights and Interests
Disputes in the Spratly Islands involve both islands and maritime claims among 
several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, China (including 
Taiwan), Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. These states all laid claims 
and occupied part of the islands in the South China Sea.
This Section will analyse whether the Tribunal should have accepted 
jurisdiction over determining the legal classification (and thus maritime 
entitlements) of maritime features in the South China Sea (including but not 
limited to Itu Aba) that are the subject of sovereignty and maritime claims by 
third States (in particular, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam). We have focussed 
on the claims (or potential claims) of Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan with 
respect to those features and the potential application of the ICJ’s judgment 
in the Monetary Gold case.
Sub-section (i) explains the scope of the principle espoused in Monetary 
Gold, which has been clarified and developed through the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals; Sub-section (ii) explains that there are 
other important principles of international law that suggest that the Tribunal 
should have adopted a more cautious approach to the exercise of jurisdiction 
when third party rights are at issue; Sub-section (iii) analyses whether the 
484   Id. at paras. 848, 851, 857, 978, 983.
485   Id. at para. 1089.
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Tribunal determined correctly that the “legal interests of Malaysia do not form 
‘the very subject-matter of the dispute’ and are not implicated by the Tribunal’s 
conclusions”; and Sub-section (iv) analyses whether Vietnam’s and Taiwan’s 
legal interests in the South China Sea form “the very subject-matter of the dis-
pute” that was the subject of the Merits Award.
5.4.1 The Scope of the Principle Espoused in Monetary Gold with 
Respect to Third Party Rights
The Tribunal explained in the Merits Award the scope of the Monetary Gold 
principle. The Tribunal stated that:
[r]ead correctly, Monetary Gold calls for a court or tribunal to refrain 
from exercising its jurisdiction where the ‘legal interests [of a third State] 
would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-
matter of the decision’. The circumstances of Monetary Gold, however, 
‘represent the limit of the power of the Court to refuse to exercise its juris-
diction,’ and any more expansive reading would impermissibly constrain 
the practical ability of courts and tribunals to carry out their function.486
The Tribunal’s exposition of the Monetary Gold principle is correct as a mat-
ter of international law. The Monetary Gold case arose out of the discovery 
in Germany of certain quantities of monetary gold belonging to Albania. The 
governments of France, the UK and the US were tasked with responsibility 
for implementing a 1946 Agreement on Reparation which required that mon-
etary gold found in Germany should be pooled for distribution among the 
countries entitled to receive it. The UK claimed that the Albanian gold should 
be delivered to the UK in partial satisfaction of the Court’s Judgment of 1949 
against Albania in the Corfu Channel case. Italy claimed that the gold should 
be delivered to it in partial satisfaction for the damage which it alleged it had 
suffered as a result of an Albanian law of 13 January 1945. The three countries 
tasked with implementing the agreement decided that that the gold should 
be delivered to the United Kingdom unless, within a certain time-limit, Italy 
or Albania applied to the Court requesting it to adjudicate on their respective 
rights. Albania took no action, but Italy made an application to the Court. The 
Court observed:
486   Id. at para. 640.
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The Court is not merely called upon to say whether the gold should be 
delivered to Italy or to the United Kingdom. It is requested to determine 
first certain legal questions upon the solution of which depends the 
delivery of the gold.
[…]
Albania has not submitted a request to the Court to be permitted to 
intervene. In the present case, Albania’s legal interests would not only 
be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the 
decision. In such a case, the Statute cannot be regarded, by implication, 
as authorizing proceedings to be continued in the absence of Albania.487
As Albania was not present before the Court, and given that its “legal interests 
[…] would form the very subject matter of the decision”, the Court declined 
jurisdiction over Italy’s application.
The Court subsequently adopted the Monetary Gold principle in the East 
Timor case, again to decline jurisdiction, this time due to the absence of 
Indonesia.488 Overall, however, the ICJ jurisprudence demonstrates that a 
relatively high threshold is applied in order for the Monetary Gold standard to 
preclude jurisdiction.
The ICJ discussed the scope of the Monetary Gold principle in the Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v. United 
States). Nicaragua claimed that the US had supported rebels in Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica and Honduras and had provided logistical support and weapons 
to the guerrilla forces in El Salvador who were fighting against Nicaragua’s 
interests.489
The US claimed that Nicaragua’s application to the Court was inadmissible, 
in part, because third States not present before the Court, including Honduras 
487   Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 
Rep. 19 (June 15) (Judgment) at 32–33. 
488   The Court determined in that case that: “… Australia’s behaviour cannot be assessed 
without first entering into the question why it is that Indonesia could not lawfully have 
concluded the 1989 Treaty, while Portugal allegedly could have done so […] the very 
subject-matter of the Court’s decision would necessarily be a determination whether, 
having regard to the circumstances in which Indonesia entered and remained in East 
Timor, it could or could not have acquired the power to enter into treaties on behalf of 
East Timor relating to the resources of its continental shelf. The Court could not make 
such a determination in the absence of the consent of Indonesia.” See East Timor (Port. v. 
Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 91 (June 30) (Judgment), at para. 28.
489   Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 71, at paras. 18–25.
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and El Salvador, had an interest in the dispute but were not present before 
the Court.490
The Court rejected this argument, emphasising that its decision had a bind-
ing effect for the parties only and that third States that may be affected by the 
decision could either institute separate proceedings or apply for permission to 
intervene in the present proceedings.491 The Court confirmed (as stated also in 
the Merits Award) that the Monetary Gold principle would preclude jurisdic-
tion only when third part rights form the “very subject matter of the decision”. 
The Court’s explanation merits quotation in full:
There is no doubt that in appropriate circumstances the Court will 
decline, as it did in the case concerning Monetary Gold Removed from 
Rome in 1943, to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it where the 
legal interests of a State not party to the proceedings “would not only 
be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of 
the decision” (ICJ Reports 1954, p. 32). Where however claims of a legal 
nature are made by an Applicant against a Respondent in proceedings 
before the Court, and made the subject of submissions, the Court has in 
principle merely to decide upon those submissions, with binding force 
for the parties only, and no other State, in accordance with Article 59 of 
the Statute. As the Court has already indicated (paragraph 74, above) 
other States which consider that they may be affected are free to insti-
tute separate proceedings, or to employ the procedure of intervention. 
There is no trace, either in the Statute or in the practice of international 
tribunals, of an ‘indispensable parties’ rule of the kind argued for by the 
United States, which would only be conceivable in parallel to a power, 
which the Court does not possess, to direct that a third State be made a 
party to proceedings. The circumstances of the Monetary Gold case prob-
ably represent the limit of the power of the Court to refuse to exercise 
its jurisdiction; and none of the States referred to [by the USA] can be 
regarded as in the same position as Albania in that case, so as to be truly 
indispensable to the pursuance of the proceedings.492
490   Id. at paras. 437–43.
491   Id. at para. 88.
492   Id. See also Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, supra note 40, at para. 56. The 
I.C.J. examined whether the legal interests asserted by Nicaragua in support of an applica-
tion to intervene in the case formed “the very subject matter of the decision” or whether 
Nicaragua was only affected by that decision.
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The Monetary Gold principle also arose in the Case concerning certain 
phosphate lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), in respect of a dispute over the 
rehabilitation of lands in Nauru that previously had been under Australian 
administration. According to Nauru’s submission before the ICJ, Australia 
had breached its international obligations, including obligations under the 
Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru.493
One of Australia’s preliminary objections, focussed on the fact that third 
States i.e., New Zealand and the United Kingdom (which, together with 
Australia, formed the Administering Authority for Nauru under the Trusteeship 
Agreement) were not parties to the ICJ proceeding.494
The Court considered Australia’s objection in light of the Monetary Gold 
principle and determined that:
In the present case, the interests of New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
do not constitute the very subject-matter of the judgment to be rendered 
on the merits of Nauru’s Application and the situation is in that respect 
different from that with which the Court had to deal in the Monetary 
Gold case. In the latter case, the determination of Albania’s responsibil-
ity was a prerequisite for a decision to be taken on Italy’s claims. In the 
present case, the determination of the responsibility of New Zealand or 
the United Kingdom is not a prerequisite for the determination of the 
responsibility of Australia, the only object of Nauru’s claim. […]
a finding by the Court regarding the existence or the content of the 
responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might well have implica-
tions for the legal situation of the two other States concerned, but no 
finding in respect of that legal situation will be needed as a basis for the 
Court’s decision on Nauru’s claims against Australia.495
The Court therefore focussed on whether it would be required to deter- 
mine the “responsibility” of a third party as “a prerequisite for a decision to be 
taken on” the claims before the Court, or whether it would be required to make 
a finding in respect of the “legal situation” of the third parties. Sub-section (ii) 
and (iii) below assesses whether the Tribunal necessarily had to make deter-
minations about the “responsibility” of Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan, or in 
493   Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 240 (June 26) 
(Judgment on Preliminary Objections), at para. 5.
494   Id. at para. 39.
495   Id. at para. 55.
271A Legal Critique of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
respect of the “legal situation” of those States, in order to determine the merits 
of the claims submitted by the Philippines.
The principle of due process (from which the Monetary Gold principle 
“draws its strengths”) also suggests that tribunals should exercise caution when 
third-party rights are at issue. For example, in Chevron v. Ecuador (Third Interim 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility), the tribunal explained that:
… the Monetary Gold principle draws its strengths from, and implements, 
a number of distinct and fundamental principles of international law. 
Most obviously, it gives effect to the principle that no international tri-
bunal may exercise jurisdiction over a State without the consent of that 
State; and by analogy, no arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction over any 
person unless they have consented. That may be called the ‘consent’ prin-
ciple, and it goes to the question of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
In the Monetary Gold case itself, the International Court of Justice 
held that, as a corollary of the ‘consent’ principle, if the very subject-
matter of the case that it has to decide is a question of the rights of a 
State not before it, the International Court cannot proceed to decide the 
case. In such a case, the Court would not hear full argument on the rights 
in question. That corollary may be called the ‘indispensible [sic.] third 
party’ principle; and it goes to the question of the ability of the tribunal 
to decide the case justly and according to law.
There is also a concern that the rights of States should not be ruled 
upon unless they are properly before the Court and are given a full oppor-
tunity to present their case. This third aspect may be called the “due 
process” principle; and it goes to the question of the rights of the absent 
third party.496
This quote from Chevron suggests that there are broader concerns, especially 
around the due process rights of third parties, that should be borne in mind by 
international courts and tribunals when exercising jurisdiction over a dispute 
that concerns third party rights. As discussed below, it appears to us that the 
Tribunal applied the Monetary Gold principle (only with reference to Malaysia) 
without consideration of these broader due process principles.
496   Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
at paras. 4.61–63.
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5.4.2 The Tribunal’s Conclusion that the “Legal Interests of Malaysia 
Do Not Form ‘the Very Subject-Matter of the Dispute’ and are Not 
Implicated by the Tribunal’s Conclusions”
The Merits Award refers to a communication from Malaysia to the Tribunal, 
dated 23 June 2016, in which:
Malaysia recalls that it claims sovereignty over a number of features in the 
South China Sea and ‘may also have overlapping maritime entitlements 
(including an extended continental shelf) in the area of some of the rel-
evant features that the Arbitral Tribunal has been asked to classify.497
Malaysia’s communication is not publicly-available. According to the Tribunal, 
in its communication, Malaysia invokes the Monetary Gold principle and 
“argues” that:
The Arbitral Tribunal must ensure that, in determining whether certain 
maritime features in the South China Sea are entitled to specific mar-
itime zones under UNCLOS 1982, it does not express any position that 
might directly or indirectly affect the rights and interests of Malaysia. 
The Arbitral Tribunal thus cannot purport to decide upon the maritime 
entitlements pursuant to Articles 13 and 121 of UNCLOS 1982 of any fea-
tures within the EEZ and Continental Shelf of Malaysia as published in 
Malaysia’s Map of 1979.498
The Tribunal concluded that “to the extent it has examined certain features 
claimed by China (which are also claimed by Malaysia) for the purposes of 
assessing the possible entitlements of China in areas to which Malaysia makes 
no claim, the legal interests of Malaysia do not form ‘the very subject-matter 
of the dispute’ and are not implicated by the Tribunal’s conclusions.”499 
Consequently, in the Tribunal’s view, Malaysia’s rights and interests were pro-
tected, and did not engage the rule in Monetary Gold.500
The Tribunal was probably correct in concluding that Malaysia’s commu-
nication “overstates the Monetary Gold principle when it argues expansively 
that the Tribunal must “avoid deciding any question that requires it to adopt a 
497   Award, supra note 1, at para. 635.
498   Id.
499   Id. at para. 640.
500   Id. at paras. 640–41.
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view that, directly or indirectly, may affect Malaysia’s rights and interests””.501 
As explained above, in order to demonstrate that the Tribunal’s award on the 
merits would violate the Monetary Gold principle, Malaysia would need to 
have demonstrated that its legal interests formed the very subject-matter of 
the dispute before the Tribunal.
Although the extract of Malaysia’s communication set out in the Award does 
not accurately reflect the test under Monetary Gold, in our view, the Tribunal 
did not investigate adequately whether Malaysia’s claims in the South China 
Sea form the “very subject matter” of the Tribunal’s decision with respect to 
the classification of certain features in the Spratlys. The Tribunal found that:
[w]ith respect to the Philippines’ Submission No. 5, the Tribunal notes 
that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal do lie within 200 nautical 
miles of features claimed by Malaysia, although Malaysia itself has not 
claimed an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf in the area of 
either Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal.502
It appears that the Tribunal did not consider that Malaysia’s interests 
in the South China Sea relate not only to Mischief Reef and Second Thomas 
Shoal but also to a number of additional features. We understand from 
publicly-available materials that Malaysia claims sovereignty over 11 features 
in the Spratly Islands.503 These are: (1) Ardasier Reef; (2) Dallas Reef; (3) Mari- 
veles Reef; (4) Royal Charlotte Reef; (5) Swallow Reef; (6) Erica Reef; 
(7) Investigator Reef; (8) Commodore Reef; (9) Amboyna Cay; (10) Barque 
Canada Reef; and (11) North Luconia and South Luconia Shoals.504
The Tribunal determined that Swallow Reef and Amboyna Cay are “rocks” 
for the purposes of Article 121(3) of the Convention, with the result that they 
are incapable of generating any EEZ or continental shelf entitlement. This was 
an essential prerequisite to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the Philippines’ 
Submission nos. 5 and 7.
It is possible that Malaysia may claim to derive EEZ or continental shelf 
rights from any one or more of the above-mentioned 11 features in the Spratlys. 
501   Id. at para. 640.
502   Id. at para. 629.
503   See, J. Ashely Roach, Malaysia and Brunei: An analysis of their Claims in the South China 
Sea, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IOP-2014-U-008434.pdf.
504   Id.
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The Tribunal’s decision that Swallow Reef and Amboyna Cay (and, indeed, that 
all high tide features in the Spratly Islands) are “rocks”,505 clearly would preju-
dice any such claims.
5.4.3 Do Vietnam’s Legal Interests Form “the Very Subject-Matter  
of the Dispute”?
The Merits Award does not discuss whether Vietnam’s claims in the South 
China Sea form the very subject matter of certain of the claims submitted by 
the Philippines. In our view, the Tribunal should have assessed proprio motu506 
whether its exercise of jurisdiction might violate the Monetary Gold principle 
with respect to Vietnam’s putative legal interests in the South China Sea.507
5.4.3.1 Vietnam’s Position with Respect to the Spratlys
On 12 May 1977 (i.e., before UNCLOS), Vietnam published its Declaration on 
the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf, which states, in relevant part, that:
505   Award, supra note 1, at para. 646.
506   For example, in the investor-State dispute resolution context, tribunals have found that 
they are must consider questions of jurisdiction proprio motu in some situations. See, 
e.g., Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/2, Award of 15 March 2002, at para. 56: “The Tribunal further observes 
that the question of jurisdiction of an international instance involving consent of a sov-
ereign State deserves a special attention at the outset of any proceeding against a State 
Party to an international convention creating the jurisdiction. As a preliminary matter, 
the question of the existence of jurisdiction based on consent must be examined proprio 
motu, i.e., without objection being raised by the Party.” The obligation is also established 
in I.C.J. jurisprudence. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1977 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3 (Dec. 19) (Judgment), at para. 15:“the Court, in accordance with its Statute and 
its settled jurisprudence, must examine proprio motu the question of its own jurisdic-
tion to consider the Application of the Greek Government. Furthermore, in the present 
case the duty of the Court to make this examination on its own initiative is reinforced 
by the terms of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court. According to this provision, when-
ever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the 
Court, before finding upon the merits, must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction.” See 
also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 
(May 24) (Judgment), at para. 33: “Nevertheless, in accordance with its settled jurispru-
dence, the Court, in applying Article 53 of its Statute, must first take up, proprio motu, any 
preliminary question, whether of admissibility or of jurisdiction, that appears from the 
information before it to arise in the case and the decision of which might constitute a bar 
to any further examination of the merits of the Applicant’s case.”
507   The Tribunal’s Merits Award may also affect the rights and obligations of other States with 
interests in the South China Sea, including those of Brunei and Indonesia.
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1. The territorial sea of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has a breadth 
of 12 nautical miles measured from a baseline which links the furthest 
seaward points of the coast and the outermost points of Vietnamese off-
shore islands, and which is the low-waterline along the coast.
[…]
5. The islands and archipelagos, forming an integral part of the 
Vietnamese territory and beyond the Vietnamese territorial sea men-
tioned in Paragraph 1, have their own territorial seas, contiguous zones, 
exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, determined in accor-
dance with the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this statement.508
Five years later, on 12 November 1982, Vietnam issued its Statement on the 
Territorial Sea Baseline, which states at paragraphs 4 and 5:
(4) The baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of the 
Hoang Sa [Paracel Islands] and Truong Sa [Spratly Islands] Archipelagos 
will be determined in a coming instrument in conformity with para-
graph 5 of the 12 May 1977 statement of the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam. […]
(5) The sea as lying behind the baseline and facing the coast or the 
islands of Viet Nam constitutes the internal waters of the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam.509
This shows that, by the early 1980s, Vietnam had indicated on multiple occa-
sions that it would claim maritime zones, including EEZ and continental shelf 
entitlements, from the Spratly “archipelago”.510
In a statement dated 5 December 2014, however, Vietnam informed the 
Tribunal that, in its view:
508   Available in English on the website of the United States Department of State, https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/58573.pdf, last visited 30 August 2018.
509   http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/VNM_1982_
Statement.pdf, last visited 30 August 2018.
510   Note that, on 6 May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to the CLCS 
for a portion of the continental shelf of the two States into the South China Sea. The area 
of the extended continental shelf is drawn between the 200 nm limits of the two States 
measured from the baselines along the coasts of Vietnam and the East Malaysian states of 
Sarawak and Sabah. This would suggest that Vietnam does not (as yet) claim a continental 
shelf from its Spratly archipelago.
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none of the maritime features mentioned by the Philippines in these 
proceedings can enjoy their own exclusive economic zone and conti-
nental shelf or generate maritime entitlements in excess of 12 nautical 
miles since they are low-tide elevations or ‘rocks which cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of their own’ under Article 121(3) of 
the Convention.511
Vietnam’s 2014 statement to the Tribunal must be read against the backdrop 
of its previous position that the Spratlys form an “archipelago”, over which 
Vietnam claims sovereignty. Vietnam reiterated this position in two of the 
annexes to its the Statement to the Tribunal. Its annex 1, which contains a Note 
Verbale dated 8 May 2009 from the Permanent Mission of Vietnam at the UN 
to the UN Secretary General, states that:
The Hoang Sa (Paracels) and Truong Sa (Spratlys) archipelagos are parts 
of Viet Nam’s territory. Viet Nam has indisputable sovereignty over these 
archipelagoes. China’s claim over the islands and adjacent waters in the 
Eastern Sea (South China Sea) as manifested in the map attached with 
the Notes Verbales CLM/17 /2009 and CLM/18/2009 has no legal, histori-
cal or factual basis, therefore is null and void.512
Moreover, Annex 6, which contains a letter, dated 19 November 2014, from 
the Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the United Nations Secretary 
General,513 implicitly confirms that Vietnam claims that the Spratly “archipel-
ago” generates maritime entitlements, including with respect to the EEZ and 
the continental shelf:
Viet Nam possesses full legal basis and historical evidence to affirm its 
sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracels) and Truong Sa (Spratlys) archi-
pelagos, as well as its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the exclusive 
511   Award, supra note 1, at para. 36. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam Transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal in the Proceedings between 
the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China’, 5 December 2014.
512   Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to 
the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 86/HC-2009 
(8 May 2009), Annex 193.
513   Annex to the letter dated 19 November 2014 of the Permanent Representative of the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,’ 
in Supplemental Written Submission of the Philippines, Volume III, Annexes 466–99, 
16 March 2015, at 65–67.
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economic zone and the continental shelf established in accordance with 
[UNCLOS].514
Although Vietnam officially has not drawn EEZs from the Spratly or Paracel 
“archipelagos”, the above statements indicate that it has been Vietnam’s posi-
tion that the Paracel and Spratly Island groups are “archipelagos” that generate 
maritime entitlements beyond 12nm, even if the individual features within 
those archipelagos do not generate such entitlements.
5.4.3.2 How Did Vietnam Respond to the Arbitration?
Although it appears that Vietnam was generally supportive of the Tribunal tak-
ing jurisdiction, on 14 December 2014 Vietnam wrote to the Tribunal informing 
it that:
After reading the written pleadings of the Philippines, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam is of the view that some of Viet Nam’s rights 
and interests of a legal nature in the South China Sea may be involved, and 
even affected in this arbitration. By transmitting the present Statement to 
the Arbitral Tribunal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam wishes 
to preserve its rights and interests of a legal nature, including (but not 
necessarily limited to):
(i)  Viet Nam’s rights in connection with geographical features of the 
Paracel Islands (quần đảo Hoàng Sa in Vietnamese) and the Spratly 
Islands (quần đảo Trường Sa in Vietnamese);
(ii)  The rights and interests of Viet Nam in its exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf;
(iii)  The rights and interests of Viet Nam relating to the legal status and 
maritime entitlement of geographical features in the South China 
Sea, which are located within the ‘nine-dash line’;
(iv)  The rights and interests of Viet Nam in common maritime areas 
located within the “nine-dash line”; and
(v)  The other legal rights and interests of Viet Nam in the South 
China Sea.515
514   Annex to the letter dated 19 November 2014 from the Permanent Representative of 
Viet Nam addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Annex 468; see 
also, Note Verbale No. 771/HC-98 dated 6 August 1998 of the Permanent Mission of the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Annex 468.
515   Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam transmit-
ted to the Arbitral Tribunal in the Proceedings between The Republic of the Philippines 
and The People’s Republic of China, 14 December 2014, Annex 468, 44.
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As discussed above, the mere risk that third-party interests may be “affected” 
by the Tribunal’s Award is not sufficient to preclude jurisdiction. In order to 
rely on the Monetary Gold principle, Vietnam would have needed to show that 
its legal interests in the South China Sea formed the “very subject matter” of 
the claims submitted to the Tribunal. Although Vietnam explicitly did not 
request that the Tribunal apply the Monetary Gold principle, in our view, the 
Tribunal should have proprio motu assessed whether any of the claims before 
it went to the very subject matter of Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea.
5.4.3.3 The Tribunal’s Conclusions with Respect to Vietnam
The Tribunal in its Award on Jurisdiction applied the Monetary Gold principle 
with respect to Vietnam. The Tribunal concluded that:
the determination of the nature of and entitlements generated by the 
maritime features in the South China Sea does not require a decision on 
issues of territorial sovereignty. The legal rights and obligations of Viet 
Nam therefore do not need to be determined as a prerequisite to the 
determination of the merits of the case.516
In its Merits Award the Tribunal referred to its earlier finding in the jurisdic-
tional phase that “the legal rights and obligations of Viet Nam do not need 
to be determined as a prerequisite to the determination of the merits of 
the case”517
In our view, the Tribunal’s decision that Vietnam’s claims in the South China 
Sea do not form the “very subject matter of the decision” is arguably wrong. On 
this basis, the Tribunal arguably erred in accepting jurisdiction over a number 
of the Philippines’ Submissions.
In its Merits Award, the Tribunal clearly made determinations with respect 
to the “legal status and maritime entitlement of geographical features in the 
South China Sea”, in respect of which Vietnam had explicitly stated that it 
enjoys “rights and interests”. The Tribunal also rejected the notion that “the 
Spratly Islands should be enclosed within a system of archipelagic or straight 
baselines, surrounding the high-tide features of the group, and accorded an 
entitlement to maritime zones as a single unit”.518
In reaching these findings, the Tribunal arguably made findings with respect 
to the “legal situation” of Vietnam. In the words of the Tribunal (with respect to 
516   Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 2, at para. 180.
517   Award, supra note 1, at para. 157.
518   Id. at para. 573.
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the application of the Monetary Gold principle to Malaysia), the legal inter-
ests of Vietnam were clearly “implicated” by its findings with respect to the 
legal classification (whether as “rocks”, low-tide elevations or otherwise) of 
certain features claimed by Vietnam. In this sense, the Award clearly preju-
dice the “rights and interests of a legal nature” cited by the Vietnamese Foreign 
Ministries in its letter to the Tribunal dated 22 January 2013.519
Vietnam’s legal interests were further “implicated” by the Tribunal’s appar-
ent dismissal of any notion that the Spratlys could generate archipelagic 
entitlements at international law. Although Vietnam officially has not drawn 
any straight baselines around the Spratly Islands, as described above there are 
indications that Vietnam claims rights and interests based upon its assessment 
that the Spratly Islands form an “archipelago”. The Tribunal’s decision that 
China cannot enjoy any maritime entitlements or “historic rights” based upon 
the Spratlys as an archipelago appears to prejudice such Vietnamese claims.
For these reasons, there is a credible argument that the Merits Award vio-
lates the Monetary Gold principle at least with respect to Vietnam’s claims in 
the South China Sea.
5.4.4 Taiwan’s Concern on TaiPing Dao (Itu Aba)
5.4.4.1 Taiwan Authority of China (Hereafter Referred to as Taiwan)’s 
Position
Taiwan claims that Itu Aba is a fully-entitled island the purposes of Article 121(1) 
of UNCLOS. Moreover, it explicitly does so with reference to UNCLOS. Taiwan’s 
position is that:
Taiping Island (Itu Aba, the largest (0.43 square km) of the naturally 
formed Nansha (Spratly) Islands, has been garrisoned by ROC troops 
since 1956. […] For the past six decades, ROC military and civilian person-
nel have dwelled on Taiping Island (Itu Aba), conducting their respective 
missions while making use of and developing its natural resources. 
Taiping Island (Itu Aba) has groundwater wells, natural vegetation, and 
phosphate ore and fishery resources. Moreover, personnel stationed on 
the island cultivate vegetables and fruit and rear livestock. […] From 
legal, economic, and geographic perspectives, Taiping Island (Itu Aba) 
indisputably qualifies as an ‘island’ according to the specifications 
of Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
519   Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam transmit-
ted to the Arbitral Tribunal in the Proceedings between The Republic of the Philippines 
and The People’s Republic of China, 22 January 2013, Annex 468, 44.
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(UNCLOS), and can sustain human habitation and economic life of its 
own; it is thus categorically not a ‘rock’. The ROC government will firmly 
defend this fact. Any claims by other countries which aim to deny this 
fact will not impair the legal status of Taiping Island (Itu Aba) and its 
maritime rights based on UNCLOS.520
This statement suggests that Taiwan claims the maritime entitlements that 
flow from it classifying Itu Aba as a fully-fledged island under UNCLOS. The 
Tribunal did not invite Taiwan to participate in its proceedings, nor did it 
solicit Taiwan’s views.
5.4.4.2 Application of the Monetary Gold Principle with Respect to Taiwan
The Tribunal’s decision more than just “affects” Taiwan’s putative legal rights 
and interests in relation to Itu Aba. Clearly, the Tribunal had to determine that 
Itu Aba is not a fully-fledged “island”, and that no State can therefore claim 
EEZ or continental shelf rights with reference to it, before it could determine 
that Itu Aba is just a “rock”. In other words, the Tribunal’s determination that 
Itu Aba is not a fully-fledged island (as Taiwan claims) was “a prerequisite for 
a decision to be taken on” whether Itu Aba is a “rock”.521 The only reasonable 
conclusion is that the Tribunal’s decision on this point goes to the “very subject 
matter” of Taiwan’s claim that Itu Aba is an island.
This begs the obvious question: could the Tribunal’s – purported – disregard 
of Taiwan’s legal interests with respect to Itu Aba be attributed to the disputed 
status of Taiwan as a subject of international law? Clearly (and correctly), the 
Tribunal did not view Taiwan as a separate “State” under international law, 
referring to it repeatedly as the “Taiwan Authority of China”.522 The Tribunal 
520   See the official publication of Taiwan’s position on the website of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs at https://www.mofa.gov.uk.tw.en/News_Content.aspz?n=0E7B91A8FBEC4A9
4&s=EDEBCA08C7F51C98. Taiwan’s claims go beyond Itu Aba: “Whether from the per-
spectives of history, geography, or international law, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, Shisha 
(Paracel) Islands, Chungsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), and Tungsha (Pratas) Islands, as 
well as their surrounding waters, are an inherent part of ROC territory and waters. As the 
ROC enjoys all rights to these island groups and their surrounding waters in accordance 
with international law, the ROC government does not recognize any claim to sovereignty 
over, or occupation of, these areas by other countries, irrespective of the reasons put for-
ward or methods used for such claim or occupation.” 
521   Certain Phosphate Iands in Nauru, supra note 493, at para. 55.
522   Award on the Merits, para. 139. The ROC claims that being called the “Taiwan Authority of 
China” is an “inappropriate designation [and] is demeaning to the status of the ROC as a 
sovereign state”. Furthermore, we have seen (unconfirmed) reports that “Taiwan was keen 
to send representatives to observe the hearings held at The Hague […]. Unfortunately, 
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does not explicitly say that it did not apply the Monetary Gold principle 
because Taiwan is not a separate State under international law. In light of the 
Tribunal’s silence on this point, the better reading of the Merits Award is that 
the Tribunal failed to consider whether it should apply the Monetary Gold 
principle at all with respect to Taiwan.
Irrespective of the Monetary Gold principle, in light of the Tribunal’s “special 
responsibility” to satisfy itself that the claim was well-founded in fact and law, 
including as regards issues of jurisdiction, it would not have been improper for 
the Tribunal to have contacted Taiwan to request evidence (and perhaps even 
its views) as regards to the status of Itu Aba under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. 
This is particularly the case given that the Tribunal reviewed and accepted a 
communication from the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, and 
given that Taiwanese authorities have occupied and administered TaiPing Dao 
(Itu Aba) for many years. Such an approach would have been a logical appli-
cation of the Tribunal’s power to “take all appropriate measures in order to 
establish the facts”
5.5 The Tribunal Failed to State Adequate Reasons
Article 10 of Annex VII to the Convention requires that the Award shall “state 
the reasons on which it is based”. It is a fundamental principle of international 
law and a standard feature in contemporary international adjudication that 
any court or tribunal must give reasons for its decisions, a fortiori any decisions 
that are fundamental to its jurisdiction.523
due to the sensitive political and sovereignty issues involved, Taiwan’s request to send a 
delegation was not granted by the Tribunal.” See Taiwan’s position on the website of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EAD
DCFD4C6EC567&s=5B5A9134709EB875.
523   The I.C.J. has endorsed the requirement that an international judicial decision must be 
accompanied by a statement of reasons since its early judgments. For instance, in the 
Case Concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 
(Honduras v. Nicaragua), Nicaragua contested the validity of an arbitral award, inter alia, 
for it failing to state reasons. In examining Nicaragua’s allegations, the Court acknowledged 
the requirement to provide reasons, albeit it ultimately found that the decision “deal[t] 
in logical order and in some detail with all relevant consideration and (…) it contain[ed] 
ample reasoning and explanations in support of the conclusions arrived at by the arbitra-
tor”; Judgment, 18 November 1960, I.C.J. Reports 196 at 2016. See also Article 56(1), Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, “The judgment shall state the reasons on which it 
is based”; Article 29, Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, International Law Commission, 
“The award shall, in respect of every point on which it rules, state the reasons on which it is 
based”; Article 32(2), International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules, 2017, “The 
award shall state the reasons upon which it is based”; Article 48(3) ICSID Convention, 
“The award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal, and shall state the 
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In the investor-State dispute resolution context, an ICSID ad hoc commit-
tee has explained that statement of reasons “does not mean just any reasons, 
purely formal or apparent, but rather reasons having some substance, allow-
ing the reader to follow the arbitral tribunal’s reasoning, on facts and on 
law”.524 The committee further explained that “apparently relevant” reasoning 
would not suffice as reasons are required to be “sufficiently relevant”, that is, 
“reasonably sustainable and capable of providing a basis for the decision”.525
In our view, the Tribunal arguably failed to provide in its Merits Award 
“sufficiently relevant” reasons for its conclusions as regards the status of the 
Secondary High Tide Features under Article 121 (i.e., Amboyna Cay, Flat Island, 
Loaita Island, Namyit Island, Nanshan Island, Sand Cay, Sin Cowe Island and 
Swallow Reef).
Before it turned to classifying the Secondary High Tide Features, the Tri-
bunal set out factors that it would consider for the purposes of classifying the 
features in the South China Sea. The Tribunal observed, in particular, that 
“the capacity of a feature to sustain human habitation or an economic life of 
its own must be assessed on a case-by-case basis”526 and that the “negotiating 
history clearly demonstrates the difficulty in setting, in the abstract, bright-
line rules for all cases”.527 The Tribunal also made the important observation 
that features could not be categorised as islands or rocks by reference to their 
“size” alone:
The Tribunal considers that the travaux make clear that – although size 
may correlate to the availability of water, food, living space, and resources 
for an economic life – size cannot be dispositive of a feature’s status as 
a fully entitled island or rock and is not, on its own, a relevant factor. 
As noted by the International Court of Justice in Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), ‘international law does not prescribe 
any minimum size which a feature must possess in order to be consid-
ered an island.528
reasons upon which it is based”; Article 47(i), ICSID Arbitration Rules, “The award shall 
be in writing and shall contain: (…) (i) the decision of the Tribunal on every question 
submitted to it, together with the reasons upon which the decision is based”.
524   Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic of Cameroon and Société 
Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment, 3 May 1985, 
para. 119.
525   Id. at para. 120.
526   Award, supra note 1, at para. 546.
527   Id. at para. 537.
528   Id. at para. 538.
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Having made these observations, the Tribunal turned to classifying the 
Secondary High Time Features. The Tribunal determined that:
Other high-tide features claimed by China atop coral reefs in the Spratly 
Islands are smaller in size than the above-described features, with surface 
areas of less than 0.14 square kilometres, but present similar characteris-
tics. The Tribunal has examined Amboyna Cay, Flat Island, Loaita Island, 
Namyit Island, Nanshan Island, Sand Cay, Sin Cowe Island, and Swallow 
Reef for evidence of human habitation or economic life, but does not 
consider it necessary to discuss them individually. The Tribunal consid-
ers that if the six largest features described above are all to be classified 
as rocks for purposes of Article 121(3) of the Convention, the same con-
clusion would also hold true for all other high-tide features in the Spratly 
Islands.529
It is well-established that a tribunal “fails to give reasons” when the reader 
cannot:
follow the reasoning of the Tribunal on points of fact and law […] the 
requirement to state reasons is satisfied as long as the award enables one 
to follow how the Tribunal proceeds from Point A to Point B and eventu-
ally to its conclusion, even if it made an error of fact or law.530
The Tribunal arguably failed to state reasons for its conclusion that the 
Secondary High Tide Features. It is not possible to follow the Tribunal’s rea-
soning in at least two respects: (1) by “not consider[ing] it necessary to discuss 
them individually”, the Tribunal did precisely the opposite of what it said it 
would do i.e., it did not classify the Secondary High Tide Features on a “case-
by-case” basis; and (2) the Tribunal drew a “bright-line rule for all cases” on the 
basis of size alone. Contrary to its conclusions on the relevant aspects of 
the test under UNCLOS, the Tribunal took a shortcut determining that, merely 
because the Secondary High Tide Features were smaller than the six largest 
features (which the Tribunal deemed were rocks), it would “hold true” that all 
other hide-tide features in the Spratly Islands would also be “rocks”. The con-
tradictions in the Tribunal’s approach are, in any event, manifest with respect 
to its findings as regards the Secondary High Tide Features.
529   Id. at para. 407.
530   Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/4, Decision of the ad hoc committee, 6 January 1988, paras. 5.08–09.
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6 ANNEX 1
table 1 Small features mutually recognised as being fully entitled under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS











































Taiwan EEZ and CS The disputing States are China (including Taiwan), 
Philippines and Vietnam.






Storm surges may  
submerge the entire 
islet, changing its  
size and reshaping  
its topography
During hurricanes,  










No Nesting site  
to green sea 
turtles and  
birds
No




Fishing is the 
main economic 
activity
No Venezuela TS, EEZ, CS An arbitration Award of 1865, by the Queen of Spain, 
established the Venezuelan sovereignty over the island.
Venezuela claims it as an island. It has been given  
full effect in various delimitation agreements,  
including United States-Venezuela (1978), the 
Netherlands (Antilles)-Venezuela (1978) and  
Venezuela-France Agreement (1980).
On 26 July 1978, Venezuela enacted legislation  
establishing an EEZ along its mainland coasts and 
islands.
Dominica has traditionally claimed sovereignty as it 
lies within its EEZ. Nevertheless, it dropped its claims in 
2006, soon after joining the ALBA alliance.
Venezuela’s position on maritime claims is complex as it 
is not signatory of UNCLOS. As such, its claims to an EEZ 
around Isla Aves have not been formalised.
Clipperton Pacific 
Ocean



















France EEZ, CS Currently a Minor Oversea Territory of France.
Mexico and France signed a compromise in 1909, agree-
ing to submit the dispute over Clipperton to arbitration 
and appointed King Victor Emanuel of Italy as the sole 
arbitrator. In 1931, the King rendered an arbitral award 
declaring French sovereignty over the island.
After some fishermen incidents, Mexico claimed the  
feature should be qualified as a rock in the sense of 
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. Consequently, in 2017, Mexico 
and France concluded an agreement on fishing activities 
of Mexican vessels within 200 nautical miles surround-
ing Clipperton, which interestingly avoided the  
expression EEZ.
In 2010, France deposited a list of geographical  
coordinates of points defining the outer limits of the 
EEZ and CS of the island.
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Jan Mayen Arctic  
Ocean








No Important  
bird area
Volcanic island Yes Yes
Whaling 
station
Norway TS, EEZ, CS In 1976, The Norwegian Parliament enacted legislation 
establishing 200-mile around its coasts. Then, by Royal 
Decree taking effect on 29 May 1980, the Norwegian 
Government established a 200-mile fishery zone  
specifically around Jan Mayen. The Decree provided  
that the fishery zone should not extend beyond the 
median line in relation to Greenland.
On 28 May 1980, Iceland and Norway concluded an 
Agreement concerning fishery and continental shelf.  
In the agreement, the Parties agreed to refer outer  
continental shelf claims to a Conciliation Commission. 
In referring to the legal status of Jan Mayen, the 
Commission concluded that Jan Mayen must be  
considered as an island, thus entitled to a territorial  
sea, an economic zone and a continental shelf.
In its Judgment of 14 June 1993 concerning the Maritime 
Delimitation in the area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen, the ICJ fixed a delimitation line for both the 
continental shelf and the fishery zones of Denmark and 
Norway. 
table 2 Small features unilaterally claimed as fully-entitled islands under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS




















South China Sea 0.43 km2 Approx. 600
military and  
technical personnel
















Scarce mining  
and port facilities
Taiwan EEZ and CS The disputing States are China, Taiwan, Philippines and 
Vietnam.
table 1 Small features mutually recognised as being fully entitled under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS (cont.)
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table 2 Small features unilaterally claimed as fully-entitled islands under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS (cont.)

















Tromelin Indian Ocean 0.80 km2 Uninhabited
No continuous 
human presence
There is no harbour 
nor anchorages on 













In 1968, France placed it under the administration of a  
commissioner residing on the island of Réunion.
In 1978, France issued the Decree No. 78-146 (Article 1, 
pp. 16–21) unilaterally establishing sovereignty and an 
EEZ of 188 nautical miles from the outer limit of the 
French Republic off the coasts the scattered islands, 
subject to delimitation agreements with neighboring 
countries.
In contrast, the Constitution of Mauritius included 
Tromelin as a part of the Mauritian territory. Also, in 
2008, Mauritius deposited with the UN Department 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, the charts 
and lists of geographical coordinates of basepoints and 
baselines for the maritime zones, including Tromelin, 
representing the basepoints and defining the baselines 
from which the maritime zones of Mauritius shall be 
measured (see p. 1).
The controversy over Tromelin has led to the  
postponing of the ratification by the French Parliament 
of a Framework Agreement entered into by France and 
Mauritius in June 2010, providing for joint economic, 
scientific and environmental management (cogestion) 
of the island and of surrounding maritime areas.




0.2 km2 Uninhabited No No No No No France  
since 1897
TS, EEZ In 1968, France placed it under the administration of a  
commissioner residing on the island of Réunion.
In 1978, France issued the Decree No. 78-146 (Article 1, 
pp. 16–21) establishing unilaterally sovereignty and an 
EEZ of 188 nautical miles from the outer limit of the 
French Republic off the coasts the scattered islands, 
subject to delimitation agreements with neighbouring 
countries.
Juan de Nova Mozambique 
Channel
4.4 km2 Uninhabited No Identified as  
an important 
Bird Area
No No Guano deposits 
were exploited 
from the start of 
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commissioner residing on the island of Réunion.
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pp. 16–21) establishing unilaterally sovereignty and an 
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table 2 Small features unilaterally claimed as fully-entitled islands under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS (cont.)
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table 2 Small features unilaterally claimed as fully-entitled islands under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS (cont.)











































TS and EEZ In 1978, France issued the Decree No. 78–146 (see 
Article 1, pp. 16–21) establishing unilaterally sovereignty 
and an EEZ of 188 nautical miles from the outer limit of 
the French Republic off the coasts the scattered islands, 




Arctic Ocean 10.8 Km2 Uninhabited No No Almost entirely 
covered by an 
ice cap
No No Russia CS Administered as part of Franz Josef Land and belongs 





Arctic Ocean 12 Km2 Uninhabited
A polar station  
was established  
in 1937 but closed  
in 1963
No No Almost entirely 




No No Russia CS Not included in the US purchased of Alaska from 






28 Km2 Small military and 
scientific (weather 
station) personnel
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pp. 16–21) establishing unilaterally sovereignty and an 
EEZ of 188 nautical miles from the outer limit of the 
French Republic off the coasts the scattered islands, 










In previous years, 
average of 1,100 US 
military and  
contractors present; 














EEZ and TS Annexed by the US and the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1858
It was designated as a wildlife refuge in 1926, and then 
taken over by the US Navy in 1934, and then the US Air 
Force in 1948.
The atoll was used for high-altitude nuclear tests in the 
1950s and 1960s and was used as a storage and disposal 
site for chemical weapons until the 2000s.
The weapons facility on the atoll was closed in 
May 2005.
Trindade Southern  
Atlantic Ocean







Yes No No No Brazil (since 
1822)
[EEZ and TS]
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table 2 Small features unilaterally claimed as fully-entitled islands under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS (cont.)
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table 2 Small features unilaterally claimed as fully-entitled islands under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS (cont.)



























EEZ and TS The UK transferred these islands to Australia in 1947.





1.6 km2 Uninhabited No Yes [No] No No United States 
(since 1857) 
EEZ and TS
Jarvis Island South Pacific 
Ocean
4.5 km2 Uninhabited No Yes [No] No No United States 
(since 1935)
EEZ and TS Discovered by the British in 1821. Annexed by the US 
in 1858 but abandoned in 1879. The UK then annexed 
the island in 1889. The US occupied and reclaimed the 
island in 1935.
The island was abandoned after World War II.
Wake Island North Pacific 
Ocean
6.5 km2 No indigenous 
inhabitants
(there are  
approximately 100 
military personnel  
and civilian 
contractors)
Yes No No No Yes
Provides services 
to military  
personnel and 
contractors.  




United States EEZ and TS Annexed in 1899 for a cable station. Air and naval base 
constructed in 1940. In 1941, the island was captured by 
the Japanese and held until the end of World War II.
Since 1974, the island’s airstrip has been used by the  
US military.
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table 2 Small features unilaterally claimed as fully-entitled islands under Article 121(2) of UNCLOS (cont.)
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Prosecuting Crimes against Humanity before 
International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh:  
A Nexus with an Armed Conflict
Yudan Tan*
1 Introduction
The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh was created in 2010 under 
the amended International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (1973 Act) to deal with 
international crimes, including crimes against humanity committed during 
the liberation war of 1971. Scholars and the international community have 
voiced legitimacy concerns that the Tribunal’s trial will not be fair, transpar-
ent or impartial for its inconsistency with international standards concerning 
the definitions of crimes, evidentiary rules, death penalty, compensation to 
victims, and the selection of judges.1 Instead of analysing the legitimacy issues, 
this article mainly aims to examine the issue of a nexus with an armed conflict 
for crimes against humanity from Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL)2 perspective.
According to TWAIL, as Antony Anghie wrote, international law has been 
used to discipline and subordinate non-European peoples. “[T]hese doctrines 
*  Postdoc at the International Academy of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Soochow 
University, China.
1   Zakia Afrin, The International War Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973 of Bangladesh, Indian 
Yearbook of International Law and Policy 341 (2009); Bianca Karim & Tirza 
Theunissen, Bangladesh, in International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: 
Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion 114 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011); 
Bangladesh: Upgrade War Crimes Law, Human Rights Watch (July 8, 2009), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/08/bangladesh-upgrade-war-crimes-law; Letter to Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina Re: International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, Human Rights Watch 
(July 8, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/08/letter-prime-minister-sheikh-hasina 
-re-international-crimes-tribunals-act; Human Rights Watch, Ignoring Executions 
and Torture: Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces (2009), https://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0509webwcover.pdf; Abdur Razzaq, 
The Tribunals in Bangladesh: Falling Short of International Standards, in Trials for 
International Crimes in Asia 346 (Kirsten Sellars ed., 2015).
2   Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 Chinese Journal Of International Law 77 
(2003).
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[of international law] were created for the explicit purpose of excluding the 
colonial world, or else, are based on an exclusion … as when positivist jurists 
dismiss the state practice of the uncivilized Eastern states as irrelevant to the 
formulation of international law”.3 The field of international criminal law is 
not an exception. The Third World’s participation is less concerned for the 
formation of norms in this field. The design of crime definitions, attribution 
doctrines, and procedural norms in international criminal law are not neutral.4 
In addition to this, scholars noted that due to the human rights movement, 
norms of international criminal law also concern the interest of ordinary 
people from the post-colonial world. Rules and institutions of international 
criminal law sometimes unequally facilitate Third World governments to pros-
ecute international crimes committed by opposing non-State entities of Third 
World States.5 The practice of international criminal justice is criticised for its 
selectivity6 and double standards.7
It is less controversial that the notion of crimes against humanity is con-
sidered as an international crime. It is also generally asserted that the crime 
against humanity is disassociated with a nexus with an armed conflict under 
customary law now. However, it is not clear as to whether the crime was disas-
sociated with the nexus before or in the liberation war of 1971. This question 
is less concerned by European-colonial States, while it still plays a crucial role 
in prosecuting crimes against humanity committed in Bangladesh. When 
the amended 1973 Act, applied to prosecuting crimes committed in 1971, was 
adopted or approved (ex post facto law), an observation on these crimes under 
customary law at the material time is of importance. This article analyses 
the issue of the nexus with an armed conflict for crimes against humanity 
in the Bangladeshi Tribunals at the material time. The central question here 
is whether the notion of crimes against humanity required a nexus with an 
armed conflict before or in 1971.
3   Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law 315 (2005).
4   Sergey Vasiliev, The Crises and Critiques of International Criminal Justice, in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Criminal Law 25 (Kevin Heller et al. eds., forthcoming 
2020). 
5   Asad G. Kiyani, Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law, 109 American 
Journal of International Law Unbound 255 (2015).
6   Kiyani, supra note 5; Asad Kiyani, Group-Based Differentiation and Local Repression: The 
Custom and Curse of Selectivity, 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 939 
(2016); John Reynolds & Sujith Xavier, ‘The Dark Corners of the World’: TWAIL and Inter-
national Criminal Justice, 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 959 (2016).
7   Wolfgang Kaleck, Double Standards: International Criminal Law and the 
West 109–17 (2015).
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This article consists of five sections including this introduction and conclu-
sion. Section II analyses the 1973 Act and the practice of Bangladeshi Tribunals 
in relation to prosecuting crimes against humanity. Section III analyses the 
issue of whether the notion of crimes against humanity required a nexus with 
an armed conflict as a legal element in customary law. This section involves a 
historical survey on how the powerful States have shaped the notion of crimes 
against humanity and defined a nexus with an armed conflict under customary 
law. Section IV discusses the disappearance of a nexus with an armed conflict 
for crimes against humanity under customary law. In closing, Section V high-
lights final conclusions.
2 Crimes against Humanity before the International Crimes Tribunal 
in Bangladesh
In order to better understand the background of prosecution of international 
crimes in Bangladesh, this section firstly examines the establishment of the 
International Crimes Tribunals, and then briefly analyses the nexus issue for 
crimes against humanity.
The establishment of the International Crimes Tribunals in Bangladesh 
is pertinent to the Bangladesh Liberation War, which lasted for about nine 
months from 26 March to 16 December in 1971. It has been reported that 
crimes under international law, including large-scale killing, torture, rape, and 
persecution, were committed during the war.8 Accordingly, the Bangladesh 
Government passed the 1973 Act. The 1973 Act provides “for the detention, 
prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against human-
ity, war crimes and other crimes under international law”.9 There existed 
investigations of war crimes committed by members of the Pakistan Army, 
but no one was convicted under this Act due to a tripartite agreement among 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Some collaborators of the Pakistan Army were 
tried in a separate process under the 1972 Bangladesh Collaborators (Special 
Tribunals) Order, but most of them were released according to the 1973 govern-
mental clemency.10 The 1973 Act laid dormant for almost four decades, and no 
8    Rounaq Jahan, Genocide in Bangladesh, in Century of Genocide: Critical Essays 
and Eyewitness Accounts 245–53 (Samuel Totten & William S. Parsons eds., 3rd ed. 
2009).
9    The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (Act No. XIX of 1973) (Bangl.).
10   Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 12.
297A Nexus with an Armed Conflict
proceeding took off to bring perpetrators of these crimes to justice until the 
Bangladesh Government decided to try war criminals in 2009.11 The 1973 Act 
was slightly amended by the International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) 
Act 2009.12 According to the 1973 Act, as amended in 2009, an International 
Crimes Tribunal was created to deal with crimes committed since the 1971 
Liberation War. As a result, the International Crimes Tribunal-1 (ICT-1) and 
International Crimes Tribunal-2 (ICT-2) were established in 2010 and 2012 
respectively. The Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments of the two ICTs.13
With regard to the jurisdiction of the two ICTs, according to Section 3(1) of 
the 1973 Act, the two ICTs have:
[T]he power to try and punish any individual or group of individuals, or 
organizations, or any member of any armed, defence or auxiliary forces, 
irrespective of his nationality, who commits or has committed, in the ter-
ritory of Bangladesh, whether before or after the commencement of this 
Act, any of the crimes mentioned in sub-section (2).14
The crimes mentioned in sub-section (2) covers crimes against humanity, crimes 
against peace, genocide, war crimes, violation of any humanitarian rules appli-
cable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, any 
other crimes under international law, attempt, abetment or conspiracy to com-
mit any such crimes, and complicity in or failure to prevent commission of any 
such crimes. The notion of crimes against humanity under this Act is defined 
as follows:
Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture, rape 
or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population or 
11   International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971 
(1972); For a short history of the events and impunity, see Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 1, at 9–17; War Criminal Trial under Int’l Crime Act, Daily Star, (Mar. 26, 2009), 
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=81408 (the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited 
to “crimes committed within the territory of Bangladesh”; thus, crimes committed by 
Bangladeshi collaborators in Pakistan is not covered under the 1973 Act).
12   The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009) 
(Bangl.).
13   The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (Act No. XIX of 1973), § 21(1) (Bangl.). 
14   Id. § 3(1).
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persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.15
Obviously, a nexus with an armed conflict is not mentioned in this Act. A literal 
reading of the definition that the notion of crimes against humanity did not 
require a nexus with an armed conflict is less convincing. The following para-
graphs resort to case law for clarification.
In practice, as of December 2019, the ICT-1 in Bangladesh has delivered 30 
judgments. The ICT-2 has also delivered 11 judgments from 2012 to 2015, but 
it has not been functioning since September 2015.16 Until now, 97 individuals 
have been convicted for charges of crimes against humanity, genocide, or war 
crimes by the two ICTs.17 Nearly all of the accused have been charged and con-
victed for crimes against humanity.
When clarifying its applicable law, the two ICTs first stressed that their 
applicable law 1973 Act is ex-post facto legislation. The tribunals added that 
ex-post facto legislation is permitted because international tribunals, for 
example, the two UN ad hoc tribunals, were constituted under retrospective 
statutes.18 The ICTs seem to ignore that the two ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction 
over crimes is limited to crimes existent under customary international law.19 
The main issue of ex-post facto legislation is not that the tribunal must be 
founded prospectively, but instead that the tribunal shall not apply law ret-
rospectively so as to avoid violating the principle of legality. In the absence of 
relevant treaty or national criminal prohibitions in Bangladesh at the mate-
rial time before or in 1971, how can its tribunals prosecute crimes against 
humanity without violating the principle of non-retroactivity, which prohibits 
domestic authorities interpreting a crime and its elements to convict persons 
retrospectively? The existing customary international rules play a vital role 
in this circumstance.
15   Id. § 3(2)(a).
16   It is said that the ICT-2 was founded to speed up the work of the ICT-1.
17   Nearly half of the accused have been tried in absentia.
18   See Prosecutor v. Khan, Case No. 01 of 2013, Judgment, ¶¶ 71–72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Bangladesh Nov. 3, 2013); Prosecutor v. Qaiser, Case No. 04 of 2013, Judgment, ¶ 363 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Dec. 23, 2014); Mollah v. Government of Bangladesh, Case 
No. 24–25 of 2013, Judgment (Supreme Court of Bangladesh Sept. 17, 2013); Prosecutor v. 
Sattar, Case No. 05 of 2018, Judgment, ¶ 6 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Dec. 11, 2019). 
This is not the place to discuss in detail whether customary international law is applicable 
at the two domestic tribunals.
19   Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (Tadić 
Appeals Chamber decision on jurisdiction).
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An appropriate understanding for applying the ex-post facto 1973 Act should 
be that these crimes enacted in the domestic law contain similar rules as those 
under customary law. Other scholars’ observation also supports such an under-
standing, that courts in Bangladesh tend not to apply customary international 
law but instead give effect to domestic law containing similar norms.20 The two 
ICTs also reiterated the importance of customary international law. The ICTs 
clarified that they are domestic mechanisms set up to try crimes against 
humanity committed in violation of laws of war and customary law. They 
pointed out that “[t]here is nothing repugnant to CIL [customary interna-
tional law] in the Act of 1973, […] [rather it] is consonant with the provisions 
of CIL”.21 Thus, although customary law is not its applicable law, the ICTs have 
tried to construe legal elements of crimes against humanity in the 1973 Act to 
be consistent with that under customary law.
With regard to the nexus issue for crimes against humanity, the ICT-1 
adopted two approaches in their judgments. Firstly, the ICT-1 in its early judg-
ments repeatedly construed that:
Crime against humanity can be committed even in peacetime; the exis-
tence of armed conflict is, by definition, not mandatory. Neither in the 
preamble nor in the jurisdiction sections of the Act was it mentioned that 
crime against humanity requires the existence of an armed conflict…. 
However [,] no one denies the fact that there was an armed conflict 
in 1971.22
20   Karim & Theunissen, supra note 1, at 106.
21   Mollah v. Government of Bangladesh, Case No. 24–25 of 2013, Judgment, at 132 (Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh Sept. 17, 2013).
22   Prosecutor v. Sayeedi, Case No. 01 of 2011, Judgment, ¶ 32(1) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Bangladesh Feb. 28, 2013); Prosecutor v. Azam, Case No. 06 of 2011, Judgment, ¶ 32(1) 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh July 15, 2013); Prosecutor v. Chowdhury, Case No. 02 of 
2011, Judgment, ¶ 33(1) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Oct. 1, 2013); Prosecutor v. Nizami, 
Case No. 03 of 2011, ¶ 40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Oct. 29, 2014); Prosecutor v. 
Khokon, Case No. 04 of 2013, Judgment, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Nov. 13 2014); 
Prosecutor v. Hossain, Case No. 01 of 2013, Judgment, ¶ 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
Nov. 24, 2014); Prosecutor v. Islam, Case No. 05 of 2013, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Bangladesh Dec. 30 2014); Prosecutor v. Engineer, ICT-BD 01 of 2014, Judgment, ¶ 4 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Feb. 24, 2015); Prosecutor v. Hachhan, Case No. 02 of 2014, 
Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh June 9 2015); Prosecutor v. Haque, Case 
No. 03 of 2014, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Aug. 11 2015); Prosecutor v. 
Haque, Case No. 04 of 2014, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Feb. 2, 2016); 
Prosecutor v. Ahmd, Case No. 01 of 2015, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
May 3, 2016); Prosecutor v. Rahman, Case No. 03 of 2015, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Bangladesh June 1, 2016); Prosecutor v. Haque, Case No. 02 of 2015, Judgment, ¶ 4 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. of Bangladesh July 18, 2016); Prosecutor v. Hossain, Case No. 04 of 2015, 
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Accordingly, the ICT-1 confirmed that crimes against humanity require no 
nexus with an (international) armed conflict in 1971. There is no nexus of 
an armed conflict for crimes against humanity in 1971 under customary 
law. However, it is unclear whether the ICT-1 considered that the nexus was 
required before but that it disappeared in 1971. Secondly, the ICT-1 in its later 
judgments pointed out that the offences of crimes against humanity for which 
these accused are indicted are “recognized as international crimes as hap-
pened in war time situation”.23 The tribunal did not mention the nexus issue 
for crimes against humanity under customary law in 1971 but simply referred to 
the fact of the existence of the war. It appears that the tribunals intentionally 
avoided to clarify the legal issue. If a nexus was required, a conviction of the 
crimes is consistent with the principle of legality because the nexus element 
was satisfied by the fact of the Liberation War; if a nexus was not required, the 
existence of the war was only a factual background. In this way, their convic-
tions of crimes against humanity would not be challenged for the lack of a 
nexus with an armed conflict. Thus, the ICT-1 did not touch on the issue of 
whether crimes against humanity required an armed conflict nexus under cus-
tomary law at the material time in 1971.
Unlike the ICT-1, the ICT-2 held that “[i]t is the ‘context’ [of the 1971 war 
of liberation] that transforms an individual’s act or conduct into a crime 
Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Aug. 10, 2016); Prosecutor v. Sardar, Case 
No. 06 of 2015, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Dec. 5, 2016). See also 
Prosecutor v. Prodhan, ICT-BD 01 of 2016, Judgment, ¶¶ 635, 639–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Bangladesh Apr. 19, 2017).
23   Prosecutor v. Miah, Case No. 03 of 2016, Judgment, ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
Nov. 2017); Prosecutor v. Tarafdar, Case No. 06 of 2016, Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Bangladesh Jan. 10 2018); Prosecutor v. Ahmed, Case No. 05 of 2015, Judgment, ¶ 9 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Mar. 13 2018); Prosecutor v. Fakir, Case No. 04 of 2016, 
Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh May 10, 2018); Prosecutor v. Talukder, Case 
No. 08 of 2016, Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh July 17, 2018); Prosecutor v. 
Shikder, Case No. 10 of 2016, Judgment, ¶ 10, 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Aug. 13, 
2018); Prosecutor v. Ali, Case No. 05 of 2016, Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
Nov. 5, 2018); Prosecutor v. Majid, Case No. 07 of 2016, Judgment, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Bangladesh Mar. 28, 2019); Prosecutor v. Hidaetulla, Case No. 01 of 2017, Judgment, 
¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Apr. 24, 2019); Prosecutor v. Rahman, Case No. 01 of 
2018, Judgment, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh June 27, 2019); Prosecutor v. Samad, 
Case No. 04 of 2018, Judgment, ¶¶ 7, 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Aug. 27, 2019); 
Prosecutor v. Mondol, Case No. 02 of 2017, Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
Oct. 15, 2019); Prosecutor v. Sattar, Case No. 05 of 2018, Judgment, ¶ 198 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Bangladesh Dec. 11, 2019).
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against humanity”.24 The ICT-2 considered the armed conflict not only as a 
factual background but also as a legal context. The Appellate Division of the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court had once discussed the origin of crimes against 
humanity but did not analyse the nexus issue in detail.25
As observed above, the 1973 Act provides no answer to the question of 
whether crimes against humanity require a nexus with an armed conflict. Case 
law of the ICTs also did not assist in understanding the nexus issue. Judgments 
of the ICT-1 did not clarify but confused the nexus issue. The 1973 Act and the 
two ICTs’ practice, therefore, are less valuable in clarifying the nexus issue. 
The following parts turn to other authorities and jurisprudence of interna-
tional tribunals.
3 The Nexus with an Armed Conflict for Crimes against Humanity in 
Customary Law
After World War II, there were various definitions of crimes against humanity 
as international crimes.26 Scholars’ opinions also differ on whether a nexus 
24   See Prosecutor v. Alim, Case No. 01 of 2012, Judgment, ¶ 118 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
Oct. 9, 2013); See also Prosecutor v. Azad, Case No. 05 of 2012, Judgment, ¶ 78 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Bangladesh 21 Jan. 2013); Prosecutor v. Molla, Case No. 02 of 2012, Judgment, ¶ 79 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Feb. 5, 2013); Prosecutor v. Kamaruzzaman, Case No. 03 of 
2012, Judgment, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh May 9, 2013); Prosecutor v. Mujahid, 
Case No. 04 of 2012, Judgment, ¶ 123 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh July, 17 2013); 
Prosecutor v. Uddin, Case No. 01 of 2013, Judgment, ¶ 405 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
Nov. 3, 2013); Prosecutor v. Ali, Case No. 03 of 2013, Judgment, ¶ 109 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Bangladesh Nov. 2, 2014); Prosecutor v. Qaiser, Case No. 04 of 2013, Judgment, ¶¶ 925, 
930 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Dec. 23, 2014); Prosecutor v. Sobhan, Case No. 01 of 
2014, Judgment, ¶¶ 532, 539 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh Feb. 18, 2015); Prosecutor v. 
Rahman, Case No. 02 of 2014, Judgment, ¶¶ 5, 30, 262 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Bangladesh 
May 20, 2015); Prosecutor v. Mallik, Case No. 03 of 2014, Judgment, ¶¶ 93, 273 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Bangladesh July 16, 2015).
25   See Mollah v. Government of Bangladesh, Case No. 24–25 of 2013, Judgment, ¶¶ 152–58 
(Supreme Court of Bangladesh Sept. 17, 2013).
26   See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), opened for signature Aug. 8, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg 
Charter]; International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter art. 5(c), opened 
for signature Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589; Allied Control Council Law No. 10 art. II(1)(a), 
Dec. 20, 1945; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
art. 5, May 25, 1993 (amended 2002); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda art. 3, Nov. 8, 1994 (amended 2006); Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 7, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 
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with an armed conflict is a legal requirement for this crime. This section mainly 
addresses the notion of crimes against humanity and the existence of a nexus 
with an armed conflict as a legal element for crimes against humanity from an 
historical perspective.
3.1 The Notions of Crimes against Humanity in International Law
Definitions of crimes against humanity are different concerning the issue of 
the nexus with an armed conflict. According to the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters as well as the 1950 International Law Commission (ILC) Nuremberg 
Principles, a nexus with an armed conflict was a legal requirement. By con-
trast, this nexus was omitted in the 1945 Control Council Law No. 10 and was 
abandoned in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute). Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1993 also explicitly referred to a link with an 
armed conflict; however, Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 1994 did not refer to armed conflict despite all 
offences being committed in the context of a civil war. The 1950, 1991, and 1996 
versions of the Draft Code of Offences (Crimes) do not refer to a connection 
with an armed conflict.27
These definitions show a lack of uniformity of the text of crimes against 
humanity. The existence of different definitions would not inherently under-
mine the claim that there is a consensus on crimes against humanity as an 
2002) (amended 2010) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone art. 6(1), Jan. 16, 2002; Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea art. 5, Oct. 27, 2004; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal 
art. 12, 43 I.L.M. 231 (2004); Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with 
Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences  § 5, June 6, 2000; Statute of the 
Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of Senegal Created to Prosecute 
International Crimes Committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 
arts. 4(b), 6, Jan. 30, 2013, 52 I.L.M. 1028 (2013).
27   In fact, the 1950 and 1991 drafts of the ILC’s Draft Code of Offences (Crimes) avoided 
using the term “crimes against humanity”. See Text of a Draft Code of Offences against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind suggested as a Working Paper for the International Law 
Commission, [1950] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 277, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1; Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its forty-third session, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, ¶176, U.N. Doc A/46/10 (1991), 
reprinted in [1991] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 96, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2) (Article 21. Systematic or mass violations of 
human rights); Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 51 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. No. 10, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2).
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international crime under customary law. However, the various definitions 
indicate different understandings of nexus element of these crimes in cus-
tomary law. These understandings are related to the issue of what makes an 
inhumane act a crime against humanity. Competing views exist in academia 
on this question.28 One viewpoint is that, from a historically descriptive per-
spective, most of the crimes were planned and committed by State actors, who 
are generally not the physical perpetrators who committed the crimes. It is 
likely that they would go unpunished without the availability of international 
jurisdiction.29 After examining the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal of Far East 
(IMTFE) in Tokyo and the historic experience of mass crimes in Cambodia, in 
the former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda, Judge Kaul of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) concluded that “historic origins are decisive in understanding the 
specific nature and fundamental rationale of the category of international 
crime”.30 He added that “a demarcation line must be drawn between inter-
national crimes and human rights infractions; between international crimes 
and ordinary crimes; between those crimes subject to international jurisdic-
tion and those punishable under domestic penal legislation”.31 The historical 
experience is vital to understanding what the fundamental rationale of crimes 
against humanity is and how the nexus element of the crimes against human-
ity has come and changed.
3.2 A Nexus with an Armed Conflict: Two Theories
Currently, it is generally agreed that the notion of crimes against humanity 
does not require a nexus with an armed conflict. To date, national legislation of 
almost 60 States, including the UK, the US, Canada, Germany, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, and Vietnam as well as some African States, do not 
28   Margaret M. deGuzman, Crimes Against Humanity, in Routledge Handbook Of 
International Criminal Law 121–38 (W.A. Schabas & N. Bernaz eds., 2011); Kai 
Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume 1: Foundations 
and General Part 55–56 (2013); Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into 
the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, at 29 n. 62 (Mar. 31, 2010).
29   As thoroughly demonstrated by Margaret deGuzman, there are four approaches, and each 
approach has its merits and flaws to some extent. None of the four approaches could pro-
vide an entirely rational argument as regards every specific issue. See deGuzman, supra 
note 28.
30   Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter 
Kaul, ¶¶ 58–65 (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_02409.pdf.
31   Id. ¶ 65.
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require a link with an armed conflict for crimes against humanity.32 The ILC 
also endorsed the view of no nexus with an armed conflict in its recent draft 
convention on crimes against humanity.33 However, scholars’ opinions differ 
with respect to a nexus with an armed conflict as a legal element for crimes 
against humanity in the past and the disappearance of such a nexus.
Two theories exist about this issue. The Steady State theory argues that the 
link with an armed conflict was never a legal but a jurisdictional requirement 
since the 1945 IMT in Nuremberg. Thus, it is not necessary to discuss when this 
link has disappeared as it never existed. The Big Bang theory claims that the 
nexus with an armed conflict was a legal requirement before the IMT, while it 
disappeared at some time. If the Big Bang theory is justified, a further question 
is whether that link has disappeared under customary law before the material 
time in 1971.
According to Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, the definition of 
crimes against humanity was linked to “any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal”.34 It is understood that the phrase “any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal” refers to crimes against peace and war crimes.35 In 
practice, ill-treatment and murder of non-German civilians in concentration 
camps committed by Germans during the war were charged mostly as both 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.36 In addition, as Robert Jackson 
addressed at the London International Conference on Military Trials (London 
Conference) in 1945:
The reason that this program of extermination of Jews and destruction of 
the rights of minorities becomes an international concern is this: it was a 
part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless we have a war connection 
32   Penal Code art. 342 (Viet.); ICC, National Implementing Legislation Data-
base, https://iccdb.hrlc.net/data/.
33   Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/72/10, at 
25–28 (2017); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/70/10, at 59 (2015).
34   Nuremberg Charter, supra note 26, art. 6(c).
35   U.N. Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History and 
Analysis: Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General, at 68–69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 
(Mar. 3, 1949).
36   Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Flick Case, reprinted in 6 Trials of War 
Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals (TWC) 1, 1187–212 (1952) 
[hereinafter The Flick Case]; Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Hostage Case, reprinted 
in 11 TWC 757 (1950); U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, The Zyklon B Case, reprinted in 1 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (LRTWC) 93 (1947); U.N. War Crimes 
Comm’n, The Belsen Case, reprinted in 2 LRTWC 1 (1947).
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as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no basis for deal-
ing with atrocities. They were a part of the preparation for war or for the 
conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside of Germany and that 
makes them our concern.37
Indeed, Streicher and von Schirach were found guilty only of crimes against 
humanity by the IMT. But the IMT judgment also established that the two 
defendants’ conducts were associated with war crimes committed by others.38 
Thus, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter required a link with crimes against 
peace or war crimes.
One may note that the reference to the phrase “before or during the war” in 
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter permits prosecutions of crimes against 
humanity before the war.39 The IMT in some specific instances also referred 
to some acts before the war. Nevertheless, the IMT in practice only considered 
atrocities committed “during the war” in connection with the aggressive wars 
as crimes against humanity.40 For example, von Schirach was largely found 
guilty of crimes against humanity for acts after the beginning of the war, which 
were in connection with Austria’s occupation.41 According to the IMT, “[t]o 
constitute Crimes against Humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of 
war must have been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”.42 In addition, the IMT also held that since 
many actions committed before the war were not proved in connection with 
37   Minutes of Conference Session (July 23, 1945), in Report of Robert H. Jackson 
United States Representative to the International Conference on 
Military Trials: London, 1945, 331 (1949).
38   Nuremberg Int’l Military Tribunal, The International Military Tribunal 
[France v. Göring], reprinted in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before 
the International Military Tribunal (TMWC) 171, 302–04, 318–20 (1947) [herein-
after France v. Göring].
39   Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 British Yearbook of International 
Law 178, 188, 193–95, 204 (1946).
40   France v. Göring, supra note 38, at 254; The Flick Case, supra note 36, at 1212; Anatole 
Goldstein, Crimes Against Humanity: Some Jewish Aspects, 1 Jewish Yearbook of 
International Law 206, 221 (1948).
41   France v. Göring, supra note 38, at 302–04, 318–20; Schwelb, supra note 39, at 205; see 
Nuremberg Int’l Military Tribunal, The International Military Tri-
bunal, reprinted in 22 TMWC 1, 549 (1948), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/NT_Vol-XXII.pdf (noting that “Streicher’s incitement to murder and extermination 
at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions 
clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with War 
Crimes, as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a Crime against Humanity”).
42   France v. Göring, supra note 38, at 254.
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any crime, it could not “make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 
were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Charter”.43 In the 
IMT, the essence of the linkage with war crimes or crimes against peace, in 
fact, was a connection with aggressive wars.44 Therefore, it was potentially pos-
sible for the IMT to prosecute crimes against humanity before the war, but only 
if a nexus existed between the acts and aggressive wars.45 These observations 
indicate that acts committed in peacetime without any connection to the sub-
sequent wars would not constitute crimes against humanity at that time. Only 
concrete acts committed in connection with an armed conflict would consti-
tute crimes against humanity, regardless of whether they occurred before or 
during the war.
Nevertheless, some commentators consider that the nexus with aggressive 
wars was intentionally inserted by the Four Powers to limit the jurisdiction 
of the IMT over individuals of Axis countries.46 Egon Schwelb and Roger 
Clark argued that the armed conflict linkage requirement in the Nuremberg 
Charter was a jurisdictional limit rather than an inherent substantive element 
of crimes against humanity.47 In addition, the definition of crimes against 
humanity in the Nuremberg Charter was almost replicated in Article 5(c) 
of the Tokyo Charter. According to the former Judge Röling of the IMTFE, 
“the connection did not restrict the scope of the crime, but only the scope of [the 
court’s] jurisdiction”.48 Furthermore, the US and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) also once argued that the nexus never 
existed. By citing the work of the UN War Crimes Commission, the US delega-
tion in 1996 stated that “[t]he record of the development of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Charters does not […] indicate that the drafters believed that the 
nexus was required as a matter of law”.49 A Chamber of the ECCC in the Duch 
43   Id.; Goldstein, supra note 40.
44   Schwelb, supra note 39, at 204; Yoram Dinstein, Case Analysis: Crimes Against Humanity 
After Tadić, 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 373, 383–84 (2000).
45   Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/1316, ¶ 122 (1950).
46   Roger S. Clark, History of Efforts to Codify Crimes against Humanity, in Forging a 
Convention for Crimes against Humanity 11 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2010); 
United States Delegation, Crimes against Humanity, Lack of a Requirement for a Nexus 
to Armed Conflict (ICC Preparatory Works, Mar. 25, 1996), available at https://www.legal 
-tools.org/doc/1163fc/pdf/.
47   Clark, supra note 46; Schwelb, supra note 39, at 188, 194–95.
48   Antonio Cassese & B.V.A. Röling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections 
of a Peacemonger 56 (1993).
49   United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 2, n. 4.
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case referred to the ICTY’s Tadić Appeals Chamber decision on jurisdiction to 
justify an argument that a nexus never existed.50
Clark first pointed out that in Article II of the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a nexus with aggressive 
wars was not required for the crime of genocide, which is closely related to 
the persecution type of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter.51 
In addition, he noted that the connection to the “initiation of war and war 
crimes” was omitted in Control Council Law No. 10. Last, Clark clarified that in 
the original English and French texts of Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter 
adopted in August 1945, a semi-colon existed between “before or during the 
war” and “or persecutions”. However, in the original Russian text, a comma was 
used.52 This semi-colon in the English and French texts was later amended to 
a comma in the “Semi-colon Protocol” in October 1945.53 Given the modifi-
cation of this semi-colon, Clark concluded that the phrase “in execution of 
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” was 
only a requirement for persecutions.54 With regard to crimes against humanity, 
acts of “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
mane acts committed against any civilian population” are not required to be 
linked with the war.55 As for acts of persecution, the “crimes” mentioned in the 
phrase “in connection with any crime” refer to the murder type of underlying 
offences, such as “murder, extermination or enslavement”, instead of “crimes 
against peace” and “war crimes” or aggressive wars.56 In his view, a link with 
these underlying offences is confirmed by the Rome Statute, which requires 
50   Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 
¶ 292 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia July 26, 2010) (Cambodia).
51   Clark, supra note 46, at 12; Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity at Nuremberg, in 
The Nuremberg Trial and International Law 190–92 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. 
Kudri͡avt͡sev eds., 1990).
52   See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 26 (“Crimes against humanity[:] namely, murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated”); see also Clark, supra note 46, at 11.
53   Protocol to Agreement and Charter (Oct. 6, 1945), in Report of Robert H. Jackson 
United States Representative to the International Conference on 
Military Trials: London, 1945, 429 (1949) (protocol rectifying discrepancy in the 
text of the Charter, drawn up by the Governments that concluded the Agreement of 
August 8, 1945).




persecution to be “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph”.57 
Accordingly, Clark argued that the Nuremberg Charter did not acknowledge a 
substantive link with aggressive wars or an armed conflict for crimes against 
humanity in international law.58
A different argument, however, is also tenable by reference to these same 
sources.59 It is argued that the nexus with an armed conflict in the Nuremberg 
Charter was a substantive legal element rather than a jurisdictional limit for 
the following reasons. Firstly, it is the wording “trial and punishment of the 
major war criminals of the European Axis” in Article 1 and in the chapeau of 
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, rather than the nexus with war, that was 
inserted to limit the jurisdiction of the IMT.60 Secondly, the semi-colon in the 
English and French texts has not been found in preceding drafts and where 
it came from is a puzzle. The Semi-colon Protocol amended the semi-colon 
two months later. This slight revision has a high impact on the definition of 
crimes against humanity, which required all prohibited murder-type acts to be 
linked to war. It is not persuasive to argue that the reviewers changed it mistak-
enly and failed to consider the impact of the revision. Thirdly, persecution as a 
crime against humanity requires a link with the underlying murder-type acts. 
Such a link for persecution does not exclusively exclude an alternative require-
ment of a link with any crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC (war crimes, 
genocide, and aggression). This link builds a relationship between murder type 
offences and persecution type offences. But the link between the two types 
of offences cannot justify the view that the concept of crimes against human-
ity in the Nuremberg Charter substantively required no link with war.
Fourthly, the US delegation might have mixed “the context” of war or peace 
with “the nexus” with aggressive wars.61 The Legal Committee of the UN War 
Crimes Commission once declared that “[i]t was irrelevant whether a crime 
against humanity had been committed before or during the war”.62 By referring 
to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters,63 the UN War Crimes Commission con-
firmed this clarification.64 Nevertheless, the Legal Committee concluded that 
“the inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before the war 
57   Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 7(1)(h). 
58   Clark, supra note 46, at 11.
59   Schwelb, supra note 39, at 195.
60   Nuremberg Charter, supra note 26.
61   United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 1, 4.
62   U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, History of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War 178–79 (1948).
63   Id. at 522–24.
64   Id. at 192–93.
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[…] fall under crimes against humanity” because the purpose of these clashes 
was in connection with the contemplated invasion of Czechoslovakia.65 Thus, 
acts committed before the war (in peacetime) would be considered as crimes 
against humanity only if these acts were connected with the later aggressions of 
war. In fact, the ILC in its 1950 Nuremberg Principles deleted the phrase “before 
or during the war” in defining crimes against humanity, while it specifically 
referred to the connection with war crimes and aggressive wars. In its com-
mentary to Principle VI(c), the ILC emphasised that crimes against humanity 
“need not be committed during a war”, but it maintained that “such crimes 
may take place also before a war in [connection] with crimes against peace”.66 
This is the correct reading of the Nuremberg Charter and the IMT judgment.67 
On the other hand, the text of Control Council Law No. 10 did not refer to the 
nexus with war.68 In practice, except for the Justice and the Einsatzgruppen 
cases, subsequent tribunals applying that law required a connection with the 
aggressive wars for acts committed before and during the war.69 Suspects in 
the Flick and Ministries cases were charged with crimes against humanity 
committed in peacetime.70 However, the tribunals in the two cases held that it 
would not contemplate offences committed before the war and having no con-
nection with the war.71 As shown above, the fact that crimes against humanity 
might be committed before the war does not indicate that the nexus with 
aggressive wars was not required. The US delegation went too far to argue that 
there was no nexus with an armed conflict in the Nuremberg Charter.72
65   Id. at 178–79.
66   U.N. Doc. A/1316, supra note 45, ¶ 123. 
67   Dinstein, supra note 44, at 384.
68   Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Justice Case, reprinted in 3 TWC 1, 972–73 (1951); 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Einsatzgruppen Case, reprinted in 4 TWC 1, 499 
(1950). 
69   The Flick Case, supra note 36, at 1212–13; Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Krupp Case, 
reprinted in 9 TWC 1 (1948); Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Pohl Case, reprinted in 5 
TWC 193, 991–92 (1950); Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Ministries Case, reprinted 
in 13 TWC 1 (1952); see also Kevin J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
and the Origins of International Criminal Law 236–42 (2011).
70   U.S. v. Flick, Case No. 5, Indictment, ¶ 13 (Nuremberg Mil. Trib. 1947), https://digital 
commons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=nmt5; U.S. v. The 
Ministries, Case No. 11, Indictment, ¶ 30 (Nuremberg Mil. Trib. 1947), https://digitalcom-
mons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=nmt11.
71   The Flick Case, supra note 36, at 1212; The Ministries Case, supra note 69, at 116; 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The Ministries Case, reprinted in 14 TWC 1, 557 
(1952); Heller, supra note 69, at 236–42.
72   William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on 
the Rome Statute 170 (2nd ed. 2016).
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Fifthly, the Tadić Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, in fact, supported a reading 
that a nexus with an armed conflict was a legal requirement in the Nuremberg 
Charter. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute provides a notion of crimes against 
humanity committed in “armed conflict”.73 In the Tadić Appeals Chamber 
decision on jurisdiction, the Chamber held that:
[T]he nexus between crimes against humanity and either crimes against 
peace or war crimes, required by the Nuremberg Charter, was peculiar to 
the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Although the nexus require-
ment in the Nuremberg Charter was carried over to the 1948 General 
Assembly resolution affirming the Nuremberg principles, there is no 
logical or legal basis for this requirement and it has been abandoned in 
subsequent State practice with respect to crimes against humanity. Most 
notably, the nexus requirement was eliminated from the definition of 
crimes against humanity contained in Article II(1)(c) of Control Council 
Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945.74
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes 
against humanity do not require a connection to international armed 
conflict…. [C]ustomary international law may not require a connection 
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all…. [T]he Security 
Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than nec-
essary under customary international law.75
The literal meaning of the first paragraph is a bit ambiguous. By referring to 
“peculiar to the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal”, the Chamber seems 
to imply that a nexus with an armed conflict for crimes against humanity was 
not a substantive but a jurisdictional requirement in the IMT.76 At the same 
time, the Appeals Chamber said that the nexus requirement had been “aban-
doned in subsequent state practice” and referred to Control Council Law No. 10 
to indicate that the notion of crimes against humanity began to change on 
73   ICTY Statute art. 5 states that the Tribunal “shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether inter-
national or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population”.
74   Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 140.
75   Id. ¶ 141; For an analysis of the case concerning the nexus requirement, see Dinstein, supra 
note 44, at 386–87.
76   Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 140.
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20 December 1945.77 If the nexus with an armed conflict was not a substantive 
requirement, how could it be “abandoned in subsequent State practice”?78
In the second paragraph cited above, with reference to “[no] connection to 
international armed conflict” as “a settled” customary rule, on the one hand, the 
Appeals Chamber held that the nexus with an armed conflict was expanded to 
include a nexus with non-international armed conflict.79 On the other hand, 
the Appeals Chamber held that the text of crimes against humanity with a 
nexus in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute was narrower than what customary 
law required. The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that a nexus requirement 
existed, but it said it was “obsolescent”.80 There is a cross-reference to the two 
paragraphs cited, confirming the relationship between them. The Appeals 
Chamber stated that “customary international law no longer requires any 
nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict […] Article 5 was 
intended to reintroduce this nexus for the purposes of this Tribunal”.81 The 
expressions of “no longer” and of “reintroduce” further discredit the idea that a 
nexus with an armed conflict was never a requirement. The clarification of the 
Tadić Appeals Chamber decision demonstrates that a link with an armed con-
flict was a legal element. This clarification also indicates that the chamber of 
the ECCC in Duch misunderstood the Tadić case. Therefore, the ECCC decision 
in Duch is also less valuable on the interpretation of the nexus issue.
As the Secretary-General summarised, the nexus with war is a compro-
mise between two ideas.82 One is the traditional principle that the treatment 
of nationals is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The competing principle 
is that inhumane treatment of human beings is wrong even if it is tolerated 
or practised by their States, in peace and war, and that this wrong should be 
penalised in the interest of the international community. Without abandoning 
the traditional principle, the latter idea of guaranteeing a minimum stan-
dard of fundamental rights to all human beings was qualified by the nexus 
requirement at that time.83 In other words, since aggressive wars affect the 
rights of other States, the nexus with an armed conflict justifies international 
prosecution. A construction of no nexus at that time means that acts of their 
governmental leaders against their citizens in peacetime might be charged 
77   Id.
78   Id.
79   Id. ¶ 142.
80   Id. ¶ 140.
81   Id. ¶ 78.
82   U.N. Doc A/CN.4/5, supra note 35, ¶¶ 70–72.
83   Id.
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with crimes against humanity. It would be going too far to conclude that States 
aimed to create the notion of crimes against humanity without any association 
with war.
The Four Powers knew that they were creating a new regime that would be 
binding on all States in the future. The American delegate Jackson stated that:
If certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes 
whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, 
and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against 
others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us.84 […] 
[O]rdinarily we do not consider that the acts of a government toward 
its own citizens warrant our interference. We have some regrettable cir-
cumstances at times in our own country in which minorities are unfairly 
treated. We think it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt to bring ret-
ribution to individuals or to states only because the concentration camps 
and the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise 
of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see 
no other basis on which we are justified in reaching the atrocities which 
were committed inside Germany, under German law, or even in violation 
of German law, by authorities of the German state.85
These statements demonstrate that without a link with aggressive wars, the 
leaders of those countries that created the IMT might be at a real risk for mur-
der or persecution of their own civilian populations. The UK Chief Prosecutor 
Hartley Shawcross shared this view of the nexus with war. The prosecutor 
believed that acts, not associated with aggressive wars and committed by a 
government against their civilian populations, should not constitute crimes 
against humanity as a distinct international crime.86
A short survey of the drafting history of Article 7 of the 1998 Rome Statute 
is also helpful in clarifying the nexus issue. The Ad Hoc Committee in 1995 
reported that “in light of Nuremberg precedent and the two UN ad hoc 
tribunals, there were different views as to whether crimes against humanity 
84   Minutes of Conference Session, supra note 37, at 330.
85   Id. at 333.
86   Nuremberg Int’l Military Tribunal, One Hundred and Eighty-seventh 
Day: Afternoon Session, reprinted in 19 TMWC 433, 470–71 (1948) (Sir Hartley 
Shawcross making Final Speech on behalf of Prosecution). In his view, “the Charter 
merely develops a pre-existing principle” and the crimes against humanity in the juris-
diction of the IMT “are limited to this extent-they must be crimes the commission of 
which was in some way connected with, in anticipation of or in furtherance of the crimes 
against the peace or the war crimes stricto sensu with which the defendants are indicted”.
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could be committed in peace time”.87 Australia said that there is no longer any 
requirement of such a nexus between an armed conflict and crimes against 
humanity in customary law.88 In the Preparatory Committee, there were 
debates about the nexus with an armed conflict.89 It was generally agreed that 
the crime need not be limited to acts during international armed conflict.90 The 
US strongly argued for removing a nexus with an armed conflict.91 By contrast, 
China and Russia argued for retaining the nexus with an armed conflict.92 
There were proposals to incorporate the wording “in time of peace or in time 
of war” in the chapeau of the provision about crimes against humanity. This 
proposal, however, did not survive in the 1998 Draft Statute adopted by the 
Preparatory Committee.93 In the Draft Statute, one alternative of the defini-
tion of crimes against humanity retains the phrase “in armed conflict” in a 
bracket.94 At the 1998 Rome Conference, the majority of States supported the 
 
87   Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., 50 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 22, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995); Press Release, General Assembly, 
Sixth Committee Hears Differing Views on Code of Crimes Against International Peace 
and Security, U.N. Press Release GA/L/2866 (Oct. 16, 1995) (Argentina supported crimes 
against humanity in peacetime; while India opposed this idea); Summary of Interventions 
by the Australian Delegation on the Specification of Crimes (Aug. 17, 1995).
88   Summary of Interventions by the Australian Delegation on the Specification of Crimes 
(Aug. 17, 1995).
89   Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., 51 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 22, ¶¶ 88–90, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (Vol. I) (Sept. 13, 1996); Press Release, Preparatory 
Committee on International Criminal Court Concludes First Session, U.N. Press Release 
L/2787 (Apr. 12, 1996). For States supporting no armed conflict nexus, see Press Release, 
Preparatory Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court Begins First 
Session, U.N. Press Release L/2761 (Mar. 25, 1996) (Australia & the Netherlands); Japan, 
“Proposal by Japan on Crimes against Humanity” (Mar. 25, 1996); the UK, “Proposal by 
the United Kingdom on Crimes against Humanity: Article 20 quarter” (Mar. 25, 1996); 
The Netherlands, “Crimes Against Humanity” (Mar., 1996); Denmark, “Crime Against 
Humanity: Chapeau and residual clause” (Mar. 27, 1996).
90   Press Release, Preparatory Committee for Establishment of International Criminal Court 
Discusses Definitions of ‘Genocide’, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, U.N. Press Release L/2762 
(Mar. 25, 1996).
91   United States Delegation, supra note 46.
92   Press Release, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Must be Precisely Defined Say Speakers in 
Preparatory Committee for International Court, U.N. Press Release L/2763.Rev.1* (Mar. 26, 
1996).
93   Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., 51 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 22A, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (Vol. II) (Sept. 13, 1996). 
94   U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, at 20–21, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998); For a detailed analysis of the Preparatory Committee’s 
drafts, see Schabas, supra note 72, at 170.
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view that crimes against humanity can be committed both in wartime and 
in peacetime.95 A large number of States expressed their satisfaction with 
the omission of an armed conflict.96 States widely accepted the absence of the 
nexus with an armed conflict at the Rome Conference. The drafting history 
also indirectly support the Big Bang theory that a nexus was required, at the 
very least, in the IMT.97
As shown above, the nexus with aggressive wars was required for crimes 
against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter and IMT. This nexus was not a 
jurisdictional link but a substantive element of crimes against humanity.98 The 
95   U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, ¶¶ 6–7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.1 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Italy); U.N. Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ¶ 62, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.8 (June 18, 1998) (Ecuador); U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ¶¶ 21, 36, 40, 51, 55, 58, 77, 81, 
84, 87, 89, 92, 95, 101, 108, 109, 112, 114, 117, 120, 124, 133, 136, 138, 147, 149, 152, 154, 158, 162, 
167, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3 (June 17, 1998) (21 (Germany), 36 (Czech Republic), 
40 (Malta), 51 (Brazil), 55 (Denmark), 58 (Lesotho), 77 (Republic of Korea), 81 (Poland), 
84 (Trinidad and Tobago), 87 (Australia), 89 (UK), 92 (Argentina), 95 (France), 101 (Cuba), 
108 (Thailand), 109 (Slovenia), 112 (Norway), 114 (Côte d’Ivoire), 117 (South Africa), 120 
(Egypt), 124 (Mexico), 133 (Colombia), 136 (Iran), 138 (US), 147 (Spain), 149 (Romania), 152 
(Senegal), 154 (Sri Lanka), 158 (Venezuela), 162 (Italy), 167 (Ireland)); U.N. Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ¶¶ 2, 4, 7, 8, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (June 17, 
1998) (2 (Canada), 4 (Guinea), 7 (Switzerland), 8 (Sweden), 11 (Portugal), 12 (Yemen), 
13 (Vietnam), 14 (Netherlands), 15 (Bahrain), 16 (Benin), 17 (Japan), 18 (Bangladesh), 19 
(Niger), 20 (Austria), 21 (Uruguay), 23 (Sierra Leone), 25 (Israel), 27 (Chile), 29 (Kenya)); 
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5, (Nov. 20, 1998) (51 (Venezuela)); U.N. 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34 (Nov. 20, 1998) (15 (Jamaica)).
96   U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, ¶¶ 8, 39, 41, 74, 76, 78–79, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25 (Nov. 20, 
1998) (8 (South Africa), 39 (Mozambique), 41 (Sweden), 74 (Botswana), 76 (Croatia), 78 
(Australia), 79 (Senegal)); U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, ¶¶ 34–35, 48, 63, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26 
(Nov. 20, 1998) (34 (Uruguay), 35 (Turkey), 48 (Brazil), 63 (Ghana)); U.N. Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ¶¶ 19, 74, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27 (Nov. 20, 1998) (19 (Nicaragua), 74 (Sri Lanka)); U.N. 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34 (Nov. 20, 1998) (15 (Jamaica)).
97   Schabas, supra note 72, at 148.
98   William A. Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND 
RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 60 (2012); Editors, Jurisdiction: Universal 
Jurisdiction – War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 13 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 239, 246 (1991).
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IMT focused on the need to show a connection to aggressive wars.99 This idea 
was confirmed by the ILC in its 1950 Nuremberg Principles and its 1950 Draft 
Code of Offenses.100 The drafting history of Article 7 also demonstrates that a 
nexus with an armed conflict was a legal requirement for the crimes against 
humanity. These observations show that the Big Bang theory is justified that 
the notion of crimes against humanity required a nexus with an armed conflict.
4 The Disappearance of the Nexus with an Armed Conflict
As for commentators arguing for the nexus as a jurisdictional requirement in 
the Nuremberg Charter, it is not necessary to assess when this link disappeared, 
since it never existed. For other commentators deeming the nexus a substan-
tive legal element, the nexus with an armed conflict disappeared at some 
time. As observed above, the second viewpoint is the appropriate understand-
ing. Schabas wrote: “[T]he nexus between armed conflict and crimes against 
humanity that existed at Nuremberg was part of the original understanding, 
and was only removed at some point subsequent to 1945”.101 Scholars also dif-
fer with respect to the disappearance of a nexus with an armed conflict as a 
legal element at the material time. The sub-question in this section is whether 
that link with an armed conflict disappeared under customary law before or in 
1971. The following paragraphs survey post-Nuremberg instruments, jurispru-
dence and the attitude of the UN organs to show the existing confusion about 
determining the moment of the disappearance of the nexus.
As shown above, the text of Control Council Law No. 10 did not refer to the 
nexus with war. However, in the application of Control Council Law No. 10, 
the Subsequent Proceedings required a link with an armed conflict. Addition-
ally, the 1950 ILC Nuremberg Principles also upheld the requirement that 
the underlying acts of crimes against humanity, before or during the war, be 
connected to aggressive wars. The formulation of crimes against humanity 
in the 1951 Draft Code of Offences required that “inhuman acts […] are com-
mitted in execution of or in [connection] with other offences defined in this 
99   France v. Göring, supra note 38, at 184.
100   Jean Spiropoulos (Special Rapporteur), Formulation of the Nürnberg Principles, at 187, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/22 (Apr. 12, 1950), reprinted in [1957] 2 Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 181, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1; Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. A/CN.4/19 (1950), reprinted in [1957] 2 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 249, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1950/Add.1.
101   Schabas, supra note 98, at 59.
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article”.102 This formulation did not substantively remove the armed conflict 
nexus requirement.103 The definition in the 1954 Draft Code of Offences, how-
ever, did not follow the essence of the 1951 version on the nexus issue but 
enlarged the scope of crimes against humanity to cover acts not committed 
in connection with other offences.104 Article 1(b) of the 1968 Convention on 
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations referred to “[c]rimes against 
humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are 
defined in the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal”.105 
Given its very ratification by States, Article 1(b) of the Convention is less sig-
nificant evidence to justify that a nexus was not required under customary law 
in 1968.
Jurisprudence of international and internationalised tribunals also does 
not show consistency on when the armed conflict nexus disappeared for 
crimes against humanity. The 2006 Kolk and Kislyiy v Estonia case before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerned the punishment against 
two individuals by Estonia based on the 1994 Estonia Penal Code for crimes 
against humanity committed in peacetime in 1949. The ECtHR rejected the 
two individuals’ applications because Article 7(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights prohibiting retroactive application of crimes under national 
or international law was not violated. The Chamber of the ECtHR implicitly 
upheld that by virtue of international law, the prosecution of deportation as 
a crime against humanity committed in peacetime in 1949 was not a violation 
102   Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 136, U.N. 
Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1957] 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 123, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1 (art. 2(10) reads: “Inhuman acts 
by the authorities of a State or by private individuals against any civilian population, such 
as murder, or extermination, or enslavement, or deportation, or persecutions on political, 
racial, religious or cultural grounds, when such acts are committed in execution of or in 
connexion with other offences defined in this article”).
103   Id. at 59, 136. 
104   Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, at 150, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/85 (1954), reprinted in [1957] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Com- 
mission 112, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1. Art. 2(11) reads: ‘Inhuman acts such 
as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed against 
any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the 
authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the tolera-
tion of such authorities”.
105   Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force 
Nov. 11, 1970).
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of non-retroactive application of the law. In its logic, international law in 1949 
did not require a nexus with an armed conflict for crimes against humanity.106
Antonio Cassese criticised the decision in the Kolk and Kislyiy v Estonia case 
and argued that the link with war was an indispensable element for prohibited 
acts of crimes against humanity before 1949. In his view, it is “only later, in the 
late 1960s, that a general rule gradually began to evolve, prohibiting crimes 
against humanity even when committed in time of peace”.107 By contrast, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the 2008 Korbely v Hungary case held that the 
link with an armed conflict “may no longer have been relevant by 1956”.108 Also, 
a Chamber of the ECCC found that “customary international law between 1975 
and 1979 required that crimes against humanity be committed in the context of 
an armed conflict”.109 The observation on case law shows that different views 
exist about when the nexus with an armed conflict was or was not relevant.
The UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council considered that the 
nexus with an armed conflict was not required for crimes against humanity 
under customary law in 1993. In 1993, the Report of the Secretary-General on 
the establishment of the ICTY stated that:
Crimes against humanity were first recognised in the Charter and 
the Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as in Law No. 10 of the 
Control Council for Germany. Crimes against humanity are aimed at any 
civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are 
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character.110
A plain reading indicates no nexus with an armed conflict. The Secretary- 
General held that the nexus with an armed conflict is not required for pun-
ishable acts constituting crimes against humanity under customary law.111 The 
Secretary-General, however, proposed interpreting Article 5 of the draft stat-
ute of the ICTY by restricting the crime “when committed in armed conflict, 
 
106   Kolk v. Estonia, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 399 (2006) (Decision).
107   Antonio Cassese, Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity and Non- 
Retroactivity of Criminal Law: The Kolk and Kislyiy V. Estonia Case before the ECHR, 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 410, 413 (2006).
108   Korbely v. Hungary, 2008-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 299, 348 (2008) (Grand Chamber).
109   Co-Prosecutors v. Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 145 & 146), Decision 
on Appeals by Nuon Chea and Ieng Thir[tie]th against the Closing Order, ¶ 144 
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Feb. 15, 2011) (Cambodia).
110   Rep. of the S.C., ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
111   Id. at 34.
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whether international or internal in character”. The Secretary-General may 
have intentionally “defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than neces-
sary under customary international law”.112 The UN Security Council adopted 
the draft statute of the ICTY without modification.113 In its interpretative clari-
fication of the ICTY Statute, the UK delegation also stated that:
Articles 2 to 5 of the draft [ICTY] Statute describe the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Statute does not, of course, create new 
law, but reflects existing international law in this field…. Article 5 covers 
acts committed in time of armed conflict.114
This statement demonstrates that a notion of crimes against humanity in 
non-international and international armed conflict reflects part of “existing 
international law”.115 In addition, the possibility that acts committed in peace-
time constitute crimes against humanity under customary law at that time is 
not excluded.116 The Security Council then implicitly confirms the absence of 
the nexus requirement in adopting the 1994 ICTR Statute.117
The 1995 Tadić Appeals Chamber decision has a significant impact on the 
clarification of the absence of nexus in custom. As mentioned above, the 
Appeals Chamber in the Tadić decision on jurisdiction observed that the prac-
tice of States began to abandon the nexus requirement. The Appeals Chamber 
was confident in claiming no connection to an armed conflict under custom-
ary law in 1993. In its view, offences with no connection to an armed conflict 
constituted crimes against humanity in 1993, whereas the ICTY only has juris-
diction over crimes against humanity committed in armed conflicts or linked 
geographically and temporally with an armed conflict.118 Subsequent ICTY 
112   Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, at 141.
113   S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
114   U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993).
115   Id.
116   See also U.N. Secretary-General, 13 n. 9, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (“In this context, it 
is to be noted that the International Court of Justice has recognised that the prohibitions 
contained in common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention are based on ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’ and cannot be breached in an armed conflict, regardless of 
whether it is international or internal in character”).
117   But see Schabas, supra note 72, at 169.
118   Prosecutor v. Kunarać, Case No. IT-96-23-A, Judgement, ¶ 83 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR72.1, Decision 
on Interlocutory Appeal concerning Jurisdiction, ¶ 14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Aug. 31, 2004); Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR72.1, Decision on 
Motion for Reconsideration of the “Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal concerning 
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cases upheld the view that there was no nexus with an armed conflict under 
customary law, at least at the material time in 1993.119 The preparatory works of 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute also demonstrate that States generally recognised 
the definition of crimes against humanity committed without association with 
an armed conflict at the 1998 Rome Conference.120
To sum up, instruments and jurisprudence after World War II and the view 
of the UN organs leave the moment of its disappearance more confusing in 
1949, 1951, 1956, the 1960s, 1968, or later in 1993.
5 Conclusion
The International Crimes Tribunals in Bangladesh seek to prosecute crimes 
against humanity that occurred decades ago in 1971. This article discussed 
the question of whether the notion of crimes against humanity did require 
a nexus with an armed conflict under customary law in 1971 from TWAIL per-
spective. Section II discussed the notion of crimes against humanity in the 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 and analysed the approaches adopted 
by the Bangladeshi Tribunals in dealing with the nexus issue for crimes against 
humanity. The 1973 Act did not refer to an armed conflict. In practice, the 
Bangladesh ICT-1 adopted two methods in dealing with the nexus issue. In the 
early stage, the ICT-1 construed that crimes against humanity in the amended 
1973 Act do not require a nexus with an armed conflict, which is consonant 
Jurisdiction” Dated 31 August 2004, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 15, 2006).
119   Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 249, 
251 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kunarać, Case 
No. IT-96-23-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 82–83 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 
2002); Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR72.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
concerning Jurisdiction, ¶ 13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 31, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR72.1, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration 
of the “Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal concerning Jurisdiction” Dated 31 August 
2004, ¶ 21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 15, 2006); Prosecutor v. Stanišić, 
Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgement, ¶ 960 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
May 30, 2013).
120   Schabas, supra note 72, at 147–52; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against 
Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (2011); 
Christopher K. Hall & Carsten Stahn, Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity, in Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ 
Notes, Article by Article 144, ¶¶ 3–29 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 2nd ed. 
2008).
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with customary law. Later on, the ICT-1 simply stressed the fact of war as a 
background for the prosecution and punishment, leaving the nexus legal issue 
untouched. However, given the fact that the 1971 liberation war existed as a 
background, the practice of the ICT-1 would not violate the principle of non-
retroactivity. This also assists in understanding why the ICT-1 in its recent 
judgments do not touch on the nexus issue. By contrast, the ICT-2 held that a 
nexus with an armed conflict was required in customary law and this element 
is satisfied in its cases.
Section 3 illustrated how the histories have shaped the concept of crimes 
against humanity and why it was connected with an armed conflict. In theory, 
scholars’ opinions differ concerning whether a nexus with an armed conflict 
was a legal element. The Steady State theory argues that the link with an armed 
conflict was never a legal but rather a jurisdictional requirement imposed by 
the Nuremberg Charter for the purpose of the IMT. However, the Big Bang the-
ory holds that the nexus with an armed conflict was a legal requirement before 
the IMT but disappeared later on. After analysing the jurisprudence of inter-
national criminal tribunals and international authorities, this article argues 
that the armed conflict nexus was a requirement for crimes against humanity. 
The Big Bang theory seems to be the appropriate interpretation of the nexus 
issue. As shown above in Section 4, it remains unclear when this nexus had 
disappeared, in the 1960s, 1971, or later on in customary law. Thus, it is uncer-
tain whether the notion of crimes against humanity required a nexus with an 
armed conflict in 1971.
The background after World War II might account for the disappearance 
of the nexus for crimes against humanity and why it is unclear when such a 
nexus had disappeared. On the one hand, the Allies Powers in 1945 introduced 
crimes against humanity to prosecute crimes committed inside Germany by 
Germans against its citizens. As observed above, for fear of prosecuting act 
committed by their government against civilians, a nexus between the crimes 
with the aggressive war, an international armed conflict, was required. After 
World War II, these Allied powers tried to reshape the post-war system through 
the UN. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed, while the 
establishment of an international criminal tribunal was delayed for decades 
until the end of the 1980s. At that time, the issue of extending crimes against 
humanity to cover crimes committed in civil war or in peace time was less 
concerned and discussed by these Allied powers. During the last four decades, 
there were few prosecutions of crimes against humanity in the world. Most 
prosecution of the crimes committed in the past were brought in recent years.
On the other hand, during the independence movements and the decol-
onisation period after World War II, many States became independent or 
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declared their independence. In addition, the process of decolonisation 
sometimes involves violence and liberation wars. According to Article 1(4) 
of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the conflicts 
between the colonial domination and non-State entities in exercising self-
determination are characterised as international armed conflicts. In this 
circumstance, European-colonial States are not in the interest of expanding 
the scope of crimes against humanity by removing the nexus with an interna-
tional armed conflict. Disassociating the armed conflict nexus was only in the 
interest of non-State entities in these colonial States and of peoples in new 
States, in particular those States without political democracy. Over the pre-
vious decades, however, there have been few reported cases where domestic 
courts have prosecuted crimes against humanity committed in conflicts or in 
peace time. For lack of practice in prosecuting crimes against humanity and 
opinio juris, it is inappropriate to conclude at what moment the customary 
rule of crimes against humanity was modified by dismissing the armed con-
flict nexus. Therefore, it is less agreed that the nexus requirement was removed 
before or in 1971.
Certain term or norm in European thought is the starting point for the 
TWAIL analysis. A nexus with an armed conflict for the notion of crimes 
against humanity was a European-centric idea. However, the issue when this 
nexus disappeared remains unclear. Practice of post-colonial States may assist 
in clarifying this issue. It is an opportunity for the Bangladeshi Tribunals to 
contribute to the clarification of the nexus issue for crimes against humanity. 
This article concludes that the Bangladeshi Tribunals failed to clarify the nexus 
issue for crimes against humanity at the material time and that the Tribunals 
missed the chance to contribute to the clarification of a customary rule. The 
view of some judgments of the Bangladesh Tribunals is less supported that a 
nexus of an armed conflict was not required under customary law in 1971. The 
Bangladeshi Tribunals should be cautious to this legal element as well as 
the background and considerations of these Allies Powers observed above. 
Such an analysis in their judgments would improve the soundness of their 
reasoning and better qualify themselves as relevant State practice for the iden-
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Participation in Multilateral Treaties
Karin Arts*
 Editorial Introduction
This section records the participation of Asian states in open multilateral law- 
making treaties which mostly aim at world-wide adherence. It updates the 
treaty sections of earlier Volumes until 31 December 2018. New data are pre-
ceded by a reference to the most recent previous entry in the multilateral 
treaties section of the Asian Yearbook of International Law. In case no new data 
are available, the title of the treaty is listed with a reference to the last Volume 
containing data on the treaty involved. For the purpose of this section, states 
broadly situated west of Iran, north of Mongolia, east of Papua New Guinea 
and south of Indonesia will not be covered.
 Note
• Where no other reference to specific sources is made, data were derived 
from Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, https://
treaties.un.org/pages/participationstatus.aspx or, when not available there, 
from the United Nations Treaty Series Online, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
UNTSOnline.aspx?id=2&clang=_en
• Where reference is made to the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law (HccH), data were derived from https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions
• Where reference is made to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), data were derived from https://www.iaea.org/resources/treaties/
treaties-under-IAEA-auspices
• Where reference is made to the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), data were derived from https://www.icao.int/Secretariat/Legal/
Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx
• Where reference is made to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), data were derived from https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
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• Where reference is made to the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), data were derived from http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p= 
NORMLEXPUB:1:0
• Where reference is made to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
data were derived from http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Status 
OfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx
• Where reference is made to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), data were derived from http://portal 
.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12024&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html
• Where reference is made to WIPO, data were derived from http://www.wipo 
.int/treaties/en
• Where reference is made to the Worldbank, data were derived from www 
.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members#4 and www.worldbank.org/ 
en/about/leadership/members#5
• Reservations and declarations made upon signature or ratification are not 
included
• Sig. = Signature; Cons. = Consent to be bound; Eff. date = Effective date; E.i.f. = 
Entry into force; Rat. = Ratification or accession
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 Antarctica
Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959: see Vol. 21 p. 237.
 Commercial Arbitration
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
1958: see Vol. 20 p. 194.
 Cultural Matters
Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory 
Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, 1949: see Vol. 7 
pp. 322–323.
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Materials, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 234.
Convention concerning the International Exchange of Publications, 1958: see 
Vol. 6 p. 235.
Convention concerning the Exchange of Official Publications and Government 
Documents between States, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 235.
Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diploma’s and Degrees in 
Higher Education in Asia and the Pacific, 1983: see Vol. 14 p. 227.
Asia-Pacific Regional Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications in 
Higher Education, 2011: see Vol. 23 p. 177.
International Agreement for the Establishment of the  
University for Peace, 1980
Continued from Vol. 16 p. 157)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Nepal 27 Sep 2018
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 Cultural Property
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970: see Vol. 22 p. 306.
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, 1972: see Vol. 22 p. 306.
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, 2005: see Vol. 22 p. 306.
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the  
Event of Armed Conflict, 1954
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 178)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Turkmenistan 22 Jan 2018
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the  
Event of Armed Conflict, 1954
(Continued from Vol. 13 p. 263)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Afghanistan 12 Mar 2018
Turkmenistan 22 Jan 2018
Second Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the  
Event of Armed Conflict, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 178)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
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State Sig. Cons.
Afghanistan 12 Mar 2018
Turkmenistan 22 Jan 2018
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 306)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Singapore 22 Feb 2018
 Development Matters
Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1982: see Vol. 7 
pp. 323–324.
Agreement to Establish the South Centre, 1994: see Vol. 7 p. 324.
Amendments to the Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 
1998: see Vol. 10 p. 267.
Multilateral Agreement for the Establishment of an International  
Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries, 2010
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 178)
State Sig. Cons.
Bhutan 3 Apr 2018
 Dispute Settlement
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, 1965: see Vol. 11 p. 245.
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Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court: see 
Vol. 23, p. 179.
 Environment, Fauna and Flora
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, as 
amended, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 238.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969: see 
Vol. 15 p. 215.
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969: see Vol. 9 p. 284.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, 1971: see Vol. 18 p. 103.
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971: see Vol. 12 p. 237.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, 1972, as amended: see Vol. 7 p. 325.
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by 
Substances Other Than Oil, 1973: see Vol. 6 p. 239.
Protocol to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1976: see Vol. 10 p. 269.
Protocol Relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships 1978, as amended: see Vol. 15 p. 225.
Protocol to amend the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1982: see Vol. 13 p. 265.
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985: see Vol. 15 p. 215.
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987: see Vol. 16 p. 161.
Amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1987: see Vol. 13 
p. 266.
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal, 1989: see Vol. 22 p. 309.
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and 
Cooperation, 1990: see Vol. 23 p. 181.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1990: see Vol. 15 p. 216.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1992: see Vol. 18 p. 103.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992: see Vol. 13 p. 266.
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992: see Vol. 14 p. 229.
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UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 1994: see Vol. 11 
p. 247.
Amendment to the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1995: see Vol. 23 p. 181.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1997: see Vol. 19 p. 182.
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997: see Vol. 19 
p. 182.
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 1998: see Vol. 19 
p. 182.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1999: see Vol. 19 p. 182.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000: see Vol. 19 p. 183.
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001: see Vol. 19 
pp. 183.
Amendment to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 2006: see Vol. 23 p. 182.
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, 2012: see Vol. 23 p. 183.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as  
Water fowl Habitat, 1971
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 103)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (DPR) 16 Jan 2018
Protocol to Amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability  
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 181)
(Status as provided by IMO)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Thailand 7 Jul 2017 7 Jul 2018
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Protocol to Amend the 1971 International Convention on the  
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for  
Oil Pollution Damage, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 181)
(Status as provided by IMO)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Thailand 7 Jul 2017 7 Jul 2018
International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling  
Systems on Ships, 2001
(Continued from: Vol. 22 p. 309)
(Status as provided by IMO)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Bangladesh 7 Jun 2018 7 Sep 2018
Philippines 6 Jun 2018 6 Sep 2018
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage, 2001
(Continued from: Vol. 20 p. 199)
(Status as provided by IMO)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Myanmar 19 Jan 2018 19 Apr 2018
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International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ 
Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 182)
(Status as provided by IMO)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Bangladesh 7 Jun 2018  7 Sep 2018
China 22 Oct 2018
Philippines 6 Jun 2018  6 Sep 2018
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and  
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010
(Continued from Vol. 23 pp. 182–183)
State Sig. Rat.
Afghanistan  6 Jun 2018
Malaysia  5 Nov 2018
Nepal 28 Dec 2018
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and  
Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2010
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 183)
Entry into force: 5 March 2018
Minamata Convention on Mercury, 2013
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 310)
State Sig. Rat.
India 30 Sep 2014 18 Jun 2018
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 Paris Agreement
Paris, 12 December 2015
Entry into force: 4 November 2016
State Sig. Rat.
Afghanistan 22 Apr 2016 15 Feb 2017
Bangladesh 22 Apr 2016 21 Sep 2016
Bhutan 22 Apr 2016 19 Sep 2017
Brunei 22 Apr 2016 21 Sep 2016
Cambodia 22 Apr 2016 6 Feb 2017
China 22 Apr 2016 3 Sep 2016
India 22 Apr 2016 2 Oct 2016
Indonesia 22 Apr 2016 31 Oct 2016
Iran 22 Apr 2016
Japan 22 Apr 2016 8 Nov 2016
Kazakhstan 2 Aug 2016 6 Dec 2016
Kyrgyzstan 21 Sep 2016 18 Feb 2020
Laos 22 Apr 2016 7 Sep 2016
Korea (DPR) 22 Apr 2016 1 Aug 2016
Korea (Rep.) 22 Apr 2016 3 Nov 2016
Malaysia 22 Apr 2016 16 Nov 2016
Maldives 22 Apr 2016 22 Apr 2016
Mongolia 22 Apr 2016 21 Sep 2016
Myanmar 22 Apr 2016 19 Sep 2017
Nepal 22 Apr 2016 5 Oct 2016
Pakistan 22 Apr 2016 10 Nov 2016
Papua New 22 Apr 2016 21 Sep 2016
Guinea
Philippines 22 Apr 2016 23 Mar 2017
Singapore 22 Apr 2016 21 Sep 2016
Sri Lanka 22 Apr 2016 21 Sep 2016
Tajikistan 22 Apr 2016 22 Mar 2017
Thailand 22 Apr 2016 21 Sep 2016
Timor Leste 22 Apr 2016 16 Aug 2017
Turkmenistan 23 Sep 2016 20 Oct 2016
Uzbekistan 19 Apr 2017 9 Nov 2018
Vietnam 22 Apr 2016 3 Nov 2016
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Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, 2016
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 183)
Entry into force: not yet
State Sig. Rat.
Japan 18 Dec 2018
Sri Lanka 28 Sep 2018
 Family Matters
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, 1956: see Vol. 11 p. 249.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards 
Children, 1956: see Vol. 6 p. 244.
Convention on the Conflicts of Law Relating to the Form of Testamentary 
Dispositions, 1961: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages, 1962: see Vol. 8 p. 178.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, 1973: see Vol. 6 
p. 244.
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, 1993: see Vol. 22 p. 310.
 Finance
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, 1965: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 1988: 
see Vol. 19 p. 184.
 Health
Protocol Concerning the Office International d’Hygiène Publique, 1946: see 
Vol. 6 p. 245.
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 2003: 
see Vol. 19 p. 185.
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Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, 2012
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 311)
Entry into force: 25 Sep 2018
State Sig. Rat.
India  5 Jun 2018
Iran 7 Jan 2014 27 Aug 2018
Pakistan 29 Jun 2018
 Human Rights, Including Women and Children
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953: see Vol. 10 p. 273.
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957: see Vol. 10 p. 274.
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960: see Vol. 22 p. 312.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966: see Vol. 16 p. 165.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966: see 
Vol. 23 p. 186.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 1966: see Vol. 23 p. 186.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
1966: see Vol. 15 p. 219.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
1979: see Vol. 11 p. 250.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, 1984: see Vol. 21 p. 245.
International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985: see Vol. 6 p. 248.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 251.
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1989: see Vol. 18 p. 106.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990: see Vol. 18 p. 106.
Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1992, see Vol. 12 p. 242.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, 1999: see Vol. 7 p. 170.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2000: see Vol. 20 p. 202.
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Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2000: see Vol. 22 p. 312.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2008: see Vol. 22 p. 312.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
2008: see Vol. 22 pp. 312–313.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 2010: see Vol. 22 p. 313.
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2002
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 186)
State Sig. Cons.
Afghanistan 17 Apr 2018
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
Communications Procedure
New York, 19 December 2011
Entry into Force: 14 April 2014
State Sig. Rat.
Maldives 28 Feb 2012
Mongolia  4 Oct 2013 28 Sep 2015
Thailand 25 Sep 2012 25 Sep 2012
 Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, I–IV, 1949: see 
Vol. 11 p. 252.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977: see Vol. 18 
p. 107.
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Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
1977: see Vol. 12 p. 244.
Protocol III Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 2005: see Vol. 17 
p. 171.
 Intellectual Property
Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see Vol. 6 p. 251.
Protocols 1, 2 and 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see 
Vol. 6 p. 251.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 1967: 
see Vol. 13 p. 188.
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 as amended 1979: see 
Vol. 23 p. 188.
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 1961: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1970 as amended in 1979 and modified in 1984 and 
2001: see Vol. 22 p. 314.
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against 
Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
Multilateral Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Copyright 
Royalties, 1979: see Vol. 6 p. 252.
Trademark Law Treaty, 1994: see Vol. 15 p. 222.
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, 2006: see Vol. 23 p. 189.
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, 2012: see Vol. 22 p. 315.
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886 as 
Amended 1979
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 314)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
State Party E.i.f.
Afghanistan 2 Mar 2018 2 Jun 2018
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Madrid Union Concerning the International Registration of Marks,  
Including the Madrid Agreement 1891 as Amended in 1979, and the  
Madrid Protocol 1989
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 188)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
State Sig. Rat.
Afghanistan 26 Jun 2018
Indonesia  2 Jan 2018
Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods  
and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, 1957 as 
Amended in 1979
(Continued from Vol. 13 p. 271)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
State Party Latest Act to which  
State is Party
Iran 12 Jul 2018 Geneva
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 1996
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 189)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
State Sig. Rat.
India 25 Dec 2018
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WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 189)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
State Sig. Rat.
India 25 Dec 2018
Patent Law Treaty, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 315)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
State Sig. Rat.
Korea (DPR) 22 Aug 2018
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons  
Who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2013
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 189)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
State Sig. Rat.
Afghanistan 28 Jun 2013 26 Jul 2018
Philippines 18 Dec 2018
 International Crimes
Slavery Convention, 1926 as amended in 1953: see Vol. 15 p. 223.
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956: see Vol. 14 p. 236.
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 
1963: see Vol. 9 p. 289.
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Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, 1968: see Vol. 6 p. 254.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970: see Vol. 8 
p. 289.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, 1971: see Vol. 8 p. 290.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, 1973: see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973: see Vol. 14 
p. 236.
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979: see Vol. 20 
p. 206.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, 1988: see Vol. 18 p. 111.
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988, see 
Vol. 12 p. 247.
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 254.
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
1991: see Vol. 23 p. 191.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 1994: 
see Vol. 11 p. 255.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997: see 
Vol. 20 p. 206.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998: see Vol. 16 p. 171.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
1999: see Vol. 17 p. 174.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000: see 
Vol. 23 p. 191.
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2000: see Vol. 23 p. 191.
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplement-
ing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
2000: see Vol. 21 p. 250.
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Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2001: see Vol. 21 p. 250.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 2003: see Vol. 23 p. 191.
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
2005: see Vol. 23 p. 191.
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 2005: see Vol. 18 p. 112.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of  
Genocide, 1948
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 249)
State Sig. Rat.
Turkmenistan 26 Dec 2018
 International Representation
(see also: Privileges and Immunities)
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
 International Trade
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, 1965: see Vol. 17 p. 176.
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 1974: 
see Vol. 6 p. 257.
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980: see 
Vol. 21 p. 251.
UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in 
International Trade, 1991: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts, 2005: see Vol. 21 p. 251.
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 Judicial and Administrative Cooperation
Convention on Civil Procedure, 1954: see Vol. 20 p. 208.
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil or Commercial Matters, 1965: see Vol. 22 p. 319.
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
1970: see Vol. 22 p. 319.
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for  
Foreign Public Documents, 1961
(Continued from Vol. 17 p. 176)
(Status as provided by HccH)
State Party E.i.f.
Philippines 12 Sep 2018
 Labour
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (ILO Conv. 29): see Vol. 19 p. 192.
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 
1948 (ILO Conv. 87): see Vol. 22 p. 319.
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (ILO Conv. 98): 
see Vol. 19 p. 193.
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (ILO Conv. 100): see Vol. 22 p. 320.
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (ILO Conv. 105): see Vol. 19 p. 193.
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (ILO 
Conv. 111): see Vol. 22 p. 320.
Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (ILO Conv. 122): see Vol. 8 p. 186.
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (ILO Conv. 138): see Vol. 23 p. 193.
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (ILO Conv. 182): see Vol. 19 
p. 194.
Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006 
(ILO Conv. 187): see Vol. 22 p. 320.
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 Narcotic Drugs
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic 
Drugs, concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 
and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at 
Geneva on 26 June 1936, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade 
in, and Use of, Prepared Opium and amended by Protocol, 1925, amended 1946: 
see Vol. 6 p. 261.
International Opium Convention, 1925, amended by Protocol 1946: see Vol. 7 
p. 334.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, 1931, amended by 
Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs, 1931, and amended by Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 7 p. 334.
Protocol bringing under International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the 
Convention of 1931, as amended by the Protocol of 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 1936, 
amended 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the 
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, 1953: 
see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961: see Vol. 13 p. 276.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by Protocol 1975: see 
Vol. 21 p. 253.
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971: see Vol. 13 p. 276.
Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1972: see Vol. 15 
p. 227.
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988: see Vol. 20 p. 210.
 Nationality and Statelessness
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954: see Vol. 17 p. 178.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concern-
ing Acquisition of Nationality, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning 
Acquisition of Nationality, 1963: see Vol. 8 p. 187.
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 Nuclear Material
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963: see Vol. 17 p. 179.
Amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, 2005: see Vol. 22 p. 322.
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (and the 
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy), 1988: 
see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1986: see Vol. 19 p. 196.
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency, 1986: see Vol. 19 p. 196.
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 1997: see 
Vol. 16 p. 178.
Protocol to Amend the 1963 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
1997: see Vol. 17 p. 180.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 322)
(Status as provided by IAEA)
State Cons. (deposit) E.i.f.
Thailand 19 Jun 2018 19 Jul 2018
Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 323)
(Status as provided by IAEA)
State Cons. (deposit) E.i.f.
Thailand 3 Jul 2018 1 Oct 2018
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Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 196)
(Status as provided by IAEA)
State Cons. (deposit) E.i.f.
Thailand 3 Jul 2018 1 Oct 2018
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of  
Nuclear Material
Vienna, 8 July 2005
Entry into force: 8 May 2016
(Status as provided by IAEA)
State Cons. (deposit) E.i.f.
Bangladesh  4 Jul 2017  4 Jul 2017
China 14 Sep 2009  8 May 2016
India 19 Sep 2007  8 May 2016
Indonesia 27 May 2010  8 May 2016
Japan 27 Jun 2014  8 May 2016
Kazakhstan 26 Apr 2011  8 May 2016
Korea (Rep.) 29 May 2014  8 May 2016
Kyrgyzstan 26 Sep 2016 26 Sep 2016
Myanmar  6 Dec 2016  5 Jan 2017
Pakistan 24 Mar 2016  8 May 2016
Singapore 22 Oct 2014  8 May 2016
Tajikistan 10 Jul 2014  8 May 2016
Thailand 19 Jun 2018 19 Jul 2018
Turkmenistan 22 Sep 2005  8 May 2016
Uzbekistan  7 Feb 2013  8 May 2016
Vietnam  3 Nov 2012  8 May 2016
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 Outer Space
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967: 
see Vol. 16 p. 178.
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial 
Bodies, 1979: see Vol. 10 p. 284.
Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space, 1974: see 
Vol. 15 p. 229.
 Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946: see 
Vol. 19 p. 197.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 
1947: see Vol. 7 p. 338.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961: see Vol. 19 p. 197.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963: see Vol. 19 p. 197.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning 
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Convention on Special Missions, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Special Missions concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, 2004: see Vol. 15 p. 230.
 Refugees
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
 Road Traffic and Transport
Convention on Road Traffic, 1968: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Convention on Road Signs and Signals, 1968: see Vol. 20 p. 213.
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 Sea
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958: see Vol. 6 
p. 271.
Convention on the High Seas, 1958: see Vol. 7 p. 339.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 272.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: see Vol. 19 p. 198.
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1994: see Vol. 19 p. 199.
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (…) Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 197)
State Sig. Rat.
Vietnam 18 Dec 2018
 Sea Traffic and Transport
Convention Regarding the Measurement and Registration of Vessels employed 
in Inland Navigation, 1956: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 as amended: 
see Vol. 12 p. 255.
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966: see Vol. 15 p. 230.
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969: see Vol. 15 
p. 231.
Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 275.
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Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
1972 as amended: see Vol. 19 p. 200.
International Convention for Safe Containers, as amended 1972: see Vol. 20 
p. 215.
Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships, 1973: see 
Vol. 6 p. 275.
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974: see Vol. 15 p. 231.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974 as amended 1978: see Vol. 12 p. 256.
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 as amended 1978: see Vol. 19 p. 200.
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007: see Vol 23 
p. 198.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 198)
(Status as provided by IMO)
State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
Indonesia 28 Nov 2017 28 Feb 2018
Philippines 24 Apr 2018 24 Jul 2018
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life  
at Sea, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 198)
(Status as provided by IMO)
State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
Indonesia 28 Nov 2017 28 Feb 2018
Philippines  6 Jun 2018  6 Sept 2018
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 Social Matters
International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1904, 
amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1910, 
amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 
1910, amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and 
Children, 1921: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 1921, 
amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic 
in Obscene Publications, 1923: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of, and Traffic 
in, Obscene Publications, 1923, amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full 
Age, 1933: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full 
Age, 1933, amended by Protocol, 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation 
of the Prostitution of Others, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 257.
Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons 
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 257.
International Convention Against Doping in Sports, 2005: see Vol. 23 p. 198.
 Telecommunications
Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 1976: see Vol. 13 p. 280.
Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), 
1976 as amended: see Vol. 19 p. 202.
Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Develop-
ment, 1977: see Vol. 10 p. 287.
Amendment to Article 11, Paragraph 2(a), of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific 
Telecommunity, 1981: see Vol. 8 p. 193.
Amendments to articles 3(5) and 9(8) of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific 
Telecommunity, 1991: see Vol. 9 p. 298.
Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for 
Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, 1998: see Vol. 15 p. 232.
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Amendments to the Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for 
Broadcasting Development, 1999: see Vol. 10 p. 288.
Amendments to the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 2002: see 
Vol. 13 p. 280.
 Treaties
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969: see Vol. 19 p. 203.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International 
Organizations or Between International Organizations, 1986: see Vol. 6 p. 280.
 Weapons
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
other Gases, and of Bacteriological Warfare, 1925: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968: see Vol. 11 p. 262.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the 
Subsoil Thereof, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 282.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
1972: see Vol. 22 p. 327.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, 1976: see Vol. 21 p. 259.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons which may be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate 
Effects, and Protocols, 1980: see Vol. 23 p. 201.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1992: see Vol. 21 p. 259.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997: see Vol. 23 p. 201.
Amendment of Article 1 of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 2001: see Vol. 23 p. 201.
Arms Trade Treaty, 2013: see Vol. 23 p. 201.
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1996
(Continued from Vol. 22 p. 328)
State Sig. Cons.
Thailand 12 Nov 1996 25 Sep 2018
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 204)
State Sig. Cons.
Sri Lanka 1 Mar 2018
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2017
(Continued from Vol. 23 p. 202)
State Sig. Cons.
Myanmar 26 Sep 2018
Vietnam 22 Sep 2017 17 May 2018
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Environmental Law – Green Climate Fund
 Bilateral Agreement
On 8 March 2018, the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and 
KfW, Development Bank acting on behalf of the German Federal Government 
signed a Financing Agreement for the implementation of a Climate Resilient 
Infrastructure Mainstreaming (CRIM) project. The total cost of the project 
is 82,75 million USD out of which 40 million USD has been given from the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) as a grant to – construct and renovate cyclone 
shelters and critical access roads to protect lives in the rural coastal areas of 
Bangladesh; develop urban infrastructure and protect vulnerable city dwellers 
from climate risks; and establish a national “Center of Excellence for Climate 
Resilience Infrastructure” to inform and guide infrastructure development 
throughout the country. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a new multilateral, 
multi-billion-dollar fund which was established by 194 countries as Parties 
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 
Conference of Parties (COP) in 2010. GCF aims to promote the shift towards 
low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. The CRIM project 
is the first project which has been approved by the GCF for Bangladesh.
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
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Human Rights – Women’s Rights, Violence against 
Women, Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW, Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women, UDHR, 
ICCPR, CRC
 Dowry Prohibition Act 2018
Bangladesh witnessed a rise in dowry related violence since its independence 
from Pakistan in 1971, which assumed alarming proportions in subsequent 
years. Scores of women and young girls (primarily child brides) faced mental 
and/or physical torture by their husbands and/or in-laws, some resulting in 
death or suicide. The first anti-dowry law, titled Dowry Prohibition Act, was 
passed in 1980 in an attempt to curb the rising incidents of domestic violence 
against women and young girls on the pre-text of non-payment of dowry. 
In 2018, the Bangladesh Parliament repealed the 1980 law and passed the 
Dowry Prohibition Act 2018. While provisions of the earlier law and its subse-
quent amendments have been given due consideration while drafting the new 
Act, the new law is said to have been framed to respond to evolving concerns 
and needs of the day.
Section 2(b) of the Act defines dowry as any direct or indirect demand for 
money or any other wealth or consent thereto, as precondition to marriage 
made by one party to the marriage to the other at the time of marriage or 
before marriage or during the continuation of the marriage as a stipulation to 
continue the marriage. The definition of dowry in this section excludes dower 
provided as per Muslim personal laws and gifts from relatives, friends, and 
well-wishers given to any party to the marriage.
The Act criminalizes the act of demanding dowry and prescribes a maxi-
mum of 5 years and a minimum of one year’s imprisonment or a fine of 
maximum BDT 50,000 or both (section 3). The Act prescribes the same penalty 
for any party to marriage who gives or receives dowry or who facilitates the 
giving or receiving of dowry or who enters into an agreement to facilitate 
the same (section 4). Section 5 of the Act regards any agreement related to the 
giving or receiving dowry as void. The Act of 2018 adds a new provision by way 
of section 6 that penalizes any person who files or induces another to file a 
false complaint or case with intent to victimize any person, with a maximum 
of five year’s imprisonment or BDT 50,000 fine or both. Section 7 considers 
an offence committed under this Act as cognizable and non-bailable but open 
to out of court settlement.
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Critics of the new Act flag several discrepancies. To begin with, the exclu-
sion of gifts from the definition of dowry in section 2(b) creates scope for 
misrepresenting dowry as gifts, leading to potential misuse of the provision. 
The Act equally penalizes the act of demanding and payment of dowry but 
ignores the extenuating circumstances which compel a party to concede to the 
demand. This will discourage parties who are compelled to pay from report-
ing the offence, namely, the wives and their families. Out of court settlements 
primarily pertain to petty crimes; dowry demands predominantly involve 
physical and mental torture on the wife and by making it a compoundable 
offence, the law trivializes the impact of the offence. This will also provide the 
accused and/or his family with an opportunity to force the complainant and/
or her family to settle out of court.
Human Rights – UDHR – Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities – Convention on the Rights of People 
with Disabilities (CRPD) – ICCPR – UNGA Resolution 
46/119 (17 December 1991)
A new law on mental health was adopted by the Bangladesh Parliament by 
repealing the earlier Lunacy Act of 1912. The new Act has provisions that aim 
to ensure the overall well-being including the care, dignity, right to property 
and rehabilitation of people having mental health problems. It did away with 
terms such as, “lunatics” and “temporary patients”, defined inter alia, “men-
tal health” and the criterion for “non-protesting” patient and distinguished 
between “mental illness” and “mental disorder” (section 2, definitions). The 
Government has been entrusted with the responsibility of implementing all 
activities including the expansion, development, regulation and coordination 
of mental health related issues (section 4).
The law speaks of establishing a Mental Health Review and Monitoring 
Committee in every district which will include, among others, government 
representatives and mental health professionals, amongst whom at least 
one member shall be a woman (section 5). Any guardian or relative, who is 
dissatisfied with the treatment of a patient with mental health issues, may 
seek redress from this Committee (section 5[1]). Appeal lies with the gov-
ernment in case the applicant is aggrieved by the decision of the Committee 
(section 5[4]). All matters relating to the role and functions of this Commit- 
tee shall be determined by the Rules that would be drafted to help imple-
ment this Act (section 5[5]). Section 6 states that people with mental health 
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problems shall be ensured rights to their health, property, dignity, education 
and other rights, as appropriate (section 6[1]); all matters pertaining to the 
rights of these people shall be regulated by the Rules to be drafted (6[2]).
The Act empowers the government to establish hospitals, or medical college 
hospitals or separate units/departments in district hospitals for the treatment 
of mental health patients as long as separate arrangements are in place to 
treat mental health patients who are drug addicts, under-trial or convicted 
prisoners and minors (section 7 [1]). Private hospitals for treating mental 
health patients can also be set up after obtaining a license from the govern-
ment to this end (section 8). The government has the authority to enter and 
inspect any mental hospital and inspect and seize any register, sample, equip-
ment, or documents related to mental health treatment of patients as deemed 
appropriate and necessary; however, in case of registers or documents that 
pertain to the illness of the patient, approval of the patient or his/her guard-
ian must be obtained before seizure or public disclosure (section 9). In the 
case of private mental hospitals, the government has the authority to suspend 
their licenses and close their operations in the public interest, if the there 
is evidence that treatment of patients is not up to the required standard 
or if the violation of any of the conditions of the licence is such that it 
would be inappropriate to ask the hospital to show cause (section 9 [b]). Where 
private hospitals are closed, respective hospital authorities are required to 
ensure the speedy transfer of under-treatment patients to other hospitals (sec-
tion 9[c]). Anyone running a mental hospital without a proper licence shall 
be punishable with a fine of Taka 0.5 million and a further Taka 2 million taka 
for repeat offences (section 10 [1]). Any practitioner working in any unlicensed 
metal hospital shall be liable to a fine of taka 100,000 (section 10[3]).
The Act has extensive provisions for the admission of mental health 
patients for treatment, whether voluntary, involuntary or non-protesting; 
when admitting minors, the consent of the guardian or relative is mandatory 
(section 11[1]). Admission of voluntary patients is quite straightforward – the 
designated medical officer will examine the patient within 24 hours of 
the application and record the findings in a prescribed form (section 12[2]). A 
voluntary patient who has been admitted may express unwillingness to receive 
treatment or request for release at any point of time; however, the medical offi-
cer may, if s/he deems it fit to categorize the patient as an involuntary patient, 
reject the request (section 12[3]). That there can be a change in the admission 
status or that the request for release can be rejected shall be communicated 
to the patient (section 12[4]). The rationale for admission of patients and the 
duration of stay in the hospital shall be re-considered every 15 days and in case 
of minors, every 7days (section 12[125]).
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As for non-protesting patients, they may be admitted with the consent 
of the guardian or relative (section 13[1]). All other processes relating to change 
in the admission status, release, review of the rationale for admission and 
duration of stay, and the right to be informed of the same shall be the same as 
that applicable in case of voluntary patients (section13 [2,3,4]).
Before admitting an involuntary patient, several factors will have to be con-
sidered: the designated medical officer or a mental health specialist or the 
Mental Health Review and Monitoring Committee shall take into account 
the nature and degree of the illness, incidents of violence and tendency thereto, 
unwillingness to take medication, predisposition to suicide, etc., and the fact 
that non-admission of the patient shall pose imminent threat to his/her health 
and safety and that of the public (section 14[4]). Subject to these various con-
siderations and based on the consent or application of the guardian or relative 
of the patient or the on-duty police officer of the concerned jurisdiction or the 
designated medical officer, steps for admitting the patient shall be undertaken 
(section 14[1]). The duration of such admission shall vary according to, inter 
alia, the recommendation of the designated medical officer, assessment of the 
Mental Health Review and Monitoring Committee, and the importance of 
the treatment (section 14[2]). A relative, parent or friend can initiate an 
application for involuntary admission. This is followed by an assessment by 
a medical officer within 24 hours. A medical officer can authorize emergency 
admission for up to 72 hours. An assessment by a psychiatrist is required for 
ongoing involuntary admission. This status is reviewed every 28 days. The 
maximum duration of admission is 180 days; the Mental Health Review and 
Monitoring Committee can extend the duration of stay, if necessary.
Patients who are accused of a crime shall be admitted for treatment based 
on the order of a Magistrate (section 15). Patients devoid of an address or 
guardian or relatives shall be admitted for treatment by the representative of 
the local government authority of a given locality (section 17). If any person 
suffering from mental health problems is considered to be dangerous, s/he 
shall be taken into police custody and referred to the nearest mental hospital 
(section 17[2]). The Act directs the rehabilitation of mental health patients by 
social welfare systems or rehabilitation centers (sections 19–20).
A guardian or relative of a person afflicted by mental health problems may 
move the court for determination of his/mental status; the court shall order a 
designated medical officer to determine the mental status of the concerned 
individual and submit a report (section 20[1–2]). The medical officer may seek 
attendance of the person for examination by way of a notification; where the 
concerned person is a woman who practices religious and/or cultural dictates 
that require seclusion from the public, she may be examined in any convenient 
place in the court premises (section 20[3])). Upon submission of the report, 
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the court shall make an order on the mental status of the person and his/her 
capacity to hold and manage property (section 20[4]).
The Act specifically emphasizes on salient issues pertaining to guardian-
ship of persons afflicted by mental health problems (section 22). When, after 
admission into a hospital, a mental health patient is found to be incapable 
of managing his/her property due to mental illness or any other reason, the 
designated medical officer will inform his/her guardian or relative about 
the potential damage to property that his/her incapacity is likely to cause. If 
the guardian or relative is unwilling to take any steps in this regard, the des-
ignated medical officer shall request the court to appoint a Manager to look 
after the said property. If the court is convinced that the patient is incapable 
of managing his/her property and that his/her parents are not alive, it shall 
appoint a Manager for a period of three years. On assuming responsibility, the 
Manager shall prepare and submit to the court an inventory of all moveable 
and immoveable property of the patient. Thereafter, the Manager shall, on 
behalf of the patient, undertake the receipt, regulation and management of 
property, business, partnership and necessary legal actions in this regard; how-
ever, the Manager is prohibited from transferring, by way of sale, mortgage, 
gift, exchange, rent or lease beyond 5 years any of the patient’s immoveable 
property without the permission of the court. Within 3 months of the com-
pletion of each financial year, the Manager is required to submit to the court 
reports on the status of the property in his custody, money received and all 
expenditures related to the care and treatment of the patient. The guardian or 
relative of the patient is entitled to seek information from the Manager and in 
the event of his death from his legal representative, regarding all transactions, 
expenditure, etc. related to the patient’s property; they may also move the 
court to obtain financial records of the same. With the exception of the costs 
required for the care and treatment of the patient and management of his/her 
property, the Manager shall deposit all money to the government treasury; this 
shall be returned to the patient when it is evident that s/he has recovered fully.
The Act criminalizes the issuance of false certificates regarding the men-
tal status of a patient by mental health practitioners and makes it punishable 
with a fine not exceeding Taka 3,00,000 or one year’s rigorous imprisonment 
or with both (section 23[1]). If a guardian of a mental health patient or a man-
ager appointed to look after his/her property fails to discharge his/her duties in 
terms of care and treatment of the patient or management of the property or 
fails to comply with directive/s of the court in this regard, s/he shall be liable 
to a fine not exceeding Taka 5,00,000 or rigorous imprisonment of three years 
or with both (section 23[2]). Anyone contravening any provision of this law or 
any rules thereto, or any government order or directive or assisting, abetting 
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or instigating any such contravention shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 
1,00,000 or six month’s imprisonment or with both (section 23[3]). Offences 
under this Act are non-cognizable, compoundable and bailable (section 24[2]).
Human Rights – Cyber Security – UDHR – ICCPR – 
Freedom of Expression
 Digital Security Act 2018
Bangladesh enacted the Digital Security Act in September 2018. The purpose 
of the law, as stated in its preamble, is to “ensure National Digital Security and 
enact laws regarding Digital Crime Identification, Prevention, Suppression, 
Trial and other related matters”. The Act prescribes measures to deal with def-
amation, the hurting of religious sentiments, the causing of deterioration of 
law and order, and the instigation of violence against any person or organiza-
tion by publishing or transmitting any material on any website or in electronic 
media. More importantly, this law has extra-territorial application manifest in 
section 4 which provides that if any person commits any offence within the 
meaning of this Act from outside of Bangladesh, s/he would be liable to pun-
ishment as though the offence was committed in Bangladesh.
The law speaks of establishing a Digital Security Agency with appropriate 
manpower the terms of reference of which will be prescribed by the govern-
ment. The role and functions of this Agency shall be formulated in the Rules 
that will be drafted for implementing the Act (sections 5–7). The law also pro-
poses the creation of a National Digital Security Council to be headed by the 
Prime Minister (section 12). Primarily an advisory and policy making body, 
the Council will ensure proper implementation of the Act.
The Act lays down preventive measures in terms of power to remove or 
block some data-information, having in place an Emergency Response Team, 
developing a digital forensic lab and ensuring the quality of the lab. The law 
grants law enforcement authorities wide-ranging powers to remove or block 
online information (via the Digital Security Agency) that harms the unity 
of the nation, economic activities, security, defense, religious values or pub-
lic order or spreads or incites communal hostility and hatred (section 8). 
The Bangladesh Telecommunications and Regulatory Authority (BTRC) will 
remove or block the item accordingly. Comprising of digital security experts 
and if necessary, members of the law enforcement agencies, the Emergency 
Response Team Working will work round the clock to guard against potential 
cyber/digital attacks and to take remedial measures, as and when necessary, 
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either by themselves or by drawing on international expertise (section 9). The 
digital forensic lab will provide forensic support to the implementation of the 
Act (section 10); to this end, it will be fully equipped with trained personnel, 
relevant infrastructure, equipment and instruments in order to maintain a 
high technical standard (section 11).
The Act has an extensive list of crimes and accompanying punishments 
(sections 17–36). They include: illegal entrance in Critical Information Infra-
structure (section 17); illegal entrance into computers, digital devices, computer 
systems (section 18); damage to computers, computer systems (section 19); 
offenses relating to computer source code change (section 20); propaganda 
or campaign against the liberation war, recognition of the liberation war, the 
Father of the Nation, the national anthem or national flag (section 21); digital 
or electronic forgery (section 22); digital or electronic fraud (section 23); iden-
tity fraud (section 24); publishing and sending offensive, false or fear-inducing 
data-information (section 25); collecting and using identity information with-
out permission (section 26); cyber-terrorism (section 27); publication and 
broadcast of such information on any website or in any electronic form that 
hampers religious sentiments or values (section 28); publication and broadcast 
of defamatory information (section 29); e-transactions without legal authority 
(section 30); deteriorating law and order (section 31); breaching Government 
secrets (section 32); illegal transfer and saving of data-information (section 33); 
hacking related offence (34); aiding in the commission of offences under this 
Act (section 35); offence committed by Company (section 36).
Among these various provisions, the most disputed and debated are the 
following:
Section 21
Anyone spreading “propaganda and campaign against liberation war 
of Bangladesh or spirit of the liberation war or Father of the Nation” 
using digital devices or instigating such acts, will be punishable with a 
maximum of fourteen years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to Taka 10 mil- 
lion or with both. S/he will be given a life sentence or a fine of Taka 
30 million or with both for committing the offence for the second time 
or recurrently.
Section 25
A person may face up to three years in prison or Taka 0.3 million in fine 
or with both if s/he is found to have deliberately publishing information 
on the website or in electronic form that is “aggressive or frightening” or 
361State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law 
which can make someone disgruntled; knowingly publish or broadcast 
false and distorted (fully or partially) information to annoy or humili-
ate someone; knowingly publish or broadcast false and distorted (fully 
or partially) information to tarnish the image of the state or to spread 
rumours. A person will face up to five years in jail or Taka 1 million fine or 
with both for committing the offence for the second time or recurrently.
Section 28
A person may face up to seven years in jail or Taka 1 million in fine or with 
both if s/he is found to have deliberately published or broadcast some-
thing on the website or in electronic form or get it done to hurt religious 
sentiments and values. A person will face up to ten years in jail or Taka 2 
million in fine or with both for committing the offence for the second 
time or recurrently.
Section 29
A person may face a maximum of three years in jail or Taka 0.5 million in 
fine or with both if s/he commits an offence stipulated in section 499 of 
the Penal Code (defamation) through website or in electronic form. S/he 
will be punishable with a maximum of five years in jail or a fine of Taka 
1 million or with both for committing the offence for the second time or 
recurrently.
Section 31
This section penalizes the posting of information that “creates animosity, 
hatred, or antipathy among the various classes and communities” or cre-
ates instability or disorder or disturbs or is about to disturb the law and 
order situation with a maximum of ten years of imprisonment or a fine 
of Taka 0.5 million or with both. If any person commits the crime for the 
second time or recurrently, s/he will be punished with imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding ten years or with a fine not exceeding Taka 1 million 
or with both.
Section 32
A person may face imprisonment for a maximum of fourteen years or a 
fine of Taka 2.5 million or with both for gathering, sending, or preserv-
ing classified information of any government using a computer or other 
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digital device. If s/he commits the offence for the second time or recur-
rently, s/he will be punished with life imprisonment or with fine not 
exceeding Taka 10 million or with both.
The passage of this law was met with wide criticism from the media and 
civil society. Termed as draconian and arbitrary, the law was viewed as going 
beyond its defined scope and venturing into areas that may potentially impede 
the freedom of expression and freedom of the media. A law that penalizes the 
expression of opinions about historical facts are incompatible with a country’s 
obligations to respect freedom of opinion and expression. Without sufficiently 
distinguishing between genuine cyber-crimes and the nature and practice 
of independent journalism, the law introduces provisions that can easily be 
used and abused to curb press freedom. Besides, the vagueness in the language 
poses threats to the freedom of expression as it leaves too much room for inter-
pretation, which can be misused. Indeed, the vagueness, combined with the 
potentially harsh penalty, increases the likelihood of self-censorship. The Act 
has also been criticized for giving the police unrestricted powers of search, 
seizure, and an arrest without warrant, with virtual impunity.
Human Rights – Administrative fairness – Equality 
before Law – Equal Protection – Non-Discrimination
 Dr. A.Y.M. Akramul Hoque Versus Government of the People’s Republic 
of Bangladesh 12 SCOB [2019] High Court Division (Special Original 
Jurisdiction), Writ Petition No.1852 of 2014, Judgment Delivered on 
04 November 2018.
The case of the petitioner, as set out in the Writ Petition, in short, is as fol-
lows: The petitioner having qualified in the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) 
Examination of 1982 was recommended by the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) for appointment to the Administration Cadre and accordingly he joined 
the Administration Cadre as Assistant Commissioner on 14.12.1983 following 
which he served in various capacities under the government and was ulti-
mately promoted to the post of Joint Secretary on 05.03.2005. As Joint Secretary 
to the Government of Bangladesh, he served as Director, Bangladesh Jute Mills 
Corporation from 15.05.2005 to 15.03.2006 and as Director General, Bureau of 
Statistics from 30.03.2006 to 15.10.2009. However, he was made an Officer on 
Special Duty (OSD) under the then Ministry of Establishment (now Ministry 
of Public Administration) on 16.10.2009 and since then he has been an OSD 
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thereunder. It may be noted here that while historically the OSD position mer-
ited honour and respect, in recent times, this is increasingly being used as a 
means of penalizing government officers who do not toe the partisan line of 
the ruling party.
A combined gradation list of the officers of the Administration Cadre of 
various batches of 1982 was updated on 27.01.2014 by the government. The 
name of the petitioner appears in serial no. 79 in that combined gradation 
list. A total of 28 officers who were below the petitioner in the gradation list 
were promoted to the post of Additional Secretary by superseding him vide 
a notification issued by the Ministry of Public Administration on 27.01.2009. 
On 07.09.2009, the Ministry of Public Administration issued another notifi-
cation thereby promoting another 46 officers of the Administration Cadre to 
the post of Additional Secretary by superseding the petitioner. Subsequently, 
on 10.10.2011 the concerned Ministry issued yet another notification whereby 
27 officers were promoted to the post of Additional Secretary by superseding 
the petitioner. Several other notifications followed pursuant to which more 
officers were promoted to the post of Additional Secretary by superseding the 
petitioner bringing the total to 302, all of whom were below the petitioner in 
the gradation list, and who were promoted to the higher post of Additional 
Secretary bypassing the petitioner without any justifiable reason. At later dates 
and via various notifications, a total of 21 officers, who were below the peti-
tioner in the combined gradation list, were promoted to the post of Secretary 
bypassing the petitioner.
The Court issued a Rule Nisi calling upon the respondents to show cause 
as why the different notifications issued by the government whereby officers 
were promoted by superseding the petitioner and so far as they relate to the 
exclusion of the name of the petitioner therefrom, should not be declared to 
be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and why a direction should 
not be given upon the respondents to treat the petitioner as deemed to have 
been promoted to the post of Additional Secretary with effect from 27.01.2009 
and to the post of Secretary to the Government with effect from 28.06.2011 and 
to pay him all attending benefits and/or such other or further order or orders 
passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper.
The legal instrument for regulation of the appointment of the civil servants 
by promotion to the ranks of Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, Additional 
Secretary and Secretary respectively is hereinafter referred to as the Promotion 
Rules of 2002. Rule 4(1) of the Promotion Rules of 2002 provides merit, effi-
ciency and seniority as the basis of promotion. Rule 4(2) provides that in case 
of promotion to the rank of Additional Secretary or Secretary, the importance 
and nature of assignments discharged by a concerned officer in his total 
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service tenure and his personal reputation and other relevant matters will also 
be considered. Rule 5 prescribes the procedure for promotion. As per Rule 5(4), 
the Superior Selection Board (SSB – respondent no. 2 in this case) will make 
necessary recommendations for promotion which are required to be approved 
by the Prime Minister.
The court observed that the petitioner had the requisite qualifications as 
enumerated in the 1st Schedule to the Promotion Rules of 2002 for appoint-
ment by promotion to the rank of Additional Secretary on 27.01.2009, when a 
good number of officers, who were below the petitioner in the gradation list, 
were promoted to the post of Additional Secretaries. As per the 2nd Schedule 
to the Promotion Rules of 2002, an officer shall be evaluated based on 100 
marks for promotion. The court observed that on 27.01.2009, when other offi-
cers who were below the petitioner in the gradation list were considered for 
promotion, the petitioner, despite being otherwise eligible for promotion and 
having presumably obtained the qualifying marks, was not promoted to the 
post of Additional Secretary. The court believed that the additional consider-
ations as contemplated by Rule 4(2) of the Promotion Rules of 2002 were not 
only redundant but also vague, because these are already covered by the ACRs 
of concerned officers. The provisions of Rule 4(2) have been constantly used by 
the authority to pick and choose at will candidates for higher ranks in the Civil 
Service of Bangladesh. Hence, Rule 4(2) of the Promotion Rules of 2002 was 
discriminatory. The court held that repeated supersessions of the petitioner 
by junior officers to the post of Additional Secretary and thereafter to the post 
of Secretary to the Government of Bangladesh were arbitrary and vitiated 
by malice in law. The repeated supersessions of the petitioner also violated 
Article 29(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Against this backdrop, the Rule 
was liable to be made absolute.
The government contested the Rule by filing an Affidavit-in-Opposition 
stating that the petitioner was not found eligible for promotion to the post 
of Additional Secretary and as such, he was not recommended by the SSB. 
Denying the petitioner’s claim that he had the requisite qualifications for pro-
motion, the government contended that Rule 4(2) of the Promotion Rules of 
2002 was not vague, redundant or discriminatory as it requires consideration 
of the nature and importance of the duties performed by an officer concerned 
throughout his service career and is equally applicable to all incumbents. The 
officers below the petitioner were found eligible and accordingly they were 
recommended for promotion by the SSB. The government argued that senior-
ity was not the only basis from promotion – merit and efficiency are equally 
important, qualities that the petitioner lacked. Therefore, the supersessions 
of the petitioner were not vitiated by malice in law. No right of the petitioner 
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was curtailed or infringed nor was he deprived of his legal entitlement. 
Besides, the petitioner being now retired, there is not scope for promotion to a 
higher position.
In response to the government’s Affidavit-in-Opposition, the court held that 
the government’s argument that the petitioner was not eligible for promotion 
in the light of Rule 4(2) of the Promotion Rules of 2002, was not tenable given 
that no specific reason was assigned by the SSB for the supersession of the peti-
tioner. It was evidently clear that the SSB did not objectively assess the worth, 
efficiency, drive, zeal to work and integrity of the petitioner, particularly when 
the contents of his ACRs from 1984 to 2013 speak volumes about his spotless, 
untainted and unblemished service record. What was interesting was that the 
petitioner scored about 95% marks on an average between 2000 to 2009.
Since he was made an OSD in the Ministry of Public Administration from 
2010 to 2013, the petitioner did not incur any liability for the absence of his ACRs 
for that period (2010 to 2013). Acknowledging that the petitioner’s ACRs during 
his entire service career were excellent and given that no specific reason was 
assigned for his repeated supersessions, the court held that the SSB did not act 
fairly in evaluating the suitability of the petitioner for promotion to the post 
of Additional Secretary to the Government. In this context, the court alluded 
to decisions in Re Infant H(K) ([1967] 1 All E.R. 226, Council of Civil Service 
Union Vs Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All E.R. 935, and Swadeshi 
Cotton Mill Vs India, AIR 1981 SC 818 which maintained that administrative 
authorities must act fairly and that this rule must not be compromised save in 
very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands.
Drawing on relevant case law from various jurisdictions (Ram Chandra … 
Vs … Secretary to the Government of W. B, AIR 1964 Cal 265; Punjab … Vs … 
Khanna, AIR 2001 SC 343; Shearer  … Vs  … Shield, [1914] AC 808; Associated 
Provincial Picture  … Vs  … Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223; State 
of A.P. and others  … Vs  … Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC 739; Regional 
Manager … Vs … Pawan Kumar Dubey, AIR 1976 SC 1766; Venkataraman … Vs … 
India, AIR 1979 SC 49; Maneka Gandhi … Vs … India, AIR 1978 SC 597; Romana 
Shetly … Vs … International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628; Ajay Hashia … 
Vs … Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487; D.S. Nakara … Vs … India, AIR 1983 SC 130; 
A.L. Kalra … Vs … P and E Corporation of India, AIR 1984 SC 1361 et al.) and legal 
authorities (Dicey; Rotundy; Sir Ivor Jennings), the court stressed that mala 
fides or bad faith vitiates everything and a mala fide act is a nullity. In the pres-
ent case, mala fides applied as the aggrieved party was able to establish that 
the authority making the impugned supersessions did not apply its mind at all 
to the matters in question. This is evidenced by the incomprehensible man-
ner in which the SSB brushed aside the spotless, untainted and unblemished 
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service record of the petitioner throughout his career without furnishing any 
plausible reason whatsoever. Equally astounding was the SSB’s failure to take 
into consideration the petitioner’s ACRs which ought to have been the most 
dominant and persuasive factors determining his eligibility for the promotion 
post. However shockingly enough, those evaluations were completely disre-
garded by the SSB – it was a case of total non-application of the mind. That 
the SSB had an ulterior motive and that some extraneous factors were defi-
nitely taken into account by the SSB were evidently clear from the facts and 
circumstances of the case. Indeed, the repeated supersessions of the petitioner 
were classic examples of bad faith or mala fides. The reason for supersession as 
mentioned in the Affidavit-in-Opposition, appear prima facie, cryptic, vague, 
unspecific and nebulous and as such, the court believed that the impugned 
supersessions of the petitioner were arbitrary and unreasonable.
The doctrine of acting fairly requires that the SSB ought to have examined 
the matter of promotion of the petitioner objectively before arriving at a 
decision. Disappointingly, however, the SSB did not do so and the court was 
compelled to conclude that the petitioner was superseded several times in 
the “colourable exercise of power” and with a purpose for which he became 
a victim of ex-facie arbitrariness, unreasonableness and bad faith. It was on 
record that the petitioner submitted a representation dated 13.09.2009 to the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Public Administration for reconsideration of his 
case for promotion; instead of responding thereto, the petitioner was made an 
OSD in the Ministry of Public Administration on 16.10.2009 – this was malice 
in law – pure and simple.
On the issue of equality before law and equal protection of law, the court 
stressed that while no employee has any right to claim promotion on the basis 
of seniority alone, where the promotion post is to be filled up on a seniority-
cum-suitability basis as per service rules, the guarantee of Articles 27 and 
29(1) of the Bangladesh Constitution require that an employee fulfilling the 
qualifications for promotion should be duly considered for promotion. Thus, 
if the junior employee is promoted without considering the case of a senior 
employee who fulfills the qualification for promotion, the guarantee of equal-
ity of opportunity is violated.
Considering the views of different distinguished Judges and scholars on the 
meaning of the phrase “equality before law and equal protection of law”, 
the court observed that “equality before law” is not to be interpreted in its 
absolute sense to hold that all persons are equal in all respects disregarding 
different conditions and circumstances in which they are placed or special 
qualities and characteristics which some of them may possess but which are 
lacking in others. The term “equal protection of law” is used to mean that all 
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persons or things are not equal in all cases and that persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike. Equal protection is the guarantee that similar people 
will be dealt with in a similar way and that people of different circumstances 
will not be treated as if they were the same.
The Court maintained that the petitioner and others who were in the 
combined gradation list of officers were a class by themselves. There was no 
‘intelligible differentia’ or ‘permissible criteria’ between them; as such, the peti-
tioner should not have been discriminated against as regards his promotion.
Having due regard to the discussions and the facts and circumstances of the 
case, the Rule was made absolute in part. The respondents were directed to 
treat the petitioner as deemed to have been promoted to the post of Additional 
Secretary with effect from 27.01.2009 and to the post of Secretary to the 
Government with effect from 28.06.2011. He would be deemed to have gone on 
Post Retirement Leave (PRL) as a Secretary to the Government of Bangladesh 
on 28.02.2014. Consequentially, he would be entitled to all pensionary benefits 
of a Secretary to the Government of Bangladesh in view of the then prevalent 
National Pay Scale of 2009.
Human Rights – Administrative Fairness – Principles 
of Natural Justice – Due Process of Law
 Md. Shamsujjaman and Others – Versus – Bangladesh, Represented 
by the Secretary, Ministry of Education, Ramna, Dhaka and Others, 
13 SCOB [2020] High Court Division (Special Original Jurisdiction), 
Writ Petition No. 3691 of 2014, Judgement Delivered on 14.11.2018
Relevant facts of the case are that petitioners, the petitioners, being 10 in num-
ber, studying in different departments at the Shahjalal University of Science 
and Technology, Sylhet challenged the order of their expulsion issued by the 
University on account of an incident that took place on 13.12.2013. On that day, 
a human chain was formed by the teachers and students of the University 
condemning the heinous attack on a monument of the University. Some mis-
creants attacked the teachers and students who formed the human chain, 
causing injury to some of them. The said incident was published in both 
national and local dailies. Following the incident, an Inquiry Committee was 
formed to look into the matter. On 26.12.2013, the Inquiry Committee issued 
letters only to petitioner nos. 1 and 2, asking them to appear before the 
Committee on 30.12.2013. The petitioners refrained from appearing before 
the Committee. The Committee submitted its report to the Proctor, who was 
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the Member Secretary of the Committee, recommending action against cer-
tain students of the University, including the petitioners. Pursuant to the 
report and recommendation of the Committee, the University authority issued 
show cause letters, all dated 02.02.2014, upon the petitioners, asking them to 
respond within 15 days of receiving the said notice, which they did.
On 27.02.2014, at its 183rd Meeting, the Syndicate of the University took 
a decision approving the temporary suspension order of the petitioners. 
However, on the very same day, the Syndicate also passed an order of expul-
sion of the petitioners. Accordingly, pursuant to the decision of the Syndicate, 
the impugned letters dated 16.03.2014 were issued to all the petitioners, com-
municating thereby the orders of their expulsion from the University.
The petitioners filed applications before the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University praying for cancellation of the suspension order. There was no 
response to the application. The petitioners then issued a Notice Demanding 
Justice requesting the concerned respondents to cancel the expulsion order. 
Again, no steps were taken in response to the notice. Being constrained, the 
petitioners moved the Court and obtained the instant Rule.
After hearing both sides, the court conceded that while the image and sanc-
tity of the University cannot be allowed to be vandalized and perpetrators 
of such action must be dealt with sternly, even if they were students of the 
University, in so doing, the University authorities must follow the principles 
of natural justice and conduct the proceeding in accordance with the law and 
only in accordance with the law. The court believed that a plain reading of the 
show cause notice reveals various deficiencies; for example, the show cause 
merely stated that an incident took place in which some teachers and students 
came under attack and some motorcycles and bicycles were burnt, without 
going into relevant details in terms of, for example, the exact place and time of 
the occurrence, the identities of the teachers and students who were allegedly 
injured, the extent and nature of the injuries sustained by them, the number 
of motorcycles and bicycles that were alleged to have been damaged, and so 
on. In the absence of such relevant information, the court regarded the show 
cause notice as being based on vague, unspecific and indefinite allegations. 
Given that the show cause notice was the first step in the entire process that 
would culminate in the expulsion of the petitioners and that it stated therein 
that an Inquiry Committee conducted the inquiry and submitted a report, no 
such report was either annexed with the show cause notice itself or served 
upon the petitioners, thereby preventing them from giving a proper reply to 
the allegations brought against them.
On perusal of the impugned order of the University Syndicate dated 
16.03.2014, it was apparent to the court, the authority issued the expulsion order 
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in a very mechanical manner, without affording the petitioners an opportu-
nity of being individually heard. In essence, the petitioners were condemned 
unheard, which by itself is a gross violation of the principle of natural justice, 
not to mention the non-observance of the due process of law. The University, 
more particularly the Syndicate, being in a position of “loco parentis”, is obliged 
not only to observe the well-established principle of natural justice, but also to 
act in accordance with law. The court observed that, in the instant case, not 
only did the University authority fail to observe the due process of law, but 
the impugned orders of expulsion were passed in gross violation of the prin-
ciples of natural justice. The Syndicate, being the highest administrative body 
of the University, was also acting as a quasi-judicial body and as such, it was, 
imperative that it complied with principles of natural justice and acted in the 
due process.
Drawing on judicial decisions from Indian and domestic jurisdictions, the 
court elaborated that the concept “administrative fairness” requires that an 
authority, while taking a decision which affects a person’s right prejudicially, 
must act fairly and in accordance with the law. Unfortunately, the University/
Syndicate in the present case failed to comply with the principles of natural 
justice resulting in arbitrariness, which in turn, vitiated the impugned order. 
Therefore, the court held that the impugned order of expulsion of the petition-
ers was made without lawful authority and was of no legal effect and made the 
Rule absolute.
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Human Rights – Legal Justifications for the 
Practice of Euthanasia – Differentiating Active and 
Passive Euthanasia – Right to Life as Reflected in 
International Human Rights Instruments – Guidelines 
for Allowing Passive or Active Euthanasia – Survey of 
Indian Jurisprudence on Euthanasia
 Common Cause (A Reg. Society) v. Union of India and Another 
(Supreme Court of India, 9 March 2018)
Petitioner, a registered society, sought a declaration from the court to uphold 
the right to die with dignity as a fundamental right within the fold of right to 
live with dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Petitioners 
also requested the Court to direct the respondents, the Union of India to out-
line and notify the procedures and guidelines in this regard in consultation 
with the State Governments. Petitioners had asserted that every individual 
was entitled to take his/her decision about the continuance or discontinu-
ance of life when the process of death had already commenced and he/she 
had reached an irreversible permanent progressive state where death was 
not far away. The Government of India, as respondents, presented before 
the Court their concerns about the recognition of this right without ade-
quate assessment. The Government brought to the attention of the Court 
the serious consideration being given by its agencies in this regard. The 
Government referred to the work done by the Law Commission of India 
in this regard and also its 241st report on this aspect. The Government also 
pointed out that the Law Commission of India had submitted a report on 
The Medical Treatment of Terminally-ill Patients (Protection of Patients and 
Medical Practitioners) Bill, 2006. The Government also pointed out that a 
private member bill on this topic was pending before the Indian Parliament. 
However, the Government pointed out that the Ministry of Health and 
* Professor, Centre for International Legal Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal 
Nehru University, India.
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Family Welfare was not in favour of the enactment due to several implemen-
tation and procedural limitations that might need exercise of due caution 
and discretion.
After surveying its own jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of the courts 
of United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, 
Luxembourg and the European Courts of Human Rights, the Court referred 
to obligations that would be necessary when discussing voluntary euthanasia. 
According the Court the following rights in the ICCPR had been considered 
by the practice of voluntary euthanasia: right to life (Article 6); freedom from 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 7); right to respect for private 
life (Article 17); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18). The 
Court further noted,
Right to life under Article 6(1) of the ICCPR provides: Every human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. The second sentence of Article 6(1) 
imposes a positive obligation on the States to provide legal protection of 
the right to life. However, the subsequent reference to life not being arbi-
trarily deprived operates to limit the scope of the right (and therefore the 
States’ duty to ensure the right). Comments from the UN Human Rights 
Committee suggest that laws allowing for voluntary euthanasia are not 
necessarily incompatible with the States’ obligation to protect the right 
to life.
The Court further noted that the UN Human Rights Committee had empha-
sised that laws allowing for euthanasia must provide effective procedural 
safeguards against abuse if they were to be compatible with the State’s obliga-
tion to protect the right to life.
According to the Court there was an inherent difference between active 
euthanasia and passive euthanasia as the former entailed a positive affirmative 
act, while the latter related to withdrawal of life support measures or with-
holding of medical treatment meant for artificially prolonging life. Further, 
the Court noted that in active euthanasia, a specific overt act was done to 
end the patient’s life whereas in passive euthanasia, something was not done 
which was necessary for preserving a patient’s life. It was due to this difference 
that most of the countries across the world had legalised passive euthanasia 
either by legislation or by judicial interpretation with certain conditions and 
safeguards. The Court also decided that the sanctity of life has to be kept on 
the high pedestal yet in cases of terminally ill persons or Persistent Vegetative 
State (PVS) patients where there is no hope for revival priority shall be given 
to the Advance Directive and the right of self-determination. In the absence 
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of Advance Directive, the procedure provided for the said category hereinbe-
fore shall be applicable. And the Court accordingly laid down the principles 
relating to the procedure for execution of Advance Directive and provided the 
guidelines to give effect to passive euthanasia in both circumstances, namely, 
where there were advance directives and where there were none, in exercise 
of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution and the law stated by it in 
its earlier decisions. The Court also decided that its directives and guidelines 
should remain in place till the Parliament brings in appropriate legislation to 
this effect.
Human Rights – Constitutional Validity of the Right 
to Sexuality – Right to Privacy and Human Dignity 
under International Human Rights Instruments – 
Definition of Sexual Orientation in Yogyakarta 
Principles
 Navtej Singh Johar and Others v. Union of India (Supreme Court of 
India, 6 September 2018)
Petitioners sought the intervention of the Court in declaring section 377 of 
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as unconstitutional violating Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India. They also sought the Court to recognize the right to 
sexuality, right to sexual autonomy and the right to choice of a sexual part-
ner to be part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of Constitution. 
The present case was filed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s observations in the 
Puttaswamy case that had recognized right to privacy as a fundamental right 
and had also observed that sexual orientation was an essential component 
of this right. While ruling in the present case, the Court also had to examine 
its own decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. Naz Foundation and 
others overturning the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation v. 
Government of NCT of Delhi and others.
The Court, while surveying its own jurisprudence on the subject, referred 
to broader aspects of the `living’ and `transformative’ nature of the Indian 
Constitution. While referring to constitutional morality and human dignity, 
the Court took recourse to international human rights law. It, thus, stated,
The fundamental idea of dignity is regarded as an inseparable facet of 
human personality. Dignity has been duly recognized as an important 
aspect of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. In the 
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international sphere, the right to live with dignity had been identified as 
a human right way back in 1948 with the introduction of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The constitutional courts of our country 
have solemnly dealt with the task of assuring and preserving the right 
to dignity of each and every individual whenever the occasion arises, for 
without the right to live with dignity, all other fundamental rights may 
not realise their complete meaning.
The Court surveyed briefly the jurisprudence on the aspect of `sexual orien-
tation’ in the European Court of Justice, the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
Supreme Court of South Africa and the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Later, it referred to the Yogyakarta Principles, in particular its definition of 
the expression “sexual orientation” as understood to refer to “… each person’s 
capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to and inti-
mate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same 
gender or more than one gender.”
Further, referring to the evolution of culture and an affirmative move 
towards a more inclusive and egalitarian society, the Court pointed out that 
“… Non-acceptance of the same would tantamount to denial of human rights 
to people and one cannot be oblivious of the saying of Nelson Mandela – to 
deny people their human rights is to challenge their very humanity. The Court 
listed the aspects of right to privacy as incorporated in several of the interna-
tional human rights instruments such as Article 12 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), (1948) and Article 17 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.
The Court while expressing its view regarding the decriminalisaiton 
of Seciton 377 of IPC, pointed out that “At the very least, it can be said that 
criminalisation of consensual carnal intercourse, be it amongst homosexuals, 
heterosexuals, bi-sexuals or transgenders, hardly serves any legitimate public 
purpose or interest. Per contra, we are inclined to believe that if Section 377 
remains in its present form in the statute book, it will allow the harassment 
and exploitation of the LGBT community to prevail. We must make it clear 
that freedom of choice cannot be scuttled or abridged on the threat of crimi-
nal prosecution and made paraplegic on the mercurial stance of majoritarian 
perception.”
The Court further observed “The LGBT community possess the same 
human, fundamental and constitutional rights as other citizens do since these 
rights inhere in individuals as natural and human rights. We must remember 
that equality is the edifice on which the entire non-discrimination jurispru-
dence rests. Respect for individual choice is the very essence of liberty under 
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law and, thus, criminalizing carnal intercourse under Section 377 IPC is irratio-
nal, indefensible and manifestly arbitrary. It is true that the principle of choice 
can never be absolute under a liberal Constitution and the law restricts one 
individual’s choice to prevent harm or injury to others. However, the organisa-
tion of intimate relations is a matter of complete personal choice especially 
between consenting adults. It is a vital personal right falling within the private 
protective sphere and realm of individual choice and autonomy. Such progres-
sive proclivity is rooted in the constitutional structure and is an inextricable 
part of human nature.”
The Court held that “… Section 377 IPC, so far as it penalizes any consensual 
sexual relationship between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), 
heterosexuals (man and a woman) or lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot 
be regarded as constitutional.”
Human Rights – Right to Privacy and Human 
Dignity as a Fundamental Right in the Context of 
Implementation of Aadhaar Scheme – Survey of Human 
Rights Jurisprudence Relating to Data Protection 
within India and in Other Jurisdictions
 Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) and Another v. Union of India and 
Others (Supreme Court of India, 26 September 2018)
The present case (along with a batch of several writ petitions) related to the 
implementation of the Aadhaar card scheme. It shall be recalled that in an 
earlier judgment in the same case the Indian Supreme Court had held on 
24 August 2017 that the privacy was a constitutionally protected right that 
emerged primarily from the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 
of the Constitution. The Court also had held that elements of privacy also 
arose in varying contexts from the other facets of freedom and dignity rec-
ognised and guaranteed by the fundamental rights contained in Part III 
(fundamental rights) of the Indian Constitution. However, in the present case 
petitioners argued that the Aadhaar programme and its formation/structure 
under the Aadhaar Act were grave risk to the rights and liberties of the citizens 
of India which were otherwise secured by its Constitution. The Petitioners 
further argued that the Aadhaar scheme militated against the constitutional 
abiding values and its foundational morality and had the potential to enable 
an intrusive state to become surveillance state on the basis of information that 
was collected in respect of each individual by creation of a joint electronic 
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mesh. While the petitioners had no dispute with regard to the allotment of 
Aadhaar number for the purpose of unique identification of the residents, 
their apprehensions were about the manner in which the Scheme had been 
rolled out and implemented. According to the petitioners the manner of 
Aadhaar scheme implementation forced a person to part with his or her core 
information namely biometric information in the form of fingerprints and its 
scan. Petitioners further argued that this information were to be given to the 
enrolment agency in the first instance which was a private body and, thus, 
there was a risk of misuse of this vital information pertaining to an individual. 
Petitioners also argued that the provisions of the Aadhaar Act were not only 
about giving away vital information about the residents of the State in the form 
biometrics but also about the movement as well as varied kinds of transactions 
which a resident would enter from time to time. This, according to petitioners, 
posed a threat in the form of profiling of the citizens by the State and also its 
potential misuse by non-state actors. The Government of India, while defend-
ing the Aadhaar Scheme provided a detailed outline and presentation of how 
all the safety and other related measures were incorporated in the Aadhaar Act 
to protect the privacy of the citizens.
Explaining in detail the contours of the right to privacy and its constitu-
tional validity from its earlier judgment delivered in the same case in 2017, 
the Court noted that the privacy had now been treated as part of fundamental 
rights. Further, linking right to privacy to the right to human dignity the Court 
reiterated its decision in the earlier case by noting “… privacy postulates the 
reservation of a private space for an individual, described as the right to be let 
alone, as a concept founded on autonomy of the individual. In this way, right 
to privacy has been treated as a postulate of human dignity itself.” Referring to 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Court further noted,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recorded in the 
Preamble recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace. It included freedom from fear and want as 
amongst the highest aspirations of the common people. This is of course 
subject to resources of each State. But the realisation is contemplated 
through national effort and international cooperation. Evidently, the 
UDHR adopts a substantive or communitarian concept of human dignity. 
The realisation of intrinsic worth of every human being, as a member of 
society through national efforts as an indispensable condition has been 
recognised as an important human right. Truly speaking, this is directed 
towards the deprived, downtrodden and have nots.
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Referring to the doctrine of proportionality and its own jurisprudence on 
this aspect, the Court observed that whenever challenge was laid to an action 
of the State on the ground that it violated the right to privacy, the action of 
the State was to be tested on the following parameters: (a) the action must be 
sanctioned by law; (b) the proposed action must be necessary in a democratic 
society for a legitimate aim; and (c) the extent of such interference must be 
proportionate to the need for such interference.
Besides its own jurisprudence, the Supreme Court referred to two cases of 
the European Courts of Human Rights, namely, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. 
Minister for Communication, Marine and Natural Resources (2014) and S and 
Marper v. United Kingdom (2012). While analyzing these two cases, the Court 
observed,
In Digital Ireland, the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union adopted Directive 2006/24/EC (Directive), which regu-
lated Internet Service Providers’ storage of telecommunications data. It 
could be used to retain data generated or processed in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications network for the purpose of fighting seri-
ous crime in the European Union (EU). The data included data necessary 
to trace and identify the source of communication and its destination, to 
identify the date, time duration, type of communication, IP address, 
telephone number and other fields. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
evaluated the compatibility of the Directive with Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and declared 
the Directive to be invalid. According to the ECJ, the Directive inter-
fered with the right to respect for private life under Article 7 and with 
the right to the protection of personal data under Article 8. It allowed 
very precise conclusion to be drawn concerning the private lives of the 
persons whose data had been retained, such as habits of everyday life, 
permanent or temporary places of residence, daily and other move-
ments, activities carried out, social relationships and so on. The invasion 
of right was not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In S and 
Marper, the storing of DNA profiles and a cellular sample of any person 
arrested in the United Kingdom was challenged before the ECtHR. Even 
if the individual was never charged, if criminal proceedings were discon-
tinued, or if the person was later acquitted of any crime, their DNA profile 
could nevertheless be kept permanently on record. It held that there had 
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been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. Fingerprints, DNA profiles and 
cellular samples, constituted personal data and their retention was 
capable of affecting private life of an individual. Retention of such data 
without consent, thus, constitutes violation of Article 8 as they relate to 
identified and identifiable individuals. The Court held that invasion of 
privacy was not “necessary in a democratic society as it did not fulfill any 
pressing social need. The blanket and indiscriminate nature of retention 
of data was excessive and did not strike a balance between private and 
public interest.
Surveying it own jurisprudence on the privacy issues, the Court also referred to 
the existing legal regime such as Information Technology Act, 2000 and others 
that sought to collate and regulate data protection. It also referred to legisla-
tive developments that had been taking place within the Indian Parliament 
with the pending legislation relating to new Data Protection Bill, 2018. The 
Court also referred to European Union General Data Protection Regulation 
(EUGDPR), 2016 (which came into force on 25 May 2018) replacing the Data 
Protection Directive of 1995. The Court also briefly surveyed some of the legis-
lations passed by the States within the United States.
The Court, after examining each of the concerns raised by the petitioners, 
outlined following guidelines for implementation: (a) Authentication records 
not to be kept beyond a period of six months, as stipulated in Regulation 27(1) 
of the Authentication Regulations. This provision which permits records to be 
archived for a period of five years held to be bad in law; (b) Metabase relating 
to transaction, as provided in Regulation 26 of the aforesaid Regulations in the 
present form, held to be impermissible, which needs suitable amendment; (c) 
Section 33 of the Aadhaar Act is read down by clarifying that an individual, 
whose information is sought to be released, shall be afforded an opportunity 
of hearing; (d) Insofar as Section 33(2) of the Act in the present form is con-
cerned, the same is struck down ; (e) That portion of Section 57 of the Aadhaar 
Act which enables body corporate and individual to seek authentication is 
held to be unconstitutional; (f) Impressed upon the Government of India to 
bring out a robust data protection regime in the form of an enactment on the 
basis of Justice B.N. Srikrishna (Retd.) Committee Report with necessary modi-
fications thereto as may be deemed appropriate.
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Criminal Law – Constitutional Validity of the  
Crime of Adultery – United Nations Working Group 
on Women’s Human Rights on the Effect of Crime 
of Adultery on Women – Striking down of Crime of 
Adultery as a Penal Provision in Other Jurisdictions
 Joseph Shine v. Union of India (Supreme Court of India, 27 September 
2018)
The constitutional validity of the Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 
dealing with the crime of adultery was challenged in this petition. Surveying its 
own jurisprudence on the topic the Court, inter alia, noted that the impugned 
provision demonstrably treated woman as subordinate to men inasmuch as 
it laid down that when there was connivance or consent of the man, there 
was no offence. The Court further, at the outset, observed that this treated the 
woman as a chattel; treated her as the property of man and totally subservient 
to the will of the master; that it was a reflection of the social dominance that 
was prevalent when the penal provision was drafted. The Court also noted that 
with the passage of time it had recognized the concept of equality of woman 
and the essential dignity which she was entitled to.
Besides surveying its own jurisprudence, the Court noted that adultery as 
a crime did not exist in many countries such as China, Japan, Australia, Brazil 
and in many western European countries. The court also judicially took note of 
the diversity of culture in all these countries. Referring to the United Nations 
Working Group on Women’s Human Rights: Report (2012), the Court observed,
The last few decades have been characterized by numerous countries 
around the world taking measures to decriminalize the offence of adul-
tery due to the gender discriminatory nature of adultery laws as well as 
on the ground that they violate the right to privacy. However, progressive 
action has primarily been taken on the ground that provisions penalis-
ing adultery are discriminatory against women either patently on the 
face of the law or in their implementation. Reform towards achieving a 
more egalitarian society in practice has also been driven by active mea-
sures taken by the United Nations and other international human rights 
organizations, where it has been emphasized that even seemingly gen-
der neutral provisions criminalising adultery cast an unequal burden 
on women.
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The Court also referred to the South Korean Constitutional Court decision 
of 2015 by a majority of 7–2 striking down Article 241 of the Criminal Law; a 
provision which criminalized adultery with a term of imprisonment of two 
years as unconstitutional. In doing so, the Court noted, South Korea joined a 
growing list of countries in Asia and indeed around the world that had taken 
the measure of effacing the offence of adultery from the statute books, con-
sidering evolving public values and societal trends. The Court also noted that 
the South Korean Constitutional Court had deliberated upon the legality of 
the provision four times previously, but chose to strike it down when it came 
before it in 2015, with the Court’s judgment acknowledging the shifting public 
perception of individual rights in their private lives.
Further referring to the South Korean Constitutional Court’s rationale for 
the decision in its judgment, the Court observed,
The Court used the test of least restrictiveness, and began by acknowledg-
ing that there no longer existed public consensus on the criminalization 
of adultery, with the societal structure having changed from holding 
traditional family values and a typeset role of family members to sexual 
views driven by liberal thought and individualism. While recognizing 
that marital infidelity is immoral and unethical, the Court stated that 
love and sexual life were intimate concerns, and they should not be made 
subject to criminal law.
The Court also briefly examined similar cases that were dealt with in other 
jurisdictions such as Uganda, South Africa, Canada, Turkey and the United 
States.
The Court noted that it had travelled on the path of transformative con-
stitutionalism and, therefore, it was absolutely inappropriate to sit in a time 
machine to a different era where the machine moves on the path of regression. 
Hence, to treat adultery as a crime would be unwarranted in law. Examining 
the evolution of the crime of adultery in different jurisdictions (and in the reli-
gious texts) the Court noted that the provision was wholly outdated and had 
outlived its purpose. Accordingly, as per the the maxim of Roman law, cessante 
ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex, apply to interdict such law, but when such law fell 
foul of constitutional guarantees, it was this Court’s solemn duty not to wait for 
legislation but to strike down such law.
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Human Rights – Civil Code Reform – Recommendations 
by the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) – Revision  
of the Civil Code to Lower the Age of Majority  
from 20 to 18
On June 13, 2018, the revised Civil Code was enacted to lower the age of major-
ity from 20 to 18. Currently, Article 4 of the Civil Code provided that the age of 
majority is reached when a person has reached the age of 20. With this change 
in the age of majority, the government explained the significance of creating 
an environment in which young people aged 18 and 19 years old can make their 
own life choices, as well as encouraging their active participation in society 
and making it more dynamic. The Civil Code defines the age of majority as 
the age at which a person is able to enter into a contract alone and the age at 
which a person is no longer subject to parental authority. The age of majority 
has been set at 20 years since the Civil Code was enacted in 1896 (Meiji 29). It 
was the first time in 140 years since the proclamation of the Grand Council of 
State in 1876 that the age of majority was reviewed, and it is scheduled to take 
effect in April 2022. One of the important changes is that the marriage age 
of women will be raised from 16 to 18 old years (Article 731 of the Civil Code, 
“Age for marriage”), and the marriage age of men and women will be unified at 
18 for the first time in Japan.
At the beginning of the Meiji period, Japan is said to have constituted its Civil 
Code order on the premise that the physical and mental maturity of women is 
earlier than men. There was also the issue of the economic independence of 
women as it was believed that women achieve economic stability only after 
they get marriage and the issue of the inadequacy of women’s education as 
it was generally believed that women did not need higher education. In that 
historical context, the age for marriage for men and women was set differently. 
* Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
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The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
had pointed out that women and men were treated unequally and recommend 
the Japanese government to respond as follows:
The Committee reiterates its previous recommendation (CEDAW/C/
JPN/CO/6, para. 22) and calls upon the State party to urgently adopt a 
comprehensive definition of discrimination against women in national 
legislation in line with article 1 of the Convention, with a view to ensuring 
that women are protected against both direct and indirect discrimina-
tion in all spheres of life.
Discriminatory laws and lack of legal protection
12. The Committee regrets that its previous recommendations regard-
ing existing discriminatory provisions have not been addressed. The 
Committee is particularly concerned:
(a) That the Civil Code retains discriminatory provisions since it sets 
different minimum ages of marriage for women and men at 16 and 
18 years of age, respectively;
(b) That the Civil Code continues to prohibit only women from 
remarrying within a specified period of time after divorce, notwith-
standing the decision of the Supreme Court to shorten the period 
from 6 months to 100 days;
(c) That, on 16 December 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of article 750 of the Civil Code requiring married 
couples to use the same surname, which in practice often compels 
women to adopt their husbands’ surnames;
(d) That, despite the abolition in December 2013 of the provision that 
discriminated against children born out of wedlock in inheritance 
matters, various discriminatory provisions, including the provision 
in the Family Register Act concerning the discriminatory descrip-
tion during birth notification, have been retained;
(e) That there is no comprehensive anti-discrimination law that covers 
intersectional discrimination against women belonging to various 
minority groups who are frequently subjected to harassment, stig-
matization, and violence.
13. The Committee reiterates its previous recommendations (CEDAW/C/
JPN/CO/5 and CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/6) and urges the State party to 
undertake the following without delay:
(a) Amend the Civil Code in order to raise the legal minimum age of 
marriage for women to 18 years of age in order for it to be equal to 
that of men; revise legislation regarding the choice of surnames for 
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married couples in order to enable women to retain their maiden 
surnames; and abolish any waiting period for women to remarry 
upon divorce;
(b) Abolish all discriminatory provisions regarding the status of chil-
dren born out of wedlock and ensure that the law protects them 
and their mothers from stigma and discrimination in society;
(c) Enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that prohib-
its multiple/intersectional forms of discrimination against women 
belonging to various minority groups, and protect them from 
harassment and violence, in line with general recommendation 
No. 28 (2010) on the core obligations of States parties under article 2.
Responding to paragraph 12(1) above, Japan already amended its laws to 
shorten the period of prohibition of women from remarriage, and this amend-
ment can also be positioned as a follow-up to one of the Committee’s concerns 
that remained unaddressed, namely paragraph 12(a) and 13(a). The age limit 
for smoking, drinking and public competitions (horse racing, bicycle races, 
auto racing, motorboat racing) will be maintained at 20 years old. These are 
supposed to maintain the conventional age from the viewpoint of concerns 
about health and measures against gambling addiction.
Human Rights – Cases of Implementing the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction
On March 15, 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the failure to comply with 
the order under the Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction that the return of children, estab-
lished in a lower court case as final was “unlawful detention.” In this case, a 
Japanese couple living in the U.S. had a deteriorating marital relationship, and 
the wife, in January 2016, returned to Japan with her child without the consent 
of the husband.
In July 2016, the husband filed a case based on the Act for Implementation 
of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. He 
filed a petition with the Tokyo Family Court under Article 26 of the Act for 
Implementation of the Hague Convention Implementation to have the child 
returned to the United States. Article 26 provides that:
A person whose rights of custody with respect to a child are breached 
due to removal to or retention in Japan may file a petition against the 
person who has the care of the child with a family court to seek an order 
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to return the child to the State of habitual residence pursuant to the pro-
visions of this Act.
The court issued a decision in September 2016 ordering the return of the child 
to the United States, and this decision became final. Based on the above order, 
the husband filed a petition for execution by substitute of return of a child 
with the Tokyo Family Court (Article 137 of the Act for Implementation of the 
Hague Convention) and implementation of the child’s return was decided 
upon (Articles 134(1) and 138 of the Act for Implementation of the Hague 
Convention). The court execution officer attempted to persuade the wife to 
release the child at her residence in May 2017, but she refused to open the 
front door, so the court execution officer entered through an upstairs window. 
However, the wife fiercely resisted the child’s release by placing herself and 
her child under the same futon and holding him close to her. The child also 
refused, stating that he wanted to stay in Japan and did not want to go to the 
United States. Consequently, the court execution officer was not able to release 
him. The implementation was terminated without the child’s release. The hus-
band then requested that the unlawful detention should be resolved under the 
Act on Protection of Personal Liberty (the Habeas Corpus Act).
In November 2017, the Kanazawa Branch of the Nagoya High Court refused 
to allow the return of the child to the husband because handing the child 
over to the husband was against the child’s will. However, the Supreme Court 
ruled that
[t]he detainee(child) was placed in a situation where it was difficult 
for him to obtain sufficient multifaceted and objective information 
necessary to make a decision as to whether or not to remain with the 
respondent (wife), including information regarding the return order, 
the significance of the return order and the execution by substitute of 
return of a child based thereon, and his life after being returned to the 
United States in accordance with the return order … In making that deci-
sion, the respondent (wife) exerted undue psychological influence on the 
detainee (child).
The Supreme Court further held that
[t]here are special circumstances in which the detainee cannot be said 
to have remained under the respondent’s control, based on his own free 
will … The custody of the respondent for detainees should be considered 
to be a restraint within the meaning of Act on Protection of Personal 
Liberty (the Habeas Corpus Act) and its regulations.
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Human Rights – Terrorism – Domestic Measures
 Decision of Constitutional Court Concerning on ‘Constitutionality of 
Additional Security Screening of Airline Passengers, Constitutional 
Court Decision 2016Hun–Ma780 (Decided on February 22, 2018)
In this case, the complainant, an airline passenger was subjected to the usual 
security screening procedure while going through immigration at Incheon 
Airport on the way to boarding a US-bound flight. He/She, however, was sub-
ject to secondary security screening before boarding by the request of the US 
Transportation Security Administration. The additional screening was con-
ducted by a security screening officer, who took out his/her belongings for 
visual identification and gave the complainant a pat-down. Then the com-
plainant filed a constitutional complaint claiming that his/her fundamental 
rights, especially related to the right to personality and the security of person, 
was infringed by Article 8.1.19 of the National Aviation Security Plan, which is 
against the constitutional rule prohibiting excessive restriction.
The Republic of Korea is a party to the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation and Article 2.4.1 of Annex 17 (Security: Safeguarding International 
Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference) to this Convention 
stipulates that “Each Contracting State shall ensure that requests from other 
Contracting States for additional security measures in respect of a specific 
flight(s) by operators of such other States are met, as far as may be practicable.” 
The Aviation Security Act, along with the obligation of air transport operators 
to observe international conventions, prescribes basic matters concerning the 
standards and procedures of security screening, and that the Minister of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport shall formulate and execute a “national aviation 
security plan” to perform aviation security-related affairs. In other words, the 
National Aviation Security Plan was established with the purpose to observe 
* Professor, Kyung Hee University, Korea.
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international conventions regarding civil aviation security, and to guarantee 
the safety and security of aircraft. Therefore, the legitimacy of its legislative 
purpose and its appropriateness of means is justified. Furthermore, the rele-
vant provisions provide specific standards and methods for security screening, 
with an aim to minimize the infringement of fundamental rights. Thus, the rule 
of minimum restriction is satisfied.
The Court also highlighted that due to the rising number of safety-related 
accidents or threats of terrorism concerning aircraft in the domestic and inter-
national arenas, the public interest of securing the safety of civil aviation is 
significantly grave, while the restriction on the fundamental rights of passen-
gers incurred by additional security screening is not as large. Therefore, “the 
National Aviation Security Plan” does not violate the rule against excessive 
restriction.
Overall, the Court held that the provision of the “National Aviation Security 
Plan,” does not violate the constitutional principle against excessive restriction, 
and therefore does not infringe upon the fundamental rights of the complain-
ant, an airline passenger.
Treaties – Interpretation – Municipal Law
 Decision of Supreme Court Concerning on the Petition for Return of 
a Child (The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction), Supreme Court Order 2017Seu630 (Decided on 
April 17, 2018)
One of the main issues, in this case, was the interpretation of relevant provi-
sions of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
This Convention and its domestic implementation legislation, ‘the Act on the 
Implementation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention’ clearly provide 
that a person whose right to custody under the Convention has been breached 
as a result of a wrongful removal or retention of a child to or in the Republic 
of Korea may file with the court a petition seeking the return of the child, and 
in such case, the court is obliged to act expeditiously with the welfare of the 
child as its top priority. But, at the same time, the court may dismiss the peti-
tion seeking the return of a child even where the right of custody has been 
breached as a result of a wrongful removal of a child, if “there is a grave risk 
that the return of the child would expose the child to physical or psychologi-
cal harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” And such an 
exception to return of the child under this Act is designed to prevent any harm 
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against welfare of a child, as a result of prompt return of the child. Thus, the 
Court maintained that it is important to place priority on the rights and inter-
ests of a child before the right to custody of either parent or the promptness 
of the procedure. In the same vein, a grave risk means not only the harmful 
effects on a child’s mind and body because of the petitioner’s direct violence or 
abuse against the child, but also the risk of psychological harm due to frequent 
violence committed against the other parent including cases where the child 
may suffer severely by deprivation of appropriate protection or care upon his/
her return to the State of habitual residence.
The lower court rendered its judgment by considering the facts that first, the 
petitioner had verbally and physically abused the counterparty multiple times, 
which caused the psychological suffering of Principal 1 (child in concern) who 
witnessed such abuse, and second, in a case where only the principals or only 
Principal 2 (the other child in concern) is returned to Japan, such separation is 
likely to cause psychological suffering on the principals in the instant case. As 
a result, the lower court rejected the petition for the return of the principals, 
and the petitioner re-appealed to the Court.
Similarly, the Supreme Court emphasized the elements that should be exam-
ined comprehensively when receiving the petition for the return of a child as 
below: “the entirety of circumstances, including the degree of the harm and 
whether there are concerns of a recurrence of the harm, the specifics of the 
environment in which the child is brought up both before and after his/her 
return, and the psychological and physical impact of the return on the child.”
Overall, the re-appeal is dismissed by the Supreme Court because the lower 
court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal principle 
regarding a grave risk.
Human Rights – Refugees – Constitution
 Decision of Constitutional Court Concerning on the Right to Counsel 
of a Refugee Detained for Repatriation, Constitutional Court Decision 
2014HunMa346 (Decided on May 31, 2018)
The complainant is a foreigner of Sudanese nationality. Upon arriving at 
Incheon International Airport on 20 November 2013, the complainant 
applied for recognition of refugee status and was confined in a repatriation 
waiting room at Incheon International Airport until the decision to refer 
the request for refugee recognition review has been made. The respondent, 
the head of the Incheon Airport Immigration Office, refused to refer the 
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complainant for refugee status screening and the complainant was continu-
ously confined in the waiting room for repatriation at Incheon International 
Airport. On 28 November 2013, the complainant filed a lawsuit for the annul-
ment of the decision not to refer to the refugee status screening procedure 
and filed a writ of habeas corpus petition seeking release from confinement. 
While these two lawsuits were pending, the complainant’s counsel requested 
the respondent to allow a meeting with the complainant on 25 April 2014, 
but the respondent refused. The complainant filed this constitutional com-
plaint on 30 April 2014, claiming that the respondent’s refusal of visitation by 
a counsel infringed upon the right to counsel prescribed in Article 12(4) of the 
Constitution and the right to trial.
The Court decided that “detainment” prescribed in Article 12(4) clearly is 
not limited only to that of a criminal proceeding but should be read to incorpo-
rate measures imposed by administrative procedures. In other words, the right 
to counsel prescribed in Article 12(4) of the Constitution is should be imme-
diately guaranteed to persons in administrative detention. In the same vein, 
the repatriation waiting room at Incheon International Airport is a confined 
space with an iron gate and access to the room is controlled by the Incheon 
International Airport Airline Operators Committee. Therefore, the complain-
ant could not leave the waiting room to venture into the transit area and had 
no way of communicating with the outside world aside from via a payphone. 
The complainant had been detained in the repatriation waiting room for 
approximately five months by the time the respondent refused visitation by 
the counsel, and could not have expected to leave the waiting room at his/her 
discretion until the lawsuit on the revocation of the non-referral decision to 
refugee recognition review was completed.
Overall, the complainant was being “detained,” as prescribed in the main 
text of Article 12(4) of the Constitution, when disallowed visitation by the 
counsel. It further restricted the complainant’s right to counsel without legal 
grounds, and thus infringed upon the complainant’s right to counsel. Also, it is 
not likely that allowing the complainant to meet with his/her counsel would 
interfere with either guaranteeing national security, maintaining order, or 
seeking public welfare.
There is a concurring opinion of two justices on the issue of the right to trial. 
They emphasized that the right to a trial, in this case, is an essential human 
right for effectively guaranteeing physical freedom. Thus, the complainant is 
a bearer of the right to a trial, despite being a foreigner. The disallowance of 
visitation by an attorney restricts the complainant’s right to counsel, as part 
of the right to trial.
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Human Rights – Municipal Law – Conscientious 
Objectors
 Constitutional Court Decision Concerning on Conscientious Objec­
tors, Constitutional Court Decision 2011HunBa379 and 27 Other Cases 
(Consolidated), (Decided on June 28, 2018)
Here, the Constitutional Court found the Categories of Military Service 
Provision nonconforming to the Constitution on the ground that it stipu-
lated only five categories of military service excluding Alternative service. The 
Categories of Military Service Provision has the purpose of ensuring national 
security by equally imposing military duty and retaining and efficiently allo-
cating military service resources. Therefore, the provision itself is an adequate 
means to fulfill a reasonable legislative purpose. Since receiving military train-
ing is a precondition for all types of military service stipulated in the Categories 
of Military Service Provision, it may cause conflict with the conscience of 
conscientious objectors if such duty is imposed on them. As such, the possibil-
ity of Alternative service has long been examined. If the introduction of the 
Alternative service does not have a significant influence on national defense 
and not reduce the effectiveness of the military service system, reserving or 
preventing the introduction of the Alternative service program for reasons of 
the unique security situation of the nation cannot be justified. Therefore, the 
Categories of Military Service Provision runs against the minimal impairment 
rule for categorizing military service that entails military training only and 
excluding the Alternative service program.
Although public interests like “national security” and “equity or fairness 
in the allocation of military duties” are significantly important, adding the 
Alternative service program to the Categories of Military Service Provision 
would still enable the accomplishment of such interests. By contrast, the Court 
maintained that if the program is not stipulated in the Provision, “conscien-
tious objectors have to be imprisoned for at least a year and a half and are left 
to suffer immense disadvantages, such as dismissal and restriction from work-
ing as public officials; loss of patent rights, permission, approval, licenses, etc. 
issued by the Government; disclosure of personal information; implicit and 
inadvertent bias upon ex-convicts; and difficulties in finding jobs, etc.”
Provided that conscientious objectors are assigned to public service work, it 
will be more beneficial in terms of realizing national security and public inter-
est than just imprisoning the objectors for punishment. Also, by tolerating and 
incorporating them as members of our community would surely enhance the 
level of integration and diversity at the national and societal level. Thus, it is 
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considered that the Categories of Military Service Provision does not fulfill the 
requirement to balance interests.
As a result, the Court decided that the Categories of Military Service 
Provision, which failed to stipulate the Alternative service program for consci-
entious objectors, infringes on objectors’ freedom of conscience by violating 
the anti-over restriction principle.
After the Court’s decision, active and heated discussion over introducing 
an Alternative service program for conscientious objectors has increased. The 
media reported that setting an objective and fair preliminary examination and 
a strict post-management procedure regulated by the Government, determin-
ing an adequate duration, and the level of difficulty that can ensure equity 
between active military service and alternative service are the primary con-
cerns of the public.
In the same vein, the Supreme Court has dealt with this issue, regarding con-
scientious objection and the Military Service Act on November 1, 2018 (Supreme 
Court Decision 2016Do10912, Violation of the Military Service Act). The Court 
maintained that the refusal to perform the duty of military service on moral or 
religious grounds (so-called “conscientious objection”) refers to an act of refus-
ing to participate in military training or bear arms based on a conscientious 
judgment established by a religious, ethical, moral, and philosophical motive. 
And based on Article 88(1) of the Military Service Act providing that any per-
son who fails to enlist in the military shall be punished by imprisonment with 
labor for not more than three years, the judiciary uniformly sentences a con-
scientious objector to imprisonment with labor for at least one year and six 
months in actual trials without considering the individual circumstances of 
the conscientious objectors. Having materialized the citizen’s duty of national 
defense through the Military Service Act, the duty of military service ought to 
be faithfully performed, and military administration should be fairly and rigidly 
executed. Therefore, whether to permit conscientious objection brings about a 
normative clash, which further requires coordination between constitutional 
provisions, i.e., Article 19 (provision on basic rights such as the freedom of con-
science) and Article 39 (provision on the duty of national defense). Overall, the 
Court ruled that the lower court had convicted the Defendant without exam-
ining whether such conscientious objection constitutes a ‘justifiable cause’ 
under Article 88(1) of the Military Service Act, while there was room to deem 
the act of refusal to enlist by the Defendant(a Jehovah’s Witness), grounded 
on his genuine conscience, as a ‘justifiable cause.’ In other words, the Court 
found that the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine and 
remanded the case to the lower court.
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Jurisdiction – Sovereign Immunity – Treaties
 Decision of High Court Concerning on Sovereign Immunity and the 
Act of U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, Busan High Court 
Decision 2017Na52583 (Decided November 13, 2018)
After the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, the Commanding General 
of the United States Army Pacific established a military ruling body known as 
the United States Army Military Government in Korea (hereafter ‘USAMGIK’) 
to govern Korea south to the 38th Parallel North and has been ruling the south-
ern part of Korea under Proclamation No. 1 of 7 September 1945, declaring 
that the legislative power such as the making of proclamations, ordinances, 
regulations etc. vests in the USAMGIK; accordingly, the Defendant USAMGIK 
had been executing its legislative power until it was replaced by the govern-
ment of the Republic of Korea (co-Defendant). USAMGIK enacted USAMGIK 
Ordinance No.57 (“the Ordinance”) in February 1946. The Ordinance ordered 
all natural and judicial persons within Korea South of 38th North Latitude to 
deposit until March 7, 1946 inclusive in one of the financial institutions among 
the seven designated by the UNAMGIK, all notes of the Bank of Japan. It also 
prohibited the persons from engaging in any transaction concerning any such 
currency once the deposit has been made.
At that time, the father of the Plaintiffs deposited banknotes of Japan, a 
sum of 4,570 Yen, to the designated financial institution. Now, in this case, 
the Plaintiffs made a claim against the U.S. Government arguing that the 
Defendant enacting the Ordinance allowed them to confiscate the banknotes 
of the deceased (Plaintiffs’ father) which is a violation of international 
humanitarian law including the international treaty, Convention Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (hereafter ‘the Hague Convention’), 
to which the Defendant is a party. And the Plaintiffs who are the inheritors of 
their father’s property demanded compensation since the Defendant is liable 
under the Hague Convention. However, the Defendant protested that Korean 
Courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the lawsuit made against the U.S. 
Government as the enactment of the Ordinance should be guaranteed sover-
eign immunity as it was a sovereign act of a foreign State.
The Court decided that the lawsuit made against the Defendant should 
be dismissed due to the following reasons. Firstly, the enactment of the 
Ordinance by the Defendant through USAMGIK is a sovereign act of a State 
(acta jure imperii) both in nature and purpose since it is a highly public act 
of the USAMGIK, a ruling body of the southern part of Korea then, intended 
to abolish the old currency system based on banknotes of Japan and to create 
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a newly established currency system in Korea. Secondly, whereas customary 
international law on sovereign immunity has developed from an absolute doc-
trine granting unconditional jurisdictional immunity to a sovereign State, to a 
restrictive theory that distinguishes sovereign acts and commercial acts, the 
disputed sovereign act can be granted immunity even from the currently pre-
dominant view of the restrictive approach. Thirdly, even if Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act of the United States may exclude the application of sovereign 
immunity to such acts as the enactment of the Ordinance by the USAMGIK, 
the Act is the law of the Defendant’s which can only be used as a reference, but 
not as a generally recognized rules of international law having the same effect 
as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea. In other words, it is difficult to 
decide that the Korean Court can exercise jurisdiction over the lawsuit filed 
by the Plaintiffs resorting to the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Act. Finally, the Plaintiffs appealed to the High Court, but the Court dismissed 
the appeal on the same grounds.
International Development – Legislation
 Framework Act on International Development Cooperation (Partial 
Amended Dec. 24, 2018., by Act No.16023)
The Framework Act states that its purpose is to ensure policy coherence and 
to enhance aid effectiveness. It sets out the purposes, definition and basic 
principles of Korea’s development cooperation, and specifies, among other 
things, the role of the Committee for International Development Cooperation 
(CIDC) and the framework for implementation of aid. In particular, the law 
emphasizes the functions of the CIDC as an apparatus intended to create a 
consolidated ODA delivery system in Korea. The passage of the Framework 
Act enabled Korea to pursue its goal of enhancing development effectiveness 
based on a more systematic ODA policy and framework domestically. It at the 
same time sent a signal to the international community that Korea is commit-
ted to continuing its development cooperation.
First, ‘youth’ is added as the target actor for IDC as the Article 3(1) states: 
“the basic ideas of international development cooperation is to reduce pov-
erty, improve the human rights of women, children, people with disabilities, 
and youth achieve gender equality, realize sustainable development and 
humanitarianism in developing countries, promote economic cooperation 
relationship with partner countries and pursue peace and prosperity in the 
international community”.
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Second, the objectives of international development cooperation is 
amended as the Article 3(2) para.4–2 states, “Contribution to the achieve-
ment of internationally agreed goals related to the sustainable development 
(referring to 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted at the United 
Nations Summit on Sustainable Development in September 2015 and others).”
Lastly, in order to enhance publicity campaigns encouraging pub-
lic participation, the Article 15(2) newly inserted as below: “To increase 
public participation under paragraph (1), a supervising agency shall prepare 
and implement various programs in a comprehensive and systematic manner 
for the public to have an easier access in their daily lives.”
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Air Law – Montreal Convention – Warsaw 
Convention – Carriage by Air and Land
 Wang Bao’An & Ors v Malaysian Airline System Bhd and Other Cases 
[2018] 11 MLJ 585, High Court, Kuala Lumpur
This was a suit brought by a group of dependents of those who perished on 
board Malaysian Airlines flight MH 370 on 8 March 2014, against the carrier, 
Malaysian Airline System Bhd. Two questions were raised at the hearing. First, 
whether the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International 
Carriage by Air 1999 (Montreal Convention) and the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air 1929 
(Warsaw Convention) provided exclusive causes of action against a carrier, 
ousting all common law causes of action. Second, whether the cap on liabil-
ity for a dependency claim imposed by Section 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956 
applied in respect of a claim made under the Montreal Convention. (Note that 
Malaysia is a party to both Conventions and have incorporated it into domestic 
law by way of the Civil by Air Act 1974 (amended)).
The Court decided that the Montreal Convention provided an exclusive 
cause of action and ousted all common law causes of action against the car-
rier. The similar principle applied with regards to the Warsaw Convention. 
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention makes clear that the jurisdiction is 
exclusive and precludes the existence of any other cause of action arising or 
being maintained against a carrier. There is only a limited exception to this 
rule, that is when European community law provides for rights to standardised 
compensation. The High Court was also persuaded in this manner, as the mat-
ter had been decided by an apex court, the Court of Appeal in a previous case 
All Nippon Airways Co Ltd v Tokai Marine & Trading Co. Ltd [2013].
* Special Adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross. Any views expressed here 
are solely the author’s.
394 Kang
Criminal Law – Relevance of Treaties in Court
 Public Prosecutor v. Farid Bakhtiari Gholam [2018] MLJU 1642, High 
Court, 28 November 2014
The accused was charged for the offence of distributing the drug – Metham-
phetamine, an offence under Section 39B(1)(a) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The 
offence was alleged to have been committed at the Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport on 5 May 2014. During the trial, the chemist testified that he analysed 
the drug content to ascertain whether it was Methamphetamine without 
further analysis of the type of Methaphetamine – whether it was constituted 
by the isomer dextromethaphetamine or levomepthamphetamine, or a com-
bination of both.
The defence argued that it was material to ascertain the type of isomer. 
This is vital as the Government of Malaysia had ratified numerous interna-
tional treaties such as the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 and 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which must be adhered to. 
According to the 1971 Convention, the isomer levomethamphetamine – (x) N, 
alpha-dimethylphenethylamine is not found under Schedule II. Accordingly, 
the defence argued that the drugs found on the accused could possibly be 
drugs not found under Schedule II of the Convention.
The Court accepted that the chemist had sufficiently analysed the sub-
stance and that it was not necessary to determine the active compound of the 
substance. The Court in considering the applicability of international trea-
ties found that in particular, Chapter VI – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances as found in the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic, Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substance which Malaysia had ratified on 11 May 1993 
is non-binding. The Court was persuaded by the prosecution’s argument that 
Conventions and International Declarations are non-legally binding instru-
ments and therefore, do not bind the Court and do not form part of the 
municipal laws of the country.
Human Rights – Convention on The Rights of the 
Child – Relevance of Treaties in Courts
 CAS v MPPL & Anor (2019) 4 MLJ 243, Decision Rendered on 15 October 
2018, Court of Appeal
This was an appeal by the plaintiff whose action was dismissed at the outset 
by the High Court on the basis that the action was without merit and legal 
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basis. The plaintiff had an intimate relationship with the defendant, who was 
married. The defendant later had a child whom the plaintiff claimed to be his. 
The plaintiff asked the Court to grant an order directing the paternity test to 
be taken on the child, to determine the question at hand. He argued that based 
on Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (the right to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents), the child had the right to know 
his or her biological parents. Further, the Court also considered if ordering the 
paternity test would be in line with Article 3 CRC (best interest of the child 
as primary consideration). The defendant argued that the test should not be 
ordered by the Court, as, if the test finds that the child’s father is the plaintiff, 
this will render the child as illegitimate and born out of wedlock. The issue 
was among others, whether the Court could consider the provisions of the CRC 
(which Malaysia is a party to).
With reference to the applicability of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the Court held that international treaties and conventions are 
not directly applicable to domestic law and courts, unless they are incorpo-
rated into domestic law. That said, the Court underlined that when the law 
is ambiguous, Courts are charged with a duty to interpret domestic laws in a 
manner where their language will be in conformity and not in conflict with 
international law. The case is remitted to the High Court for determination of 
the factual matrix which was not earlier considered, given that the action was 
summarily dismissed.
International Economic Law – Tax Treaty – 
International Tax Law
 Malaysia’s Accession to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) (the MLI)
On 23 January 2018, Malaysia signed the multilateral BEPS Convention (MLI). 
The treaty implements a series of tax measures to update bilateral tax trea-
ties, with the aim of reducing opportunities for tax avoidance; an action point 
under the OECD BEPS Action Plan. Upon signing, Malaysia submitted 73 trea-
ties entered into by Malaysia and other jurisdictions which it intended to 
designate as Covered Tax Agreements, which are tax treaties to be amended 
through the MLI.
396 Kang
International Labour Organisation – Labour Law – ILO 
Convention
 Inter Heritage (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Sheraton Imperial Kuala Lumpur 
Hotel) v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Hotel, Bar & Restoran 
Semenanjung Malaysia [2018] ILJU 119
The case involved an industrial action between a hotel and the staff union with 
regards to the implementation of the minimum wage in Malaysia. The issue 
at hand was whether the management of the hotel could include the compo-
nent of service tax which was disbursed among its staff members in addition 
to their basic wages when calculating the minimum wage amount.
As such, the Court had to determine the components that made up the 
minimum wage amount. The Court sought guidance from the ILO Convention 
No.131: Minimum Wage Fixing Convention 1970, noting that the government 
introduced a minimum wage in Malaysia following its ratification to the above 
Convention. While the 1970 Convention defined minimum wage, it did not 
provide the wage components i.e. what could be considered when calculating 
the minimum wage. Similarly, the Malaysian legislation – the National Wages 
Consultative Council Act 2011 is silent on the component.
The Court held that the component constituting service tax could form part 
of the minimum wage (in addition to the basic wages). The decision was made 
considering the intention of the wage guidelines issued by the government 
and further felt that if decided otherwise, it would cause enormous industrial 
disharmony.
Law of the Sea – Maritime Delimitation – UNCLOS – 
Port Limit
 Malaysia/Singapore Overlapping Maritime Boundary Claims
Given the proximity between Malaysia and Singapore, both countries are faced 
with various overlapping maritime zones. Some of which have been resolved, 
others remain in negotiation. In 1979, Malaysia declared the Johor Port limit, 
leaving a gap area between the Singapore port and the Johor port limit – the 
gap area has been claimed by both States as their territorial sea.
On 25 October 2018, the Minister of Transport, Malaysia effected changes to 
the Johor port limits (State bordering Singapore) by way of gazette, an author-
ity granted by the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952. The Marine department 
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issued the port circular informing of the change on 11 November 2018 and 
a notice to mariners on 22 November 2018. The change expands the Johor 
port limits until it meets the Singapore port limits. On 4 December 2018, the 
Malaysian Marine Department issued a port circular asserting that the Johor 
port limits are within Malaysian territorial waters.
Singapore asserted that the new limits were done unilaterally and arbitrarily 
beyond the territorial waters claim made by Malaysia in 1979 (through a map 
published by Malaysia in the same year). It underlined that it does not accept 
both claims (1979 and present) of the territorial water limits made by Malaysia 
and that the move constitutes a serious violation of Singapore’s sovereignty 
and international law.
In view of the developments, on 6 December 2018, Singapore extended 
the Singapore Port Limits off Tuas by way of Port Authority of Singapore (Port 
Limits) (Amendment) Notification 2018, an extension which Singapore 
believes to be within its territorial waters. This resulted in an overlap of the 
port limits of both Johor and Singapore. Both States have also sent vessels to 
patrol the area concerned.
On 8 January 2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of both State agreed to set 
up a working group on maritime issues to study and discuss legal and opera-
tional matters and to de-escalate the situation within the area, which resulted 
in 5 recommendations announced on 14 March 2019. In February 2019, a 
Malaysian vessel, operated by the Marine Department, Malaysia collided with 
a Greece flagged vessel, Pireas within the disputed area. Singapore underscores 
that the incident may have resulted from the confusion for the international 
shipping community, threatening navigational safety in the area.
In April 2019, both countries announced the formation of a new committee 
to begin negotiations to delimit all outstanding maritime boundaries; pending 
any agreement, both States have agreed to reverse their port limits to status 
quo i.e. before 25 October 2018. The parties also agreed to operate in the area 
concerned in accordance with international law, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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State Practice of Asian Countries in  
International Law
Nepal
Amritha V. Shenoy*, Ravi Prakash Vyas** and Rachit Murarka***
Air Law – Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal 
Convention), 1999
Nepal acceded to the Convention on 16 October 2018. The Convention 
amended the Warsaw Convention. It also consolidates the Warsaw conven-
tion and related treaties dealing with civil aviation. The convention applies 
to international carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo. Article 17 of the 
Convention provides for the liabilities of the international carriage. Article 21 
makes provisions for “compensation in case of death or injury of passengers.” 
The compensation provided is mentioned in Special Drawing Rights that is 
described in Article 23. 
Criminal Law – Crime Victim Protection Act, 2018
Article 21 of the Constitution of Nepal, 2015 provides the right of victims to 
justice. Right to victims is elucidated in the UN Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power and under Article 25 of 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. In 
this regard, the Act is a comprehensive one that provides various rights to 
crime victims like the right to fair treatment under Section 4, right against dis-
crimination according to Section 5, right to privacy under Section 6, right to 
information relating to investigation under Section 7 and other rights for crime 
victims.
* Assistant Professor, Kathmandu School of Law, Bhaktapur, Nepal.
** Assistant Professor, Kathmandu School of Law, Bhaktapur, Nepal.
*** Assistant Professor, Kathmandu School of Law, Bhaktapur, Nepal.
We acknowledge our research assistant, Rasmi Regmi, for assisting us to come up with 
this comprehensive piece on Nepal’s State practice.
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Criminal Law – Participation in International 
Programs
Nepal participated in the eighth session of the Working group in Trafficking 
in Persons as an observer. It was the first time Nepal participated in the ses-
sion. Nepal has ratified the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime 
Convention, the parent convention of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of 
Migrants Protocols. The protocols are not ratified by Nepal yet.
Environmental Law – Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010
Nepal acceded to the Protocol on 28 December 2018. The protocol aims at 
implementing the objective of “fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources” set by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Article 4 of the Protocol provides for access to genetic resources with 
the prior informed consent of the State party (the country of origin). The State 
party shall take steps to ensure involvement or consent of the indigenous and 
local communities. Article 7 provides for access to traditional knowledge asso-
ciated with genetic resources held by the indigenous and local communities 
with their “prior and informed consent or approval”. Mutually agreed terms are 
to be established in this regard. Article 10 calls for creating a global multilateral 
benefit-sharing mechanism “to address the fair and equitable sharing of bene-
fits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources”. Article 23 provides for technology transfer to the develop-
ing country parties, especially the least developed country and small island 
developing countries.
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Environmental Law – Right to Healthy Environment – 
Right to Life – Parens Patriae Principle to Protect 
Biodiversity and Environment
 Adv. Bhagwati Paharo et al. v. Prime Minister and the Council of 
Ministers [NKP 2075 Vol. 9 Decision No. 10087, Dated 29 April 2018]
The Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport has entered into a con-
tract with Manakamana Darshan Private Ltd., J.V. Doppelmayr Silevan, Austria 
and Chitwan Co-E Nepal Pvt. Ltd. to establish cable cars from Basundhara 
Park to Bouddha Peace Stupa and other physical structures in the name of 
development within Basundhara Park. The contract has provision to use 
Basundhara Park for twenty years. The area is swampy and consists of a dense 
forest, Raniban which is a biodiversity park. The World Peace Biodiversity Park 
in Raniban area is the only biodiversity park in the west and a prominent tour-
ist area. The applicant claims that the contract made by the government is 
harmful for the environment and beauty of the area. It violates the right to life 
guaranteed under international law and national laws. The property granted 
under the contract for twenty years is also claimed to be unlawful.
The issues highlighted before the Court were, what are the effects of con-
struction of cable car station in Batam in Basundhara Park via Raniban to the 
Buddisht Stupa? If the land acquired by the government for a particular pur-
pose is being used for another purpose, is it legal? The decision made by the 
Pokhara Valley City Development Committee to give consent to the Ministry 
of Physical Infrastructure and Transport and detailed project report for the 
Memorandum of Understanding of Pokhara Cable Car between the Ministry 
and Manakamana shall be dismissed or not?
The apex Court held that Nepal is a party to the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance, 1971. Due to this international obligation to protect 
the swampy areas and wetlands arises. Establishing cable cars and other physi-
cal infrastructure in the area would lead to cutting of trees and consequently, 
hamper the biodiversity of that area. Nepal is a party to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 1992. The Convention specified the responsibility of estab-
lishing a protected area or area system, establishing necessary guidelines for 
conservation, establishing guideline for conservation, promoting natural con-
servation, including ecosystem, in order to preserve biodiversity. However, 
the Batam station cable car stoppage at Basudhara Park via Raniban to the 
Buddhist Stupa would lead to deforestation and thereby, violate State’s obli-
gations under the Convention. Therefore, the Court directed not to conduct 
activities that affect biodiversity.
401State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law 
The Court in its ratio decidendi held, “While the State may be able to obtain 
private property for the benefit of the public on the basis of the concept of 
eminent domain and our existing legal system. However, by virtue of such 
rights of the State to use the private property for the private interest of a private 
company or individual of power cannot be done.” Further, the Court observed 
that “the adverse effects on a person’s health because of being in a polluted 
environment leads to violation of right to environment linked to the right to 
life of a person. To assure this right, healthy environment is necessary. Healthy 
environment consists of ponds, rivers, forests, fresh climate and environmen-
tal balance. By virtue of being a protector of citizens and as per the principle of 
Parens Patriae, the responsibility to protect its citizens is of the State.”
Environmental Law – Climate Change – Writ of 
mandamus
 Adv. Padam Bahadur Shreshta v. Office of Prime Minister and Council 
of Ministers [NKP 2076 Vol. 3, Decision No. 10210, Dated 25 December 
2018]
Climate change is a global threat today. With regard to Nepal, increasing tem-
perature (0.06% every year) is a major concern. Concerned authorities have 
formulated policies like National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), 
2010, National Framework for Local Adaptation Plan for Action (LAPA), 2011, 
Climate Change Policy emphasising on conservation of forests and bio-
diversity, agriculture and food security, climate disaster, urban living and 
infrastructure, water resources and energy and public health. The policies 
are not implemented properly. The applicant submitted an application to the 
respondent requesting to make laws to address the issue of climate change. 
The respondent failed to frame laws on addressing climate change. There-
fore, the applicant filed the writ of mandamus. The following prayers were 
addressed by the Supreme Court:
1. Since there is no legal provision for mitigating climate change in the 
Environment Protection Act, a separate climate change law is necessary. 
Therefore, it is incumbent on the respondent to formulate a law on cli-
mate change and implement it.
2. Until the Climate Change Mitigation Act is enacted, the existing climate 
change policies should be implemented immediately and effectively.
3. Since the implementation of aforementioned policies is very slow, a 
unit for climate change mitigation in all municipalities and villages in 
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all districts of all seven provinces should be established. There is a need 
to make and implement an action plan to prevent the effects of climate 
change immediately.
4. Climate change affects the Himalayan region to lower reaches of the 
Terai. Therefore, it is imperative to create an effective implementation 
plan to protect its direct and indirect impact on livelihoods.
5. Until the policies are implemented or relevant laws are formulated to 
address climate change, the applicant prays to the Court to grant an 
interim order.
The Supreme Court held that environmental justice can be achieved by ensuring 
right to a clean environment, including safety of human lives without caus-
ing destruction to humanity. Nepal is a party to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention Climate Change, 
1992, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora, 1973, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1982. These conventions 
aim at mitigating climate change, protection of forests and bio-diversity. Apart 
from signing these international agreements, it is imperative to have a consci-
entious or promotional arrangement in addition to the regulatory arrangement 
by national laws on environment protection including punitive and compen-
satory arrangements. The Court issued a writ of mandamus to the respondent. 
The Court ordered the respondent to make laws relating to climate change 
as soon as possible and implement the policies formulated so far. The Court 
applied the principle of parens patriae to highlight the responsibility of the 
state in mitigation of climate change by the protection of the environment.
Human Rights – Privacy Act, 2018
The primary aim of the Privacy Act is to ensure right to privacy guaranteed 
under Article 28 of the Constitution of Nepal. The preamble of the Act men-
tions “privacy of the matters relating to body, residence, property, document, 
data, correspondence and character of every person, to manage the protection 
and safe use of personal information remained in any public body or institu-
tion”. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the 
right to privacy as a human right. Nepal ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights in 1991. Article 17 of ICCPR states, “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation and 
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everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks.” Thus, the Act is passed to fulfil Nepal’s international obligations as 
well as to elucidate the rights granted in the Constitution.
Human Rights – Public Health Service Act, 2018
The Public Health Service Act is passed to give details to Article 35 of the 
Constitution of Nepal that guarantees right to get free basic health service and 
emergency health. Article 3 (1) of the Act describes the right as “Every citizen 
shall have the right to obtain quality health service in an easy and convenient 
manner.” Section 50 of the Act obliges creation of National Public Health 
Committee. One of the functions of the Committee enumerated in Section 51 
is “to cooperate, coordinate and monitor to apply international policy, strategy 
and commitment related to public health in the national interest of Nepal.” 
Nepal became a party to the World Health Organization Constitution on 
2 September 1953. One of the major principles of the WHO Constitution is “the 
health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security 
and is dependent upon the fullest cooperation of individuals and States”. The 
Public Health Service Act is one of the steps towards complying with these 
international obligations.
Human Rights – Right to Employment Act, 2018
The Act was passed to provide right to employment mentioned in Article 33 of 
the Constitution. The Act is passed “in order to ensure the right of every citizen 
to employment, provide every citizen with an opportunity to choose employ-
ment according to his or her capacity, and in relation to the terms and conditions 
of employment and unemployment support”. Section 6 of the Act prohibits 
discrimination and states, “except for a special provision made by the prevail-
ing law for any particular class or community with respect to the provision of 
employment to the unemployed, no person shall make discrimination on the 
ground of one’s origin, religion, colour, caste, ethnicity, sex, language, region, 
ideology or similar other ground”. The Act is a positive step towards ensur-
ing international obligations under Convention Concerning Discrimination 
in Respect of Employment and Occupation or Discrimination Convention, 
1958 (ratified on 19 September 1974), Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 
(ratified on 19 September 1974), Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory 
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Labour, 1930 (ratified on 3 January 2002) and Convention Concerning the 
Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957 (ratified on 30 August 2007).
Human Rights – Right to Food and Food Sovereignty 
Act, 2018
Article 36 of the Constitution of Nepal provides for fundamental right related 
to food, food security and food sovereignty of the citizens. The Act explains 
this provision. Furthermore, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights men-
tions in Article 25 about right to food as part of an adequate standard of living. 
As per the international obligations, Article 11 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights mentions, “The State Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and hous-
ing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”
Human Rights – Right to Safe Motherhood and 
Reproductive Health Act, 2018
Article 38 (2) of the Constitution of Nepal guarantees fundamental right to safe 
motherhood and reproductive health of women. Right to safe motherhood and 
reproduction falls under the broader framework of right to health. ICESCR pro-
vides right to health in Article 12. ICCPR General Comment 14, paragraph 44(a) 
states that “basic reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and 
child health care” is a part of the core content. Article 16 of the Convention on 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women guarantees women equal rights 
to decide “freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children 
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to 
exercise these rights.” Section 3(3) of the Act states the same principle, “Every 
woman shall have the right to safe motherhood and reproductive health. 
Every woman shall have the right to determine the gap between births or 
the number of children.” CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 24 
provides that States shall prioritise the “prevention of unwanted pregnancy 
through family planning and sex education.”
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Human Rights – Social Security Act, 2018
Article 43 of the Constitution of Nepal provides for right to social security. The 
Act has been passed to ensure this fundamental right. According to Section 3 
of the Act, right to get social security allowance is granted to senior citizens, 
indigent, incapacitated and helpless persons, helpless single women, citizens 
with disabilities, children and citizens unable to take care of themselves. The 
enactment addresses the human rights of the vulnerable in the society.
Human Rights – Act Relating to Children, 2018
The Act aims at “respecting, protecting, promoting and fulfilling the rights 
of the child guaranteed under Article 39 of the Constitution. This enactment 
is towards ensuring the fulfilment of international obligations of Nepal under 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (ratified on 14 September 1990). 
Similar to the provisions in the convention, the Act provides for right to life 
in Section 3, right to name, nationality and identity in Section 4, right against 
discrimination in Section 5 and other rights specific to child.
Human Rights – Act Relating to Compulsory and Free 
Education, 2018
Article 31 of the Constitution provides for fundamental right to acquire educa-
tion. The Act is passed to make this right effective. Under international human 
rights instruments, right to education is enunciated in Article 26 of UDHR, 
Articles 13 and 14 of ICESCR, Articles 28 and 29 of Convention on the Rights 
of Child, Article 10 of CEDAW, Article 5 of Convention on Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination, and Article 24 of the Convention on the Right 
of Disabled. Thus, through these international instruments obligations are cre-
ated for Nepal and this legislation is towards complying with them.
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Human Rights – Freedom to Live with Dignity – 
Freedom of Movement
 Adv. Parasmani Bhattrai and Others v. Prime Minister and Office 
of Council of Ministers [NKP 2075 Vol. 60, Decision No. 9984, Date 
29 January 2018]
During the blockade, there was hindrance at customs points at Nepal-India 
border. During these times, transport of goods was hampered. The hindrance 
in transportation of goods resulted in affecting supply of essential goods like 
food, medicine, fuel, clothes etc. Nepal is a party to international treaties and 
agreements that confer rights to a landlocked State. Furthermore, as far as 
bilateral relations between India and Nepal are concerned, there exists the 
Nepal-India Transport Treaty that further facilitates trade and movement 
of goods.
The contention raised by the applicant was that the defendant has created 
hindrance in the basic fundamental rights conferred in the Constitution. The 
question before the court was whether an interim order should be granted 
or not.
The apex Court held that Article 16(1) of the Constitution ensures right to 
live with dignity. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966 sets obligations for the State to protect the right to live with dignity. 
After the promulgation of the Constitution in 2015, Nepal sent a team under the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to India to negotiate with the Government of India. 
Nepal’s Embassy in India took diplomatic steps to solve the issue. The reply in 
writing explained that the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the interna-
tional community about the crisis hindering movement across the Indo-Nepal 
border. The impact was explained at the UN Human Rights Council’s World 
Periodical Conference in Geneva. The Court dismissed the writ because the 
lives of people in Nepal had attained normalcy with guarantee of right to live 
with dignity. The Court also held that Nepal’s government is trying to fulfil its 
international obligations under the treaties ratified.
The ratio decidendi of the case is that freedom is never absolute and it has 
some restrictions. Moreover, with regard to the international agreements 
and the obligations set forth by them, implementation is expected from the 
civilised nations. However, there is no dispute that the international agree-
ments can be applied in the national sphere according to the needs, resources 
and capabilities of State parties.
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Human Rights – Right to Vote – Freedom of Speech 
and Expression – Citizens in Foreign Employment to be 
Facilitated with Voting Rights during Elections
 Managing Director of Law and Policy Forum for Social Justice, Adv. Prem 
Chandra Rai v. Government of Nepal, Office of the Prime Minister and 
the Council of Ministers [NKP 2075 Ashoj Vol. 6, Decision No. 10039, 
Date 21 March 2018]
The Constitution guarantees the right to vote to every citizen. The international 
laws also ensure this right. However, citizens who are abroad (as migrant work-
ers) are deprived of the right to vote. According to the Election Commission, 
the total number of voters is more than 14 million. Whereas, according to the 
data published by the Government of Nepal in 2008/2009, the total number 
of persons with labour permit during this period is 2.7 million. However, since 
there is no provision for nationals in foreign country to vote, more than 3 mil-
lion Nepalese citizens abroad appear to be excluded from the voting rights. 
Some other States have the provision for external voting but Nepal lacks it.
The issue brought before the Court was should citizens staying abroad for 
foreign employment to be allowed to vote from outside Nepal during elec-
tions? The Court held that “the character of democratic governance is to act in 
accordance with the wishes of the people and election is a means of expressing 
their wishes. The right to vote for citizens should be interdependent with the 
freedom of thought and expression because the citizens express their views on 
the basic questions such as whom to elect and what laws and policies are to be 
formed in a democracy.” The Court opined that in the light of various national 
laws and international law regarding the voting rights of citizens, the Nepali 
sovereign people would exercise their sovereignty through adult franchise.
The Court decided in accordance with Article 11, UDHR that ensures the 
freedom of thought and expression. Article 21(3) of UDHR enunciates that 
the will of the people to be expressed through elections is the basis of gov-
ernment’s authority. Similarly, freedom of speech and expression is elucidated 
in Article 19 of ICCPR and Article 25 of the Covenant talks about citizen’s 
right to participate in the matter of public interest either by himself or his 
freely elected representative by exercising adult franchise. Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment 25 paragraph 11 mentions that the State should 
adopt effective measures to ensure that all citizens have access to voting rights. 
Article 41 of the Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers, 1990 states 
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that persons and their families in foreign employment shall have the right to 
vote and to be elected in the election of their country as prescribed by law. 
Even though Nepal has not ratified the Convention, it appears that interna-
tional law recognises the right of citizens of foreign employment to participate 
in elections in their own country. Therefore, the Court ordered to take neces-
sary steps to make arrangement to ensure the right of voting for all citizens 
of foreign countries for various purposes without limiting the right to vote of 
Nepali citizens in foreign employment.
Human Rights – Right to Education – Lack of  
Nepali Citizenship
 Om Prakash Sah v. Nepal Government, Home Ministry and Others [NKP 
2076 Jeshta Vol. 2, Decision No. 10195, Date 14 April 2018]
Om Prakash Sah, the applicant has attained the School Leaving Certificate 
and completed his Higher Level Education. He cleared the entrance exam for 
Mechanical Engineering Department of Purbanchal Campus, Dharan. During 
enrolment, he was asked to submit a copy of his citizenship. He applied for 
the citizenship card to the concerned authorities. They denied to grant him 
one on various reasons. Hence, the applicant filed the writ petition request-
ing the Court to order the authority to grant him the citizenship card as soon 
as possible. He also prayed to the Court to order the University not to quash 
his enrolment and not to curtail the right to education because of lack of 
citizenship.
The issues brought before the Court were on the right to education and right 
to citizenship. The apex Court decided that the applicant has approached the 
wrong authority to grant citizenship and hence, the Court could not order on 
that regard. However, the Court held that the cancellation of enrolment of the 
applicant on not possessing the citizenship card is unjust. The Court opined 
that right to education is guaranteed under the Constitution as well as under 
various international conventions. Article 26(1) of the UDHR guarantees right 
to education. Article 13 of the ICESCR, 1966 also guarantees right to educa-
tion. The Constitution of UNESCO, 1945, signed by Nepal also mentions right 
to education. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that deprivation of natural 
rights such as right to education based on the reason that the student does not 
possess Nepali citizenship was held to be unconstitutional.
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Human Rights – Children’s Rights – Death of  
Children Due to Low Quality of Vaccines under 
Government’s Program
 Adv. Dal Bahadur Dhami et al v. Prime Minister and Office of Council of 
Ministers [NKP 2075 Shrawan Vol. 4, Decision No. 9997, Date 28 June 
2018]
The government of Nepal under the Children Immunization Program vacci-
nated children of Doti district for measles. Pursuant to immunization, four 
children passed away. Health Ministry, the respondent to the case took respon-
sibility towards formation of a committee, investigation and submission of a 
report in this regard. However, the ministry failed to submit a report. Therefore, 
the applicant filed a writ petition praying for certiorari or mandamus.
The issue before the Court is with regard to the violation of right to life of 
children due to the careless act of government. It is questioned whether the 
government has taken necessary measures regarding the vaccination or not.
The Court held that under international instruments, right to health is 
guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the UDHR, Article 12(1) of the ICESCR, and 
Article 24 of the Child Rights Convention. General Comment 14 of the ICESCR 
interprets right to health as including the freedom of health and entitlement of 
health. Thus, under international laws and the interim constitution of Nepal, 
the Nepal government has accepted the responsibility to guarantee the right to 
health of its citizens. Therefore, the distribution of vaccines is one of the pri-
mary duties of the government. The evidence adduced before the Court proves 
that vaccines were not tested properly and death of children was caused due to 
the carelessness of the government. The Court decides to grant Rs. 10,000,000 
to the family of the deceased children. It also orders to provide free service to 
those who had wrong effect of the vaccine. The Court also ordered the gov-
ernment to check the quality of vaccines for its international standards. The 
Court held “right to health is under economic, social and cultural rights. For 
the implementation of these rights, the State should take necessary measures 
to progressively utilise the available resources. Since the rights related to the 
basic needs of human life such as food, housing, basic education and health 
are under the State’s core minimum obligations. Thus, for the implementation 
of these rights the economic conditions and issues, including the availability of 
resources are irrelevant. The State shall take immediate steps to implement 
these rights.”
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International Organizations – Consumer Protection 
Act, 2018
The Consumer Protection Act came into effect on 18 September 2018. Article 44 
of the Constitution of Nepal provides the right of consumers. To elucidate the 
right therein, this Act was passed. Section 24 of the Act provides for duties of 
the Consumer Protection Council. One of the duties is “to draft necessary poli-
cies to cooperate with national and international organizations or institutions 
related to the rights of consumers”.
Terrorism – Convention on Cooperation in Combating 
International Terrorism, Transnational Organized 
Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking, 2009
The Convention was framed under the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Nepal ratified the Con-
vention on 19 August 2018. As suggested from the name of the convention, 
Article 1 obliges the State parties to cooperate in combatting international ter-
rorism, transnational organized crime and “illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances including their precursor chemicals” by “mutual 
assistance in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and suppression of 
such crimes.”
Treaties – International Agreement for the 
Establishment of the University for Peace, 1980
Nepal acceded the International Agreement for the Establishment of the 
University for Peace on 27 September 2018. The Agreement was adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly by resolution 35/55 dated 5 December 
1980. Article 2 of the Agreement provides that the headquarters would be in 
Costa Rica. Article 3 confers certain privileges and immunities and legal capac-
ity for the smooth functioning of the university. Article 4 makes provision for 
financial contribution voluntarily by the State parties. However, Nepal has 
made reservations to Article 4. Article 2 of the Charter of the University for 
Peace elucidates the aims and purposes of the University as “the university 
shall contribute to the great universal task of educating for peace by engaging 
in teaching, research, post-graduate training and dissemination of knowl-
edge fundamental to the full development of the human person and societies 
through the interdisciplinary study of all matters relating to peace.”
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Criminal Law – Cybercrimes
 Resolution Concurring in the Accession to the Convention on Cyber­
crime, Senate Resolution No. 89, 19 February 2018
The Senate concurred in the ratification of the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, 
citing it as the sole binding international mechanism to address the threats of 
cybercrime, by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of investigations, 
proceedings, and evidence-gathering for criminal offenses relating to com-
puter systems and data.
Criminal Law – International Criminal Court
 Note Verbale No. 000181­2018 from the Philippine Mission to the United 
Nations to the Secretary­General of the United Nations, 18 March 2018
The Philippines sent a notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Statute. While the Government of the Philippines affirmed its commitment 
to fight against impunity for atrocity crimes notwithstanding its withdrawal, 
citing its own punitive legislation, it justified its withdrawal as “a principled 
stand against those who politicize and weaponize human rights, even as its 
independent and well-functioning organs and agencies continue to exercise 
jurisdiction over complaints, issues, problems, and concerns arising from its 
efforts to protect its people.” The withdrawal takes effect after one year.
* Associate Professor, University of the Philippines College of Law.
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International Economic Law – Free Trade Agreements
 Resolution Concurring in the Ratification of the Free Trade Agreement 
between the EFTA States and the Philippines, Senate Resolution No. 93, 
05 March 2018
The Senate concurred in the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement 
between the European Free Trade Association States and the Philippines, 
which covers trade in goods, services, investment, government procurement, 
intellectual property rights, competition, and sustainable development. 
The Agreement will provide the Philippines with preferential treatment and 
duty-free market access to all industrial and fisheries products to the EFTA 
Member States.
International Organizations – ASEAN+3
 Resolution Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Estab lishing 
ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), Senate Resolution 
No. 87, 19 February 2018
The Philippine Senate concurred with the ratification of the Agreement 
establishing the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), which 
constitutes AMRO as an international organization and grants legal personality, 
privileges, and immunities to AMRO’s principal office, officials, staff, and coun-
try experts. This enables AMRO to conduct objective surveillance as a credible 
international organization and contribute to regional financial stability by 
carrying out its principal functions to monitor, assess, and report on the mac-
roeconomic status and financial soundness of the members of the ASEAN+3; 
identify macroeconomic financial risks and vulnerabilities in the region and 
assist them, if requested, in the timely formulation of risk-mitigating policy 
recommendations; support members in the implementation of regional finan-
cial arrangements; and conduct other activities as determined by the AMRO 
Executive Committee.
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Law of the Sea – Marine Pollution
 Resolution Concurring in the Accession of the International Con­
vention on the Control of Harmful Anti­fouling Systems on Ships 2001, 
Senate Resolution No. 94, 05 March 2018
The Philippine Senate concurred in the accession to the International Con-
vention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships (AFS 2001 
Convention) that aims to prohibit the use of harmful organotins in anti-fouling 
paints used on ships, and to establish a mechanism to prevent the potential 
future use of other harmful substances in anti-fouling systems. The resolution 
cited scientific studies and investigations by Governments and competent 
international organization showing that certain AFS used on ships pose a 
substantial risk of toxicity and other chronic impacts to ecologically and eco-
nomically important marine organisms, as well as to human health that may be 
harmed due to consumption of affected seafood. The Senate recognized that 
the use of AFS to prevent organism build-up on the surface of ships is critically 
important to efficient commerce, shipping, and impeding the spread of harm-
ful aquatic organisms and pathogens, and that there was a need to continue to 
develop effective and environmentally safe AFS as well as to promote the sub-
stitution of harmful systems by less harmful, or preferably harmless, systems.
 Resolution Concurring in the Accession to the Protocol of 1997 to 
amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto. 
Senate Resolution No. 95, 05 March 2018
The Philippine Senate concurred in the accession to the 1997 Protocol to 
amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships of 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, or MARPOL 
Annex VI. The protocol establishes emissions controls and requires emissions 
control areas for ship exhaust gases, particularly sulphur dioxides (SO2x) and 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions; prohibits the deliberate emission of ozone 
depleting substances, regulates shipboard incineration and emission of vola-
tile organic compounds from tankers.
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 Resolution Concurring in the Accession to the Protocol of 1988 Relating 
to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966. Senate Resolution 
No. 96, 05 March 2018
The Philippine Senate concurred in the accession to the 1988 Protocol relating 
to the International Convention on Load Lines of 1966, which seeks to ensure 
watertight integrity of ships bulls below the freeboard deck through regula-
tions that take into account the potential hazards present in different zones 
and seasons, and includes a technical annex containing additional safety mea-
sures concerning doors, freeing ports, hatchways, and other items.
 Resolution Concurring in the Accession to the Protocol of 1978 Relating 
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974. 
Senate Resolution No. 97, 05 March 2018
The Philippine Senate concurred in the accession to the 1978 Protocol relat-
ing to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974, that 
requires the fitting of inert gas systems, high capacity fixed washing, and radars 
on ships depending their dead weight tonnage. It noted that new crude carri-
ers and product carriers of 20,000 DWT and above must be fitted with an inert 
gas system, while crude carriers of 20,000–40,000 DWT may be exempted by 
flag States where it is considered unreasonable or impracticable to fit an inert 
gas system and high capacity fixed washing. Also, all ships of 1,600 to 10,000 
GRT are required to be fitted with radar, and ships of 10,000 GRT and above 
must have two radars each capable of independent operation.
 Resolution Concurring in the Accession to the Protocol of 1988 Relating 
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974. 
Senate Resolution No. 98, 05 March 2018
The Philippine Senate concurred in the Accession to the Protocol of 1988 relat-
ing to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, or the 
SOLAS Protocol 88, which introduced a new Harmonized System of Survey 
and Classification to harmonize the International Convention on Load Lines 
and the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973. This is to lessen the problems caused 
by the variations in the requirements under the two instruments for the survey 
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and certification of ships, and to reduce costs to shipowners and administra-
tions by enabling the required surveys to be carried out at the same time. The 
Protocol also enables the Philippines to apply a single and uniform system of 
survey and certification of all types of domestic ships.
 Instrument of Accession to the International Convention for the 
Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004, 
06 June 2018
The Philippines, through its Embassy in London, United Kingdom, deposited 
an Instrument of Accession to the International Convention for the Control 
and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, which prescribes 
regulations to control the transfer of potentially invasive species and harm-
ful aquatic organisms found in ships’ ballast water, and requires all ships to 
manage their ballast water and sediments according to prescribed standards, 
and have on-board ballast water treatment systems. All States Parties are also 
obligated to ensure that ports and terminals have adequate facilities for the 
reception of sediments.
Law of the Sea – High Seas
 Resolution Concurring in the Acceptance of the Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. Senate Resolution No 99, 
05 March 2020
The Philippine Senate concurred in the acceptance of the 1993 Agreement 
to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, which establishes flag State 
responsibility over fishing vessels entitled to fly the flag of a State Party, by 
ensuring that such vessels to not engage in activities that undermine the effec-
tiveness of international conservation and management measures.
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Law of the Sea – Conservation and Management of 
Living Resources
 Resolution Concurring in the Accession to the Agreement on Port 
State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing. Senate Resolution No. 100, 05 March 2020
The Philippine Senate concurred in the accession to the 2009 Agreement on 
Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, which promotes the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of living marine resources and marine ecosystems through 
the implementation of effective port State measures against IUU fishing. 
The Agreement applies to foreign-flag vessels seeking entry into or found in 
Philippine ports, except for vessels of neighboring States engaged in artisanal 
fishing for subsistence and container vessels no carrying fish, or if carrying, 
only fish that have been previously landed.
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Elisabeth Liang* and Jaclyn L. Neo**
Arbitration – Public Policy and Issue Estoppel 
in Setting-Aside Proceedings – International 
Commercial Arbitration
The Singapore High Court in BAZ v BBA and others and other matters [2018] 
SGHC 275 set aside an ICC award as against the parties which were minors, as 
it violated Singapore’s most basic notion of justice to find them liable for fraud-
ulent misrepresentation for an amount exceeding S$720 million. It clarified 
that it was this determination that went against the principle of protecting the 
interests of minors in commercial transactions, which was part of the public 
policy in Singapore, rather than the failure to appoint a litigation representa-
tive for the minor parties in the arbitration.
The High Court also held that the doctrine of issue estoppel, though not 
expressly provided for in the New York Convention or Model Law, may be 
applied as part of the residual domestic law applicable in setting-aside or 
enforcement proceedings. In particular, where the setting-aside application 
is based on grounds attracting de novo review by the seat court, and is not 
concerned with arbitrability or public policy, the seat court would be slow 
to recognise the determination of a foreign enforcement court as giving rise to 
issue estoppel. The determination of the seat court should be given primacy.
However, the extended doctrine of res judicata would not apply – setting-
aside or enforcement proceedings are a review of the outcome of the arbitration 
proceedings, and unlike the multiple sets of litigation proceedings envisaged 
in the extended doctrine of res judicata, unconcerned with the merits of 
the dispute.
* Associate, WongPartnership LLP.
** Associate Professor, National University of Singapore Faculty of Law, and Director of the 
Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University of Singapore.
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Arbitration – Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
Pending Challenge at the Seat – International 
Commercial Arbitration
Skaugen, the applicant in Man Diesel Turbo SE v IM Skaugen Marine Services 
Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 132, sought to adjourn enforcement of the arbitral award 
on grounds that its setting-aside application in the seat court had “good pros-
pects”, the length of delay would not be substantial, and Man Diesel would 
not suffer prejudice resulting from the adjournment. The Singapore High 
Court refused this and chose to uphold the ex parte order granting leave for 
immediate enforcement of the award, noting that Skaugen had only filed its 
setting-aside application in the seat court after Man Diesel had commenced 
enforcement proceedings in Singapore. The SGHC found it contradictory that 
Skaugen had in fact started new arbitration proceedings against Man Diesel 
predicated on the validity of the arbitral award, whilst later attempting to set 
aside the same award in the seat court for invalidity.
Further, a delay of one to two years before the setting-aside application 
would be disposed of would be too long and prejudicial to Man Diesel.
Arbitration – Review of Jurisdiction of Arbitral 
Tribunal in the Singapore Courts – International 
Commercial Arbitration
The Court of Appeal in Marty Ltd v Hualon Corp (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (receiver 
and manager appointed) [2018] SGCA 63 held that the commencement of liti-
gation proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement was indicative of 
the claimant’s intention to repudiate the arbitration agreement. In dicta, it 
considered it “strongly arguable” that the mere commencement of litigation 
proceedings was itself a prima facie repudiation of the arbitration agreement, 
especially where the commencement of litigation proceedings is not explained 
nor qualified in scope.
Where the defendant to these litigation proceedings then engages the court’s 
jurisdiction on the merits – in this case, by applying for summary judgment in 
its favour or to strike out the action – it will be deemed to have submitted to 
the court’s jurisdiction and thus accepted the claimant’s repudiation of the 
arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal would not have juris-
diction to hear the dispute.
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Arbitration – Review of Jurisdiction of Arbitral 
Tribunal in the Singapore Courts – International 
Commercial Arbitration
In Sinolanka Hotels & Spa (Private) Limited v Interna Contract SpA [2018] 
SGHC 157, the Singapore High Court confirmed that parties cannot apply for 
the curial review of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction under either Section 10(3) 
of the International Arbitration Act or Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration if the tribunal had decided the 
issue of jurisdiction in the final award (or in an award which also deals with 
the merits of the dispute), and not as a preliminary question. The statutory 
language in this regard is clear that the courts have no power to determine the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction at such stage.
Arbitration – Review of Jurisdiction of Arbitral 
Tribunal in the Singapore Courts – International 
Commercial Arbitration
In Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd v Avant Garde Maritime Services (Pte) Ltd 
[2018] SGHC 78, the Singapore High Court held that where jurisdiction had 
been decided as a preliminary question, a failure to challenge it within 30 days 
(pursuant to Section 10(3) of the International Arbitration Act and Article 16(3) 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law) had a preclusive effect on subsequent setting-
aside proceedings at the seat. This would apply even if the challenging party 
had not participated in the arbitration, and especially, would amount to an 
abuse of process where the challenging party had deliberately allowed the 
arbitration to proceed and only raised a jurisdictional challenge at the seat 
court in blatant disregard of the 30-day time limit. However, the challenging 
party would not lose its passive remedy of resisting enforcement whether in 
another jurisdiction or at the seat.
Dispute Resolution – Memorandum of Guidance – 
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of 
China
China and Singapore signed the Memorandum of Guidance between the 
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme 
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Court of Singapore on Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments 
in Commercial Cases on 31 August 2018. It applies to both international and 
non-international cases of which recognition and enforcement of judgments 
requiring a natural or legal person to pay a fixed or ascertainable sum of money 
to another natural or legal person in commercial cases is sought in the other 
party’s courts, including judgments issued by the Singapore International 
Commercial Court.
This Memorandum is significant as there was no pre-existing treaty for 
reciprocal enforcement of judgments between both countries. Kolmar Group 
AG v Jiangsu Textile Industry (Group) Import & Export Co Ltd (2016) Su 01 Xie 
Wai Ren No 3 was the first case in which a Chinese court enforced a judgment 
in Singapore, but it is not a binding precedent. The Memorandum now sets 
out various procedural and substantive conditions for the enforcement of 
Singapore judgments in China. Most importantly, it stipulates that Chinese 
courts will not review the merits of a Singapore judgment. A Singapore judg-
ment may only be challenged on limited procedural and jurisdictional grounds, 
or as contrary to public policy. The Memorandum sets out the same conditions 
for the enforcement of Chinese judgments in Singapore courts.
Treaty – Ratification of Treaties
Singapore ratified the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on 19 July 2018 and the agreement entered 
into force on 30 December 2018. The CPTPP is a regional free trade agree-
ment between eleven countries which represent 14% of the global economy. 
It is also Singapore’s first preferential trade agreement that involves Canada 
and Mexico. Notably, the CPTPP provides for investor-State dispute resolu-
tion under the ICSID Convention Arbitration and Additional Facility Rules or 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (including the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules) if 
an investment dispute has not been resolved after six months of consultations 
and negotiations, and includes a Code of Conduct for arbitrators.
Treaty – Free Trade Agreement – Singapore and  
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka and Singapore signed the Sri Lanka-Singapore Free Trade Agree-
ment on 23 January 2018. The agreement has been ratified and entered into 
force on 1 May 2018. The Free Trade Agreement is Sri Lanka’s first modern 
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and comprehensive free trade agreement and provides Singapore compa-
nies with another avenue to venture into the larger South Asia market. It is 
also Sri Lanka’s first treaty commitment on government procurement, and 
lists the Singapore International Arbitration Centre as an institution under 
which investor-State disputes can be brought, promoting Singapore as an arbi-
tration hub.
Treaty – Bilateral Investment Treaty – Singapore  
and Kenya
Singapore and Kenya signed the Singapore-Kenya Bilateral Investment 
Treaty and an Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on 12 June 
2018. The Bilateral Investment Treaty grants investors protection such as 
Most-Favoured-Nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and protec-
tion from illegal expropriation. The Agreement for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation stipulates the taxing rights of both jurisdictions on all forms of 
income flows arising from cross-border business activities and minimizes the 
double taxation of such income.
Treaty – Bilateral Investment Treaty and Air Services 
Agreement – Singapore and Rwanda
Singapore and Rwanda signed the Rwanda-Singapore Bilateral Investment 
Treaty and Air Services Agreement on 15 June 2018. The Bilateral Invest- 
ment Treaty grants investors protection such as Most-Favoured-Nation 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and protection from illegal expropria-
tion. It is complemented by the Air Services Agreement, which will enhance 
connectivity, enabling wider economic benefits through increased investment, 
tourism and trade between the countries.
Treaty – Bilateral Investment Treaty – Singapore  
and Indonesia
Singapore and Indonesia signed an Agreement on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, also known as the Bilateral Investment Treaty, on 
11 October 2018. This replaced the previous Bilateral Investment Treaty which 
expired on 20 June 2016. The Bilateral Investment Treaty will complement 
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the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement to promote greater invest-
ment flows between both countries, by providing investor protection such 
as Most-Favoured-Nation treatment, National Treatment, fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security based on customary international 
law, and protection from illegal expropriation.
Treaty – Free Trade Agreement – Singapore and the 
European Union
The European Union (EU) and Singapore signed the EU-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement (EUSFTA) and EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement 
(EUSIPA) on 19 October 2018. The agreements will be sent to the European 
Parliament for approval before the EUSFTA can be ratified and entered into 
force. The EUSIPA must be ratified by both the EU and its individual member 
states and will additionally be sent to the regional and national parliaments of 
the EU member states for approval before it enters into force. This is expected 
to take around two to three years after signing.
Key benefits of the EUSFTA include tariff elimination, reduced non-tariff 
barriers, greater market access for service providers, professionals and inves-
tors, enhanced government procurement opportunities, and enhanced 
intellectual property rights.
The EUSIPA will replace the twelve existing bilateral investment treaties 
between Singapore and various EU member states. It notably clarifies invest-
ment protection standards and obligations, prescribes shorter timelines for 
consultations between parties and for the tribunal to issue an award, and 
adopts similar requirements to the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. It also 
establishes a new standing international and fully independent dispute reso-
lution system, comprising a First Instance Tribunal and an Appeals Tribunal 
with permanent members. The latter will hear challenges to tribunal members 
in-house. These features, as the European Commission has announced, are 
indicative of the EU’s new approach to investment protection and its enforce-
ment mechanisms.
Treaty – Free Trade Agreement Upgrade Protocol – 
Singapore and the People’s Republic of China
Singapore and China signed the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
Upgrade Protocol on 12 November 2018. It will enter into force upon ratification. 
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The upgraded Free Trade Agreement enhances market access for goods, 
improves Singapore companies’ access into China’s legal, maritime and con-
struction services sectors and Chinese companies’ access into Singapore’s air 
transport, courier, environment and financial services sectors. It also enhances 
investment protection for Singapore investors in China, surpasses existing 
commitments in the World Trade Organisation Trade Facilitation Agreement 
in Release of Goods, Advance Rulings and Express Shipments, and introduces 
new chapters on Trade Remedies, Economic Cooperation, Competition, 
Environment, E-commerce and Manpower.
Treaty – Bilateral Investment Treaty – Singapore and 
Kazakhstan
Singapore and Kazakhstan signed the Singapore-Kazakhstan Bilateral 
Investment Treaty on 21 November 2018. Kazakhstan is Singapore’s most sig-
nificant economic partner among the five Central Asian states and also part 
of the Eurasian Economic Union, which Singapore is in the process of nego-
tiating a Free Trade Agreement with. The signing of the Bilateral Investment 
Treaty will serve as a good foundation to the ongoing negotiations. The Treaty 
also provides for an investor’s submission of a claim to arbitration under the 
ICSID Convention Arbitration and Additional Facility Rules or UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (including the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules) if an invest-
ment dispute has not been resolved after six months of consultations and 
negotiations.
Treaty – United Nations Convention on International 
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on International 
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation on 20 December 2018. It 
shall be open for signature by all States in Singapore, on 7 August 2019. The 
Convention is the first UN treaty to be named after Singapore and will be 
known as the “Singapore Convention on Mediation”.
Playing a similar role as the New York Convention does for arbitration, 
the Convention is the first multilateral treaty to provide for the cross-border 
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, and will give businesses 
greater certainty that their mediated settlement agreements can be relied 
upon in cross-border commercial dispute resolution. Singapore’s role in the 
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negotiations, drafting of the treaty, and as the host of the treaty signing serve 
to consolidate its position as a leading international dispute resolution centre.
Treaty – Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting
Singapore deposited the Instrument of Ratification for the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting on 21 December 2018. The Convention was signed by 
Singapore on 7 June 2017 and will enter into force for Singapore on 1 April 2019. 
The key benefits include minimum standards for preventing treaty abuse such 
as the adoption of the Principal Purpose Test, minimum standards for enhanc-
ing dispute resolution with assistance from the Inland Revenue Authority of 
Singapore, and mandatory binding arbitration provisions to provide certainty 
and specified timeframes for parties in treaty-related disputes.
Human Rights – Submission of First Report on 
International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination to Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Singapore submitted its first report to the United Nations Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) on 
24 December 2018. Singapore signed the ICERD in October 2015 and ratified it 
in November 2017. The Committee has not yet provided its concluding obser-
vations on Singapore’s Report.
The Report emphasises Singapore’s commitment to racial harmony, 
anchored on the principles of the secular state, multi-racialism and meritoc-
racy. Singapore highlighted three pillars on which the Government’s approach 
to building social cohesion was anchored: (i) legislation that safeguards 
racial and religious harmony; (ii) policies that foster social integration; and 
(iii) programmes that mobilise the community to build mutual respect 
and understanding, and to work together for the common good. Specific 
measures include the Presidential Council for Minority Rights which acts as 
a safeguard against the implementation of discriminatory laws; the Group 
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Representation Constituency to ensure Parliament’s multi-racial composi-
tion; the Ethnic Integration Policy to ensure a balanced ethnic mix across 
public housing estates and to prevent the formation of racial enclaves; five 
ethnic-based Self-Help Groups to assist low-income persons and families; and 
Community Programmes in place to foster social cohesion.
International Economic Law – Review of 
Investor-State Awards in the Singapore Courts – 
Investment Treaty Law
Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and others v Kingdom of Lesotho 
[2018] SGCA 81 is Swissborough’s appeal against the Singapore High Court’s 
decision to set aside a partial final award on jurisdiction and merits by a 
Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal on grounds that the PCA Tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the SGHC did have 
jurisdiction to hear the setting-aside application pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)
(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(i.e., an award dealing with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within 
the terms of the submission to arbitration), even if the Kingdom had been 
contesting the very existence of the PCA Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the 
claims submitted to it. In dicta, the Court of Appeal further stated that even 
if it had no jurisdiction to hear the setting-aside application on Article 34(2)
(a)(iii) grounds, it would have allowed the Kingdom to amend the grounds for 
setting-aside in its originating summons to Article 34(2)(a)(i) (i.e., the arbitra-
tion agreement was invalid) – highlighting, once again, the Singapore courts’ 
extremely pro-arbitration approach.
This decision also affirmed the Singapore courts’ willingness to engage in 
extensive treaty interpretation, with the Court of Appeal reviewing, in its appel-
late position, the SGHC’s de novo analysis of the PCA Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
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Treaties – Agreements Concurred By Thailand In  
2018 – International Agreements on Peaceful Use of 
Nuclear Energy
In 2018, Thailand became a party to four key international agreements on the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. This includes the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material; the Amendment to the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the Convention on Nuclear Safety; 
and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, respectively.
On June 19, 2018, the country acceded to the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the Amendment to the Conven-
tion on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Amendment). These 
two main conventions entered into force for Thailand on July 19, 2018. To be a 
party to the CPPNM and its Amendment demonstrates that Thailand has com-
mitted to strengthening nuclear security in the country and also promoting 
international cooperation in this respect.
Subsequently, on July 3, 2018, Thailand acceded to another two key con-
ventions: the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and the Joint Convention 
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management (Joint Convention). Both conventions have been effec-
tive for Thailand since October 1, 2018. The accession to the CNS and the 
Joint Convention proves the country’s strong commitment to the safety of its 
nuclear facilities, installations, and operations.
According to the series of those conventions, the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy constitutes the use of nuclear energy for research and development 
for the sake of making technological advances that can be applied to various 
fields, such as agriculture, public health, and the environment. These advances 
* Professor, Eastern Asia University, Thailand.
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can contribute to raising people’s quality of life, adding more value to their 
business endeavors, and driving progress in industry and other related sectors.
As a member of the international community, Thailand has always cooper-
ated with other countries to establish the standards of control for the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy that is transparent, effective, and truly ensure peace- 
ful benefits.
Treaties – Agreements Concurred By Thailand In 2018 – 
Labour’s Rights – ILO Forced Labour Protocol of 2014
Thailand has ratified a number of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Conventions in recent decades. This reflects the view of the country to ensur-
ing worker rights and safety.
On June 4, 2018, Thailand has ratified to the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced 
Labour Convention of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The 
Protocol adopted by an overwhelming majority by the International Labour 
Conference in 2014, reinforces the international legal framework for combat-
ing all forms of forced labor, including trafficking in persons, and calls on states 
parties to take measures to prevent and suppress forced labor, create signifi-
cant penalties for violators, implement and enforce the policies, and protect 
victims and ensure their access to remedies and compensation.
Regarding this, Thailand is the 24th country to ratify and the first country 
in Asia to ratify the ILO Forced Labor Protocol. The ratification of the Protocol 
of the country demonstrates the Government’s commitment to improving 
and aligning its national legislative framework with international labor stan-
dards to ensure the elimination of forced labor and further guarantee decent 
employment opportunities for all workers in Thailand.
Treaties – Agreements Concurred By Thailand In  
2018 – Banning of Nuclear explosions – Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1996
Thailand has become a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
of 1996 (CTBT) on September 25, 2018. This demonstrates the commitment of 
the country to banning all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military 
purposes, in all environments.
The CTBT requires each state party to undertake not to carry out any nuclear 
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, to prohibit and prevent 
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any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and 
to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carry-
ing out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. 
To comply with this, each state party is under an obligation to establish the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to achieve the object 
and purpose of the CTBT, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, 
including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to pro-
vide a forum for consultation and cooperation among states parties.
Treaties – Agreements Concurred By Thailand In 
2018 – War and Armed Conflict – Protection of the 
Operation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization Act, B.E. 2561 (2018)
Thailand signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1996 (CTBT) 
and since November 12, 1996, it requires member countries to enact the law on 
the protection of the operation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (Organization).
On July 25, 2018, the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand enacted the 
Protection of the Operation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization Act, B.E. 2561 (2018). The main purpose of this Act is to provide 
legal status of the Organisation under Thai law and necessary privileges and 
immunities will be extended to such an organization and persons who per-
form an operation related to such Organization for enhancing its operation 
within areas, jurisdiction and control of member countries. This law became 
effective on July 28, 2018.
This Act defines the terms of ‘Treaty’ and ‘Organization’ in Section 3 and 
ensures the interests of protecting the operation of the Organization in 
Thailand. The Organization is recognized as a juristic person and be deemed to 
have a domicile in Thailand (Section 4(1)). In addition, the Organization, del-
egates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, delegates 
of State Parties being representatives of members elected to the Executive 
Council, together with their alternates and advisers, Director-General, inspec-
tors, inspection assistants, members of the staff of the Organization and 
observers, as well as the living quarters, office premises, papers, correspon-
dence, records, samples and equipment approved by the Conference of the 
states parties, of the inspection team shall be accorded privileges and immuni-
ties as set forth in the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, only to the extent of the 
provisions thereof which are accepted and applied by the Government, and an 
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agreement that the Government may further conclude with the Organization, 
during the performance of duties in Thailand or the entry into Thailand to 
perform duties or in performing missions in connection with the Organization 
(Section 4(2)).
Human Rights – Conflict of Laws – LGBT Rights – 
Same-Sex Civil Partnership – Recognition of Foreign 
Civil Partnership
 Chatwut Wangwon [Court of Appeal, Black Case No. 1017/2561, Red 
Case No. 18776/2561, December 27, 2018]
The claimant, Mr. Chatwut Wangwon, filed his claim, seeking a court order 
appointing him to be in charge of the estate of his deceased partner, a British 
national. The claimant and his partner, a same-sex couple registered a civil 
partnership under English law at a British embassy in Hanoi, Vietnam.
In order to determine whether the claimant could be in charge of the estate, 
the Court needed to consider whether the civil partnership status between the 
two same-sex individuals under the British Civil Partnership Act 2004 is valid 
under the laws of Thailand. In this regard, the recognition of this civil parent-
ship status must be not contrave the public order or good morals recognized 
under the laws of Thailand.
Later, the Court of the First Instance rejected the claim filed by the claim-
ant on the ground that Thailand does not recognize same-sex marriage and 
therefore the same-sex civil partnership registration could not be treated as a 
legal marriage under Thai law which is only reserved for a man and a woman 
according to article 1435 of the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand. The 
claimant appealed the judgment of the Court of the First Instance. The Court 
of Appeal was to determine whether the civil partnership registration is valid 
under the Act of Conflict of Laws B.E. 2481.
On December 27, 2018, the Court of Appeal, with the resolution passed at 
its General Assembly, delivered its judgment, ruling that the registration of a 
same-sex civil partnership was not contrary to the public order and good mor-
als of Thailand under Section 5 of the Act of Conflict of Law B.E. 2481.
The Court further stated that the registration of a civil partnership between 
the same-sex couple was recognized under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that all human beings could not be discriminated against on the ground 
of sex. Moreover, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2017 also 
recognizes that human dignity, rights, and liberties and equality of the people 
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shall be protected and all persons are equal before the law accordance with the 
provisions of Sections 4 and 27 of the 2017 Constitution.
With this regard, the Court further stated that the application of the foreign 
law that provides for a same-sex couple to share their lives without prejudice 
or unfair treatment on the ground of sex by birth is in line with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and core human rights treaties to which Thailand 
is a party. Also, the Court ruled that such an application of foreign law is in line 
with Section 4 and Section 27 of the Constitution of Thailand.
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Environmental Law – Water Security – Management of 
Mekong River Basin – Regional Cooperation
Vietnam has taken efforts to push the development of the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) in the capacity of the MRC Chair in 2018. Prime Minister 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc, in his capacity as the MRC chairman, called upon the par-
ticipants at the MRC Leaders’ Meeting held in Phnom Penh on 4–5 April 2018 
to pay special attention toward the issue of security of water resource and to 
increase cooperation between MRC members and its dialogue partners 
(including China and Myanmar) as the MRC cannot fulfils its mission with-
out the active collaboration with them. The international relations issue of the 
Mekong River needs to be expanded beyond the four MRC member countries.
Vietnam’s Prime Minister also emphasized the necessity for the countries 
to observe the MRC Guidelines for conducting Transboundary Environmental 
Impact Assessment (TbEIA). It is argued that the balanced and flexible 
approach of TbEIA would help countries to promote the sustainable develop-
ment, utilisation, conservation and management of the Mekong River Basin 
water and related resources.
The security of water resources from international rivers is highly depen-
dent on international cooperation between the countries involved in the 
exploitation and use of this water resource. The Mekong River is a “transna-
tional resource” exploited and managed by six countries, including Cambodia, 
China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. However, the national vision 
and interests of the countries are different, leading to instability in security for 
water resources from this river, causing impacts on the national security of 
Vietnam: China and Laos are making the most of hydropower exploitation for 
economic development; Thailand has extensively developed and exploited 
their irrigation infrastructure to serve its northeastern region; Cambodia wants 
* Associate Professor, Dean of International Law Faculty, Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, 
Vietnam.
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to maintain great water level in Tonle Sap Lake to keep the seafood source; 
Vietnam is the country which has the last flow before exposing sea, is strongly 
affected by security of water resources. Vietnam does not want saltwater 
intrusion to be more serious, affecting food and seafood in the Mekong Delta, 
which shows that adjustment for exploitation and management activities of 
any country that the river crosses has impacts on the national security for the 
remaining countries.
The Mekong Delta of Vietnam is the last region of the Mekong basin, which 
is Vietnam’s rice basket, providing rice and export aquatic resources. However, 
95% of the water flow to the Mekong Basin is from the upstream region 
of the Mekong River. Due to great dependence on external sources, security of 
water resources in Vietnam may be threatened by neighboring countries, 
especially those in the upstream region of Mekong. The thorough exploitation 
of resources from the Mekong River without the close cooperation between 
countries has led the Mekong Delta in Vietnam to a serious reduction in water 
flow, sediment residue, aquatic resources and threatens food security that is an 
important source of national security. Given the current development, argu-
ably, upstream countries may use water source as a “weapon” against Vietnam. 
For Vietnam, water resources of the Mekong River has a direct impact on its 
national security and therefore, the government is very active in seeking and 
developing appropriate international cooperation mechanism amongst the 
countries that share the Mekong River for socio-economic development.
Vietnam has been advocating the use of an international legal mecha-
nism to facilitate the cross-boundary collaboration in managing the water 
resource of the Mekong River. It signed the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (which officially came 
into force in August 2014) and became the first MRC member to accede to 
the Convention. Currently, it is actively discussing with other ASEAN members 
to access the Convention, thereby contributing to strengthening international 
legal mechanisms, facilitating the sustainable management and development 
of Mekong River water resources. Since 2014, Vietnam has been strongly sup-
porting the MRC Basin Development Strategy 2016–2020 which focuses on 
strengthening international cooperation on the Mekong River not only through 
the MRC framework and but also through the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
(GMS) with the participation of the six countries sharing the Mekong River 
(despite the fact the later only prioritizes the economic cooperation rather 
than water security in the Mekong River). Arguably, strengthening the six-
party contact between the countries of the Mekong River will bring the two 
upstream countries of China and Myanmar into the MRC mechanism.
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Human Rights – Treaties And Covenants – Vietnam’s 
First National Report on the Implementation of 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment
On November 14 and November 15, in Geneva, Switzerland, Vietnam’s inter-
sector delegation led by Senior Lieutenant General Le Quy Vuong, Member of 
the Party Central Committee and Deputy Minister of Public Security, delivered 
a presentation and made defense in the discussion session on the initial Report 
on Vietnam’s implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT/C/VNM/1). The report was adopted at the 1708th meeting (CAT/C/
SR.1708), held on 29 November 2018.
The published materials by Vietnam are included: (1) Plan for implementing 
the Convention against Torture by the Prime Minister (issued together with 
Decision No. 364/QD-TTg dated on March 17, 2015); (2) The first national report 
of Vietnam on the implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“Convention against Torture”) with 14 appendices attached; (3) Speech by 
Senior Lieutenant General Le Quy Vuong and annexes attached. These are docu-
ments that have been approved by competent authorities, directly related to 
the implementation of the Convention against Torture in Vietnam and show-
ing the State’s policies and laws against torture and other cruel, inhumane or 
humiliating treatment or punishment.
Of which, between 2017 and 2018, Vietnam had adopted three new laws 
in order to better implement the Convention against Torture: the amended 
Law on Legal Aid, the amended Law on State Compensation Liability, and 
the Law on Denunciations. The Government of Vietnam has promulgated a 
Project on disseminating the content of the Convention and Vietnamese law 
on anti-torture to cadres, civil servants, officials and the people. The objective is 
to raise the awareness and understanding of officials, public servants, officials 
and people on the contents of the Convention and relevant Vietnamese laws 
on torture prevention and combat. In addition, the Ministry of Public Security 
had piloted a project of audio-video recording in criminal procedure in 45 facili-
ties. Vietnam has continued to actively cooperate with foreign partners in 
the prevention and control of torture, through the exchange of information 
and experience on the organization and implementation of the Convention 
as well as practical measures, means and effective use of equipment to 
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prevent torture; to participate in and organize international conferences and 
seminars related to anti-torture, contributing to strengthening the capac-
ity of Vietnamese officials, especially the police force, in implementing the 
Convention against Torture.
The Vietnamese government delegation answered questions raised by 
members of the Anti-Torture Committee in the dialogue and also highlighted 
difficulties in implementing the Convention; seriously noting the recommen-
dations to have better directions for implementing the Convention.
In its concluding observations on the initial report of Vietnam, amongst the 
other proposals, the UN Committee against Torture suggested the Government 
to amend national legislation, including the 2015 Criminal Code, in order to 
introduce and explicitly criminalize acts of torture, to ensure that both the 
crime of torture and the attempt to commit such a crime are punishable with 
appropriate penalties that are commensurate with the gravity of their nature 
compliant with the applicable Convention, to acknowledge and publicly and 
unequivocally condemn at the highest level all acts of torture and ill-treatment 
of any persons deprived of their liberty, as well as to take urgent measures to 
render the material conditions of detention of persons sentenced to death 
equivalent to those of other prisoners.
International Economic Law – International 
Economic Cooperation – The EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement Split Into Two Specific Agreements
In June 2018, the EU and Vietnam officially concluded the EU-Vietnam 
Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) and the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection 
Agreement (EVIPA), which were initially negotiated as a single EU-Vietnam 
Free Trade Agreement. The parties completed the negotiation of the FTA since 
2015, but could not conclude due to disagreement amongst the EU members 
about the scope of the EU free trade agreement with its external trading part-
ners. To overcome the issues, the EU and Vietnam have agreed to split the 
investment protection content and the mechanism of investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) from the EVFTA to form a separate agreement, following 
the approach chosen by the EU for the trade and investment agreements with 
Singapore.
The EVFTA, upon the time it becomes effective, will facilitate the tariff 
reductions on 99% of goods between the European Union and Vietnam. The 
agreement is seen as a comprehensive, high quality and balanced agreement of 
interests for both Vietnam and the EU, as well as compliant with the provisions 
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of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The FTA consists of 17 Chapters, 2 
Protocols and a number of memorandum of understanding attached with the 
main contents: trade in goods (including general provisions and market access 
commitments), rules of origin, customs and trade facilitation, food safety and 
hygiene measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT), trade in services 
(including general provisions and market access commitments), investment, 
trade remedies, competition, state-owned enterprises, government procure-
ment, intellectual property, trade and sustainable development, cooperation 
and legal institution.
Regarding trade in goods, for Vietnamese exports, as soon as the FTA comes 
into effect, the EU will eliminate import duties on 85.6% of tariff lines, equiva-
lent to 70.3% of Vietnam’s exports to the EU. After seven years from the date 
of entry into force of the Agreement, the EU will eliminate import duties on 
99.2% of tariff lines, equivalent to 99.7% of Vietnam’s exports. So far, this is 
the highest level of commitment a partner gives to Vietnam through signed 
FTAs. This benefit is especially meaningful when the EU is one of the two larg-
est export markets of Vietnam. For EU exports, Vietnam commits to eliminate 
tariffs as soon as the Agreement comes into effect with 48.5% of tariff lines 
(accounting for 64.5% of import turnover). Subsequently, after seven years, 
91.8% of tariff lines equivalent to 97.1% of EU exports were removed from 
Vietnam by import taxes.
For other issues related to trade in goods, Vietnam and EU also agree on 
contents related to customs procedures, SPS, TBT, trade remedies, etc., creating 
a legal framework for the two sides to cooperate. Regarding trade in services 
and investment, Vietnam’s commitments go beyond those within the WTO, so 
are the EU’s commitments. Notably, the EU’s commitments are equivalent to 
the highest EU commitments under the recent EU FTAs. EVFTA also includes 
chapters related to competition, state-owned enterprises, sustainable devel-
opment, cooperation and capacity building, legal and institutional. These 
contents are in line with Vietnam’s legal system, creating a legal framework 
for both sides to strengthen cooperation and to promote the development of 
mutual trade and investment.
The EVIPA, meanwhile, regulates the investments between the parties, 
including both direct and non-direct, and investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Under EVFTA, both the EU and Vietnam pledge to accord 
national treatment and most favored nation treatment to the investments 
of investors of the other Party, with a few exceptions, as well as to apply fair 
and equitable treatment, to allow the free transfer of capital and profits from 
investment abroad, as well as to not expropriate and to compensate appro-
priate damages for investors. Most importantly, the parties have agreed to 
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establish an International Investment Court, with two levels of settlement 
(Panel and Appellate Body), to resolve investor-state disputes. The EVIPA’s dis-
pute settlement mechanism possesses most distinctive trait learning from the 
WTO quasi-judicial dispute settlement model, which is the establishment of a 
semi-permanent adjudicatory body similar to an investment court in replace-
ment of the arbitration model envisaged by the vast majority of investment 
treaties over the past decades.
It is expected that the EVFTA and EVIPA will help not only to promote the 
trade and investment relationship between the signing parties, but also create 
a premise towards the discussion of an FTA between the EU and ASEAN in the 
future. Vietnam and Singapore, the two ASEAN members having FTAs with 
the EU, have brought the issue to discussion at the ASEAN ministerial meetings 
and received positive responses from other ASEAN members.
International Economic Law – Asia-Pacific Mega Trade 
Deal – Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
On 14 November 2018 in Singapore, on the occasion of the 2nd RCEP Summit, 
Vietnam, together with the ASEAN Member States and ASEAN’s free trade agree-
ment (AFTA) partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand, 
delivered the Joint Leaders’ Statement on the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) Negotiations (Joint Statement).
The Joint Statement reflects “the task to conclude the RCEP negotiations 
is becoming more urgent and significant given the current headwinds faced 
by the global economy” and describes the status of the RCEP negotiations 
in November 2018, mainly including market access negotiations and rules 
negotiations. Although a few gaps remain, concluding market access nego-
tiations are considered to be “within reach” to meet the goals in the Guiding 
Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the RCEP. Furthermore, Chapters on 
Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation (CPTF); Government Procurement; 
Institutional Provisions; Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures; and 
Standards, Technical Regulations, and Conformity Assessment Procedures 
(STRACAP); which, added to the earlier concluded chapters on Economic and 
Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH) and on Small and Medium Enterprises, 
bring the total number of concluded chapters in RCEP to seven.
Launched in 2012 with the goal to deepen economic relationship among the 
16 Asia-Pacific nations, the RCEP talks were originally planned to be finished by 
2015 but the parties have not been able to complete the negotiation in accor-
dance with the set deadline. The talks encountered many difficulties including 
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a lack of an existing comprehensive economic agreement among some partici-
pating nations, a wide gap in political and economic conditions between the 
negotiating nations and some countries’ conservative attitude towards market 
access. A total of 28 rounds of talks have been held up to 2018 since the leaders 
of the 16 countries declared the start of negotiations on the sidelines of the 
21st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in November 2012.
Once signed, the RCEP will form a free-trade area covering about half of the 
world’s population, and accounting for 32.2 percent of global GDP, 29.1 percent 
of global trade and 32.5 percent of global investment inflows.
International Economic Law – Import-Export – Trade 
Remedies – WTO Dispute Settlement
 Decision No. 3877 on Investigation into the Imposition of Anti- 
Dumping Measures for Products of Chinese and Korean Origins 
(Case No. AD04)
On October 15, 2018, the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry and Trade issued 
Decision No. 3877/QD-BCT on the investigation and imposition of anti-
dumping measures on flat-rolled alloy or non-alloy steel products, varnish 
painted or scanned or coated with plastics or other covers originated from the 
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea (case number AD04).
The petitioners are four colored steel manufacturers representing the 
domestic manufacturing industry, which include: Dai Thien Loc Joint Stock 
Company, Ton Phuong Nam Corporation, Nam Kim Steel Joint Stock Company 
and Steel Joint Stock Company. Goods alleged to be dumped are colored steel 
products classified by the following HS codes: 7210.70.11, 7210.70.19, 7210.70.91, 
7210.70.99, 7212.40.11, 7212.40.12, 7212.40.19, 7212.40.91, 7212.40.92, 7212.40.99. 
Dumping rate of investigated goods from China is 25.5% and that from Korea 
is 19.25%. The alleged dumping of goods is proved to be the main cause lead-
ing to significant losses of domestic manufacturing industry, which is reflected 
by the decline in such indicators as utilization, output, revenue, profit and 
inventory. After initial analyses on the dossier submitted by the petitioners, 
the Investigation Authority recommended the Minister of Industry and Trade 
to proceed the investigation. The details of investigation are conducted pursu-
ant to Article 80 of the Law on Foreign Trade Management on contents of an 
anti-dumping measures imposition investigation and Article 32 of the Decree 
No. 10/2018/ND-CP on deciding to conduct anti-dumping measures imposi-
tion investigation.
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 Vietnam Investigates the Application of Anti-Customs Evasion 
Measures of Trade Remedies (Case No. AC01.SG04)
On July 26, 2018, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Vietnam issued a deci-
sion to initiate an investigation to apply prevention measures of trade remedies 
evasion for wire/rolled steel products with HS codes 7213.91.90, 7213.99.90, 
7217.10.10, 7217.10.29, 7229.90.99, 9839.10.00 and 9839.20.00, which are imported 
into Vietnam from other countries.
This is the first anti-customs evasion investigation for imports into 
Vietnam. This case is based on suspicion of evading trade remedies from the 
original case code SG04 after Vietnam applied an official safeguard measure 
on steel and long steel products imported into Vietnam. After the 6-month 
investigation period, on May 13, 2019, the Ministry of Industry and Trade issued 
Decision No. 1230/QD-BCT on the application of measures to avoid evasion 
of trade remedies for wire and rolled steel products imported into Vietnam. 
Measures against evading trade remedies are applied in the form of addi-
tional import duties with a tax rate of 10.9% from May 28, 2019 to the end of 
March 21, 2020.
Evading trade remedy measures is an action of businesses to avoid part or 
all of the obligation to enforce trade remedies measures, mostly relating to 
evading the trade remedy tariffs. According to the Vietnam’s Trade Remedies 
Authority, in recent years, many forms of customs evasion have taken place in 
Vietnam, of which, the most common is the activity of transporting goods to a 
third country to obtain a new source of origin, misrepresenting the origin, and 
re-labeling goods. The fraudulent acts of origin, illegal goods transportation 
from other countries to Vietnam may seriously distort the trade remedy mea-
sures applied by Vietnam against foreign imports and cause increased losses 
for domestic producers. Until recently, due to a lax legal framework, Vietnam 
has yet to initiate an investigation into customs-evasion by foreign firms. 
However, Vietnamese exports have been faced increasingly with anti-customs 
evasion investigations, mainly by the EU, US, Turkey and Brazil.
With the introduction of the Law on Foreign Trade Management in 2017, 
Vietnamese authorities now have a legal basis for the initiation of action 
against the evasive behavior by foreign firms. The trade authorities of Vietnam 
shall strengthen inspection and verification of the origin of goods, and 
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Book Review
∵
Annalisa Ciampi (ed.). History and International Law: An Intertwined Relationship 
(Edward Elgar, 2019). Hardcover: 232pp.
There are a variety of different reasons to take an interest in history when deal-
ing with international law since there is a deep and multifaceted relationship 
between international law and history. Analyzing this intertwined relationship, 
History and International Law: An Intertwined Relationship edited by Annalisa 
Ciampi, Professor of International Law at the University of Verona, Italy fea-
tures contributions from leading scholars and practitioners in international 
law, history and diplomacy. History and International Law: An Intertwined 
Relationship covers topics ranging from Part I, History and International Law: An 
Introduction (1. Creative Forces and Institution Building in International Law; 
2. Eastern Europe’s Imprint on Modern International Law); to Part II, History 
and International Human Rights Law (3. History, Isolation and Effectiveness of 
International Human Rights Law; 4. EU Human Rights Law and History: A Tale 
of Three Narratives); and Part III, History, International Humanitarian Law 
and International Criminal Law (5. ‘Treaty after Trauma’: ‘Protection for All’ 
in the Fourth Geneva Convention; 6. History and Core International Crimes: 
Friends or Foes?; 7. ‘Imaginary Trials’: The Legacy of the ICTY in Croatia, Bosnia 
and Serbia; 8. The Rise and Demise of the ICC Relationship with African States 
and the AU).
As many of the titles of the chapters indicate, this book focuses on particu-
lar reference to international human rights and humanitarian and criminal 
law rather than general international law. The term “history” that this book 
adopts is how each relevant treaty was made, not historical facts utilized as evi-
dence for international judicial bodies. From the perspective of international 
legal historians, first usage is important, but for practicing international law-
yers working on dispute settlement and public international law litigation, the 
latter usage is more important.
The debates within international judicial institutions show vivid examples 
as to why international lawyers should understand the very nature of history as 
having probative value as evidence. For example, in the separate opinion of 
the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
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case, Judge Kooijmans stated that, “[Only] by taking into account the full spec-
trum of the Parties’ history, can their present rights be properly evaluated. By 
not giving the full historical context its due, however, the Court has … unnec-
essarily curtailed its scope for settling the dispute in a persuasive and legally 
convincing way[;]”1 and in the separate opinion of the Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case, Judge Ranjeva stated that, “The 
inequality and denial of rights inherent in colonial practice in relation to … 
colonies is currently recognized as an elementary truth; there is a resultant 
duty to memorialize these injustices and at the same time to acknowledge an 
historical fact.”2 These judges emphasized the need to understand the histori-
cal context of a territorial dispute before reaching a sovereignty determination. 
The historical criticism approach, first mentioned in the Case Concerning the 
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, 
provided direction for the development of future decisions with regard to 
colonial issues. Though not stated in the actual judgment, the reference to the 
historical criticism approach in these separate opinions contributes greatly to 
the expansion of the international legal perception regarding colonial settle-
ment.3 These views provide an opportunity for theorization of the historical 
criticism approach, which would help diminish the force of current interna-
tional jurisprudence founded upon European imperialism and elevate the 
status of the historical perspectives of former colonies.
Though History and International Law: An Intertwined Relationship is not 
able to address all interests and while this book may require a second subtitle 
so that readers will be able locate this book for their own purposes without 
confusion, international lawyers and academics will find this book both use-
ful and insightful, in particular, if they are specially interested in international 
human rights and humanitarian and criminal law.
Seokwoo Lee
Co-Editor-in-Chief
1   Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16), (separate opinion of Judge Koojimans), 
para. 4.
2   Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10), (separate 
opinion of Judge Ranjeva), para. 3.
3   Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/
Singapore), 2008 I.C.J. 12 (May 23), (declaration by Judge Ranjeva), para. 5.
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This bibliography provides information on books, articles, notes, and other materials 
dealing with international law in Asia, broadly defined. Only English language publi-
cations that are newly published in 2018 or those that were previously published but 
had updated editions in 2018 are listed in this survey. Please refer to earlier editions of 
Asian Yearbook of International Law for earlier bibliographies.
Most, if not all, of the materials can be listed under multiple categories, but each 
item is listed under a single primary category. However, edited books may appear more 
than once if multiple chapters from the book are listed under different categories. 
Readers are advised to refer to all categories relevant to their research. The headings 
used in this year’s bibliography are as follows:
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2. Boundary Delimitation and Sovereignty
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8. Intellectual Property and Technology
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10. Human Rights
11. Migration and Refugees
12. International Humanitarian Law, Criminal Law, and Transnational Crime
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2018 DILA International Conference and 2018 DILA 
Academy & Workshop
The 2018 DILA International Conference entitled “Historical Injustice and Islamic 
Views on International Law & the Making of International Law in Indonesia” and the 
2018 DILA Academy and Workshop on “State Practice in International Law in Asian 
States in the Year of 2017” was held on April 21–22, 2018 at the Islamic University of 
Indonesia (UII) in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
The conference opened in the morning of April 21 with welcome addresses by 
Nandang Soetrisno, Rector of UII; Hikmahanto Juwana, Chairman of The Foundation 
for the Development of International Law in Asia (DILA) and Professor of International 
Law, Faculty of Law of the Universitas Indonesia; and Seokwoo Lee, Co-Editor-in-Chief 
of the Asian Yearbook of International Law and Professor of International Law at Inha 
University Law School in Korea. This was followed by the kenote address given by Ko 
Swan Sik, who was a co-founder of DILA and Professor of International Law (emeritus) 
of Erasmus University at Rotterdam.
Session one of the conference was entitled “Historical Injustice and International 
Law – Part 1” and was chaired by Hikmahanto Juwana with presentations made by 
Korean scholars. The first presenter, Professor Seokwoo Lee presented his paper 
“Territorial Settlements in Peace Treaties”. The second presenter, Seung-Jin Oh of 
Dankook University, presented on “Historical Injustice and Dispute Settlement in 
Asia”. The final presenter of the session, Buhm-Suk Baek of Kyung Hee University, pre-
sented on the “State Practice in International Law in Korea in 2017”.
Session two was the second part of “Historical Injustice and International Law” 
and was chaired by Christopher Cason of the Islamic University of Indonesia and 
also included presentations from Korean scholars. The first presenter, Sung-Won Kim 
of Wonkwang University, presented on “The Eastphalian Project Revisited”. The sec-
ond presenter, Seryon Lee of Jeonbuk National University School of Law, discussed 
the “Refugee and Humanitarian Crisis: Paving the Way for Refugee Protection in East 
Asia”. Next, Sangmin Shim of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy explained “The 
North-South Divide on Sustainable Development and the Recent Developments in 
the Asian Context”. Lastly, Eon Kyung Park and Tea-Gil Kim of Kyung Hee University 
discussed the “Historical Injustice in Asia and the Role of International Economic Law: 
How is Fair Trade for Implementation of a ‘Level Playing Field’ Realized?”
Session three was the first part of “Islamic Views on International Law and the 
Making of International Law in Indonesia” and was chaired by Tae-Hyun Choi of 
Hanyang University School of Law, Korea. The first presenter was Melda Kamil 
Ariadno of the Universitas Indonesia who examined the “Indonesian Practices on 
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the Law of the Sea”. Agus Triyanta of the Islamic University of Indonesia followed 
with a discussion of “Ihya Al-Mawat: An Islamic Perspective on the Concept of Land 
Occupation in International Law”. The third presenter, Dodik Setiawan Nur Heriyanto 
of the Islamic University of Indonesia, followed with a presentation on “Increasing 
ASEAN’s Role in Settling Regional Refugee Problems”. Finally, Christopher Cason of the 
Islamic University of Indonesia presented on “Forward, Reverse, or Neutral: A Look 
Back on Ten Years’ Development of Women’s Employment Rights in Indonesia and 
South Korea”.
Session four was the second part of “Islamic Views on International Law and the 
Making of International Law in Indonesia” and was chaired by Seokwoo Lee. First, 
Jawahir Thontowi of Islamic University of Indonesia examined “The Role of Indonesia 
in Making ASEAN International Law: The Helsinki Agreement on Aceh as a Model 
Adopted by The Philippines and Thailand Governments to Peacefully Settle Muslim 
Rebellions”. Then, Sefriani of the Islamic University of Indonesia presented on “A New 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Model for Indonesia”. The third presenter, Sri Wartini of 
the Islamic University of Indonesia discussed the “Implementation of the RAMSAR 
Treaty in Indonesia”. Lastly, Nandang Sustrino of the Islamic University of Indonesia 
presented on “Indonesia and the Word Trade Organization”.
The conference then came to a close with final remarks by chairpersons 
Hikmahanto Juwana and Seokwoo Lee with support from Lowell Bautista of University 
of Wollongong School of Law, Australia.
The following day, April 22, the 2018 DILA Academy and Workshop was convened 
with welcome addresses by Nandang Soetrisno, Hikmahanto Juwana, and Seokwoo 
Lee. The first session of the Academy and Workshop was entitled, “State Practice in 
International Law in Northeast Asian States in the Year of 2017 – Part 1” and chaired 
by Hikmahanto Juwana. Next, Si Jin Oh of Sahmyook University, Korea spoke on 
the “Relevance of History and Theory in the Historical Injustice Issues of East Asia”. 
Lastly, Seokwoo Lee and Hee Cheol Yang of the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and 
Technology followed with presentations on the “State Practice in International Law in 
Korea in 2017”.
The second session of the day was “State Practice in International Law in Northeast 
Asian States in the Year of 2017 – Part 2” and chaired by Daesong Hyun of the Korea 
Maritime Institute. Presentations were made by Dustin Kuan-Hsiung Wang of National 
Taiwan Normal University on the “State Practice in International Law in Taiwan in 
2017”; Kanami Ishibashi of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies on the “State Practice 
in International Law in Japan in 2017”; and finally by Jay Batongbacal of the University 
of the Philippines on “State Practice in International Law in the Philippine in 2017”.
The last full session of the Academy and Workshop, “State Practice in International 
Law in Southeast Asian States in the Year of 2017”, was chaired by Ko Swan Sik. 
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Hikmahanto Juwana and Arie Afriansyah of Universitas Indonesia presented on the 
“State Practice in International Law in Indonesia in 2017”.
Hikmahanto Juwana and Seokwoo Lee then offered their final remarks and closed 
the 2018 DILA Academy and Workshop.
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